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A.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION RULE 14d-l0

A-I

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article addresses the impact ofvarious judicial int~retatioDS of
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") Rule 14d-IO , commonly
known as the "best-price rule," on the structuring ofM&A transactions. Rule 14d-IO
provides in pertinent part:

"(a) No bidder shall make a tender offer unless:
(I) ...

(2) The consideration paid to any security holder pursuant to the tender
offer is the highest consideration paid to any other security holder during such
tender offer."
The recent judicial interpretations, particularly the decision ofthe
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Epstein v. MeA, /nc.,2 have created
significant risks that the Rule will be breached by various arrangements customarily
entered into in connection with acquisition transactions, which breach could have severe
financial consequences. As a direct result, M&A practitioners and their client~ are
avoiding tender offers as a component of acquisition structures in most transactions. This
includes instances where using a tender offer \vould be beneficial to all parties involved.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the adoption, interpretation and
application of Rule 14d-l0, and its effects on acquisition transactions. In addition, this
article will critique the Ninth Circuit's holding in Epstein and discuss the its potential
ramifications on M&A activity.
II.

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE mSTORY OF RULE 14d-lO

Section 14(d)(7) ("Section 14(d)(7)") of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"), which was adopted in 1968 as part ofa substantial revision of
the la\v regarding tender offers, provides:
"Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders before the expiration thereof by increasing the consideration offered to
holders ofsuch securities, such person shall pay the increased consideration to
each security holder whose securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders whether or not such securities have
been taken up by such person before the variation ofthe tender offer or request or
invitation."
Following its adoption, the Commission consistently interpreted Section
14(d)(7) as imposing a "best-price" rule in favor ofholders ofthe securities that \vere

1

17 C.F.R. § 240.14d.lO.

2

SO F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 1995), rev-d on other grounds, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
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subject to a tender offer, requiring that ''all such holders must be paid the highest
consideration offered under the tender offer."3
Notwithstanding that the Commission's interpretation of Section 14(d)(7)
as imposing a best-price requirement was widely known and was generally accepted
tender offer practice, certain Court decisions cast doubt on the application ofthe bestprice rule in the context ofissuer tender offers and, accordingly, the Commission proposed
in 1985 that its interpretation of Section 14(d)(7) be codified.4 The result was
Rule 14d-l0, which was adopted by the Commission in 1986 as part of a package of
changes to the tender offer rules.'
A key part ofthe Commission's focus in adopting that package was the
elimination of "abusive" or "discriminatory" tender offer practices, such as those inherent
in "Saturday Night Specials," "First-Come First-Served" offers and other "abuses
presented by unconventional tender offers."6
In proposing and adopting Rule 14d-lO, the Commission emphasized the
"need to provide clarity and certainty in the regulato!y scheme applicable to tender offers
with respect to equal treatment ofsecurity holders. ,,7 In doing so, the Commission was
recognizing, as a matter ofpolicy, that the tender offer rules needed to be unambiguously
defined, and it expressly stated that it was intendini its proposals to remove any ambiguity
over its existing interpretation of Section 14(d)(7), while at the same time ensuring "equal
treatment of all holders of a class ofsecurities for which a tender offer is made while
facilitating transactions consistent with investor protection...,

m.

RULE 14d-l0 JURISPRUDENCE

Although the intent ofthe Commission seemed clear in adopting
Rule 14d-lO, the cases that have interpreted it have given rise to greater uncertainty and
ambiguity over the best-price rule than existed. before the adoption ofthe Rule.
The focus in these cases has principally and most importantly centered on
\vhether the phrase "during such tender offer" in Rule 14d-IO set a temporal limit, such
that only transactions entered into during the formal tender offer period could be

3

SEC Release Nos. 33-6595; 34-22198; IC-14611; 1985 SEC Lexis 1175, (July I, 1985) ("SEC Proposing

Release"), ·3.
4

Id, .2.

5 SEC Release Nos. 33-6653; 34-23421; IC-15199; 1986 SEC I..exis 1179 (July 11, 1986) ("SEC Adopting
Release"), ·47. At the same time, the Commission effected changes to the rules regarding minimum offering periods
and \vithdrawal rights.
6

SEC Adopting Release, Id., ·10, *21.

7 Id., .4, .5, *19. See also SEC Release Nos. 33-6619; 34-1248-1 (Jan 14, 1986) (SEC Release Proposing #2), *[
] and SEC Adopting Release, Id., ·47.

BId.
9

Id., .6.
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considered in determining whether Rule 14d-l0 had been complied with, or whether such
phrase did not limit the application ofthe Rule to the formal tender offer period on the
basis that the concept of "tender offer" could be construed to encompass transactions
entered into and/or consummated outside such period
(a)

Pre-Epstein Decisions

Prior to Epstein, which was deCided in 1995, three cases considered
Rule 14d-IO.
In the first ofthese, Field v Trump,10 the bidder in a tender offer was
encountering difficulty with certain key stockholders, who would not support the tender
offer. In order to resolve this issue, the bidder purported to terminate its tender offer and
negotiate separately with the dissident stockholders. One day after such purported
termination, having successfully agreed on the purchase ofthe dissident stockholder's
stock for a price in excess ofthe first tender offer price, the bidder purported to
commence a second tender offer, at a new price that was lower than that agreed with the
dissident stockholders. The essential issue for the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Second
Circuit was whether the bidder's tender offers were two separate tender offers, or whether
they were a single offer. The Court concluded that "where the goal [ofthe tender offer]
has not been abandoned, a purported withdrawal followed by a 'new' offer must be treated
as a single continuing offer for the purposes ofthe 'best-price rule."'ll As there was a
single offer, the higher price paid to the dissident stockholders, which was agreed during
the formal tender offer period, breached Rule 14d-l0.
In the second case, Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc.,12 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether the "cashing-out" ofcertain
executives' equity units and stock options by the target following expiration of a tender
offer and upon consummation of a back-end merger breached the best-price rule in
Rule 14d-l0. The Court held that it did not, for reasons that included that such cash-out
occurred "well after the expiration of the tender offer"!3 (in this case five months after
such expiration).

Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not directly
address the meaning of "during such tender offer" in either Field or Kranzer, each opinion
ofthe Court effectively treated that expression as meaning "after commencement and
before expiration of the tender offer."
The same treatment is evident in the third pre-Epstein case, Kahn v.
Virginia Retirenzent System,14 a decision ofthe U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit. In this case the Court had to determine whether certain private purchases of
shares, undertaken in advance of the commencement of a tender offer, breached the best10

850F..2d 938.

11

ld, *945.

12

937 F.2d 767.

13

Id., *779.

14

13 F.3d 110.
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price rule. In holding that such purchases did not, the Court focused on the fact that, at
the time ofthe purchases the tender offer had not commenced in terms ofRule 14d-2
under the Exchange Act.ls As such, the share purchases did not occur "during" the tender
offer and thus did not, and could not, violate Section 14(d)(7) or Rule 14d-IO.
(b)

Epstein v. MeA., Inc.

In Epstein, the U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the
acquisition ofMCA, Inc. ("MeA") by Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd
("Matsushita"). The acquisition was structured as a tender offer for MCA common stock
followed by a back-cnd merger ofMCA into Matsushita. Shortly before the tender offer
commenced, Matsushita entered into a separate arrangement with MeA's chairman and
chiefexecutive officer whereby he would Dot tender his MeA common stock in the tender
offer, but shortly after the tender offer expired he would exchange such shares for
preferred shares in a Matsushita subsidiary that was capitalized at 106% of the value ofthe
CEO's MCA common stock, with.such value determined on the basis ofthe highest price
paid in the tender offer. Such preferred-shares would be redeemed for such highest tender
offer price in certain specified circumstances, provided an annual dividend and were
secured by letters of credit. In addition, the CEO's exchange of common stock for
preferred shares would take place on a tax free basis (unlike the tender offer/merger),
which provided a substantial tax benefit to the CEO.
MCA's CEO, who was a significant stockholder in MCA, had clearly
received preferential treatment relative to other stockholders in MCA,and the question
(among others) for the Court was whether this seemingly private purchase ofshares from
the CEO, which was agreed to before formal commencement ofthe tender offer, was
conditio.ned upon consummation ofthe tender offer and was consummated after expiration
ofthe tender offer, violated Rule 14d-l0.
The Court stated that the answer to this question "depended on whether
[the CEO] received greater consideration than other MCA shareholders "during such
tender offer.""16 In interpreting Rule 14d-IO, the Court rejected MCA's arguments that
the determination ofwhether this was the case was simply a function ofthe timing of entry
into the arrangements with the CEO and that Rule 14d-l0 had no application as such
arrangements were effected in all respects outside the formal tender offer period.
Instead, the Court focused on the investor protection purposes ofthe
Exchange Act and Rule 14d-l0 and held that "an inquiry more in keeping with the
language and purposes ofRule 14d-l0" focuses on whether the transaction in question
was an "integral part" of the tender offer. In reaching this conclusion, and in considering
whether the seemingly separate arrangements with the CEO were really a part ofthe
tender offer, the Court adopted the "functional test" that had been articulated in Field that
"[clourts faced with the question ofwhether purchases ofa cOlporation's shares are
privately negotiated or are part of a tender offer have applied a functional test that

15 They key issue in the case \vas \vhether a particular press release had commenced the tender offer, such that
Section 14(dX7) and Rule 14d-10 \vould actually apply.
16

Id.• *654. quoting the language of Rule 14d·l0.
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scrutinizes such purchases in the context ofvarious salient characteristics oftender offers
and the purposes ofthe Williams Act."!7
Applying these standards, the Court held the transaction with the CEO to
be integral to the tender offer, for the principal reasons that the redemption price for the
preferred stock was based on the tender offer price and that such transaction was
conditional on completion ofthe tender offer in a number ofmaterial respects.!8
The Court also considered a second transaction, whereby the employment
agreement ofMCA's chiefoperating officer was amended, with Matsushita's approval,
shortly before announcement of the tender offer to provide for the payment of $21 million
to the COO if the tender offer succeeded. MeA advised the Court that this was
undertaken to compensate the COO for the value of certain options he had expected to
receive, but would not receive because ofthe impending Matsushita acquisition
transaction. The Court held that the central issue in relation to this payment was "whether
it constitutes incentive compensation that MeA wanted to give [the COO] independently
ofthe [MatsushitaIMCA] deal, ora premium that Matsushita wanted to give [the COO] as
an inducement to support the tender offer and tender his own shares.•,19 Ifthat were the
case, then such payment would be integral to the tender offer and would constitute
"consideration" pai9, in terms of Rule 14d-lO, for shares tendered, and Rule 14d-l0 ~.
would be violated.20 The Court held that there were material issues of fact as to whether
such an inducement existed in respect ofthe payment to the COO.
The Court did recognize in reaching its decision that not all transactions
entered into in the context of a tender offer would be integrated with the tender offer,
noting that 'fRule 14d-IO does not prohibit transactions entered into or effected before, or
after, a tender offer--provided that all material terms ofthe transaction stand independent
ofthe tender offer."21
(c)

Lerro v Quaker Oats Co.

Lerro v. Quaker Oats eo. 22 concerned the acquisition of the Snapple
Beverage Corporation ("Snapplett ) by Quaker Oats Co. ("Quaker Oats") pursuant to a
merger agreement that provided for a tender offer followed by a back-end merger. Prior
to the formal commencement ofthe tender offer, Snapple and a subsidiary of Quaker Oats
entered into a distribution agreement with a company ("Select") controlled by one ofthe

17 Id.. *656. quoting Field. Id., 943-44. As discussed inSeetion S of this letter, the Court was in fact quoting Field
out ofcontext.
18 Id..
19

*656.

Id., .659.

20 This analysis is not explicit in the opinion oCEpstein, but this is hOlY the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District ofCalifomia in Perera v. ClJiron Corporation, 1996 WL 2S 1936 (N.D. Cal.) reconciled the "integration" test
and "inducement" test in Epstein.

21 Id. t

*656.

2284F.3d239(May17.1996).
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major stockholders of Snapple, which provided for the distribution of Snappleand Quaker
products after the merger, and which replaced an existing agreement between Snapple and
Select for the distribution ofSnapple products. The effectiveness ofthe distribution
agreement was conditioned on the consummation ofthe merger.
As the distribution agreement was signed on November 3, 1994, and the
tender offer formally commenced at 12.01 a.In. on November 4, 1994 (such time being
determined by the Court in accordance with Rule 14d-2 under the Exchange Aet23), the
U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the agreement was not entered
into "during such tender offer" in terms ofRule 14d-IO. Rather, it was entered into before
such offer and, accordingly, as "before the offer is not 'during' the offer, ,,24 there could not,
as a matter of Jaw, be a breach ofRttle 14d-IO. It was irrelevant to the Court whether or
not the distnoution agreement was "integral" to the tender offer.2S
In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted an entirely different test
from that in Epstein,26 and held that only transactions entered into during the formal
tender offer period, i.e., after the formal commencement ofthe tender offer under
Rule 14d-2 and prior to the expiration ofthe offer in accordance with its terms, could as a
matter oflaw result in a breach· ofRule 14d-IO.

(d)

The Progeny of Epstein and Lerro

The difference in approach between Epstein and Lerro is succinctly
captured in a statement at the end ofthe Lerro opinion: "our case is about 'when'rather
than 'what'.tf27 Len-o provides a clear tem.porallimitation on the application of
Rule 14d-l0-whether the Rule applies is solely a function of"when" the transaction in
question occurred relative to the formal tender offer period On the other hand, Epstein
focuses on "what" a tender offer is and "what" is part ofthat tender offer--ifa transaction
is integral to the tender offer then, irrespective ofwhen it occurs, it is part ofthe tender
offer and, therefore, occurs "during such tender offer" for the purposes of Rule 14d-l0.
In the U.S. District Court cases decided since each of Epstein and Lerro,
there has a been an inconsistent application ofRule 14d-l0, depending principally·on
which ofthe two approaches the particular District Court has followed. Overall, and
despite the fact that Epstein is of questionable precedential value (having been overruled
on grounds unrelated to Rule 14d-lO), the Epstein approach appears to be prevailing over
the Lerro approach, as plaintiffs use the uncertainty ofthe "integral part" test, and the

23

17 C.F.R. § 24O.14d.2.

24

ld., 243.

25

Id., 244.

~6 Id., 246. Although the approach in Lerro is clearly at odds \vith the approach in Epstein, the Court stopped
short ofholding that Epstein \vas incorrectly decided (although it did state that it lacked precedential value). Rather,
it prefeITed to distinguish both Epstein (as not involving a merger, such that arrangements \vere conditional on a
tender offer) and Field (as involving a single tender offer and purchases clearly in the formal tender ofter period for
that single otTer) on their facts, and indeed \vent so far as to say that the Ninth and Second Circuits \\'ould have
reached the same conclusion on the mcts in LetTO.
27 I d.
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factual determinations that must be made in connection therewith, to survive motions to
dismiss and applications for summary judgment.28
As a result, a wide range of arrangements customarily entered into in
connection with acquisition transactions have been held to give rise to material issues as to
whether they breach Rule 14d-IO. The following cases illustrate different types ofsuch
arrangements, all ofwhich were entered into and consummated outside the formal tender
offer period, that may now be problematic under Rule 14d-lO:
•

In Perera v. Chiron Corporation,2.9 the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California considered whether the enhancement ofcertain options held
by the target's employees was integral to the tender offer and constituted a
premium intended to encourage employee optionholders that were also
stockholders to support the tender offer. The Court found that material issues of
fact existed on these issues, and denied defendant's motion to dismiss.

•

In Padilla v. Medpartners,Inc.,30 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California considered whether the amendment of certain employment agreements
with key target employees to provide a tax gross up on golden parachute
payments, and the acquiror's agreement to honor such amended agreements,
constituted extra consideration that was paid pursuant to the tender offer in return
for the employees' support ofthe tender offer. The Court found that material
issues offact existed as to whether that was the case, and denied defendant's
motion to dismiss.

•

In Millionerrors Investment Club v. General Electric Co. Pic, JI the U.S. District
Court for the Western District ofPennsylvania considered whether the issuance of
new options to certain oftarget's employees prior to commencement ofthe tender
offer, that were subsequently to be cancelled and cashed-out in connection with a
back-end merger, were granted and to be cashed-out in order to secure such
employees' support for and approval ofthe tender offer and constituted greater
compensation than was provided to other stockholders in the tender offer. The
Court found that material issues of fact existed on these matters, and denied
defendant's motion to dismiss.

•

In Maxickv. Cadence Design Systems, Inc.,32 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California considered whether certain retention bonuses paid
to target employees were paid pursuant to the tender offer and/or for the support

28 In broad terms, in each ofa motion to dismiss and an application for summary judgment, factual issues must be
presumed in favor ofthe party not making the motion or application, as applicable. Accordingly, such motions and
applications can only be dismissed where it is beyond doubt that no set of facts could support the plaintiffs claim for
reliefor ifthe complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or alleges insufficient facts to support such a cognizable legal
theolY. See Perera v. Chiron Corporation, 1996 WL 2S 1936, *2.
29

t 996 WL 2S 1936 (ND. Cal., May 8, 1996). This case ·was decided before Lerro.

30

1998 U.S. Dist. LEXJS 22839 (C.D. Cal., 1uly 27, 1998).

31

2000 WL 1288333 (W.D. Pa., :March 21, 2000).

32

2000 WL 33174386 (ND. Cal., Sept. 21, 2000).
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ofthe tender offer. The Court found that material issues offact existed, and
denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
•

In Katt v. Titan Acquisitions, Ltd,33 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District
ofTennessee, Nashville Division, considered whether certain financial incentive
agreements with target's officers (providing for golden parachutes, accelerated
incentive awards and performance unit awards in connection with certain change
ofcontrol transactions) entered into several months before the formal
commencement of the tender offer, but which acquiror had agreed to honor, were
integral to the tender offer and induced such officers to participate in that tender
offer. The Court found that the agreements were integral to the tender offer, and
thus subject to Section 14(d)(7) and Rule 14d-l0, and that material issues offaet
existed as to whether the arrangements had in fact induced the officers to support
the tender offer. As such, defendant's motion to dismiss was denied.

•

In Karlin v. Alcafel S.A.,34 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California considered whether certain new options granted to officers oftarget
prior to the formal commencement ofa tender offer, as wen as the enhancement of
certain existing options ofsuch officers, were integral to the tender offer and an
inducement to such officers to participate therein. The Court found that material
issues offact existed as to the question ofinducement, and denied defendant's
application for summary judgment.

Each ofthese cases illustrates one ofthe principal difficulties ofthe Epstein
approach to Rule 14d-lO. In each case, in order for the defendant to have been
successful, they would have had to establish as a matter oflaw that Rule 14d-lO did not
apply or that there were no facts that supported plaintiffs allegations. Given the nature of
the Epstein integrationfmducement test and particularly the factual determinations that
must be made in connection therewith, this standard is virtually impossible to satisfy as all
disputed factual matters are, in the context of a motion to dismiss or application for
summary judgment, required to be construed in a manner that is most favorable to the
non-movinglnon-applying party. Almost inevitably, therefore, the motions and
applications will be dismissed.
One exception to that result, and a case that provides a contrast to the
other cases described above that applied Epstein, is McMichael v. United States Filter
Corporation. 3s In that case, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
considered whether the modification of certain employment agreements, principally in
respect ofgolden parachute payments, immediately before a tender offer was integral to
the tender offer, and resulted in a breach ofRule 14d-IO. The Court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the modifications did not change the substance
ofthe agreements, only the form. Therefore, the payments in question were merely the
discharge of a pre-existing contractual duty and, as a matter of law, the payments \verenot
integral to the tender offer and hence could not constitute additional consideration that
violated Rule 14d-IO. It is difficult to reconcile this finding with the earlier decisions that

33

133 F. Supp. 2d 632 (MD. Tn.• Nashville Division, November 17. 2000).

34

2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12349 (C.D. Cal., August 13.2001).

3S

2001 WL 418981 (C.D. Cal. February 23, 2001).
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have followed Epstein, a number ofwhich also involved the amendment of existing
arrangements, and the case adds uncertainty to the law on Rule 14d-l0.
Such uncertainty is also created by a case following that followed Len-o.
In Walker v. Shield Acquisition COrp.,36 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia, Atlanta Division, granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's allegations
that certain retention and transition payments entered into with target officers in the month
before the commencement of a formal tender offer breached Section 14(d)(7) and
Rule 14d-IO. The Court reJected Epstein's integration test,'7 and followed the bright line
test in Len-D.38 Accordingly, as all arrangements with respect to the retention and
transition payments were entered into and consummated outside the formal tender offer
period, the court held that such arrangements could not, as a matter oflaw, breach either
Section 14(d)(7) or Rule 14d-lO.39 There is no distinction in principle between the type of
arrangements considered in Walker and those considered in the six cases described above
that followed the Epstein approach in which similar types ofarrangements were held to be
problematic-the different result is simply a product ofthe application of a different legal
test.
Each ofthe cases described in this section considered arrangements with
employees that are very common in the context of acquisition transactions and are very
different from the type ofegregious arrangements entered into with the CEO in Epstein.
Unlike the CEO's arrangement in Epstein, none ofthe arrangements considered in the
cases fonowing Epstein and Lerro (or indeed in Le"o itself) presented facts that in any
way looked like abusive or discriminatory takeover practices presenting issues of
inequality between shareholders that are of a nature that the Commission was seeking to
regulate in promulgating Rule 14d-l0.
Nevertheless, the current state ofthe law on Rule 14d-IO suggests that
such arrangements may breach Rule 14d-lO, and the answer to whether they do is
dependent upon the approach that the Court addressing the issue wishes to adopt, how the
selected approach is actually applied and, ultimately, a complicated and confusing factual
analysis.
(e)

The Financial Cost ofa Breach ofRule'14d-lO

None ofthe cases described above have resulted in a substantive trial on
the facts, or an award of damages.

36

145 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division, March 30, 2001).

37 The Court also noted that the instant case, where the payments were conditioned on a merger, could be
distinguished from Epstein where the amngements in question \vere conditioned on successful completion ofa tender
offer. Id., -1371.

38 The Court also cited Kramer, Id., in support ofits conclusion trial transactions conditional on the merger could
Dot be said to be a part oCthe tender offer. A second case, Gerber v. Computer Associates Internationallne., (2000
WL 307379 (ED.N.Y., March 14, 2000), a decision of the US District Court Cor the Eastem District ofNe\v York),
also a~ to favor the approach in Lerro, althou~ it distinguished Lerro on the facts and did not expressly discuss
the la\v in Epstein or Lerro. In Gerber, a payment m exchange fora non-compete agreement \vas made after
commencement oCthe tender otTer under Rule 14<1-2, and during the formal tender otTer period. Accordingly,
defendant's motion to dismiss was denied.
39

Id., -1375.
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However, in Epstein, the Court appeared to indicate that the assessment of
damages would be mechanistic--the aggregate extra value received by the favored
stockholder would be calculated, and such aggregate value would be divided by the
Dumber ofshares owned by such favored stockholder. Each other stockholder would then
.
be entitled to the resulting amount for each share that they own.40
The amounts that could be at issue in these cases could bcvery significant,
running into the billions (as in Epstein) and even trillions (as in Mil/ionerrors) of dollars of
potential damages. For example, the $21 million payment to the COO in Epstein would
have equated to $17.80 per share that the COO owned, a 25% increase in the tender offer
price of$71.00. The result would be that a $6.1 billion tender offer would effectively be
$7.6 billioD tender offer.
IV.

THE IMPACT OF EPSTEIN AND ITS PROGENY

Traditionally, the question ofwhether stockholders (including employees)
of a target have been treated appropriately in an acquisition has been a matter ofstate law.
In particular, employee and other collateral arrangements entered into in connection with
an acquisition are subject to SCIUtiny according to state law fiduciary duty concrfts and, in
the context of employee arrangements, suitability and reasonablenessconcepts.4
Furthermore, in the context ofmergers (including a back-end merger after a tender offer),
various state statutes provide appraisal rights to stockholders who believe the merger
consideration is unfair, pursuant to which stockholders can seek and receive fair value for
their stock in specified circumstances. Transaction parties manage their risks in these
regards with expert advice from legal and· financial advisors, and through "due process"
mechanisms such as Special Committees and Compensation Committees. Even though
the risk of challenge to such employee and other collateral arrangements always exists in
the state law context, and indeed strike suits are common, those risks are well understood
and, importantly, the financial consequences are typically directly linked to the value of the
arrangements. As such, the risks are both manageable and measurable by competent
M&A practitioners.
The situation is, however, currently very different in the context of tender
offers. Following Epstein and its progeny it appears that a very wide range of employee
and possibly other arrangements are now problematic in the context oftender offers,
irrespective of facts such as that:
•

the arrangements are entered into for legitimate commercial purposes (principally
employment incentive arrangements to ensure continued employment after the
change of control transaction);42

40 Epstein.
41

Id., *657.

For a discussion on the applicable la\v in the Dela\vare context, see Balotti and Finkelstein, The Deltmure £mil

ofCorporations and Business Organizations, Chapter 4.
42

See, for example, Katt, Id., *636; Walker, Id., *1362.
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•

the arrangements are not contingent on the tender ofshares by the beneficiary of
the arrangement and are not a quidpro quo for the tendering ofshares;43

•

the tendering ofthe shares ofthe beneficiary is immaterial to the success or failure
ofthe tender offer;44

•

the arrangements are consistent with state law reasonableness standards and
fiduciary limitations on compensation, and have been approved by the target's
board ofdirectors following "due process" under state Iaw;45

•

the arrangements are entered into by persons in their capacity as employees, not
stockholders, and the arrangements are entered into. with employees who are not
stockholders as well as with employees who are stockholders;46

•

disclosure ofthe arrangements is made to stockholders in the tender offer
documents, so that such stockholders are aware ofthem prior to tendering their
stock and can choose not to do 50;47 and

•

the arrangements ere entered into with the target rather than the acquiror.48

Furthermore, the fact-based standard articulated by.Epstein has, given the
legal tests governing motions to dismiss and applications for SlJrnmary judgment, made it
highly unlikely that such motions or applications will be dismissed, leading to the prospect
of lengthy and costly litigation that would not exist ifa tender offer were not part ofthe
transaction structure.
Moreover, the potential damages·from losing a Rule 14d-IO action, and
hence the likely cost ofsettling an action (if such a settlement was desirable), is likely to
affect significantly the strategic and economic logic and viability ofa transaction, such that
transactions that are othetWise strategically and economically beneficial to the parties and
their stockholders may no longer be worth pursuing.
The practical result ofthe Epstein interpretation ofRule 14d-IO as
encompassing customary arrangements, as requiring complex factual determinations and
of creating significant financial exposures for a breach is that unacceptable transactional
and financial risks have been introduced into acquisitions that involve a tender offer.
Those risks cannot be effectively managed by M&A practitioners in the tender offer
context, other than by not entering into any employee or other collateral arrangements in
connection with a particular acquisition. However, such arrangements are necessary in the
vast majority ofM&A transactions, principally in order to manage effectively the "social
43 See, for example, Perera, Id., ·2-4.
44

See, for example, Perera, rd., ·1, 4; Katt, Id., ·645.

45

See. for example. Walker, Id., ·1363-1364.

46

See. for example, Perera, Id., *3-4.

47

See, for example, Walker. Id., ·1363-1364.

48

See, for example, McMichael, Id.. ·5-6.
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issues" arising out ofan acquisition and change of control, so an approach ofsimply
eliminating such arrangements is problematic.
As a result ofthese risks, it is likely that M&A practitioners and their law
firms may be forced to advise their clients that tender offers should not be incorporated in
transaction stnlctures, except in the most exceptional cases where the necessity for speed
ofexecution justifies the significant risks that must be taken.
Rather, bidders are favoring one-step mergers to effect acquisitions. Such
a stnlcture may lead to the slower consummation oftransactions, but it does not pose the
risks ofa two-step deal incorporating a tender offer.
Accordingly, and importantly, stockholders are having to wait three or
more months after the launch ofa deal, even in cash deals, to receive their transaction
consideration, whereas they could generally be paid within four weeks of announcement of
a deal ifa tender offer had been used. Also,acquirers are having to wait longer to secure
control oftargets, thus exposing themselves to transaction risks, and delaying their ,ability
to achieve the strategic benefits and synergies that made the acquisition attractive in the
first place. These timing disadvantages are even more apparent in respect oftransactions
in which the consideration is stock, where the difference in execution time between an
exchange offer and a stock-for-stock merger can be even more significant. The 14d-l0
risks discourage the use of exchange offers and, therefore, eliminate the possibility that
stockholders will receive the merger consideration very quickly in stock deals.
The foregoing impacts ofthe Epstein interpretation of Rule 14d-IO are
highly undesirable. Transactions consistent with investor protection are not being
facilitated and an important structuring option has effectively been eliminated from the
alternatives available to M&A practitioners and transaction parties, which disadvantages
such parties and their stockholders alike.

v.

LEGAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE EPSTEIN INTERPRETATION

In addition to the risks and the resulting consequences for transaction
structuring caused by Epstein that justify reform of Rule 14d-l0, it appears that the
interpretation of Rule 14d-IO by the Ninth Circuit in Epstein is wrong, and that the
interpretation in Lerro is right, as a matter of law. The decision in Epstein ignores the
plain words ofRule 14d-l0, the statutory context in which in the Rule is found and the
intent ofthe SEC in promulgating the Rule. Furthermore, strong policy justifications exist
for preferring the approach in Len-o.

Rule 14d-IO on its face limits its application to "the highest consideration
paid to any other security holder during such tender offer' (emphasis added). This
language, despite what the Court said in Epstein, clearly denotes a specified time frame-to hold otherwise would be to contradict the plain meaning of "during" and, in fact,
attribute no real meaning at all to that word.
Furthermore, the Court in Epstein effectively ignored Rule 14d-2 in
formulating its approach to Rule 14d-IO. Rule 14d-2 sets out the precise time at \vhich a
tender offer commences, and explicitly states that its definition of commencement applies
"for the purposes of Section 14(d) and the rules thereunder." (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, ifthere is a tender offer that is subject to the Exchange Act and the Rules
thereunder, under Rule 14d-2 such tender offer (irrespective ofwhat transactions are part
ofthat tender offer) does not commence as a matter of law until the time determined by
<cNYCORP-20""l.1:4636D:02/0S/02-7:41p»
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that Rule. Therefore, an arrangement entered into prior to such commencement cannot as
a matter of law occur "during" such tender offer. It is exactly this conclusion that the
Court reached in Len-o.49
On this basis, cases such as those descnOed earlier where the employee
option, retention, golden parachute and other arrangements were, on their facts, entered
into prior to formal commencement of the tender offer pursuant to Rule 14d-2 and
consummated after expiration ofthe offer cannot, as a matter or law, have breached
Rule 14d-IO as nothing occurred "during" the tender offer. Epstein has caused such cases
to be wrongly decided on this point.
It is somewhat ironic that the Ninth Circuit in Epstein, noted that
Rule 14d-2 defined when a tender offer began for the purposes of Section 14(d)(7) and
stated that:
"Rule 14d-l0 was promulgated to codify the all-holders and best-price
requirements in § 14(d)(7), and the SEC stated whenroposing the Rule that the
§ 14(d)(7) time frame would cany over to the Rule...5
The Epstein Court then ignored Rule 14d-2 and its timing requirement
reaching its decision and thereby ignored the Commission's intent tocany § 14(d)(7)'s
time requirement, as established by Rule 14d-2, over into Rule 14d-IO. Rather, as noted
above, the Court in Epstein attempted to define "during such tender offer" by focusing on
"what" constituted or formed part of a tender offer, and held that anything that was a part
ofthe tender offer must occur "during" it. The analysis ofRule 14d-2 above shows that
this cannot be correct, as it would suggest that arrangements entered into before the
commencement ofthe tender offer that were part ofit occurred "during" it, which is
directly contradictory to Rule 14d-2's statement that its commencement tests applied for
"Section 14(d) and the rules thereunder." (Emphasis added.).
In formulating its approach to Rule 14d-lO, the Epstein court relied on
Field v. Tromp, and the functional test espoused thereunder, for determining whether the
arrangements in Epstein with the CEO were part of the tender offer. However, Field is
not at all concerned, as is suggested by the Epstein Court, with the question ofwhether a
private purchase of stock like that in Epstein should be integrated with a tender offer for
the purposes ofinterpreting Rule 14d-IO. Rather, it was concerned with whether a single
tender offer had been engaged in or whether there were two offers. Having determined
that there was a single offer, the stock purchases in question clearly took place during that
offer as they occurred after commencement, in terms ofRule 14d-2, ofthe formal tender
offer that was purported to be terminated. The Court was not in fact examining the
meaning of "during such tender offer" and, accordingly, Field did not actually provide
authority for the interpretation ofRule 14d-IO adopted in Epstein.

It appears that the phrase "during such tender offer" is intended to be
interpreted as imposing a timing limitation on the application of the Rule 14d-l0. This
view is supported by the administrative history of both Section 14(d)(7) and Rule 14d-lO,
which histories the Court in Epstein misinterpreted. While the Court in Epstein correctly
emphasized the Commission's intent to ensure "equality oftreatment among all
49

Id., *242.

50 Epstein,

Id., *655 (footnote 18).
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shareholders who tender their shares,..51 the Court was incorrect in stating that the
administrative history ofRule 14d-l0 "suggests anything but the notion that the SEC
intended the Rule to be a mechanical provision concerned not with discriminatory tender
offers, but with the timing ofpayment to favored shareholders.,,52 In fact, the Commission
was concemc:d with both the concept of equality and the concept oftiming. For example,
in discussing the "best-price role" under Section 14(d)(7) that the Commission was
intending to codify, it stated:53
"Application ofthe best-price role raises certain interpretive issues. The best-price
role extends to all tendermg holders ofthe class ofsecurities subject to the offer.
The consideration to be paid must be equal to the highest amount offered at any
time during the tender offer period. Consistent with the Williams Act, the
Commission's position has been that the highest consideration offered is
determined from the earlier of the date the offer is first published or sent or given
to security holders as defined by Rule 14d-2(a) or the date ofpublic announcement
as specified in Rule 14d-2(b)." (Emphasis added.)
This emphasis on the formal tender offer period is also evident from the
Report of the House ofRepresentatives on the adoption ofSection 14(d)(7) ofthe
Exchange Act, pursuant to which Rule 14d-IO was promulgated:54

"Proposed section 14(d)(7) would provide that where a person making a tender
offer increases the consideration offered to shareholders before the expiration of
the tender offer, he must pay the increased consideration to those who tendered
their securities prior to the increase in the price, whether or not he had taken up
any ofthe securities before the increase in the consideration was announced. The
pwpose of this provision is to assure fair treatment ofthose persons who tender
their shares at the beginning ofthe tenderperiod, and to assure equality of
treatment among all shareholders who tender their shares. It (Emphasis added.)
The Commission's focus on the formal tender offer period was most clearly
demonstrated by the text the Commission proposed in 1985 for Rule 14d-l0, which
referred to consideration offered "at any time during such tender offer, determined from
the earlier ofthe date ofpublic announcement as specified in Rule 14d-2(b) or the date of
commencement pursuant to Rule 14d-2(a)...55 The language regarding Rule 14d-2 was
dropped from the Commission's revised proposed text for the Rule as released in January
1986, although the reference to "at any time" was retained in that proposal. 56 There was
no explanation given for the change in language between proposals. The text ttat any
time" was not included in Rule 14d-IO as finally promulgated, and again no explanation

51 Epstein, ld., *655.

52 ld., *654.
53

SEC Proposing Release, ld., *10.

54

H.R. Rep. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, *2821.

55

SEC Proposing Release, Id., *24125.

56

SEC Proposing Release, #2, Id., *[ ].
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was given for the change.57 Thus, these changes in language do not evidence any intent by
the Commission to eliminate the temporal limitations on the application ofRule 14d-IO
that the Commission had specified explicitly in its proposals,particu1arly since the
Commission emphasized many times that it was simply intending to codify its existing
interpretation ofSection 14(d)(7) as containing a best-price role, which role Congress and
the Commission clearly intended (as such intention is descnDed above) to apply only
during the formal tender offer period Furthermore, if the Commission was intending to
eliminate entirely the temporallimitatioDS on the Rule, and thus change its prior
interpretation ofSection 14(dX7), we believe that the Commission would have said so
explicitly in its proposing and adopting releases on Rule 14d-IO. It did not do so.
Accordingly, .it appears clear to that the Congressional intent in adopting
Section 14(d)(7), and the Commission's intent in adopting Rule 14d-l0, was to regulate
the consideration paid to security holders during the formal tender offer period, being the
period from commencement ofthe tender offer, determined in accordance with
Rule 14d-2, until the expiration thereof in accordance with the terms ofthe tender offer.
In sum, the Court in Epstein erred in interpreting both the plain words of
Rule 14d-IO and the intent ofthe Commission in promulgating the Rule.
In addition to the interpretive and intent based reasons for believing that
the Court in Epstein adopted the wrong approach in respect ofRule 14d-l0, there are
very strong policy reasons for interpreting the scope ofRule 14d-lO as limited to the clear
time frame indicated by the phrasettduring such tender offer," as the Courts did in both
Len-o and Walker. As the Commission itselfDoted in proposing and adopting
Rule 14d-IO there is "a need to provide clarity and certainty in the regulatory scheme
applicable to tender offers,"58 and a need to facilitate transactions while protecting
investors.59 Without clarity over the scope and temporal aspects ofthe best-price rule, as
the Court in Lerro stated it would "wreak havoc to say that the operation of all of the
clocks cannot be known until, years after the events, a judge declares when negotiations
became sufficiently serious to mark the commencement ofthe offer. Everything depends
on making the times start from a public announcement--and on making that time as clear
as humanly possible. That is the function of Rule 14d-2.tt60 And as the Court stated in
Walker: "In a business setting, it is impractical to leave the validi~ ofsuch agreements and
the legality of ensuing tender offers subject to encUess litigation. tt It is exactly these
undesirable results that Epstein causes.

There are strong grounds to support the policy justifications for a narrow
application ofRule 14d-IO offered by the Court in Le"o:62

57

SEC Adopting Release. Id., -56.

58

-19. See also SEC Adopting Release, Id.• -47.

59

SEC Adopting Release, Id., -12.

60

rd.,246.

61

Walker, Id., -1377.

62 Lerro, Id.• -243.
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"Purchases near in time to a tender offer, but outside it, may be essential to
transactions that an investors find beneficial Controlling shareholders often
receive indirect or non-monetary benefits and are unwilling to part with their stock
(and hence with control) for a price that outside investors find attractive. At the
same time, potential bidders may be unable to profit by paying everyone the price
essential to separate the insiders from their shares. [.•.] Treating the Williams Act
as a mandate for an identical price across the board-as opposed to an identical
price for all shares acquired in the offer--would make all investors worse oft"
VI.

CONCLUSION

The current state ofthe law on Rule 14d-lO, as interpreted by Epstein and
its progeny, does not permit M&A practitioners and their clients to stmcture transactions
to include a tender offer component withoutbei11g exposed to significant risks. That fact
is precluding the use oftender offers, a situation that needs to be remedied by reform of
Rule 14d-IO to create clearl:Y and certainly in respect ofits scope and application.
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OUTLINE OF ARTICLE ON SEC RULE 14d-IO
L

u.

INTRODUCTION

•

Article addresses the impact ofthe recent judicial interpretations of
Rule 14d-l0

•

Recent interpretations are problematic and are having a significant impact
on how M&A deals are being stroctured and executed

•

Purpose ofarticle is to analyze the adoption, interpretation, and application
ofRule 14d-lO, and its effects on acqwsition transactions

•

The SEC should restore certainty and clarity to Rule 14d-IO

LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE mSTORY OF RULE 14d-l0

•
•

SEC's stated intent in adopting Rule 14d-l0 for the formal tender offer
period
Rule codified existing SEC interpretation of Section 14(d)(7) ofthe
Williams Act as imposing a "best price" rule

m.

•

Adoption ofRule 14d-l0 designed to remove ambiguity over SEC's
interpretation of Section 14(d)(7)

•

Rule avoids discriminatory tender offers and avoids favoring either
management or the takeover bidder; Rule regulates "Saturday Night
Specials" and "FIrSt-Come First-Served" offers

•

Rule intended to be focused on pendency of the tender offer (fixed period)

•

Clarity and certainty are required and need to be restored

RULE 14d-lO JURISPRUDENCE

(a)

Early cases
•

Fieldv. Trump (1988; Second Circuit)

•

Kramerv. Time Wamer(1991; Second Circuit)

•

Kahn v. Virginia Retirement System (1993; Fourth Circuit)

•

Each effectively treated the expression "during the tender offer" in
Rule 14d-l0 as meaning "after commencement" and "before
expiration" ofthe tender offer
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(d)

(e)

•

Rejection ofrigid "temporal" test

•

Focus on investor protection purposes of the Williams Act

•

Damages calculated using multiplier of highest per share amount
paid

Lerro v. Quaker Oats (1996; Seventh Circuit)
•

Preferred interpretation of 14d-l 0

•

RejectedlDistinguished Epstein

•

Adopted a "Brightline" test - focused on temporal aspects of
Rule 14d-lO: "during the tender offer"

•

Recognized that Brightline test could lead to manipulation, but
understood need for certainty

Recent Decisions and Trends
•

Inconsistent application of the Rule by the courts, aligned with
either Epstein or Lerro.

•

Epstein view appears to be prevailing, as plaintiffs use the factual
uncertainty of the "integral part" test to swvive motions to dismiss
and summary judgment:

Chiron (1996) - enhanced options; followed Epstein;
Summary Judgment for Defendants denied
Padilla (1998) - pre-existing equity incentive plan; follo\ved
Epstein; Motion to Dismiss by Defendants denied
Millione"ors (2000) - new options; follo\ved Epstein;
Summary Judgment for Defendants denied

Maxick (2000) - retention bonuses; followed Epstein;
Summary Judgment for Defendants denied

Kat! (2000) - employment agreements; follo\ved Epstein;
Summary Judgment for Defendants denied
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Gerber (2000) - non-Competition Agreement; followed
Quaker Oats; .Summary Judgment for Defendants denied as
arrangement was entered into in formal tender offer period

McMichael (2001) - golden parachutes; followed Epstein
(but no inducement found); Summary Judgment for
Defendants granted

Walker (2001) - existing management compensation
arrangements; followed Quaker Oats; Summary Judgment
for Defendants granted
Karlin (2001) - Acceleration of options; followed Epstein;
Summary Judgment for Defendants denied

(f)

IV.

•

Cases are all very different from Epstein (they involved standard
employment arrangements; no obligation to tender; not enough
stock to matter in the tender offer; do not look like abusive
practices) - yet all have presented problems for Defendants based
on Epstein

•

Fact based analysis required -- result is that motions to dismiss and
applications for summary judgment are almost inevitably denied

Financial Cost of a Breach

•

Epstein~

•

Damages can be in the trillions/billions

multiplier effect

THE IMPACT OF EPSTEIN AND ITS PROGENY
•

Ambiguous, confusing standards have created risk in structuring M&A
deals

•

Problem of "integral part" test - fact based analysis makes it almost
impossible to have complaints dismissed given the legal standards for
summary judgments/motions to dismiss

•

Transactions that may be more beneficially structured to include tender
offers being structured as one step mergers [anecdotal--not in article]

•

Problems arise notwithstanding that:
arrangements have legitimate commercial purposes separate from
the tender offer and are not a quidpro quo for the tender of shares
tender of shares by recipient immaterial to the offer
arrangements not conditioned on the tender of shares
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arrangements are consistent with state law on fiduciary duties and
on compensation and have been approved by Boards following
"due process" under state law
arrangements entered into with target rather than acquirer
full disclosure is made to stockholders
arrangements entered into outside the formal offer period

v.

VI.

•

Delay in shareholders receiving merger consideration

•

Exchange offers unlikely to be used other than in hostile context

•

Certainty and clarity required for practitioners and their clients to use
tender offers again

LEGAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE EPSTEIN INTERPRETATION
•

Epstein ignores the clear words of Rule 14d-l0

•

Epstein ignores the clear intent ofRule 14d-l0

•

Epstein misinterprets Field v Tromp

•

Epstein is wrong from a policy (certainty) perspective

CONCLUSION
•

Epstein is wrong as a matter of law and does not reflect the intent ofthe
SEC in adopting Rule 14d-l0

•

Epstein~

•

The SEC may need to address Epstein so that the Rule provides certainty
and clarity, consistent with the Commission's original intent for the Rule.

interpretation of Rule 14d-IO will have a significant impact on
how M&A deals are being structured and implemented

«NYOORP-20'6"l.1:4636D:02/0S/02-7:41p»

A-21

B.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW MATERIALITY
QUALIFICATIONS AND MATERIAL ADVERSE CHANGE ("MAC")
CLAUSES

A-22

Where MAC's and Materialit}' Qualifiers are found in a
MerKer Agreement:
•

•

Within the representations and warranties:
o

Stand-alone representation: There is often a representation by the seller
stating that no MAC has occurred since a specified date in the past (most
often the date of the most recent audited balance sheet provided to buyer
by the seller).

o

Qualifiers to representations and warranties: Throughout the reps and
warranties section ofthe merger agreement (and occasionally in other
sections, such as certain covenants), many of the representations are limited
or qualified by use of the MAC concept (e.g., "no defaults exist except
such defaults as would not· cause a material adverse effect"). In addition,
the concept of materiality is used throughout the representations and
warranties to limit their reach (e.g., "the financial statements of the
Company fairly present, in all material respects, the financial position of the
Company.")

Within the closing conditions:
o . Stand-alone closing condition: It is often a simple condition to buyer's

obligation to close the transaction that no MAC have occurred prior to
closing.
.
o

Condition that reps and warranties be true: It is often required as a
condition to closing that seller's reps and warranties be true as of the
closing date. To the extent that there is a MAC rep that is required to be
true as of the closing date, this makes the MAC rep into a closing
condition. Furthermore, the closing condition bringing down the
representations and warranties to closing is itself usually qualified by
materiality, except to the extent that such a qualifier is already embedded in
the relevant representation (e.g., "the representations and warranties ofthe
Company contained herein that are qualified as to materiality shall be true
and correct and the representations and warranties of the Company
contained herein that are not so qualified shall be true and correct in all
material respects.")
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Functions of MAC's and Materiality Qualifiers
in a Merger Agreement:

•

Escape valve: A MAC gives the buyer (and sometimes the seller as well) a "walkaway" right in the event that something bad happens to the business being acquired
between the particular point in time set forth in the MAC and the time of closing.

•

Shorthand drafting tool: The MAC language and the phrases introducing a
materiality qualifier summarize in relatively short phrases or definitions a host of
concepts that the parties to a complex agreement would otherwise have to spend
endless effort hashing out between themselves in negotiations. The number of
factual possibilities that could constitute a MAC or that could give rise to
something "material" are literally infinite. To the extent that the parties rely on a
relatively short MAC definition (or choose not to define the phrase "material
adverse change" at all) or just use a phrase like "materially correct" as a qualifier,
they are making a risk allocation decision balancing the possibility that a judge or
other regulatory agent will be required to interpret the meaning of the definition or
phrase against the time gained by not negotiating more explicit language.
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Standard MAC Language:
•

The following is an example of a relatively standard MAC definition, less any
exceptions:

''material adverse effect" means any state of facts, change, development, effect, condition
or occurrence that [is] [would] [could] [reasonably be expected to be] material and
adverse to the business, assets, properties, condition (financial or otherwise) [,prospects]
or results of operations of the Company and its subsidiaries, taken as a whole, except...
•

Some ofthe important elements of the MAC language that are often negotiated
include:
o

temporal basis: the "[is] [would][could][reasonably be expected to be]"
sequence in the definition above sets forth a continuum of ways to deal
with the certainty of the MAC event(s) being claimed. If"is" is used, then
the MAC would presumably have to have already occurred to count.
Conversely, the "could reasonably expected to" formulation implies a much
lower degree ofpossibility being necessary to trigger the clause. The Tyson
court commented on the ambiguous nature of the temporal language in that
merger agreement but largely ignored its significance.

o

characteristic of the company affected to trigger the clause: the "business,
assets...." sequence in the paragraph above is an attempt by the buyer to
describe all the aspects of the business that could change that could
decrease its value to the buyer. The less concrete the aspect being
described, the more latitude the buyer will have to claim that the clause has
been triggered. Buyers sometimes attempt to include the term "prospects"
in the sequence; this is often viewed as an attempt to force the company to
meet financial projections supplied to the buyer by the seller. Sellers usually
resist inclusion of"prospects", and the term makes it into a relative
minority of agreements.
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•

The following is an example ofsome fairly standard exceptions to a MAC clause:

"except for any state of facts, change, development, effect, condition or occurrence (i)
relating to the economy in general, (ii) relating to the [insert relevant industry] industry
generally and not specifically relating to the Company or its subsidiaries or (iii) resulting
from the announcement or existence of this Agreement."
o

General vs. specific: In negotiating exceptions to the MAC clause,
sellers focus on calVing out adverse events that impact a large part of
the economy, the industry, etc. rather than just the acquired business.
The reasoning is that once the buyer decides to assume the risk of
making the investment, the seller shouldn't be penalized by events that
impact a broader part of the market as opposed to things that are
wrong with the acquired business itself: For example, the buyer
shouldn't get to walk away from the deal just because the U.S.
economy went into a recession or because the entire construction
industry entered a cyclical downturn.

o

Impact of signing the transaction: Sellers are often wary of assuming
the risk for events that occur because the transaction is signed up. For
example, employees may begin leaving if they believe lay-otIs will result
from the deal, or large customers may cease doing business with the
seller because they don't like the buyer. This exception is often hotly
debated because causation is very difficult to prove.

o

Events previously disclosed to buyer: Sellers often try to exclude
events of which the buyer already has knowledge, for example through
the due diligence process or because the events are described in the
seller's publicly-filed documents. The reasoning is that the buyer is
entering into the deal with full knowledge of the event, so the event
shouldn't be the basis for a right to walk away. Otherwise, the
agreement would be more like an option.
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Unusual/Highl)' Negotiated Exceptions to MAC Clauses:
•

Sellers often attempt to negotiate more customized exceptions to the MAC clause,
particularly when they have identified something unique to their business or
industry for which they believe that the buyer should assume the risk at the time of
signing. Some examples of different exceptions are:
o

changes in the capital markets, or even a particular exchange or market
index (e.g., Dow Jones, S&P SOO);

o

changes in the company's stock price;

o

changes in foreign-exchange rates (particularly relevant in cross-border
deals or when a substantial portion of a seller's revenues are in a foreign
currency);

o

changes in a particular commodity price (e.g., airplane fuel);

o

loss ofmaterial customers, suppliers, employees or executives;

o

judgments from particular lawsuits or a particular type of litigation;

o

changes general to the geographic region where the seller operates;

o

failures to meet analysts' earnings estimates; and

o

events resulting from actions taken at the buyer's request.
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TSC v. Northwa}'
TSC, which was decided in 1976, is the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case interpreting the
concept ofmateriality as applied to corporate transactions. The TSC case specifically dealt
with a claim by a shareholder that two companies that had issued a joint proxy statement
had omitted material facts from the proxy statement. In it's holding, the court resolved a
dispute among the lower courts as to the correct standard to be applied for what
constitutes "material" information.
The court's basic holding can be summarized as follows:

•

"An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." The standard
"contemplates a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the
circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
reasonable shareholder's deliberations."

The court also offered an alternate (and possibly easier to apply) formulation of the
materiality standard:
•

"There must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the 'total mix' of information made available."
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T}'son v. IBP: The Delaware Chancery Court Interprets a
MAC Clause
•

Background: Tyson (chicken processor) agreed to buy mp (beefprocessor) at the
conclusion of an auction process begun by mp management's attempt to do a
management buy-out ofmp. Shortly before the scheduled closing ofthe
acquisition, Tyson terminated the merger agreement on the basis ofthe claim
(among other claims) that mp had breached the MAC representation in the merger
agreement, therefore leaving one of Tyson's conditions to closing unfulfilled.
Specifically, Tyson claimed that 1) IBP's financial performance in the last quarter
of2000 and first quarter of2001 and 2) an impairment charge of$60 million taken
to fix some accounting problems with an acquisition, taken together, constituted a
MAC under the definition. The MAC definition in the Tyson-IBP agreement
contained standard language but no exceptions for general economic or industry
effects. After Tyson terminated, IBP sued seeking specific performance ofthe
merger agreement. The primary question at issue in the "MAE" portion of the
case was the proper viewpoint from which to analyze the concept of materiality.

•

The Chancery Court focused on the following facts in its analysis:
o

The Tyson/IBP agreement used the following "MAE" definition: "any event,
occurrence or development of a state of circumstances of facts which has had
or reasonably could be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect ... on the
condition (financial or otherwise), business, assets, liabilities or results of
operations ofIBP and its Subsidiaries taken as whole."

o

The financial statement representation in the Tyson/IBP agreement used the
following language: "the audited consolidated financial statements ofthe
Company included in the Company lO-K and unaudited consolidated financial
statements ofthe Company included in the Company lO-Q's each fairly
present, in all material respects (emphasis added), in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent basis (except as may be
indicated in the notes thereto), the consolidated financial position of the
Company and its consolidated subsidiaries as ofthe dates thereof and their
consolidated results of operations and changes in financial position for the
periods then ended (subject to normal year-end adjustments in the case of any
unaudited interim financial statements)."

o

IBP's historical financial statements showed a consistently profitable company
subject to strong swings in earnings from year to year, and Tyson \vas a\vare of
those swings.

o

Just before Tyson terminated the agreement, Tyson's investment bank had
prepared a fairness opinion stating that it believed that the deal price in the
merger agreement \vas still \vithin the range offaimess (after the occurrence of
the "MAC" events).
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!

o

Tyson was unable to produce (or didn't produce) expert testimony showing
that IBP's long-term value or earnings potential was diminished by its poor
first quarter performance.

o

Despite its poor first quarter performance, IBP management believed that IBP
was-on track to meet or exceed the projections provided to.Tyson for full-year
2001.

o

When terminating the merger, Tyson did not assert that a MAC had occurred.
The court took this to mean that Tyson did not itselfbelieve that a short-term
drop in earnings constituted a MAC.

The main points of the Chancery Court's analysis were:
o

The court imposed a heavy burden ofproof on Tyson as buyer. The court
admitted that it was unusual whether it was applying the correct burden of
proof: so this issue may be litigated again in the future.

o

The materiality of a development should be analyzed from the "long-term"
perspective of a reasonable investor rather than the perspective of a short-term
speculator.

o

An event that could constitute a MAC is likely to have an effect that can be
measured over a period ofyears (a "durationally significant" period), rather
than a period ofmonths. In particular, an adverse impact on financial results
for one or two quarters is not dispositive evidence of the occurrence of a
MAC.

o

In analyzing whether a MAC occurred, the court should take into account the
total mix ofinformation available to the buyer, including 1) information within
the agreement, including the schedules, and 2) information the buyer learned in

due diligence.

•

o

The court should analyze whether a buyer would have acted differently if it
knew that a representation by the seller was untrue or misleading at the time it
signed the agreement. That analysis should also be undertaken in the context
of all the information available to the buyer.

o

The information supplied by a buyer's outside advisors and third parties are
relevant in determining whether a MAC has occurred. The Chancery Court
relied both on earnings estimates prepared by third party analysts and on a
value analysis prepared by the buyer's investment bank.

Chancery Court's holding: The court found that the MAC representation in the
TysonlIBP merger agreement had not been breached, and that IBP \vas therefore
entitled to specific performance ofthe merger agreement (i.e., Tyson had to
complete the acquisition).
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Sample MAE Language Disclaiming T}'son
"Material Adverse Effect" shall mean any state of facts, change,
development, effect, condition or occurrence ([including] [other than] any state of
faets,change, development, effect, condition or occurrence (i) relating to the economy
in general or (ii) relating to the [industry] industry generally [even ifnot] [and not]
specifically relating to the Company) that could reasonably be expected·to be material
and adverse to the (a) business, (b) assets, (c) properties, (d) condition.(financial or
otherwise), (e) value or (f) results of operations ofthe Company. For purposes of
analyzing whether any state of facts, change, development, effect, condition or
occurrence constitutes a "Material Adverse Effect" under this definition, the parties
agree that (A) materiality shall be analyzed from the viewpoint ofwhether there is a
significant likelihood that the disclosure of such state of facts,. change, development,
effect, condition or occurrence would be viewed by a reasonable investor (and not
Buyer or any other particular investor) as having significantly altered the total mix of
information available to such investor if the total mix of information had consisted
solely of the representations and warranties of the Seller contained in this Agreement
(other than ["No MAE" clause of "absence ofadverse changes" rep}), the [Filed
SEC Documents] and the Disclosure Schedule, (B) the analysis of materiality shall not
be limited to the viewpoint ofa long-term investor, (C) each ofthe terms contained in
(a) through (f) above are intended to be separate and distinct and (D) the words of the
definition of"Material Adverse Effect" are intended to be read literally without any
regard to the holding or reasoning ofIBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 18373, 2001
Del. Ch. LEXIS 81 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2001).
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9-11: Impact of the World Trade Center disaster
•

wpp and Tempus: In early October 2001,WPP, a large advertising firm, won a
takeover battle to acquire Tempus, a smaller British media-buying firm. The
agreement came after a months-long competition between WPP and another rival,
Havas, over who would acquire Tempus. In the press release announcing that
93.9% of Tempus' shareholders had accepted its tender offer, WPP noted that its
offer was subject to conditions, including a material adverse change condition. The
tender offer had been launched in August 2001.
o

Approximately three weeks later, WPP applied to the U.K. 's Takeover
Panel (the regulatory body that governs acquisitions in the U.K.) to
withdraw from the acquisition based on the occurrence of a MAC (which
have historically have rarely been invoked in the U.K.). WPP claimed that
the downturn in the Tempus media-buying business resulting from the
events of 9-11 constituted a MAC.

o

The Takeover Panel initially rejected WPP's application without comment.
After WPP appealed, the Panel issued a sweeping decision rejecting WPP's
application and setting a very high bar for the exercise of a MAC clause in
an acquisition agreement under U.K.law.

o

The decision held that in order to justify use of a MAC clause, the change
would have to be "ofvery considerable significance striking at the heart of
the purpose ofthe transaction in question, analogous...to something that
would justify frustration of a legal contract" and that "exceptional
circumstances must have arisen affecting the offeree company which could
not have reasonably been foreseen at the time of the announcement of the
offer.•. judged not in terms ofshort term profitability but on their effect on
the longer term prospects of the offeree company."
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•

USA Networks and NLG: In November 2001, USA Networks filed an action with
the Delaware Chancery Court seeking the court's approval ofUSA's termination
ofits acquisition agreement with National Leisure Group (NLG). USA based its
claim for the right to terminate the agreement on the MAC clause in the
agreement.
o

USA's MAC claim was based on a combination oftwo separate events: 1) the
9-11 terrorist attacks and 2) NLG's loss of a major customer contract after the
signing ofthe merger agreement. The MAC clause in the USA/NLG merger
agreement (like the MAC clause in the Tyson case) did NOT contain
"standard" exceptions for events affecting the economy or the industry
generally. NLG is a travel company whose business would at least arguably
have been significantly impacted by the downturn in the travel industry after 911.

o

USA and NLG settled the case shortly before it was scheduled to go to trial.
Under the terms of the settlement, USA invested $20 million for an
approximately 20% stake in NLG. The purchase price for the acquisition of
100% ofNLG in the original agreement was approximately $150 million.
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Enron: Post - T)'son exercise of a MAC clause
•

On December 3, 2001, Enron Corp. sued its former merger partner Dynegy Inc.
for $10 billion claiming wrongful termination oftheir merger agreement. Dynegy
had earlier terminated the agreement claiming a breach ofthe MAC clause in the
merger agreement. Dynegy cited Enron's deteriorating cash position, its mounting
long-term liabilities and unspecified misrepresentations ofEnron's financial
position in terminating the merger agreement.
o

The EnronlDynegy agreement is governed by Texas law, so different legal
rules will govern the litigation than governed the Tyson case (NY law).

o

The facts ofthe EnrOD case are similar to the facts ofthe Tyson case in that
the buyer (Dynegy) was aware ofsignificant problems with the seller's
business while merger negotiations were taking place.

o

Under the facts as currently known, it appears possible that Dynegy may
have known that Enron was in breach of the agreement at the time that
Enron signed it. Texas law is not clear on whether a party that knew of a
breach at the time it signed an agreement may void the agreement based on
that breach.
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lvIEMORANDUM FOR J. WOOLERY
Recent Developments in Delaware Case Law
D. Y. Abebe

February 5, 2002

I.

ENTIRE FAIRNESS CLAIMS IN SHORT-FORM MERGERS

A.

Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corporation, 777 A.2d 242 (Del.Supr. 2001)

ISSUE:
-Whether a minority stockholder may challenge a "short-form" merger by seeking
equitable relief through an entire fairness claim?

-In resolving that issue, the Delaware Supreme Court must determine what
fiduciary duties are owed by a parent corporation to the subsidiary's minority
stockholders in the context of a "short-form" merger.
•

Fiduciary has a seemingly absolute duty to establish the entire fairness
of any self-dealing transaction.

•

In contrast, the Delaware "short-form" merger statute authorizes the
elimination of minority stockholders by a process that does not
involve the "fair dealing" component of entire fairness.

•

Unocal Corporation (ttUnocal") O\vns 96% of the stock of Unocal
Exploration Corporation (ttUXC"). Both corporations appoint special
committees to consider a possible merger.

•

UXC's committee consisted of three directors who, although also
directors of Unocal, were not officers or employees of the parent.

•

Merger was effected pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 253, the "short-form"
merger statute.

•

Plaintiffs filed this class action on behalf of UXC's minority
stockholders, asserting that Unocal's directors breached their duties of
entire fairness and full disclosure.

•

The Delaware Supreme Court notes that "a parent corporation and its
directors undertaking a short-form merger are self-dealing fiduciaries
who should be required to establish entire fairness, including fair
dealing and fair price."

FACTS:

ANALYSIS:
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•

Ho\vever, the Court recognizes that § 253 authorizes a summary
procedure that is inconsistent with fair dealing.

•

Court notes that if a fiduciary follows the procedure in the "shortform't merger statute it cannot establish the fair dealing prong ofentire
fairness. If the fiduciary sets up negotiating committees and hires
independent experts, etc., it loses the benefit of an efficient merger
provided by the statute.

•

Court holds that:

HOLDING:

B.

1.

§ 253 must be construed to obviate the requirement to
establish entire fairness.

2.

Although entire fairness in not necessary, the duty of full
disclosure remains for stockholder actions.

3.

Absent illegality, appraisal is the only remedy for a minority
stockholder who objects to a "short-form" merger.

In re Siliconix Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 20001
WL 716787 (Del.Ch., June 19, 2001)

ISSUE:
Whether alleged breaches of fiduciary duties and the oppressive structure of a
merger require a tender offer to be judged by the entire fairness standard.
FACTS:
•

Siliconix Inc., shareholder challenges stock-for-stock tender offer by Vishay
Intertechnology, Inc. ("Vishay"), through its \vholly-o\vnedsubsidiary, for the
19.6% equity interest in Siliconix that its subsidiary does not already own.

•

In 2/01, Vishay proposed an all-cash tender offer for Siliconix at $28.82 a
share and stated that ifit obtained over 90% of the stock, it \vould consider
a "short-form" merger of Siliconix into a subsidiary at the same price.

•

In its offer, Vishay requested to meet with a special committee ofindependent
Siliconix directors. Siliconixnamedtwo directors with extensive relationships
with Vishay to the special committee and paid them for their services.

•

In 5/01, Vishay informed the special committee that it was considering going
forward with a stock-for-stock exchange offer without the committee's
approval. The special committee decided to stay neutral and declined to make
a recommendation.

•

Plaintiff alleges that Vishay and the directors of Siliconix breached their
fiduciary duties to the by issuing disclosures that omitted material facts and
by structuring the tender in an coercive manner.
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ANALYSIS:
•

The Delaware Supreme Court establishes that Vishay was under no duty to
offer a particular price to the Siliconix minority shareholders because as long
as the tender offer was properly pursued, the minority's right to reject the
tender provides sufficient protection.

•

As to entire fairness claims, plaintiffalleges that the Siliconix Board breached
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty by failing to properly evaluate the
transaction and because the board was conflicted.

•

Court notes that in the context of a merger of a subsidiary with a third party
where the controlling shareholder wants the merger and the minority
shareholders are powerless to prevent it, there are certain duties for a
subsidiary's directors:

•

1.

They must protect the minority shareholders' interests;

2.

They cannot abdicate their duty by letting the shareholders
respond on their own; and

3.

They must assist the minority shareholders by determining
the subsidiary's value as a going concern.

However, Court establishes that those duties are "context specific" and that

in this case, minority stockholders had the power to prevent the tender and
that the Siliconix transaction was in the context of a tender offer rather than
a merger.
•

Plaintiff alleges (1) that Vishay misled Siliconix stockholders in its
Registration Statement (tfRS tt ) by providing negative projections about
Siliconix; (2) that the RS incorrectly states that Siliconix management
prepared the projections; and (3) that the RS did not describe new Siliconix
products. 63

•

Court states that the projections are ttsoft-information" which are inherently
speculative and uncertain, that the RS stated that Vishay participates in
Siliconix' forecasts, and that the RS described Siliconix' recent successes in
product development.

•

The RS disclosed that members ofthe Special Committee "had prior business
relationships with Vishay.tt

•

Court concludes that the timing ofthe announcement ofthe tender offer could
not have had a coercive effect on shareholders' decision to tender over three
months later.

•

Moreover, there was no coercive effect from the alleged threat to delist
because the RS states that the de-listing would occur after the tender offer and
the "short-form" merger, at which time there would be no publicly traded

63 Plaintiff abo alleges that the special committee failed to disclose additional financial projections, pro fOImas,
valuation methodologies, and the basis for Vishay's tender offer. The CoW1 addresses these allegations in a swmnary
manner and concludes that there \vere no disclosure violations. As such, the specifics ofthese allegations are not
included in the case SUJllJlla1Y.
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Siliconix stock.
•

Court concludes that plaintiffhas not demonstrated a reasonable probability
of success on the merits ofhis claim.

HOLDING:
In sum, the Court concludes that the entire fairness standard is not implicated in
the context of a parent company's tender offer for a subsidiary that it already
controls.

•

Since this specific transaction does not require the action ofthe target's board
of directors, the entire fairness standard is not applicable.

•

Court denies plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
tender.

DISCUSSION:
The Glassman and Siliconix cases represent a shift by both the Delaware Supreme
Court and Court of Chancery to allowing the parent corporation in a short-form
merger to avoid the entire fairness doctrine in situations where the parent already
controls over ninety percent of the target company. The parent may adjust its
negotiating posture because it has increased leverage over the special committee,
which would be functioning without the protection ofthe entire fairness standard and
would be unable to unilaterally block a transaction. In practice, Glassman and
Siliconix allow a parent corporation bidder to have greater flexibility in setting its
price. The decision also determines the role of special committees in tender offers
that are dependent on the parent obtaining a ninety percent or greater interest ofthe
target because, the parent would not need the special committee's recommendation
to close the merger.
Although the Delaware courts may have opened the door to the "intransigent"
majority shareholder, who could simply ignore the special committee and deal directly
with the minority shareholders, both Glassman and Siliconix still require the duty of
full disclosure. In Si/iconix, the Delaware Chancery Court expressly assumes that the
parent corporation or majority shareholder would accurately disclose pertinent
information to the minority shareholders. The implication of such a requirement is
that the Court may invalidate an otherwise legitimate short-form merger on inadequate
disclosure grounds alone.

While entire fairness may not be required in short-form mergers, thereby weakening
the position of the special committees and the minority shareholders relative to a
majority shareholder, the Delaware courts may nonetheless rigorously examine
disclosures to guarantee some protection for minority shareholders in short-form
mergers.

ll.

DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN TmRD PARTY BID SITUATIONS

Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del.Supr. 2001).
ISSUE:
Plaintiff stockholders challenge merger alleging: (1) breaches of the target board's
duty of loyalty or its disclosure duties; and (2) aiding and abetting or
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tortuous interference by the acquiring corporation.
FACTS:
•

Frederick's of Hollywood ("Frederick's") plans merger with Knightsbridge
Capital Corporation.

•

Two trusts (the "Trusts") hold about 41 % of the Class A voting shares and
51% ofthe outstanding class B non-voting shares of Frederick's.

•

Frederick's board (the "Board") approves an offer from Knightsbridge and
signs a merger agreement that prohibits the Board from soliciting bids from
third parties, but allows the Board to negotiate with third-party bidders.

•

Veritas Capital Fund ("Veritas") offers Frederick's a higher unsolicited bid.
Knightsbridge matches the Veritas offer with conditions limiting Frederick's
from pursuing higher offers.

•

In the meantime, Knightsbridge agrees to purchase the Trusts' shares, informs
the Board of the purchase, and states that it will vote the shares against any
third-party bidder.

•

The Board rejects the revised Veritas bid, citing the "no-talk" provision in the
merger agreement and Knightsbridge's plan to vote against third-party bids.

•

Plaintiff shareholders alleged that the Board breached its fiduciary duties in
selling the company and by omitting material information from the Consent
Solicitation Statement ("CSS").

ANALYSIS:
•

The Delaware Supreme Court states that the salient issue is whether the sale
of Frederick's constitutes a breach of the Board's fiduciary obligation to
maximize shareholder value by its failure to conduct an auction.

•

Court states that the Board must perform its fiduciary duties to maximize the
sale price of the enterprise.

•

Court rejects plaintiffs' initial allegation that the directors' individual interests

in avoiding personal liability to Knightsbridge influenced the decision to
approve the merger.
•

Court concludes that the Board's disclosure ofthe second, higher Veritas offer

in the CSS renders immaterial any alleged misstatement about the Board's
rationale for rejecting the bid.
•

Court concludes that the simple allegation that the CSS did not include the
reasons for the resignation of two directors did not demonstrate that the
Board knew ofthe reasons for·the resignations. Thus, the Board had no duty
to disclose.

•

Court evaluates whether the board should pay damages for its alleged breach
of the duty of due care but does not reach the issue because Frederick's
charter exempts directors from personal liability in damages adopted pursuant
to 8 Del. C. § I02(b)(7).
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•

Court addresses claims that Knightsbridge aided and abetted the Board's
breach ofits fiduciary duty to obtain the highest price available and concludes
that the merger agreement was the product of arm's-length negotiations.64

HOLDING:
The Court concludes that the amended complaint does not allege a breach of
loyalty or disclosure duty, does not support a claim for aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty, and does not support a claim for tortuous interference
with a business opportunity.

ID.

CALCULATION OF SHELF REGISTRATION DAMAGES

Duncan v. Theratx, Inc., 775 A.2d 1019 (Del.Supr. 2001)
ISSUE:
The appropriate method of calculating contract damages where an issuer's
temporary suspension of a shelf registration prevents trading by stockholders in
violation ofthe terms ofa merger agreement.
FACTS:
•

In the merger agreement between Theratx, Inc. and PersonaCare, Inc.,
PersonaCare shareholders received restricted, unregistered shares in Theratx.
Theratx filed a shelf registration that would permit the holders to trade the
shares in the event of a public offering.

•

Soon after the trading began, Theratx acquired another company. Since the
acquisition was a material change requiring an amendment to the shelf
registration, Theratx suspended the shelfregistration and re-imposed trading
restrictions on the PersonaCare stockholders' shares.

•

The PersonaCare stockholders sued for breach ofthe merger agreement. 65

ANALYSIS:
•

The Delaware Supreme Court must identify the damages rule that provides
the stockholders with adequate compensation for a breach and provides both
parties with the incentive to minimize joint losses from the breach.

•

Court states that the stockholders' lost expectation interest is the reduction in
the their presumptive capital gains attributable to the trading restrictions.

64 The Court also disposes ora tortuous interference claim against Knightsbridge, stating that Knightsbridge's
alleged misrepresentation was remedied well before the board ofFrederick's acted and that the allegations \vere
insufficient to support the inference that the alleged misrepresentation caused the board to accept the Knightsbridge
offer and reject the higher Veritas offer.

65 The case originated in the United States District Court for the Northern District ofGeorgia. The district com
held that Theratx breached the mer~er agreement. On appeal to the United States Court ofAppeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, the Court affirmed but certIfied the question ofdamages to the Dela\vare Supreme Court.
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•

Thus, the Court must determine: (1) the best estimate ofwhat the sale price
would have been absent the restrictions, and (2) at what point the Court
should measure the value ofthe shares after the restrictions were lifted.

•

Court estimates the hypothetical sale price by identifying a reasonable period
after the restriction was imposed during which the stockholders could have
sold the shares and then by selecting the "highest intermediate sale price"
during that period as the presumed sale price.

•

Court then determines the amount that the hypothetical "highest intermediate
sale price" must be reduced to reflect the remaining value ofthe shares after
the breach. The Court uses the average price ofthe shares immediately after
reinstatement, or the "hypothetical immediate sale price. It

HOLDING:
Court concludes that contract damages causedbythe suspension ofa shelfregistration
in violation of a contract are measured by calculating the difference between (1) the
highest intermediate price ofthe shares during a reasonable time at the beginning of
the restricted period and (2) the average market price of the shares during a
reasonable period after the restrictions were lifted
DISCUSSION:
The Duncan holding is important as the Delaware Supreme Court, in a case of first
impression, decides the appropriate method for calculating contract damages where
an issuer violates a merger agreement by preventing trading by stockholders through
the suspension of a shelf registration. While this is not an area that is traditionally
heavily litigated, the Court has outlined its method for calculating damages and has
provided an incentive to both parties to minimize the effects of a breach.

IV.

DISCLOSURES TO "CASHED-OUT" MINORITY STOCKHOLDERS

Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170 (Del.Supr. 2000).
ISSUE:
The adequacy of corporate disclosures to minority stockholders who were "cashed
out" in a merger approved by the majority stockholder.
•

Minority stockholders suggest that more than the traditional disclosure
requirements must be disclosed where a merger decision has been made and
the only decision for the minority stockholders is whether to seek appraisal.

•

Directors argue that traditional disclosure requirements are adequate and that
there should not be a different standard for appraisals.

FACTS:

•

House of Fabrics, Inc. (UHF'), agreed to be acquired by Fabric-Centers of
America, Inc. ("FCA") in a two step transaction--tender offer for a majority
ofHF shares followed by a merger.

•

Three weeks after the tender offer closed, HF announced the second step of
the merger and sent the minority stockholders a Notice ofSpecial Meeting of
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Stockholders ("Notice and an Information Statement ("IS"), but no proxy.
tl

)

•

HF explained that FeA owned enough shares ofHF, approximately 77%, to
approve the merger without the vote ofany other stockholder. Thus, minority
stockholders were not asked to vote on the merger.

•

Plaintiffs allege that FCAts and HFs directors breached their fiduciary duties
by failing to disclose certain financial projections, financial reports, the range
ofHFs fair value, and the board's reason to sell the company.

ANALYSIS:
•

The Delaware Supreme Court states that the duty of disclosure requires
directors to "disclose fully and fairly all material information within the board's
contro!."

•

For a disclosure claim, a party must identify the missing facts, state why they
meet the materiality standard, and demonstrate how the omission of the
alleged fact caused injury.

•

Court states that the minority stockholders failed to show that the omitted
data would be material to the their decision to support the merger.

HOLDING:
While agreeing that a stockholder deciding whether to seek appraisal should
be given financial information that is material to the decision, the Court rejects
the contention that there should be a new disclosure standard in cases \vhere
appraisal is an option.
•

The Court rejects the argument that stockholders should be given all
the financial data that they would need if they were making an
independent determinatio~ of the company's value.

DISCUSSION:
The Delaware Supreme Court clearlyrejects any argument that "cashed-out" minority
stockholders in a merger approved by the majority stockholder have the right to a
new, more stringent disclosure standard simply because appraisal is an option.
Although the Court establishes that minority stockholders should receive all material
information within the target board's control, it refuses to require any additional
disclosure in the appraisal context.
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PURCHASE ACCOUNTING & GOODWILL

A-44

MEMORANDUM FOR J. WOOLERY
Purchase Accounting & Goodwill
D. Y. Abebe

February S, 2002

The Financial Accounting Standards Board's ("FASB decision to eliminate the
pooling of interests accounting method and to allow an "impairment" test to determine
whether to amortize goodwill assets has changed the traditional accounting treatment for
business combinations.
It

)

This memorandum briefly outlines the previous accounting regime and discusses
the steps for applying the "impairment" test to new business combinations. It is not
intended to be a comprehensive description or analysis ofthe new FASB statements.66
I.

POOLING V. PURCHASE ACCOUNTING

Under the pooling of interests accounting method, an acquirer assumes the assets,
liabilities, and net worth of the target company at the value present on the target's financial
statements. With this treatment, there is no accounting goodwill because the value of the
target's capital and inventory transfer to the acquirer without adjustment.
In purchase accounting, if an acquirer's cost for the target is greater than the value
ofthe target's assets, the excess in cost creates amortizable goodwill. Acquirers could
amortize the goodwill assets as charges against earnings for a period not exceeding forty
years. Although the acquirer's assets are increased using this method, it must still write
down the newly created goodwill over time, thereby affecting the acquirer's stock price
and future earnings.
II.

NEW TREATMENT OF GOODWILL

Under FASB Rule No. 141, "Business Combinations" and Rule No. 142,
"Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets," acquirers using the purchase accounting method
will not have to amortize the goodwill assets over time. In addition, the FASB eliminated
the pooling of interests method for business combinations. The new accounting treatment
allows acquirers to subject the goodwill assets to an "impairment" test, in which the
acquirer must determine whether there has been a decline in value of the goodwill. If
there is an "impairment" of the goodwill's value, the acquirer must then amortize the
goodwill asset to its fair value.
ID.

GOODWILL IMPAIRMENT TEST

The are several steps involved in determining whether the goodwill assets have
been impaired:
1.
66

A company must determine fair value of each reporting unit. The "fair

Please refer to the full text ofthe FASB's statements for the official description ofthe rules.
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value" of a reporting unit is the amount at which it could be purchased or
sold in a current transaction between willing parties.
Once the company determines the fair value, proceed to the next step
ofthe impairment test only if the fair value is less than the carrying
value.

IV.

2.

Ifthe fair value is less than the carrying value, then the company must
determine the fair value of all tangible and intangible net assets of each
reporting unit in order to anive at the "implied fair value" of that reporting
unit's goodwill.

3.

The implied fair value ofthe goodwill is equal to the fair value of the
reporting unit, as determined in step one, subtracted by the fair value of
that reporting unit's tangible and intangible net assets.

4.

Ifthe implied fair value ofthe goodwill ofa reporting unit is less than its
canying value, the goodwill is written down to the implied fair value.

INTERIM TESTING

In addition to the annual impairment test required by FASB No. 142, interim tests
are mandatory when an event occurs or circumstances change between annual tests that
would more likely than not reduce the fair value of the reporting unit below its carrying
value. Such events include:

v.

1.

Significant adverse changes in legal factors or business climate;

2.

Adverse actions or assessments by a regulator;

3.

Unanticipated competition;

4.

Loss of key personnel; and

5.

"A more likely than not" expectation that a reporting unit or significant
portion of a reporting unit will be sold or otherwise disposed of; and

EXEMPTION FROM ANNUAL IMPAIRMENT TESTING

There are also exemptions from the annual impairment test. If the following three
conditions are satisfied with respect to a reporting unit, a company does not have to
engage in the annual impairment test for that reporting unit:
1.

The assets and liabilities ofthe reporting unit have not changed significantly
since the last fair value determination.

2.

The amount of the most recent fair value determination exceeded the
canying amount ofthe reporting unit by a substantial margin.

3.

Based on an analysis of events and changed circumstances since the most
recent valuation, the likelihood that a current fair value determination
.would be lower than the canying value of the reporting unit is remote.
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The ffiptryson case was chosen as a subject for this seminar because of the enlightening view it
give practitioners of how their highly negotiated, masterfully word-smithed, artfully arcane
contractual provisions are viewed by a knowledgeable judge with considerable business
knowledge. The case should help us all in descending from our ivory towers and wallowing in
the trenches of real issues in real deals with real people.
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--- A.2d --(Cite as: 2001 WL 675330 (Del.Ch.»
Corporation.

H

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
OPINION
STRINE, Vice Chancellor.

Court of Chancery of Delaware.

*1 This post-trial opinion addresses a demand for
specific perfonnance of a "Merger Agreement" by
IBP, Inc., the nation's number one beef and number
two pork distributor. By this .action, IBP seeks to
compel the "Merger" between itself and Tyson
Foods, Inc., the nation's leading chicken distributor,
in a transaction in which IBP stockholders will
receive their choice of $30 a share in cash or Tyson
stock, or a combination of the two.

In re IBP, INC. SHAREHOLDERS LITIGATION
IBP, INC., Defendant and Cross-Claim Plaintiff, and
Counterclaim Defendant,

v.
TYSON FOODS, INC. and LASSO ACQUISITION
CORPORAnON, Defendants, Cross-Claim
Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs.
No. elY. A. 18373.
Submitted: June 3,2001.
Decided: June 15,2001.
Corrected: June 18, 2001.
Joseph A. Rosenthal, Esquire, of Rosenthal,
Monhait, Gross & Goddess, Wilmington, Delaware;
Of Counsel: Stanley D. Bernstein, Esquire, of
Bernstein Liebhard & Lifshitz, New York, New
York, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
William D. Johnston, Christian Douglas Wright,
Danielle B. Gibbs, Esquires, of Young Conaway
Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware; Of
Counsel: Bernard W. Nussbaum, Peter C. Hein,
Kenneth B. Forrest, Eric M. Roth, Marc Wolinsky,
George T. Conway, III, Elaine P. Golin, Don W.
Cruse, Jr., Esquires, of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz, New York, New York, Attorneys for
Defendants John J. Jacobson, Jr., Wendy L. Gramm,
Martin A. Massengale, Michael L. Sanem and Jo Ann
R. Smith, and Defendant and Cross-Claim Plaintiff
and Counterclaim Defendant IBP, Inc.
Anthony W. Clark, Robert S. Saunders, Martina
Bernstein, Julie A. Tostrup, Kara R. Yancey, Darryl
A. Parson, Esquires, of Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom, Wilmington, Delaware; of
Counsel: Matthew R. KiPD, Vincent P. Schmeltz Ill,
Ryan J. RohIfsen, Cyrus Amir-Mokri, Esquires, of
Skadden, Alps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; James B.
Blair, Esquire, of Law Offices of James B. Blair,
Springdale, Arkansas; Jennifer Hendren, Esquire, of
Hendren Law Firm, Fayetteville, Arkansas; Kenneth
R. Shemin, Esquire, of Shemin Law Firm,
Fayetteville, Arkansas; Ruth Ann Wisener, Esquire,
of Conner & Winters, Fayetteville, Arkansas;
Attorneys for Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs
Tyson Foods, Inc. and Lasso Acquisition

The IBP-Tyson Merger Agreement resulted from a
vigorous auction process that pitted Tyson against the
nation's number one pork producer, Smithfield
Foods. To say that Tyson was eager to win the
auction is to slight its ardent desire to possess IBP.
During the bidding process, Tyson was anxious to
ensure that it would acquire IBP, and to make sure
Smithfield did not. By succeeding, Tyson hoped to
create the world's preeminent meat products
company--a company that would dominate the meat
cases of supennarkets in the United States and
eventually throughout the globe.
During the auction process, Tyson was given a great
deal of infonnation that suggested that IBP was
heading into a trough in the beef business. Even
more, Tyson was alerted to serious problems at an
IBP subsidiary, DFG, which had been victimized by
accounting fraud to the tune of over $30 million in
charges to earnings and which was the active subject
of an asset impairment study. Not only that, Tyson
knew that IBP was projected to fall seriously short of
the fiscal year 2000 earnings predicted in projections
prepared by IBP's Chief Financial Officer in August,
2000.
By the end of the auction process, Tyson had come
to have great doubts about IBP's ability to project its
future earnings, the credibility of IBP's management,
and thought that the important business unit in which
DFG was located--Foodbrands--was broken.
Yet, Tyson's ardor for IBP was such that Tyson
raised its bid by a total of $4.00 a share after learning
of these problems. Tyson also signed the Merger
Agreement, which permitted IBP to recognize
unlimited additional liabilities on account of the
accounting improprieties at DFG. It did so without
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told IBP management that he would blow DFG up if
he were them.

demanding any representation that IBP meet its
projections for future earnings, or any escrow tied to
those projections.

After the business decision was made to tenninate,
Tyson's legal team swung into action. They fired off
a letter tenninating the Agreement at the same time
as they filed suit accusing IBP of fraudulently
inducing the Merger that Tyson had once so
desperately desired.

After the Merger Agreement was signed on January
1, 200 I, Tyson trumpeted the value of the merger to
its stockholders and the fmancial community, and
indicated that it was fully aware of the risks that
attended the cyclical nature of IBP's business. In
early January, Tyson's stockholders ratified the
merger agreement and authorized its management to
take whatever action was needed to effectuate it.

This expedited litigation ensued, which involved
massive amounts of discovery and two weeks of trial.
[FNIl

During the winter and spring of 2001, Tyson's own
business perfonnance was dismal. Meanwhile, ffiP
was struggling through a poor fIrst quarter. Both
companies' problems were due in large measure to a
severe winter, which adversely affected livestock
supplies and vitality. As these struggles deepened,
Tyson's desire to buy IBP weakened.

In this opinion, I address IBP's claim that Tyson had
no legal basis to avoid its obligation to consummate
the Merger Agreement, as well as Tyson's contrary
arguments. The parties' extensive claims are too
numerous to summarize adequately, as are the court's
rulings.
At bottom, however, I conclude as follows:
- The Merger. Agreement and related contracts
were valid and enforceable contracts that were not
induced by any material misrepresentation or
omission;
- The Merger Agreement specifically allocated
certain risks to Tyson, including the risk of any
losses or fmancial effects from the accounting
improprieties at DFG, and these risks cannot serve
as a basis for Tyson to tenninate the Agreement;
- None of the non-DFG related issues that the SEC
raised constitute a contractually pennissible basis
for Tyson to walk away from the Merger;
- IBP has not suffered a Material Adverse Effect
within the meaning of the Agreement that excused
Tyson's failure to close the Merger; and
*3- Specific perfonnance is the decisively
preferable remedy for Tyson's breach, as it is the
only method by which to adequately redress the
hann threatened to mp and its stockholders.

*2 This cooling of affections frrst resulted in a slowdown by Tyson in the process of consummating a
transaction, a slow-down that was attributed to mp's
on-going efforts to resolve issues that had been raised
about its financial statements by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The most important
of these issues was how to report the problems at
DFG, which Tyson had been aware of at the time it
signed the Merger Agreement. Indeed, all the key
issues that the SEC raised with IBP were known by
Tyson at the time it signed the Merger Agreement.
The SEC fIrst raised these issues in a faxed letter on
December 29, 2000 to IBP's outside counsel. Neither
IBP management nor Tyson learned of the letter until
the second week of January, 2001. After learning of
the letter, Tyson management put the Merger
Agreement to a successful board and stockholder
vote.
But the most important reason that Tyson slowed
down the Merger process was different: it was having
buyer's regret. Tyson wished it had paid less
especially in view of its own compromised 2001
perfonnance and IBP's slow 2001 results.

I. Factual Background
IBP's Key Managers
IBP was fIrst incorporated in 1960. Its current
Chainnan of the Board and Chief Executive Officer,
Robert Peterson, has been with the company from the
beginning. Having started in the cattle business as a
cattle driver, Peterson learned the business from the
ground up and has been the strategic catalyst behind
IBP's growth from a relatively small fresh beef
business to a diversified food company with sales of
over $15 billion annually.

By March, Tyson's founder and controlling
stockholder, Don Tyson, no longer wanted to go
through with the Merger Agreement. He made the
decision to abandon the Merger. His son, John Tyson,
Tyson's Chief Executive Officer, and the other Tyson
managers followed his instructions. Don Tyson
abandoned the Merger because of ffiP's and Tyson's
poor results in 2001, and not because of DFG or the
SEC issues IBP was dealing with. Indeed, Don Tyson

Copr. <0 West 2002 No Claim to Orig.U.S. Govt. Works

B-2

2001 WL 675330
--- A.2d --(Cite as: 2001 WL 675330 (DeI.Ch.»

Page 3

Peterson is a strong and committed CEO, who loves
the business he has helped build and the people who
work for it. By the late 1990s, however, Peterson was
in his late sixties and cognizant that it would soon be
time to tum the reins over to a new CEO. Peterson's
heir apparent was IBP's President and Chief
Operating Officer, Richard "Dick" Bond. By 2000,
Peterson had also installed one of his top aides, Larry
Shipley, as IBP's Chief Financial Officer. Sheila
Hagen was IBP's General Counsel, having joined the
company from one of its beef industry rivals.
Although this quartet all have important roles in the
company, it is clear that Peterson remains the
dominant manager at IBP, and that Bond is the next
most important. Shipley and Hagen, however, each
have important duties regarding fmancial and legal
functions at issue in this case. As in any organization,
the roles of the four overlapped, but imperfectly so.
Put less obliquely, it is common for "big picture"
executives to view and speak about issues from a
larger strategic perspective that is less specific and
technically precise than executives like CFOs and
General Counsels who are charged with getting the
details precisely right.

sale. Because these processing activities "add value,"
they tend to have higher profit margins and generate
more stable earnings than middleman meat
slaughtering.
*4 To carry out this strategy, IBP had recently made
a series of acquisitions, including the purchase of
Corporate Food Brands America, Inc. ("CFBA") in
February 2000. These purchased entities were being
put together within IBP under the larger heading of
Foodbrands. The companies make a variety of
products, such as pizza toppings and crusts, side
dishes, sauces, condiments, and portion-controlled
meat products. IBP was also intent on promoting a
branded line of lunch meat and similar products
under the name ItThomas E. Wilson."
IBP hoped that these processed food investments
would provide a vehicle for growth and reduce the
year-to-year volatility of IBP's earnings. Given that
most of the acquired companies within Foodbrands
had been purchased no earlier than 1998, IBP was
obviously quite early in executing this yet-ta-be fully
proven strategy.
Moreover, while Foodbrands was a central part of
IBP's strategy for the future, it remained at that time a
much smaller contributor to the bottom line than
IBP's' fresh meats business. As originally reported,
for example, fiscal year (tfFY") 1999 sales for IBP's
fresh meats business were $12.4 billion as opposed to
$1.7 billion for Foodbrands. [FN2] Similarly, FY
1999 operating earnings in the fresh meats business
were $438 million as opposed to $90 million for
Foodbrands. [FN3] Thus, while Foodbrands had a
higher profit margin, fresh meats remained by far the
most substantial part of IBP's business.

IBP's Business
The traditional business of IBP is being a meat
processor that acts as the middleman between
ranchers and retail supermarkets and food processors.
This is the so-called "fresh meats" business of IBP.
Over the years, that business has evolved in
sophistication so that just about every inch of the
animals eventually can be processed by IBP or a later
purchaser into something useful. The fresh meats
business has also gotten more and more precise in
terms of slaughtering.; Whereas very large sections of
animals used to be shipped to end- users, the industry
trend is for middlemen like IBP to do more of the
cutting.

IBP Management Proposes An LBO

As of 2000, IBP was on the verge of taking that
strategy to its next level. Instead of shipping large
sections of meat to stores for further butchering, IBP
was preparing to butcher meat itself: which would be
shipped "case ready"-- that is, ready to be put into the
supennarket case. This was a new endeavor that was
hoped to yield higher margins and reduce the overall
cyclicality of IBP's business.

During 1999 and early 2000, IBP's management was
frustrated by the stock market's valuation of the
company's stock. As earnings-less dot.coms traded at
huge multiples to eyeball hits, IBP's stock traded at a
relatively small multiple to actual earnings. In
response to this problem, Peterson, Bond, and
Shipley were receptive when the investment bank of
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. ("DLJ")
expressed interest in a leveraged-buyout ("LBO") of
the company.

Likewise; IBP was endeavoring to build up its food
processing businesses. These are the businesses that
take raw food products and tum them into something
canned or packaged for supennarket or restaurant

In July, management infonned the IBP board that it
would like to pursue an LBO seriously. With the help
of DLJ, a syndicate of investors who called
themselves "Rawhide" was prepared to take the
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company private if a deal could be negotiated with
the IBP board. The board formed a special committee
comprised of outside directors, who then selected
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz as its legal advisor
and J.P. Morgan Securities, Inc. as its fmancial
advisor.

also heavily weather- driven. Ranchers are paid more
money for large animals, from which more meat can
be butchered. Cold weather makes it difficult for
ranchers to grow the animals to the point where they
will sell for the optimal price. When a severe winter
hits, ranchers may hold animals back, so that they can
be sold later after having been grown to more
profitable sizes.

To facilitate their work, the special committee and
J.P. Morgan asked IBP management to develop a set
of five-year projections for the performance of IBP,
which I will call the "Rawhide Projections" or the
"Projections." This request put the IBP management
in the position of performing a task that was
relatively novel to them. While IBP had periodically
prepared two to three-year projections for rating
agencies, it was not accustomed to making five-year
projections. Even more important, it did not utilize
such long-term projections in its own business
operations.

IBP's Foodbrands business was also affected by
fluctuations in livestock pricing, because it uses fresh
meats as raw material. While Foodbrands has a
relatively greater ability to make up for any shortage
in livestock than the fresh meats part of IBP,
Foodbrands also suffers when livestock supplies are
tight and is unable to pass on its increased costs
immediately. Instead, it hopes to regain its reduced
margins within a reasonable time. [FN4]
For all these reasons, IBP's management was wary of
preparing a five-year projection, but did so. The task
fell largely to Shipley as CFO. His methodology was
sound and reasonable, if not scientific. In sum,
Shipley's August, 2000 Rawhide Projections assumed
as follows:
• Fresh Meats:
«SYM» Beef: Shipley estimates for FY 2000
profitability (ttEBIT fFN51 per head tt ) and volume
were based on first-half results and projected to
continue through the rest of the year. Thus, he
projected EBIT per head of $27.50. But Shipley
assumed a sharp decline in EBIT per head in 2001
to $16.50 per head, and a further decline in 2002" to
$15.00, and a modest increase from 2003 to 2005.
Profitability during this period was expected to
remain fairly flat. fFN61 Shipley based his
estimates on an expected trough in the cattle cycle,
in view of historical trends.
*6 «SYM» Pork: Shipley used the same perhead EBIT figure for all five years, derived from
IBP's historical average, with a slight upward
adjustment for industry rationalization. Overall
EBIT fluctuated, but was fairly steady throughout.
• Logistics/Other: This category deals with IBP's
trucking and freezer businesses. Shipley simply
assumed that FY 2000 estimated profits would be
repeated in each of the projected years because it
was a stable business.
• Case Ready: Shipley used management's existing
assumptions. These projected losses for 2000 and
2001, and profitability in years 2002-2005.
• Foodbrands: Shipley divided Foodbrands into
three basic categories as follows:
.(500) Thomas E. Wilson--Shipley assumed that
IBP's venture into branded ready-to-eat or cooked

*5 To the contrary, IBP generally created plans for
the coming year. In the fresh beef part· of the
business, these plans were quite ambitious and
designed to motivate excellent performance, rather
than to be predictive of actual results. The plans for
the processed foods part of the business were
designed to be more predictive, but these plans also
dealt with the part of the business that was. newest,
and that included several units that had been recently
purchased by IBP.
Several other factors made it difficult to project
IBP's performance accurately. Although IBP was
executing a strategy to diversify its business so as to
be less dependent on its fresh meats business, the
reality was that fresh meats was still the core of the
company, constituting well over 80% of its sales and
earnings in 1999. Not only that, IBP's processed
foods division used fresh meats heavily.
As a middleman processor of fresh meats, IBP
purchases cows and hogs at market prices, slaughters
them, and sells them to food retailers and food
processors. IBP's profit margins are quite tight. When
live stock supplies are low, these margins shrink
further. When livestock supplies are plentiful, IBP is
more profitable.
Cattle and hog supplies go through cycles that can be
tracked with some general precision using
information from the United States Deparbnent of
Agriculture. These cycles are affected by actual
demand and ranchers' expectations of market
demand, as well as the need at various points to hold
animals back to build up herds. Livestock supply is
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been performed in August.

meat products would lose money until 2003, when
it would begin to be profitable.
«SYM» IBP Foods-- This was a unit comprised
of businesses that IBP had purchased out of
bankruptcy. Shipley projected losses in 2000 and
200 I, and profitability in the remaining years.
«SYM» Other Foodbrands-- This was the heart
of Foodbrands' .business. Shipley assumed 2000
EBIT of $157 million with a steady growth rate of
8% for the remaining years.

*7 The Rawhide deal was publicly announced the
next day. By this time, rumors had been circulating
within the fmancial community about the possibility
of such a deal.
The announcement of the transaction inspired class
action lawsuits in this court, alleging that the
transaction was unfair. These suits were filed
irrespective of the minimal barriers that existed to a
higher transaction.

The overall picture for Foodbrands therefore was a
composite of these assumptions that had Foodbrands
producing $125 million in EBIT in 2000, $137
million in 2001, and growing to nearly $300 million
by 2005. The $125 million EBIT number excluded
$42.5 million in one-time costs associated with IBP's
acquisition of CFBA and the write-off of bad debt
relating to a customer (together, the "CFBA
Charges"). Shipley excluded the CFBA Charges
because they were a non-recurring cost that was not
expected to affect Foodbrands going- forward. All
users of the Rawhide Projections relevant to this
opinion were made aware of this feature of Shipley's
analysis.

Problems At DFG Foods Begin To Surface
In 1998, as part of its strategy to grow IBP's highermargin food processing business, IBP management
purchased a specialty hors d'oeuvres, kosher foods,
and "airline food" business for $91 million, including
assumed debt. IBP bought this business from its
managers, including its President, Andrew Zahn.
Within IBP, the business became known as DFG
Foods, Inc. or "DFG." In late 1999, IBP purchased a
£ompetitor of DFG named Wilton Foods, and
combined its operations with DFG. Zahn stayed on
board after the purchase of DFG and continued to run
the business, with a right to certain earn-out
payments upon his departure that were tied to the
unit's performance.

Shipley's assumptions were reasonable given the
inherent imprecision of the task he was given. In
reaching this conclusion, I also fmd that the Rawhide
Projections were prepared with particular users in
mind: a sophisticated special committee and
investment bank that would understand that
projections of this kind are at best a useful roadmap
to where a business may go if the assumptions used
in the model pan out and if the company's business
plan is executed well. Shipley reasonably assumed
that the users of the Projections would approach them
with the sort of intrinsic skepticism and caution that
one expects from seasoned professionals, rather than
with the unquestioning attitude of a believer at the
foot of a prophet.

Although IBP hoped that DFG would become a
useful part of its overall strategy to move into highermargin businesses, as of the year 2000, DFG was an
insign'ificant portion of IBP's overall business. Before
the drastic adjustments that I will discuss later, DFG's
1999 sales had been around $75 million and its pretax earnings were $8.2 million. At these levels, DFG
constituted less than 1% of IBP's sales and less than
2% of its pre-tax earnings. While IBP employed
around 50,000 people at over 60 production facilities,
DFG employed approximately 300 workers at its two
facilities.

The IBP Board Accepts A Bid From The Rawhide
Group

On September 30, 2000, Andrew Zahn left DFG and
took a sizable earn-out payment with him. On
October 16, 2000, mp issued a press release
announcing earnings for the third quarter of FY 2000
of $83.9 million and year-to-date earnings of $203
million. Soon after this announcement, Dick Bond
learned that there were problems with the integrity of
DFGts books and records, and that it was possible
that DFG's inventory value was overstated.

After several months of negotiations, the Rawhide
Group and the special committee struck a deal on
October 1, 2000 whereby the Rawhide Group would
purchase all of IBP's shares at $22.25 per IBP share.
At a special committee meeting in connection with
approval of the transaction, Peterson expressed his
view that IBP's perfonnance for the second half of
the year was softening, and that overall EBIT for FY
2000 might be $500 to $525 million, a range that was
lower than the Rawhide Projection estimate that had

The evidence reveals that audit staff within the
Foodbrands unit had harbored concerns about DFG's
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accounting procedures for some time. Dan Hughes,
the director of internal audit at Foodbrands, had been
questioning issues. His boss, Bill Brady, who was
Foodbrands' CFO, had not taken these concerns as
seriously, and had resisted Hughes's suggestion to
infonn IBP's audit committee about possible
overstatements. Despite Tyson's arguments to the
contrary, there is no credible evidence that suggests
that anyone in IBP top management were on notice
about irregularities at DFG until mid-October 2000.

processed food business. Put mildly, Peterson's ardor
for a combination with Tyson was much stronger
than for a deal with Smithfield.
When Peterson spoke with him earlier, Don Tyson
saw the potential of the combination, but had recently
stepped aside as CEO to make way for a new
management team, destined to be led by his son John
Tyson. Don Tyson felt that the new team needed to
settle in before undertaking such a big deal.

When IBP top management learned of the problems
at DFG, a full inventory audit was ordered. The audit
concluded that DFG's inventory was overvalued by
$9 million. On November 7, 2000, IBP therefore
announced that it would take a $9 million reduction
over pre-tax earnings from the amounts previously
reported for third quarter of FY 2000. These amounts
were reported to the SEC in IBP's third quarter 10-Q.
As of that time, Peterson and Bond were led to
believe that the ·$9 million overstatement was the
extent of the problem at DFG, although efforts to get
control of DFG's fmancials continued.

By November 2000, the new Tyson team had been
putatively in charge for some time, and was led by
John Tyson, the company's CEO. As a part of its
active consideration of corporate strategy, Tyson
management periodically ran numbers on the
feasibility of a merger with IBP. By mid-November,
Tyson was seriously considering making a play for
IBP. Shortly before Thanksgiving, John Tyson
received a call from George Gillett, a major IBP
stockholder who was a participant in the Rawhide
group. Gillett called to encourage Tyson to bid for
IBP. By the time Gillett got to John Tyson, John
Tyson was already quite receptive.

The Auction For IBP Begins
Soon after the call with Gillett, John Tyson called
Dick Bond to set up a meeting to discuss a possible
combination. ·The meeting was arranged for
November 24, 2000 at an airport in Tampa due to the
various Thanksgiving itineraries of the expected
participants. The primary participants were to be
Peterson and Bond for IBP, and Don and John Tyson
for Tyson.

*8 The rumors about IBP's possible sale had not
gone· unnoticed among meat industry leaders. Two
industry participants had toyed with the idea of
making a play for IBP for years.
One was Smithfield Foods, the nation's number one
pork processing fmn. When combined with IBP,
Smithfield would be the number one producer of beef
and pork products. The strength of the SmithfieldIBP combination was also its weakness. Because of
IBP's own strength in pork, anti-trust and political
concerns were bound to be raised about a merger.
Nonetheless, those concerns did not impede
Smithfield from making an unsolicited bid for IBP on
November 12, 2000. The Smithfield bid offered $25
in Smithfield stock for each share of IBP stock. This
was not the best of news for IBP management, whose
relationship with Smithfield management was not

The November 24 Meeting

warm.

The November 24 meeting was a lovefest. Tyson
came ready to buy, and IBP came ready to be bought.
The meeting was dominated by the two elder
statesmen, Peterson and Don Tyson. Each was
excited about the possibility of combining the
companies, under the day-to-day leadership of John
Tyson and Dick Bond. Don Tyson had even been
dreaming about the companies' combined balanced
sheets at bedtime.

Meanwhile, Tyson Foods had been pondering a deal
with IBP for several years. Bob Peterson and Tyson
founder and controlling stockholder, Don Tyson,
were old industry friends with great respect for one
another. In the preceding year or so, Peterson had
bantered with Don Tyson about the idea of putting
Tyson and ffiP together. This would create a
company that was number one in beef and chicken,
number two in pork, and that would have a diverse

*9 The two discussed the combination in general,
big picture tenns with great enthusiasm. Peterson told
the two Tysons that the Rawhide Projections would
soon be published. He expressed confidence that
perfonnance of the kind indicated in the Projections
could be achieved by ffiP and that his own internal
operating plans for ffiP were more ambitious. But at
no time did Peterson promise that IBP could be
guaranteed to perfonn as the Projections predicted.
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Don Tyson ended the meeting by saying that the
companies ought to be put together as quickly as
possible.

Indeed, Peterson discussed many of the risk factors
that affected IBP and that would naturally lead a
reasonable listener to conclude that future results
could not be projected with certainty. These risk
factors included the cattle cycle, which Peterson
explained was likely to be on the downside in the
ensuing years.

The Rawhide Projections Are Published
*10 On November 28, 2000, the preliminary proxy
statement for the Rawhide deal was filed with the
SEC. The preliminary statement included a
description of the Rawhide Projections. The
statement included the Projections "solely because of
the disclosures [of them] that were made to J.P.
Morgan " during the negotiation process. fFN81 The
preliminary proxy statement included a large amount
of highlighted language that was intended to signal
the caution with which those Projections should be
used. A careful reader of the preliminary proxy
would have noted, among other things, that: (i) the
Projections had been prepared in August 2000; (ii)
that the Projections had not been updated; (iii) that
IBP Management does not ordinarily make such
Projections; (iv) that the Projections should be read in
light of IBP's most recent fmancial statements; (v)
that there were a large number of risks that could
affect whether the Projections would be met,
particularly supply cycles in the livestock markets;
and (vi) that the Projections were not guarantees of
particular results.

The testimony suggests that the conversation was
largely focused on the future and the synergistic
benefits of the combination, and not as much on year
2000. While I have little doubt that Peterson
expressed confidence in his company, I also conclude
that he did not promise Tyson that IBP's FY 2000
results would be exactly as set forth in the Rawhide
Projections. I do think Peterson felt that IBP would
have a good year and projected that confidence. That
is, I conclude that his subjective belief was fully in
accord with the views he expressed to the Tysons.
I also conclude that Peterson felt that he was having
a big picture conversation with savvy businessmen,
who would be careful to absorb his larger thoughts
against a backdrop infonned by careful reading and
examination of all the information usually considered
by a corporation considering a mega- transaction. In
this regard, I specifically conclude that a reasonable
participant in the meeting would have assumed that
the statements of all participants were general and in
keeping with the infonnal and preliminary nature of
the meeting. In talking about the Rawhide Projections
that were to be released soon, the IBP participants
would have naturally assumed that the Tysons would
read them carefully and the information that qualified
them. This assumption that Tyson Foods was
proceeding cautiously and not heedlessly is borne out
by record evidence that shows that Tyson was
running its own assumptions about a combination,
with downside cases.

By November 28, 2000, IBP had already issued its
third quarter 10-Q. The preliminary proxy statement
expressly infonned readers that the Rawhide
Projections--which had been made as of August 2000
and had not been updated-- should be read in light of
the third quarter 10-Q. The third quarter 10-Q
contained information that suggested that IBP would
have difficulty meeting the $542 million in EBIT
predicted for the year 2000. By the end of the third
quarter, IBP's total reported EBIT was $340 million,
a result that trailed third quarter results for FY 1999
by $67 million. fFN91 Whereas the Rawhide
Projections had assumed that Foodbrands would
deliver EBIT of $125 million for full year 2000,
Foodbrands had only delivered around $50 million as
of the end of third quarter 2000 on a nonnalized
basis. fFNI01 It thus needed to generate more EBIT
in the fourth quarter than the whole ofthe preceding
year to meet the Rawhide Projections' estimate.

As a result, I conclude that John and Don Tyson did
not form a belief at the November 24 meeting that the
Rawhide Projections were in the bank and would be
met with ease. Instead, they took away the view that
Peterson and Bond believed that ffiP would meet
those Projections, but that there were no guarantees
of that and that there were known risks that could
compromise IBP's ability to deliver.
At a later point in the meeting, enthusiasm for the
deal had run so high that the participants called in
Tyson General Counsel Les Baledge, who had flown
down with John Tyson, to discuss generally how the
parties would proceed if Tyson made a bid. fFN71 By
the end of the meeting, the Tysons were enthusiastic.

Tyson Makes Its Opening Bid
In early December, the Tyson board of directors met
to consider making a bid for IBP. John Tyson's vision
for the deal was fundamental: he wanted to dominate
the meat case of America's supennarkets and be the
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projections, forecasts, records, and other materials
(whether prepared by the Company, its agent or
advisors or otherwise ), regardless of the form of
communication, that contain ·or otherwise reflect
information concerning the Company that we or

"premier protein center-of-the-plate provider" in the
world. [FNlll TysonllBP would be number one in
beef and chicken, and number two in pork. It would
therefore be able to provide supennarkets with nearly
all the meat they needed.

our Representatives may be provided by or on
behalf of the Company or its agents or advisors in
the course of our evaluation of a possible
Transaction. [FN 131
The agreement carves out from the defmition the
following:
This Agreement shall be inoperative as to those
particular portions of the Evaluation Material that
(i) become available to the public other than as a
result of a disclosure by us or any of our
Representatives, (ii) were available to us on a nonconfidential basis prior to the disclosure of such
Evaluation Material to us pursuant to this
Agreement, or (iii) becomes available to us or our
Representatives on a non-confidential basis from a
source other than the Company or its agents or
advisors provided that the source of such
information was not known by us to be
contractually prohibited from making such
disclosure to us or such Representative. [FN14)

Not only that, John Tyson saw the potential to bring
Tyson Foods' own experience and unique expertise to
bear outside of the poultry realm. As all parties agree,
Tyson was an innovator in the meat industry, which
had been the leader in demonstrating that a meat
processor could produce value-added meat products
of a ready-to-eat and ready-to-heat nature. In the past,
meat processors sold large portions of meat to
supermarkets and. other processors, who butchered
them and cooked them into higher priced serving
sizes. Tyson began to do much of that work itself:
thus preserving more of the profit for itself.
*11 IBP was acknowledged to have a great fresh
beefs business with an· excellent, long-term track
record. While it was beginning to embark on valueadded strategies in the beef and pork industry, IBP
was by all accounts not as far along in that corporate
strategy and could most benefit from Tyson's
expertise in that particular area. John Tyson saw the
potential for Tyson's expertise to help IBP do in beef
and pork what Tyson had done in poultry. His vision
of the companies, however, had little to do with DFG
specifically, a small subpart of Foodbrands that he
knew little, if anything, about.

As plainly written, the Confidentiality Agreement
thus defmes Evaluation Material to include
essentially all non-public information in IBP's
possession, regardless of whether the company's
employees or agents prepared it. The terms of the
Confidentiality Agreement also emphasize to an
objective reader that the merger negotiation process
would not be one during which Tyson could
reasonably rely on oral assurances. Instead, if Tyson
wished to protect itself, it would have to ensure that
any oral promises were converted into contractual
representations and warranties. The Confidentiality
Agreement does so by providing:
*12 We understand and agree that none of the
Company, its advisors or any of their affiliates,
agents, advisors or representatives (i) have made or
make any representation or warranty, expressed or
implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the
Evaluation Material or (ii) shall have any liability
whatsoever to us or our Representatives relating to
or resulting from the use of the Evaluation Material
or any errors therein or omissions therefrom,
except in the case of (i) and (ii), to the extent
provided in any defmitive agreement relating to a
Transaction. [FN151

Tyson's
board
supported
management's
recommendation to make a bid. On December 4,
2000, Tyson proposed to acquire IBP in a two-step
transaction valued at $26 (half cash, half stock) per
share. Tyson trumpeted the fact that its offer was
preferable to Smithfield's, in no small measure
because Tyson did not face the same degree of antitrust complications that Smithfield did and could thus
deliver on its offer more quickly. To emphasize this
point, Tyson said that its offer was "subject to
completion of a quick, confmnatory due diligence
review and negotiation of' a defmitive merger
agreement." [FN 12]
To that end, Tyson sent IBP an executed
"Confidentiality Agreement," modeled on one signed
by Smithfield, which would permit it to have access
to non- public, due diligence infonnation about IBP.
That Agreement contains a broad defmition of
"Evaluation Material" that states:
For purposes of this· Agreement, Evaluation
Material shall mean all information, data, reports,
analyses, compilations, studies, interpretations,

The Due Diligence Process Begins
Tyson did not enter into the due diligence process
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its due diligence point person, Read Hudson. Tyson
was also represented by its outside fmancial and legal
advisors. The IBP team included Peterson, Bond,
Shipley, and Hagen, as well as its outside fmancial
and legal advisors.

alone. It retained Millbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCoy
as its primary legal advisor, Merrill Lynch & Co. as
its primary fmancial advisor, and Ernst.& Young as·
its accountants.
The bidding process was being run by IBP's special
committee. As members of the Rawhide group,
Peterson, Bond and their subordinates were
considered "interested" participants. Thus, while IBP
management played a key informational role, the
special committee had the fmal say.

*13 Tyson came to the meeting expecting the now

de rigeur Power-Point presentation. IBP came
expecting to answer Tyson's questions. As a result,
the meeting became a question and answer session
that covered IBP's business, segment by segment.

On December 5 and 6, 2000, Tyson's due diligence
team reviewed information in the data room at
WachtelI, Lipton. Tyson soon learned that the data
room did not contain certain information about
Foodbrands and the reason why that was so: IBP was
reluctant to share competitively sensitive infonnation
with Smithfield. The specialconunittee's approach to
this sales process was to treat the bidders with parity.
As a result, Tyson was told that any information it
wanted that was not in the data room could be
provided, but that if Tyson received that information,
so would Smithfield.

At least two important issues were discussed at the
meeting. I will start with the DFG issue. Going into
the December 8, 2000 meeting, the chairwoman of
the IBP special committee, Joann Smith, specifically
told John Tyson to ask about DFG at the meeting.
According to IBP witnesses, the DFG situation had
gotten more serious by December 8. IBP's top
management was concerned that the accounting
problems at DFG were deeper than they had
recognized and that additional charges to earnings
might be necessary. The IBP employee-witnesses all
remember Peterson saying that the DFG problem had
gotten worse by at least $20 million. Peterson himself
remembers speaking in angry and vehement terms
about Andy Zahn, labeling him as a "thief in the hen
house," and the progeny of a female dog who should
be hanged on main street in front of a crowd. [FN221
He also recalls saying that DFG was a "black hole."
His colleagues at IBP have far less specific
recollections, but do recall Peterson being quite
upset.

As a result of its due diligence, Tyson flagged
certain items including:
• Possible· asset impairments at DFG and certain
other Foodbrands companies. [FN 161
• Discrepancies in the way that IBP reported its
business segments. [FN 171
Concerns regarding whether the CFBA
acquisition qualified as a pooling. [FN 181
• IBP's policy of recognizing revenue upon
invoicing, which was going to have to change on a
going-forward basis because of new SEC guidance.
[FN191
• IBP's possible over-confidence about the outcome
of certain environmental cases. [FN201
• IBP's decision to treat its stock option plan as
involving the issuance of "fixed" rather than
"variable" options, and whether the accounting
treatment for the plan, which was disclosed in the
company's fmancial statements, was proper.
[FN211

The Tyson witnesses have a different recollection.
They recall being told that DFG was a $9 million
problem. Leatherby's notes of the meeting note that
there had been a "$9 nun writedown here (guy fired)
fudged earnout," that DFG was "not doing well," but
that IBP "believe[d] in bus." [FN23] Hankins's notes
about DFG tersely state: "DFG--At bottom of
problem." [FN241 None of the Tyson witnesses
heard Peterson describe Zahn--at that meeting--in
such unforgettable terms. They do admit, however,
that Peterson appeared agitated and upset by the
issue, that the problem was attributed to fraud by
Zahn, that Zahn had been the head of the business,
that Zahn was now gone, and that IBP was looking
into his activities.

IBP And Tyson Hold A December 8, 2000 Due
Diligence Meeting
On December 8, 2000, due diligence teams from
Tyson and IBP met in Sioux City, Iowa. The meeting
was attended by the top managers from each side.
Tyson's team included its CEO John Tyson, its CFO
Steve Hankins, its Senior Finance Vice President
Dennis Leatherby, and the in-house lawyer who was

Tyson CEO John Tyson testified at his deposition
that he was told at the December 8, 2000 meeting that
the problem had reached $20 million, which accords
with the account of the IBP witnesses. [FN25] At
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trial, John Tyson recanted this testimony. And a
chronology prepared in early 2001 by Leatherby
indicates that the DFG problem was defmed at $9
million on December 8, 2000, but that he was told by
IBP in mid-December, 2000 that the DFG problem
was "more like $30 mm." [FN261
I cannot conclude with any certainty exactly what
was said at the December 8, 2000 meeting. I fmd it
unlikely that Peterson spoke as vividly as he now
recalls at that meeting; rather I believe that Peterson
is recalling later comments he made to Tyson
representatives. But the parties were then engaged in
very intensive efforts on several fronts at once. The
DFG discussion on December 8, 2000 then had little
of the significance that it has now.
It is quite possible that all of the witnesses are
testifying honestly, but that some have telescoped
separate events together in a manner that generates
chronological error. For reasons that will become
clear, the question of whether Tyson was infonned on
December 8 that the problem was worse than $9
million is not critical. The undisputed facts show that
Tyson was apprised of fraud by the highest level
executive of DFG and that the business had serious
problems. Likewise, it is undisputed that the IBP
representatives believed that DFG was a viable
business, notwithstanding the serious problems it
faced because of Zahn, and that they were acting to
address those problems so that DFG could be turned
around.
The Discussion Of The Rawhide Projections
*14 The Rawhide Projections were also discussed at
the December 8 meeting. IBP management again
indicated that the Projections were based oq
reasonable and attainable assumptions, and that they
had confidence in the company's ability to meet those
projections in future years. Again, however, these
statements were made in a context that emphasized
the inherent uncertainty of any prediction of future
perfonnance. Much of the meeting dealt with IBP's
business, including the various risk factors that
influence whether IBP will perfonn well. In
particular, the Tyson representatives were told about
the cattle cycle, and the adverse effect that severe
weather conditions have on cattle supplies. [FN27]
IBP's management never promised or guaranteed that
the company would meet the Rawhide Projections. In
fact, Peterson told Tyson that one of DLl's biggest
concerns during the LBO process was the difficulty
of forecasting IBP's future earnings. [FN281

The participants seem to have placed little focus on
FY 2000. IBP's representatives never clearly
indicated that the company would not meet the
Rawhide target for the year. For their part, the Tyson
participants appear to have been oblivious to the
obvious warnings in the IBP third quarter 10-Q that
IBP was well behind the run-rate neededto meet the
Projections, particularly as to Foodbrands. Therefore,
the Tyson and IBP representatives did not get
"granular"--as the current lexicon goes--regarding
IBP's 2000 perfonnance-to- date. Indeed, at no time
in December did Tyson ever ask IBP for updated
profit and loss infonnation for the year.
Tyson Asks For Additional Due Diligence Regarding
Foodbrands
After the December 8, 2000 meeting, Tyson quickly
commenced its tender offer. As due diligence
continued, Tyson requested access to additional
accounting infonnation involving Foodbrands. IBP
management responded with this basic and consistent
theme: "if you want to look at it, we have to show it
to Smithfield, too. But if you want Smithfield to see
it, you can have it."
This line of reasoning was frustrating to certain
members of Tyson's due diligence team. Nonetheless,
Tyson was never denied access to documents, it was
simply told to make a tactical decision. Because
Tyson wanted to buy IBP and wanted to compete
with Smithfield after doing so, Tyson did not wish
Smithfield to see the information. Nor did IBP
management, who preferred that Tyson come out on
top in the bidding.
Tyson also never chose to narrow its due diligence
requests to deal only with the fraud at DFG. It did so
even though its own accountants were concerned
about the issue and whether IBP had really gotten to
the bottom of the problem. [FN291 While Tyson says
it did not dig deeper because IBP management told it
there was nothing bad at Foodbrands and Tyson
relied upon those assurances, I do not fmd that
testimony credible. While IBP management may
have said that there were no problems at Foodbrands
other than DFG, there is no credible evidence that
any such statements were untrue when made, or, as
we shall see, that Tyson placed any trust in .those
statements. Most important, IBP never denied Tyson
access and had already told Tyson that there had been
fraud at DFG. As a result, it is more probable that
Tyson simply wanted to keep Smithfield from having
knowledge about a business unit Tyson hoped to
soon own. What is certain is that Tyson never
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demanded access to additional due diligence as a
condition to going forward with a merger.

J.P. Morgan. The update reduced IBP's expected
EBIT for FY 2000 by $70 million-- from $542 to
$472 million. [FN32]

The Problems At DFG Grow Deeper

* 15 During this same period, IBP management was
wrestling with the DFG situation. On December II,
2000, Foodbrands' CFO Brady had sent a
memorandum to Foodbrands President Randy
Devening. The memorandum signaled that additional
write-offs would be necessary, and that DFG would
suffer serious losses for the year in proportion to the
size of its business. The memorandum concluded by
stating:
[I]t is clear that the business as it is clearly
configured is not economically viable. We need to
move rapidly and decisively to eliminate costs,
improve sales realization and stem losses. DFG's
management is in the process of preparing a
detailed plan to tum the business around. fFN301
Soon thereafter, IBP deepened its examination of
DFG by assigning a team from Price Waterhouse
Coopers (ttpWCtt) to do a full investigation. Brady's
memo was never turned over to Tyson (or to
Smithfield) in due diligence. Peterson's trial
testimony made clear that he had little regard for
Brady's views of the matter, an attitude that is
explicable given that Brady had stifled Hughes'
earlier efforts to explore the DFG issues more deeply
and to apprise IBP's audit committee about his
concerns.
According to Tyson, IBP's failure to turn over the
Brady memorandum was inconsistent with Hagen's
representation to Hudson that she had turned over all
audit reports for the "company" to Tyson. According
to Hagen, she interpreted this as requesting all audit
reports for IBP (i.e., the "company") itself, not all of
its various business units, and responded accordingly.
[FN31] Hudson never asked Hagen for audit· reports
specific to DFG~
Shipley Prepares New FY 2000 Numbers For Use In
An Auction

By mid to late December, the IBP special committee
was preparing to conduct an auction between Tyson
and Smithfield. By this point, the Rawhide group was
out of the running and happy to receive a termination
fee courtesy of the winning bidder.

On December 21, J.P. Morgan sent Tyson and
Smithfield bid instructions which called for them to
submit best and final bids, along with proposed
merger contracts, by 5:00 p.m. on December 29,
2000. The instructions informed the bidders that the
special committee was free to change the rules of the
process and that no agreement would be binding until
reduced to a signed contract.
Tyson Receives Comment Letters From The SEC
And Does Not Share Them With IBP
During ,this period, Tyson's lawyers at Millbank,
Tweed had been in communication with the SEC
about its tender offer. The communications
addressed, among other things, whether Tyson had to
exercise good faith in detennining whether a
condition to the tender offer closing had failed.
Millbank, Tweed did
correspondence to IBP.

not

send

the

SEC

Tyson Raises Its Bid After Learning That IBP's FY
2000 Earnings Would Be Lower
Than The Rawhide Projections Had Anticipated
*16 In the middle of the day on December 28, 2000,
Tyson received Shipley's updated numbers from J.P.
Morgan, which showed a $70 million decrease in FY
2000 IBP earnings. After learning of that reduction,
Tyson raised its tender offer bid $1.00 a share to
$27.00 per share in cash.
Tyson Is Infonned Of Additional Problems At DFG
On December 29, 2000, IBP and Tyson
representatives held two due diligence calls. In the
fITst, Peterson and IBP's controller, Craig Hart, spoke
with Tyson CFO Hankins and General Counsel
Baledge. Peterson told Hanks and Baledge that the
DFG charges to earnings had grown to $30 to $32
million, inclusive of the original $9 million charge
and a $3 million charge to a reserve. Because he was
not a numbers man, Peterson also told them that his
CFO Shipley would go over all the numbers with
them later in the morning.
On the second call, Shipley addressed the DFG
issue, as well as the larger issue of reconciling his
December 20 projection for FY 2000 with the
Rawhide Projections. As to DFG, Shipley indicated

J.P. Morgan asked Shipley to update his Rawhide
Projections for use in this fmal bidding stage. On
December 20, 2000 Shipley provided an update to
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that their best estimate was that the problem had
grown to $30 to $35 million, and that there could be
more charges to come. fFN331 Shipley told Tyson
that PWC and IBP were fairly far along in their work,
but that they had not yet fmished working on the
accounting issues at DFG. Shipley indicated that
DFG would not be. contributing at all to earnings in
FY2000.

representations. The evidence reveals, for example,
that Tyson had "BIG QUESTIONS" about
Foodbrands' ability to meet its projected perfonnance
for FY 2001. [FN381 Hankins scribbled down a note
that said "How can $80 m sales company hit you for
$30 + million." [FN391 Tyson's investment banker
doubted that DFG had ever made a real profit.
[FN401

Tyson representatives questioned the size of these
charges in relation to the size of DFG and the fact
that IBP had paid less than $100 million to buy the
business. They asked how much goodwill IBP carried
on its books for DFG because the amount of the
charges seemed very large for a business of DFG's
size. Shipley told Tyson that IBP had not yet fmished
accounting for the problems and that examining the
issue of goodwill was necessary to complete that
process. [FN34] He also told Tyson that IBP had not
figured out yet how it would account for the DFG
issues, and that the problems had arisen from past
conduct that took place for over a year. [FN351

Tyson also placed little faith in Shipley. Hankins did
not believe that Shipley had addressed the fmancial
issues between the companies in the manner expected
of a public company CFO. Hankins knew that he,
rather than Shipley, was likely to be the CFO of the
combined companies when all was said and done.

During the call, Shipley also reconciled his revised
FY 2000 estimate with the Rawhide Projections. He
informed Tyson that the beef business was off by
around $20 million because of tighter margins in the
fourth quarter of 2000. This $20 million decrease was
offset almost exactly by improved performance in the
logistics sectors. As a result, the entirety of the
discrepancy related to Foodbrands. Much of that
came from the charges from DFG and DFG's failure
to reach $10 million in EBIT. The rest came from
under-perfonnance in the rest of Foodbrands.
Shipley's recitation of. IBP's likely FY 2000
performance was reasonable, given the information
he knew and the fact that he told Tyson that the DFG
accounting was not yet concluded. [FN361
Shipley also discussed the Rawhide Projections for
future years, particularly as to Foodbrands. Shipley
indicated that he had not changed them, and that the
numbers were attainable. He explained certain
strategies IBP expected to implement that would help
reach that number. Shipley did not lead Tyson to
believe that meeting the Projections would be easy or
a sure thing, but that IBP had the capability to do so.
As to DFG, Shipley indicated that it would not
deliver EBIT of $10 million in FY 2001, but could
perhaps make $2 to $5 million. [FN371
Tyson's Lack Of Faith In IBP's Management

By their own admission, Tyson's representatives had
had "red flags" waved at them. fFN41] They found it
"alanning" that there was such a sharp drop-off
between IBP's expected FY 2000 perfonnance and
the Rawhide Projections, and were angry that the
likely shortfall had not been highlighted at the
December 8 due diligence meeting. [FN42]
Tyson CEO John Tyson thought he had been "misled
or lied to." [FN43] By December 29, John Tyson's
level of confidence in Shipley was simple, he had
"none." [FN44] He had been told by Bond that
Shipley was likely to be replaced as CFO of IBP.
John Tyson believed that Foodbrands was "broken."
[FN45] In sum, John Tyson did not trust IBP
management going into the fmal stages of the bidding
process.
Tyson Proceeds To Raise Its Bid In The Face of
Waving Red Flags
In keeping with its skepticism about IBP's
assurances, Tyson was receiving advice from its
investment bankers that allowed it to examine
whether an acquisition of IBP would make sense if
Foodbrands perfonned at much lower levels than
were projected in the Rawhide Projections. For
example, Merrill Lynch ran a downside case in which
Foodbrands EBIT would be only $85 million FY
2001 and 2002, and stay at a flat $95 million in FY
2003-2005. [FN461 Merrill Lynch also ran downside
cases for IBP's perfonnance as a whole that used
assumptions more pessimistic than the Rawhide
Projections.
During the evening of December 29, Smithfield put
in an all stock bid it valued at $30 per share. On or
about that same date, a member of Tyson
management and Ernst & Young discussed the

* 17 By this point, Tyson's representatives harbored
more than a healthy skepticism regarding IBP's
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possibility that the DFG problem could require IBP
to restate its previously reported fmancials and to
accept an impairment charge. [FN471
Tyson Wins The Auction--Twice
On December 30, 2000, Smithfield advised the
special committee that $30 was its best and fmal
offer. Special committee chair Smith called John
Tyson and told him that if Tyson bid $28.50 in cash it
would have a deal. John Tyson agreed and Smith said
they had a deal. Later, the IBP special committee met
to consider the Tyson and Smithfield bids. With the
advice of J.P. Morgan, the special committee
considered Tyson's $28.50 cash and stock bid to
exceed the value of Smithfield's all stock $30 bid.
The special committee decided to accept Tyson's bid,
subject to negotiation Df adefmitive merger
agreement.
*18 As a courtesy, the special committee and its
counsel informed Smithfield that it had lost the
auction. On December 31, Smithfield increased its all
stock bid to $32.00. With deep chagrin, Smith went
back to John Tyson and explained what had
happened and the committee's duty to consider the
higher bid. John Tyson was justifiably angry, but
understood the realities of the situation.

that expressly qualified Section 5.11 of the Merger
Agreement, which reads as follows:
Section 5.11. No Undisclosed Material Liabilities.
Except as set forth in Schedule 5.11 the Company
10-K or the Company 10-Qs, there are no liabilities
of the Company of any Subsidiary of any kind
whatsoever, whether accrued, contingent, absolute,
determined, determinable or otherwise, and there is
no existing condition, situation or set of
circumstances which could reasonably be expected
to result in such a liability, other than:
(a) liabilities disclosed or provided for in the
Balance Sheet;
(b) liabilities incurred in the ordinary course of
business consistent with past practice since the
Balance Sheet Date or as otherwise specifically
contemplated by this Agreement;
(c) liabilities under this agreement;
(d) other liabilities which individually or in the
aggregate do not and could not reasonably be
expected to have a Material Adverse Effect.
Schedule 5.11 itself states:

No Undisclosed Material Liabilities
Except as to those potential liabilities disclosed in
Schedule 5 .12, 5.13,5.16 and 5.19, the Injunction
against IBP in the Department of Labor Wage and
Hour litigation (requiring compliance with the
Wage and Hour laws), and any further liabilities
(in addition to IBP's restatement ofearnings in its
3rd Quarter 2000) associated with certain
improper accounting practices at DFG Foods, a
subsidiary ofIBP, there are none. [FN481

Tyson Foods went to the well again and drew out
another $1.50 a share, increasing its bid to $30 per
share. IBP agreed and this time the price stuck.
The Merger Agreement Negotiations
While the auction was on, the lawyers for IBP's
special committee had been negotiating possible
merger agreements with Tyson and Smithfield. By
December 30, the IBP lawyers were mostly focused
on Tyson because it appeared they had prevailed in
the auction.

On a later conference call between Tyson and IBP
negotiators, Hagen told the Tyson participants that
Schedule 5.11 was intended to cover the DFG issues
discussed by Shipley in the December 29 conference
call. The Tyson negotiators accepted the Schedule,
based on prior discussions between Tyson in-house
counsel Hudson and Tyson Finance Vice President
Leatherby.

The document that was used as a template for what
became the fmal Merger Agreement was initially
prepared by Millbank.Tweed, whose team was led by
Lawrence Lederman. Lederman used the Rawhide
merger agreement as his starting point because he
believed it was a good agreement for a buyer with
strong representations and warranties on the part of
the seller.

*19 Tyson's lead outside lawyer, Lederman, did not
participate in the call in which Schedule 5.11 was
accepted. It appears that neither he, Baledge or
Hankins learned about the Schedule until well after
the Merger Agreement was signed on January 1,
2001.
The Merger Agreement's Basic Tenns And Structure

Late on December 30, IBP sent Tyson's negotiators
the disclosure schedules to the Merger Agreement,
which had been drafted by IBP's General Counsel
Hagen. These schedules included a Schedule 5.11

The Merger Agreement contemplated that:
• Tyson would amend its existing cash tender offer
(the "Cash Offer") to increase the price to $30 per
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• Tyson would couple the cash tender offer with an
"Exchange Offer" in which it would offer $30 of
Tyson stock (subject to a collar) for each share of
IBP stock. This would pennit IBP stockholders
who wished to participate in the potential benefits
of the Tyson/IBP combination to do so.
• The Cash Offer would close no later than
February 28, 2001 unless the closing conditions set
forth in Annex I of the Merger Agreement were not
satisfied.
• If the conditions to the Cash Offer were not met
by February 28, 2001, Tyson would proceed with a
"Cash Election Merger" to close on or before May
15, 2001 unless the closing conditions set forth in
Annex III of the Merger Agreement were not
satisfied. In the cash election merger, IBP
stockholders would be able to receive $30 in cash,
$30 in Tyson stock (subject to a collar), or a
combination of the two.
The Annexes to the Agreement contain certain
language that is substantively identical regarding
Tyson's duty to close the transactions. That language
provides:

[E]xcept as affected by actions specifically
permitted by this Agreement, the representations
and warranties of the Company contained in this
Agreement (x) that are qualified by materiality or
Material Adverse Effect shall not be true at and as
of the scheduled expiration of the Offer as if made
at and as of such time (except in respect of
representations and warranties made as of a
specified date which shall not be true as of such
specified date), .and (y) that are not qualified by
materiality or Material Adverse Effect shall not be
true in all material respects at and as of the
scheduled expiration date of the Offer as if made at
and as of such time (except in respect of
representations and warranties made as of a
specific date which shall not be· true in all material
respects as of such specified date). [FN491
The previously described Section 5.11 is one of the
representations and warranties referenced above.
Primarily implicated in this case are the following
representations and warranties:
Section 5.07. SEC Filings. (a) The Company has
delivered or made available to Parent (i) the
Company's annual report on Form 10-K for the
year ended December 25, 1999 (the "Company 10K" ), (ii) its quarterly report on Fonn 10-Q for its
fiscal quarter ended September 23, 2000, its
quarterly report on Fonn lO-Q for its fiscal quarter
ended June 24, 2000 (as amended) and its quarterly

report on Fonn 10-Q for its fiscal quarter ended
March 25, 2000 (together, the "Company lO-Qs"),
(iii) its proxy or infonnation statements relating to
meetings ot: or actions taken without a meeting by,
the stockholders of the Company held since
January I, 1998, and (iv) all of its other reports,
statements, schedules and registration statements
filed with the SEC since January 1, 1998.
*20 (b) As of its. filing date, each such report or
statement filed pursuant to the Exchange Act did
not' contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made therein, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading.
(c) Each such registration statement, as amended or
supplemented, if applicable, filed pursuant to the
Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "Securities
Act "), as of the date such statement or amendment
became effective did not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state any
material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading.
Section 5.08. Financial Statements. The audited
consolidated fmancial statements of the Company
included in the Company 10-K and unaudited
consolidated financial statements of the Company
included in the Company 10-Qs each fairly present,
in all material respects, in confonnity with
generally accepted accounting principles applied
on a consistent basis (except as may be indicated in
the notes thereto), the consolidated fmancial
position of the Company and its consolidated
subsidiaries as of the dates thereof and their
consolidated results of operations and changes in
fmancial position for the periods then ended
(subject to nonnal year-end adjustments in the case
of any unaudited interim fmancial statements). For
purposes of this Agreement, "Balance Sheet"
means the consolidated balance sheet of the
Company as of December 25, 1999 set forth in the
Company 10-K and "Balance Sheet Date" means
December 25, 1999.
Section 5.09. Disclosure Documents. (a) Each
document required to be filed by the Company
with the SEC in connection with the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement (the "Company
Disclosure Documents "), including, without
limitation, (i) the Exchange Schedulel4D-9
(including information required by Rule 14f-1
under the Exchange Act), the Schedule 14D-9/A
(including infonnation required by Rule 14f-l
under the Exchange Act) and (iii) the proxy or
infonnation statement of the Company containing
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information required by Regulation 14A under the
Exchange Act (the "Company Proxy Statement tt),
if any, to be filed with the SEC in connection with
the Offer or the Merger and any amendments or
supplements thereto will, when filed, comply as to
form in all material respects with the applicable
requirements of the Exchange Act except that no
representation or warranty is made hereby with
respect to any information furnished to the
Company by Parent in writing specifically for
inclusion in the Company Disclosure Documents.
(b) At the time the Schedule 14D-9/A, the
Exchange Schedule 14D-9 and the Company Proxy
Statement or any amendment or supplement thereto
is frrst mailed to stockholders of the Company,
and, with respect to the Company Proxy Statement
only, at the time such stockholders vote on
adoption of this Agreement and at the Effective
Time, the Schedule 14D-9/A, the Exchange
Schedule 14D-9 and the Company Proxy
Statement, as supplemented or amended, if
applicable, will not contain any untrue statement of
a material fact or omit to state any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made
therein, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading. At the time
of the filing of any Company Disclosure Document
other than the Company Proxy Statement and at the
time of any distribution thereot: such Company
Disclosure Document will not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made therein, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading. The representations and warranties
contained in this Section 5.09(b) will not apply to
statements or omissions included in the Company
Disclosure Documents based upon information
furnished to the Company in writing by Parent
specifically for use therein.
*21 (c) Neither the infonnation with respect to the
Company or any Subsidiary that the Company
furnishes in writing to Parent specifically for use in
the Parent Disclosure Documents (as defmed in
Section 6.09(a) ) nor the information incrporated
(sic) by reference from documents filed by the
Company with the SEC will, at the time of the
provision thereof to Parent or at the time of the
filing thereof by the Company with the SEC, as the
case may be, at the time of the meeting of the
Company's stockholders, if any, contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state any
material fact required to be stated therein or
necessary in order to make the statements made
therein, in the light of the circumstances under

which they were made, not misleading.
Section 5.10. Absence a/Certain Changes. Except
as set forth in Schedule 5.10 hereto, the Company
10-K or the Company 10-Qs, since the Balance
Sheet Date, the Company and the Subsidiaries have
conducted their business in the ordinary course
consistent with past practice and there has not
been:
(a) any event, occurrence or development of a state
of circumstances or facts which has had or
reasonably could be expected to have a Material
Adverse Effect .... [FN501
Sections 5.07-5.09 therefore warrant the material
accuracy of mp's 1999 10-K and its 10-Qs for the
frrst three quarters of 2000 (the "Warranted
Financials"). Viewed literally and in isolation, these
representations can be read as providing Tyson with a
right not to close if IBP had to restate the Warranted
Financials on account of the earnings charges at DFG
that clearly related to past conduct that occurred
during the periods covered by the Warranted
Financials. Meanwhile, § 5.10 protected Tyson in the
event IBP suffered a Material Adverse Effect, as
defmed in the Agreement.
The Agreement also required Tyson to correct
promptly any information contained in its SEC filings
regarding its Cash Tender and Exchange Offers (the
"Offer Documents") that had become false and
misleading. [FN511 Tyson was also required to
provide IBP promptly with any correspondence
between itself and the SEC regarding the Offer
Documents. [FN52] For its part, IBP agreed to
correct promptly any infonnation it had given to
Tyson for inclusion in the Offer Documents. [FN53]
The December 29 SEC Comment Letter
On December 29, the SEC sent an e-mail to IBP
. special committee counsel Seth Kaplan at the fmn of
Wachtell, Lipton. The e-mail contained a fifteen-page
letter from the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance
to IBP CEO Peterson commenting on the preliminary
Rawhide Proxy as weIl as the Warranted Financials
(the "Comment Letter").
At the time Kaplan received this e-mail, he was
swamped with numerous pressing tasks. He quickly
scanned the document on screen and concluded that it
largely related to the by-then moribund Rawhide
transaction. Kaplan had been expecting comments on
the Rawhide proxy before year's end. And in fact, the
letter's initial 42 comments were focused on the
Rawhide preliminary proxy. What Kaplan failed to
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notice is that the latter half of the document contained
45 comments regarding the Warranted Financials,
which had been incorporated by reference into the
Rawhide proxy. Kaplan also failed to notice that the
letter had been e-mailed only to him, and not to
Peterson.

date. He pointed out that IBP had received this letter
during the fmal negotiation and bidding round. He
claimed that the SEC's comments should have been
disclosed and that "no exception was taken to IBP's
representations relating to the issues raised in the
SEC comment letter." [FN551

*22 Instead, Kaplan simply sent a copy of the
Comment Letter on to his associate, Ante Vucic, to
handle. He did not send a copy to Tyson, Smithfield,
or to IBP.

Baledge also claimed that the Comment Letter
would cause Tyson delay in commencing its
Exchange Offer, which it had been prepared to
launch that very day. Because the Exchange Offer
Documents incorporated IBP's fmancial statements,
Tyson had to hold off until PWC resolved the issues
the SEC raised. Baledge also complained that
progress could have been made on the issues, had
Tyson received the letter earlier.

The Comment Letter addressed a number of items
that Tyson had already identified in its due diligence
process. For example, the Comment Letter:
• Asked IBP to identify how it had discovered the
$9 million inventory problem at DFG and a
synopsis of the events that caused the problem.
• Asked IBP to disclose its revenue recognition
policies to comply with recent SEC accounting
guidelines.
• Requested information regarding pooling of
interest accounting for the CFBA acquisition;
• Asked IBP to revisit its reporting of its business
segments, in view of certain inconsistencies in its
prior approach. [FN541
In January, Kaplan learned that the SEC had not
faxed a copy of the Comment Letter to Peterson.
Instead, the SEC staffers. responsible for the
Comment Letter had mailed Peterson's copy
sometime after the New Year's holiday, most likely
January 3, 2001. The Comment Letter arrived by
mail at IBP on January 8, 2001, and IBP sent it to
Tyson by facsimile on January 10, 2001.
IBP's General Counsel Hagen spoke with the SEC
about why IBP had not received an earlier copy. She
was led to believe that the SEC had received
instructions from Wachtell, Lipton to fax to it and
mail to IBP. Hagen blew her top. During the auction
process, Hagen had found it difficult to be on the
sidelines while the Wachtell, Lipton fmn acted in the
lead role. While Hagen understood that the Rawhide
LBO made this the wiser course, tensions had arisen
between her and Kaplan.
She unleashed her anger at Kaplan in a series of emails. Kaplan denied that he had instructed the SEC
to fax to him and mail to IBP. I believe him. After
she cooled off, so did Hagen.

Baledge closed by indicating that Tyson was
"assessing the materiality and impact of the SEC's
comments and the SEC's requirement that IBP revise
its fmancial statements." [FN561
Tyson's Board and Shareholders Vote For The
Merger Agreement
On January 12, 2001, Tyson's board of directors met
and ratified management's decision to enter into the
Merger Agreement. Peterson and Bond attended as
guests of Tyson. At that point, Tyson expected to
invite both of them onto to its board, and for Bond to
run the IBP unit of the combined entity.
*23 At the board meeting, Baledge did not discuss
the Comment Letter with the Tyson board.
The same day the Tyson shareholders meeting was
held. The Merger Agreement was put to a vote of the
Tyson stockholders. Baledge made the motion. He
did not infonn the shareholders of the Comment
Letter. The Tyson stockholders approved the Merger
Agreement and
authorized management to
consummate the transactions it contemplated. [FN571
The fact that the Tyson board and stockholders were
not told about the Comment Letter is made more
understandable by the fact that Tyson's accountants
believed that the Comment Letter did not contain
"any comment that [Ernst & Young] thought was
significant to Tyson as an acquiror that Ernst &
Young had missed prior to January 1, 2001." [FN581
John Tyson Trumpets The Deal's Benefits

In a letter to the IBP special committee, Tyson's
General Counsel Baledge also expressed his concern
about receiving the letter twelve days after its mailing

During January, Tyson and its CEO John Tyson told
the world how wonderful the TysonlIBP combination
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was going to be. "By combining the number one
poultry company with the leader in beef and pork we
are creating a unique company.... It [FN59] John
Tyson emphasized that Tyson had seized a unique ..
'point in time" , opportunity to put together two
companies who were industry leaders and thus
become the world's "premier protein provider. It
[FN601 Together, the companies would dominate the
meat cases of America's supennarkets.
John Tyson's public statements also acknowledged
that there were no sure things in life. Thus, he
indicated that Tyson was purchasing IBP ''fully aware

of the cyclical factors that affect commodity meat
products." [FN611 John Tyson also evinced his
acknowledgement that IBP was not as far along in the
processed foods side of their business as Tyson
Foods was and that Tyson Foods' expertise would
help IBP achieve success in this area:
When you look at IBP, they look like Tyson Foods
twenty years ago. They have put in place the
foundation, the assets, but most of all, the people to
do to the beef and pork industry what our great
company has done in the last fifteen or twenty
years to the poultry industry. When you see that,
you understand why we get excited.
In our experiences [sic] in branding case ready
packaging and fully cooked value-added products
mirrors the path that they have created for
themselves. It is our belief that our experience and
market access in both foodservice and retail can
help them achieve their goals quicker and more
efficiently. [FN621
None of Tyson's public statements or internal
documents specifically reference DFG as important
to the fulfillment of John Tyson's vision for the
combined companies.
IBP Addresses Its Issues With The SEC While Tyson
Positions Itself To Negotiate
A Lower Price
On January 16,2001, Shipley infonned Hankins that
the DFG. earnings charges might reach $50 million,
including the $9 million already taken. Shipley
indicated that some of the charges related to 1999,
and that it was unclear if a restatement to 1999
earnings would be necessary. He also told Hankins
that the impairment study was underway but not
complete. Hankins concluded "without a doubt" from
what he was told that IBP would have to restate the
Warranted Financials. [FN63]
*24 The next day Tyson extended its Cash Offer.
The only reason it gave was that the waiting period
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino anti-trust law had not

expired. On January 19, 2001, IBP met with Tyson's
fmancial and accounting team and discussed the DFG
issues in more depth. No one at Tyson told IBP that
IBP would breach the Merger Agreement if it
restated the Warranted Financials.
On January 24, 2001, Baledge wrote the IBP special
committee and told it that Tyson would issue a press
release the following day extending its Cash Offer
again. His letter again reiterated his view that Tyson
should have received the Comment Letter before the
Merger Agreement was signed. Baledge said that
Tyson would publicly indicate that the reason for
extending the Cash Offer would be that the Cash
Offer Documents contained information prepared in
reliance on the Warranted Financials. As a result,
Tyson viewed it as prudent to delay closing until IBP
satisfied the SEC. For the same reason, Tyson was
not going to commence its Exchange Offer until the
SEC issues were settled. Once that was done, Tyson
would "assess the impact and materiality of any
changes to your fmancial statements and business."
[FN64]
In reaction to Tyson's January 25 disclosure, IBP
issued a letter from Peterson to Tyson. The letter
disclosed that the DFG charges to earnings would be
$47 million, inclusive of the $9 million, and that. the
charge related to prior periods. It said that IBP was
still considering whether a restatement was necessary
and the extent of any asset impairment at DFG.
Peterson's letter also stated that IBP had sent a letter
to the SEC that day with IBpts response to the
Comment Letter and that IBP was scheduled to meet
with the SEC on January 29, 2001 to discuss its
concerns.
At the January 29, 2001 meeting, IBP hoped to get
some helpful guidance from the SEC regarding how
it should account for the DFG issue. [FN65] This
expectation was disabused at the meeting. Instead,
the SEC told IBP that it had to figure out how to
account for DFG and that it should do so promptly.
Members of the SEC's Division of Enforcement also
attended the meeting, to the surprise and chagrin of
IBP.
On February 5, 2001, IBP delivered to the SEC a
large submission of materials to address issues raised
by the SEC. In those materials, IBP stated that the
DFG adjustments were "material to previously
reported quarterly 2000 data as well as to 1999."
[FN661 Hagen promptly sent this submission to
Baledge. Baledge never informed her that if IBP
restated the Warranted Financials, it would
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automatically breach the Merger Agreement. The
next day, Tyson issued a press release extending the
Cash Offer yet again for the same reasons expressed
in its January 25, 2001 extension.
On February 7, 2001, the SEC wrote to IBP and
indicated that it would "not decline to accelerate the
effectiveness of a registration statement" for the
Exchange Offer so long as IBP had fully and fairly
restated the Warranted Financials to address the DFG
issue and the registration statement adequately
described the restatements. [FN671 Hagen discussed
this letter with Baledge.
*25 By mid-February, the SEC's correspondence
with IBP took on a quite brusque and directive tone.
The SEC's message was that IBP ought to get on with
the business of filing restated fmancialstatements.
[FN681 The SEC had identified several technical
issues in the Warranted Financials that were not
reported in accordance with the SEC's view of
GAAP. In view of the serious DFG issues, the SEC
wanted all the issues addressed in very prompt
restatements to the Warranted Financials.
During this period, Hagen and Baledge talked about
the need for a restatement. Baledge expressed
Tyson's preference that there be only one restatement
rather than a series of them. He did not tell Hagen
that a restatement by IBP would breach the Merger
Agreement. [FN691 Baledge did not do so because he
believed that Tyson would have to detennine whether
any restatement was material to Tyson. [FN701
On February 22, 2001, IBP publicly announced that
it would have to restate the Warranted Financials to
take an additional DFG charge of $32.9 million. DFG
took an additional $12 million DFG charge for the
fourth quarter of FY 2000. IBP also indicated that it
would be taking an impairment charge at DFG of up
to $108 million. And the company announced that it
would be restating the Warranted Financials to
account for the company's stock option plan as a
"variable" rather than a "fixed" plan. This issue had
arisen during the back- and-forth between the SEC
and IBP in 2001, and was not mentioned in the
December 29 Comment Letter. Tyson had flagged
this issue much earlier in due diligence, and ffiP's
previous accounting decision was openly stated in its
199910-K.
As the February 28 deadline for the Cash Offer
loomed, Hagen approached Tyson about extending
the deadline. Tyson never responded. On February
28, Tyson instead terminated the Cash Offer. John

Tyson was quoting as stating: "Unfortunately, it will
be impossible to complete the cash tender offer by
the 28th.. IBP continues to work with the SEC to
resolve their accounting issues. After that work is
complete, we will determine what effect these
matters will have on our deal." [FN71] As of that
date, Tyson had not made a determination that IBP
had breached a contractual warranty, as Baledge
admitted at trial. [FN721
IBP responded publicly to the tennination of the
Cash Offer by indicating that Tyson's decision was in
"complete accordance" with the Merger Agreement.
[FN731 Throughout this period, it had continued to
note to the public the risk that IBP would not resolve
the SEC issues to·Tyson's satisfaction.
Ty.son Gets Nervous And Wants To Reprice The
Deal
During February, Tyson Foods became increasingly
nervous about the IBP deal and began to stall for
time. While Tyson still believed that the deal made
strategic sense, it was keen on fmding a way to
consummate the deal at a lower price. The
negotiations with the SEC were a pressure point that
Tyson could use for that purpose and it did.
*26 Tyson's anxiety was heightened by problems it
and IBP were experiencing in the first part of 200 1. A
severe winter had hurt both beef and chicken
supplies, with chickens suffering more than cows.
Tyson's fIrst quarter 2001 ended on December 30,
2000. During that period, Tyson earned $.12 a share,
down from $.25 during the same period in its FY
2000. Tyson's second quarter 2001 was shaping up
even worse. Tyson's performance was way down
from previous levels. Eventually, Tyson would have
to reduce its earnings estimate for this period, only to
fmd out its reduction was not sufficient. Eventually,
Tyson reported a loss of $6 million for the pertinent
quarter, compared to a profit of $35.7 million for the
prior year's period. [FN741 It described the period as
involving the "most difficult operating environment"
Tyson had seen since 1981, and admitted that Tyson
had suffered from the "on-going effect of the severe
winter weather." [FN751
Meanwhile, IBP was experiencing similar problems.
At the end of January, IBP had begun sending weekly
profit & loss ("p. & L") statements to Tyson. These
showed very slow results that appeared to leave IBP
in a compromised position from which to meet the
Rawhide Projection of $446 million in EBIT for

Copr. C West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

B-18

Page 19

2001 WL 675330
--- A.2d --(Cite as: 2001 WL 675330 (DeI.Ch.»
2001. Both the beef fresh meats and Foodbrands
businesses were perfonning at below- par levels.
When the quarter ended on March 31, 2001, IBP had
earned only $.19 a share, meaning that it would have
to produce $1.74 a share in earnings over the
succeeding three quarters to meet the Rawhide
Projection of$I.93 per share for FY 2001.

addressed these issues and Don Tyson's continued
concern about IBP's year-to-date perfonnance. Don
Tyson did not voice concerns about DFG or the SEC
accounting matters. At the end of the conversation,
Don Tyson said he was satisfied and was going
fishing. Bond relayed this to John Tyson, who was
pleased. [FN771

By mid-February, these factors led the Tyson and
IBP factions to approach each other warily. IBP
sensed that Tyson wanted to renegotiate. Hagen
prepared for an even worse possibility: that Tyson
would walk away and IBP would have to enforce the
deal. Bond tried to deal with the problem by being
responsive to John Tyson's calls for help in
reassuring his father, Don Tyson, that the deal still
made sense.

On March 7, 2001, John Tyson sent all the Tyson
employees a memorandum stating that Tyson Foods
was still committed to the transaction. But on March
13, 2001, he expressed concern to Bond about IBP's
frrst quarter perfonnance and wanted Bond's best
estimates for the rest of the year. Bond sent him
estimates that had a low estimate of $1.80 per share
in earnings and a high side of $2.47, with a best
estimate of $2.12. John Tyson's advisor Hankins
believed these estimates to be much too optimistic . in
view oflBP's slow start.

On the Tyson side, its key managers began to slow
down the merger implementation process to buy time
for John and Don Tyson. While Tyson and IBP
continued to do all the merger integration planning
that precedes a large combination, Tyson was also
bent on using its leverage to extract concessions from
IBP. To the extent that Tyson Foods had wiggle room
not to close the Cash Offer, Don and John Tyson
wanted to use that to give them more time to see
numbers from IBP and to assess the transaction in
light of Tyson's own strategic situation. Their
subordinates did as instructed and stalled for time by
not agreeing to extend the Cash Offer deadline, as
IBP had offered.
By February, Don Tyson had brought in Leland
Toilet and Buddy Wray to counsel with him on the
transaction. Tollet and Wray were Don Tyson's key
executives when he was Tyson's CEO and the three
were known as the "old guard." Since Don Tyson
controlled 90% of Tyson's stock, his word was still
the key one at Tyson, and he was worried.

IBP Filed Its Restated Financials And Tyson
Continues Its Strategy To Put
Pressure On IBP To Renegotiate
On March 13, 2001, IBP also formally filed its
restatements to the Warranted Financials. The formal
restatements were in line with the previous release
regarding DFG, as was the $60.4 million DFG
"Impainnent Charge" took in its year 2000 lO-K.
None of the other issues covered had any impact on
IBP's prospects. Tyson reacted in print in a March 14
press release that indicated that Tyson was pleased
IBP had resolved most of its issues with the SEC.
The press release also indicated that Tyson was
continuing to look at IBP's business and noted its
weak fIrst quarter results. Behind the scenes, Tyson's
investor relations officer, Louis Gottsponer, was
turning up the heat on IBP through comments to
analysts.
In an internal e-mail, Gottsponer explained Tyson's
renegotiation strategy:
To document this point in the process. We've billed
this as the next significant event (we're waiting
until they file), so now people want to know what
the new timeline looks like....
To keep the pressure on their stock price. Based on
the voice mails that have been left for me (those
seven) the street views these restatements as
insignificant. We know these accounting issues
aren't the biggest reason to renegotiate (i.e. beef
margins). Lets remind people of that (softly). To
set the stage for other points that may help us to
renegotiate. [FN781
Sure enough, the next day analysts began reporting

*27 On March 5, 2001, Dick Bond met with Don
Tyson to help alleviate some of those worries. Don
Tyson was quite concerned that mp was not on
course to meet its projected· earnings for the year.
Bond tried to convince him otherwise. As to DFG,
Don Tyson said that if he were running mp, he
would "blow that whole thing up and write the whole
thing off and move on." [FN761 Don Tyson never
mentioned the SEC Comment Letter issues during the
entire meeting.
During a later phone conversation, Bond again
talked with Don Tyson. Don Tyson raised fears about
mad cow disease and hoof-and-mouth disease. Bond
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that IBP's earnings outlook would possibly lead to a
renegotiation of the deal. £FN791
*28 On March 15, 2001, Tyson in-house counsel
Read Hudson sent a letter to Hagen at Baledge's
instruction. The letter reads:
Congratulations on getting your restated SEC
filings behind you. I know they involved a lot of
hard work on your part.
Now that all you have left to file is the 2000 10-K,
it seems that we should begin preparation of
documentation, filings, etc. as we move forward
with the cash election merger.... [FN801
Tyson Terminates And Sues ffiP
By late March, Don Tyson did not support an
acquisition of IBPat $30 per share. On March 26,
2001, Tyson and IBP's merger integration teams had
a scheduled' meeting. John Tyson used that occasion
to raise the possibility of repricing the deal with Bond
to $27 to $28 per share. Bond told John Tyson that he
did not see how the DFG issue could warrant a
reduction of more than $.50 or so. Although he did
not tell this to John Tyson, Bond had already come to
the pragmatic conclusion that IBP might have to
reprice to $28.50 or so in order to get a deal done
without a fight. The price discussion went no further.
At the merger integration meeting, the companies'
consultant McKinsey & Co. reported that $250
million in synergies could be achieved in the Merger.
John Tyson instructed the merger integration team to
move full speed ahead. [FN81] During the meeting,
John Tyson had been called out a couple of times.
When the meeting concluded, he pulled Bond aside
and told Bond that his father, Don Tyson, was
coming back to Arkansas. Don Tyson was still
nervous about the deal and John Tyson needed
Peterson and Bond to help "get him back in the boat. II
[FN82]
On March 27, 2001, Merrill Lynch presented Tyson
with a revised IBP valuation analysis, using
pessimistic assumptions generated by Tyson CFO
Hankins. The analysis concluded that $30.00 per
share was still within the " 'fairness' range," that the
"transaction still makes tremendous strategic sense,"
and that "[e]ven at $30 per share, tremendous long[FN831 But the
term value accrues to TSN."
document also contained analyses that Tyson could
use to renegoti~te a lower price.
On March 28, 2001, Don Tyson called a meeting of
the "old guard" and Tyson's current top management.

The agenda's fIrst two items were the state of the
economy in general, and the state of Tyson's
business. As of that day, Tyson's own perfonnance
for the year was very disappointing and it had been
forced to admit so publicly only days earlier. Only
after discussing the fIrst two items on the agenda did
the participants discuss the IBP deal. Don Tyson
expressed continued concerns about IBP's current
year performance and about mad cow disease. When
it came time to make the decision how to proceed,
Don Tyson left to caucus with the old guard. The new
guard was excluded, including John Tyson. Don
Tyson returned to the meeting and announced that
Tyson should find a way to withdraw. The problems
at DFG apparently played no part in his decision, nor
did the comments from the SEC. £FN841 Indeed,
DFG was so unimportant that neither John nor Don
Tyson knew.about Schedule .5.11 of the Agreement
until this litigation was underway. fFN851
*29 After the old guard had decided that the Merger
should not proceed, Tyson's legal team swung into
action. Late on March 29, 2001, Baledge sent a letter
stating:
Tyson Foods ... will issue a press release today
announcing discontinuation of the transactions
contemplated by the Agreement and Plan of
Merger dated as of January 1, 2001 among IBP,
inc. ("IBP") and Tyson (the "Merger Agreement").
We intend to include this letter with our press
release.
On December 29, 2000, the Friday before fmal
competitive negotiations resulting in the Merger
Agreement, your counsel received comments from
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
raising important issues concerning IBP's financial
statements and reports filed with the SEC. As you
know, we learned of the undisclosed SEC
comments on January 10, 2001. Ultimately, IBP
restated its fmancials and filings to address the
SEC's issues and correct earlier misstatements.
Unfortunately, we relied onthat misleading
information in detennining to enter into the Merger
Agreement. In addition, the delays and
restatements resulting from these matters have
created numerous breaches by IBP of
representations,
warranties,
covenants
and
agreements contained in the Merger Agreement
which cannot be cured.
Consequently, whether intended or not, we believe
Tyson Foods, Inc. was inappropriately induced to
enter into the Merger Agreement. Further, we
believe ffiP cannot perform under the Merger
Agreement. Under these facts, Tyson has a right to
rescind or tenninate the Merger Agreement and to
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receive compensation from IBP. We have
commenced legal action in Arkansas seeking such
relief. We hope to resolve these matters outside
litigation in an expeditious and business-like
manner. However, our duties dictate that we
preserve Tyson's rights and protect the interests of
,our shareholders.
If our belief is proven wrong and the Merger
Agreement is not rescinded, this letter will serve as
Tyson's notice, pursuant to sections 11.01 (f) and
12.01 of the Merger Agreement, of termination.
[FN861
Notably, the letter does not indicate that IBP had
suffered a Material Adverse Effect as a result of its
fIrst-quarter perfonnance.
But as indicated in the letter, Tyson had sued IBP in
Arkansas that evening, shortly before the -close of the
business day. 'The next day IBP filed this suit to
enforce the Merger Agreement.

Finally, Tyson argues that the Merger Agreement
should be rescinded because that Agreement (and
related contracts) were fraudulently induced. In this
respect, Tyson contends that IBP's failure to disclose
the Comment Letter and certain DFG-related
documents before January 1, 2001 constitutes ground
for rescission. Tyson says that the Agreement should
also be rescinded because IBP management made
oral statements regarding the Rawhide Projections
that they knew to be false, on which Tyson
reasonably relied to its detriment. For identical
reasons, Tyson says that a letter agreement it signed
in connection with the Merger Agreement should also
be rescinded, thus entitling Tyson to a refund of a
$66 million tennination fee it paid to the Rawhide
group on behalf of IBP.
The parties have chosen to accompany their basic
contentions with a variety of subsidiary theories, all
of which derive from the same factual issues.

II. The Basic Contentions Of The Parties
The parties have each made numerous arguments
that bear on the central question of whether Tyson
properly terminated the Merger Agreement, which is
understandable in' view of the high stakes. The
plethora of theories and nuanced arguments is
somewhat daunting and difficult to summarize. But
the fundamental contentions are as follows.
IBP argues that Tyson had no valid reason to
terminate the contract on March 29, 2001 and that the
Merger Agreement should "be specifically enforced.
In support of that position, IBP argues that it has not
breached any of the contractual representations and
warranties. In addition, IBP contends that Tyson
improperly terminated the Cash Offer on February
28, 2001 because all closing conditions were met as
of that date. In this regard, IBP says that Tyson did
not need· IBP to fonnally file its Restated Financials
in order for Tyson to proceed with the Cash Offer. As
a result, IBP says that § 2.0I(e) and (It) of the
Agreement do not provide Tyson with a contractual
safe harbor.

*30 Tyson argues that its decision to tenninate was
proper for several reasons. First, Tyson contends that
IBP breached its contractual representations
regarding the Warranted Financials, as evidenced by
the Restatements. Second, Tyson contends that the
DFG Impairment Charge as well as IBP's
disappointing fIrst quarter 2001 perfonnance are
evidence of a Material Adverse Effect, which gave
Tyson the right to tenninate.

Before turning to the resolution of the parties'
various arguments, it is necessary to pause to discuss
certain choice of law issues. The parties are in accord
that New York law governs the substantive aspects of
the contractual and misrepresentation claims before
the court. This accord is in keeping with the parties'
choice to have New York contract law govern the
interpretation of the Merger Agreement. [FN87] But
they part company on certain issues with respect to
the precise burden of proof governing these claims.
[FN88] For the sake of clarity, I will outline the
approach I take up front.
Under either New York or Delaware law, IBP bears
the burden of persuasion to justify its entitlement to
specific perfonnance. Under New York law, IBP
must show that: (1) the Merger Agreement is a valid
contract between the parties; (2) IBP has substantially
perfonned under the contract and is willing and able
to perfonn its remaining obligations; (3) Tyson is
able to perfonn its obligations; and (4) IBP has no
adequate remedy at law. [FN891 These elements must
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence under
New York law. Delaware law, by contrast, requires
that a plaintiff demonstrate its entitlement to specific
performance by clear and convincing evidence. The
reasons for this are not entirely clear, but seem to rest
in the policy concern that a compulsory remedy is not
typical and should not be lightly issued, especially
given the availability of the more usual legal remedy
ofmoney damages. [FN901
Although the conflict of law principles by no means
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provide clear guidance, the better reading of them
suggests that New York law should. apply~ The
relevant principles indicate that the law of Delaware
should be applied "unless the primary purpose of the
relevant rule of the otherwise applicable law is to
affect decision of the issue rather than to regulate the
conduct of the trial. In that event, the rule of the state
of the otherwise applicable law will be applied."
[FN91] IBP has the better of the argument, in my
view. The question of which party has the burden of
proof may be seen as purely procedural. But the
question of what the burden of proof is typically
constitutes a policy judgment designed to affect the
outcome of the court's decision on the merits. fFN921
For example, Delaware's choice of the clear and
convincing evidence standard appears to have been
made for substantive policy reasons that do not affect
the trial process. The parties have not provided me
with authority suggesting why New York selected the
preponderance standard, which is not the prevalent
rule in the United States for specific performance.
[FN931 Because the New York approach is a
minority approach, I infer that New York public
policy as expressed by its common law of longstanding is in favor of a standard that makes it easier,
rather than more difficult, to hold a party to its
specific promise. For that reason, I conclude. that it is
most appropriate to apply the law of New York to
IBP's claim for specific perfonnance, especially
because the application of New York law is in
keeping with the parties' own choice of the - law
governing the Merger.

these claims, but dispute what state's law governs the
precise burden of proof: Under ·New York law, the
plaintiff must prove fraud by clear and convincing
evidence. ·IFN9S1 Under Delaware law, by contrast,
the standard is a preponderance. - [FN961 -Tyson
claims that the issue of burden of proof is a purely
procedural issue that ought to be decided by the -law
of Delaware. IBP contends that the issue is a matter
ofsubstantive policy that ought to be governed by the
law of the state whose law is relevant to the
determination of Tyson's claim, the law of New
York. For the same reasons discussed above, New
York's choice of the clear and convincing standard is
best viewed as a policy decision that affects the
court's decision, rather than a matter of trial
procedure. [FN971 Given the parties' choice to use
New York law as the law governing the Merger
Agreement, :it makes sense that the merits of any
claim for rescission of that contract be decided using
the evidentiary burden established by New York law.
Candor requires acknowledgement of the fact that
the parties did not provide me with detailed briefmg
about the choice of law and burden issues discussed
above. These questions may be thought to raise many
subtle concerns that I do not pretend to have
addressed in any sophisticated way. [FN981 As a
result, I will indicate clearly whether there is any
issue in the case that would be decided differently
were the evidentiary burden different than I have just
outlined.
III. Resolution OfThe Parties' Merits Arguments

*31 In this case, IBP's and Tyson's respective
abilities to perform the Merger Agreement are not
disputed. Nor is there any doubt that the Merger
Agreement, on its face, is a binding contract setting
forth specific rights and duties. What is most at issue
is whether Tyson had a right to tenninate what
appears to be a valid and binding contract, or to
rescind that contract because of misrepresentations or
material omissions of fact in the negotiating process.

In the pages that follow, I fIrst address whether IBP
breached a representation and warranty that justified
Tyson's termination of the Merger Agreement. I then
analyze the merits of Tyson's rescission claims. I
conclude with the question of whether Tyson was
entitled to terminate its Cash Offer on February 28,
2001.
A. General Principles OfNew York Contract Law

Under both New York and Delaware law, a
defendant seeking to avoid perfonnance of a contract
because of the plaintiffs breach of warranty must
assert that breach as an affmnative defense. fFN94]
Indeed, Tyson has plead breach of warranty as an
affrrmative claim, and not simply as a defense.
Therefore, Tyson bears the burden to show that a
breach of warranty excused its non-performance.

The Merger Agreement's tenns are to be interpreted
under New York law. Like Delaware, New York
follows traditional contract law principles that give
great weight to the parties' objective manifestations
of their intent in the written language of their
agreement [FN991 If a contract's meaning is plain
and unambiguous, it will be given effect. fFNIOOl
Parol evidence may not be used to create a
contractual ambiguity; rather, such ambiguity must
be discerned by the court from its consideration of
the contract as an entire text. [FN 101]

Under either Delaware or New York law, Tyson also
bears the burden to prove its rescission ·claim. rThe
parties agree that New York law generaily governs
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*32 In reading a contract, "the [court's] aim is a
practical interpretation of the expressions of the
parties to the end that there be a realization of [their]
reasonable expectations." [FNI02] "In a written
document [a] word obtains its meaning from the
sentence, the sentence from the paragraph, and the
latter from the whole document, all based upon the
situation and circumstances existing at its creation."
[FN 1031 "Particular words should be considered ... in
the light of the obligation as a whole" and "not as if
isolated from the context." [FNI04]

When, however, the contract is susceptible to more
than one reasonable interpretation, the court may
consider extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity.
[FN 1051 The court's examination of the parol
evidence is merely a continuation of an effort to
discern the parties' intentions. Therefore, the
subjective beliefs of the parties about the meaning of
the contractual language are generally irrelevant.
[FN 106] Where one of the parties, however,
expresses its beliefs to the other side during the
negotiation process or in the course of dealing after
consummation, such expressions may be probative of
the meaning that the parties attached to the
contractual language in dispute. [FN107]

B. Do The DFG Charges To Earnings Evidence A
Breach Of Warranty?
I. The Merger Agreement Does Not Unambiguously
Assign The DFG-Related Risks
The first question I address is whether the DFGrelated problems of IBP were a risk that was
contractually accepted by Tyson, through the
inclusion of Schedule 5.11. The parties have starkly
different views of whether the reference to DFG in
Schedule 5.11 operates to qualify all of the
representations and warranties in the Agreement.
Tyson contends that Schedule 5.11 has no effect on
any representation and warranty other than that
contained in § 5.11 of the Agreement. There are no
Schedules 5.07-5.09 attached to the Agreement that
operate to qualify § § 5.07-5.09 explicitly. And § §
5.07, 5.08, and 5.09 are, by their own tenns,
unqualified by reference to Schedule 5.11, and
generally stand for the proposition that IBP warranted
that the Warranted Financial Statements were
accurate in all material respects and comported with
GAAP. Tyson thus claims that these "flat"
representations were plainly breached when IBP
restated the Warranted Financial Statemepts to record
the additional losses at DFG.

In suppo~ ofthis argument, Tyson points out that the
parties knew how to qualify representations and
waqantie's. when they wished to do so. For example, §
5.16 in the Agreement is' a representation regarding
IBP's compliance w~th its legal Qbligations. The
Agreement contains no Schedule 5.16, but § 5.16
expressly references Schedules 5.11, 5.12, and 5.19.
Likewise, the Agreement's disclosure schedule states
that "[i]tems disclosed for anyone section of this
Disclosure Schedule are deemed to be disclosed for
all other sections of this Disclosure Schedule to the
extent that it is reasonably apparent that such
disclosure is applicable to other such section(s)." Had
the drafters wished to provide that each Schedule
would qualify each representation and warranty, this
language could have been easily altered to
[FN 108]
accomplish that purpose plainly.
Furthennore, the parties .agreed that the disclosure
schedule was "qualified in its entirety by reference to
specific provisions of the Agreement...." As a result,
Tyson argues that the scope of Schedule 5.11 is
qualified by the flat warranties in § § 5.07-5.09. In
sum, Tyson contends that a written deal is a written
deal. Having plainly warranted the material accuracy
of the Warranted Financial Statement as a closing
condition, IBP is stuck.
*33 For reasons I now explain, my reading of the
Agreement suggests that Tyson's reading is not the
only reasonable one and that it is therefore
appropriate to consider parol evidence in detennining
the meaning of the Agreement. As a general matter,
the strength of Tyson's interpretation--its simplicity
and laser beam focus on the language of § § 5.075.09--is also its weakness. When these sections are
considered in light of the overall Agreement and the
undisputed factual context in which the parties were
contracting, the Tyson reading becomes far less than
compulsory.

I begin at§ 5.11 itself. That section says that
"[e]xcept as set forth in Schedule 5.11 [or the
Warranted Financials], there are no liabilities of the
Company or any Subsidiary of any kind whether
accrued, contingent, absolute, detenninable or
otherwise ...." Schedule 5.11 itself states that in
addition to what was disclosed in the Warranted
Financials, there may be ''further liabilities (in
addition to mp's restatement of earnings in its 3rd
Quarter 2000) associated with certain improper
accounting practices at DFG Foods."
[FNI09]
Taken together, § S.ll and Schedule 5.11 use the
tenn "liabilities" in a broad and imprecise manner
that would not be used by an accountant. Certainly,
Schedule 5.11 can reasonably be read to include
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additional charges to earnings associated with
improper accounting practices at DFG within the
tenn, along with any other liabilities--such as
litigation risks--associated with those practices.
Section 5.11 expressly contemplates that scheduled
liabilities of this nature are not reflected in the
Warranted Financials, but will be in addition to those
contained in the Warranted Financials, regardless of

when the events giving rise to the liabilities arose .
Tyson largely acknowledges that this is the most
reasonable reading of § 5.11 and Schedule 5.11.
But it argues that the fact that IBP could recognize
potentially unlimited liabilities because of past
accounting improprieties at DFG does not mean that
DFG was free to restate the Warranted Financials
without breaching the Agreement. That is, what was
contractually important to the parties was the
particular document in which such liabilities were
publicly disclosed, rather than the magnitude of such
liabilities. To be specific, under Tyson's reading, IBP
was free to take a charge to earnings of $45 million in
its fourth quarter 2000 10-Q, even if that charge
related to accounting improprieties that had taken
place in prior periods. fFNII01 What IBP was not
permitted to do was to disclose an identical charge as
a restatement to the Warranted Financials because
that would violate the "flat" warranties in § § 5.075.09.
The record reveals that this sort of hair-splitting has
no rational commercial purpose. At trial, Tyson's
CFO Hankins was asked directly to explain what
difference it made whether the DFG charges were
disclosed in a restatement to the Warranted
Financials as opposed to a later filing. Hankins at
fITSt could not even understand the issue, which alone
is telling given its significance in this case and
Hankins' active role in it. Once he understood the
question, Hankins paused for a very lengthy period of
time, until basically admitting that he could not come
up with a reason why the filing in which the
liabilities were recognized was consequential.
Subsequent Tyson witnesses--who were all on notice
that this question would likely be asked--had no
better answer. fFNllll In fact, Tyson'S General
Counsel Baledge admitted that it made no economic
difference whether the Warranted Financials were
restated to. record the liabilities or whether those
liabilities were recorded in a filing for a later period.
[FNl121
*34 Tyson's interpretation is one that would be
"unreal to men of business and practical affairs."

[FN1131 New York law disfavors.a reading of a
contract that produces capricious and absurd results,
in favor ofa reading th~t is reasonable in the
commercial context in which the parties were
contracting. [FN1141
To rebut this conclusion, Tyson has. argued that § §
5.07-5.09 "look to the past"and "do not identify
future risks." fFN1151 Meanwhile, Schedule 5.11 is
supposedly forward-looking and only "warrants that
there are no contingencies that may result in IBP
obligations in the future to a third party (such as
litigation against the company) other than those
disclosed in the [Warranted Financials] and Schedule
5.11." fFNI161
There are several reasons why this construction is
not mandated. First, BS noted, the term "liabilities" in
Schedule 5.11 seems to clearly encompass charges to
earnings of the kind taken in the third quarter 2000
10-Q so long as those charges resulted from the same
kind of past accounting irregularities that produced
the initial charges. Second is Tyson's past and future
reading of the Agreement. Tyson contends that its
past/future construction makes sense because a
restatement of past fmancial statements adversely
affects market perception· and subjects the company
to fraud suits by investors, as it did here. [FN 1171
Supposedly, Tyson did not want to accept this sort of
risk. Yet, by its own argument, Tyson admits that
Schedule 5 .11 allocates to Tyson the risk of any
liability that arose from "improper accounting
practices" at DFG, including liability from lawsuits
based on the practices. Tyson's logic is simply sliced
too thin to sustain a rmding that its construction is the
only reasonable one.
Perhaps most importantly, Tyson's argument fails to
address Schedule 5.11 's reference to Schedule 5.13.
Schedule 5.13 discloses that IBP is engaged in an
"inventory accounting method dispute" with the
Internal Revenue Service, and that the "issue of past
years has yet to be fonnally resolved" and "[t]ax
years 1992 to date are still open." Sections 5.07-5.09
do not cross-reference Schedule 5.13. Under Tyson's
argument, it could walk away from the contract if the
IRS determines that IBP's inventory accounting
methods used in the Warranted Financials was
improper and that a restatement of them is required.
That reading of the Agreement therefore produces a
silly result, which supports IBP's contention that § §
5.07-5.09 cannot be read woodenly in isolation from
the other provisions of the Agreement. [FN 1181
As IBP notes, Schedule 5.11 's reference to Schedule
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5.13 is of interpretative significance for another
reason. By including a reference to Schedule 5.13
and this "inventory" dispute, Schedule 5.11 again
signals that the word "liabilities" was being used as a
loose tenn for balance sheet adjustments that might
affect prior warranted periods. This cuts against the
view that Tyson's reading is the only reasonable
construction.

*35 So too does language in the Annexes to the
Agreement. These Annexes are of great significance
because they govern the circumstances under which
Tyson was free to abandon its Cash and Exchange
Offers, as well as the Merger. Each of the applicable
Annexes provides that Tyson may refuse to close if
the representations and warranties in the Agreement
are not true "except as affected by actions specifically
permitted by" the Merger Agreement. [FNl191 IBP
argues that this proviso is essentially a contractspecific articulation of the New York law principle
that more specific sections of a contract govern over
more general ones, when there is an inconsistency
between the two. [FN1201
According to IBP, Schedule 5.11 specifically permits
IBP to recognize further liabilities on account of the
accounting improprieties at DFG. Thus, according to
IBP, the Annexes protect IBP by ensuring that its
specific contractual right ,to do so does not result in a
technical breach of a more general representation and
warranty that permits Tyson to walk. IBP supports
this contention by pointing to the Model Stock
Purchase Agreement produced by the American Bar
Association's Committee on Negotiated Acquisitions.
The Committee Commentary states:
The Sellers may also request that the 'bring down'
clause [i.e ., the Annexes] be modified to clarify
that the Buyer will not have a 'walk right' if any of
the Sellers' representations is rendered inaccurate
as a result of an occurrence specifically
contemplated by the acquisition agreement. The
requested modification entails inserting the words
'except as contemplated or pennitted by this
Agreement' (or some similar qualification).

would make a representation or warranty untrue.
[FN123] Rejection of Tyson's f«st contention in this
regard, largely disposes of its second. It makes little
sense to say that Schedule 5.11 does not specifically
permit IBP to recognize additional liabilities at DFG
on account of the improper accounting there. That
appears to be its plain purpose, and to clearly extend
to liabilities that were caused by improper past
activities. [FN124] And if mp is "specifically
pennitted to" take such action, it is implausible to
think that the Agreement would construe that same
action as a breach of covenant. Rather, it seems more
commercially reasonable to read the proviso in the
Annexes, as IBP does, as a safe-guard that ensures
that more specific aspects of the representations and
warranties in the Agreement will govern over the
more general, when giving literal effect to both the
general and specific provisions produces an
unreasonable result.
*36 For all these reasons, I conclude that Tyson's
reading of the language of the contract is not the only
reasonable one. Indeed, if forced to choose, I would
fmd that IBP's reading of the Agreement is the one
that is most reasonable in view of the overall
language and structure of the Agreement, and
commercial setting within which the parties were
operating. The Tyson interpretation in essence reads
the DFG disclosure in Schedule 5.11 out of the
Agreement because it gives mp no reasonable room
to address additional charges to earnings on account
of past accounting improprieties. Put differently,
Tyson argues that it came out of a hotly contested
auction with an option, rather than an obligation, to
purchase IBP, having silently pocketed an almost
sure walk-away right. By contrast, the IBP reading
continues to give wide scope to § § 5.07-5.09, but
merely qualifies their application when necessary to
give effect to a more specific provision of the
contract.
2. The Parol Evidence Demonstrates That IBP's
Reading OfThe Agreement Is In
Large Measure The Correct One

[FN12t1

Tyson's response to this line of argument is again
quite literalistic and technical, rather than
commonsensical. At most, Tyson says, Schedule 5.11
operates solely to prevent IBP's recognition of
additional liabilities for accounting improprieties
from causing a breach of § 5.11 ; it does not
specifically pennit IBP "to incur liabilities related to
DFG.". [FN 1221 And if it did, ffiP would be in
breach of its covenant not to take any action that

The parol evidence supports IBP's position. The
representations and warranties in the Agreement were
lifted for the most part from the pre-existing Rawhide
merger agreement. Tyson's lawyers created the first
draft of the Agreement using the Rawhide agreement
because it was one that contained representations and
warranties favorable to a buyer.
By contrast, Schedule 5.11 was created specifically
to address the DFG issues that had been discussed by
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representatives of Tyson and IBP during the
December 29 call in which Shipley provided Tyson
with updated infonnation regarding IBP's year 2000
results. [FN125] During that conversation, Shipley
had infonned Tyson that there would be more large
charges to earnings because of improprieties at DFG,
that an asset impainnent study was beginning, and
that IBP was not done with its accounting for the
problems.
Hagen drafted Schedule 5.11 to address the DFG
issues dealt with during the December 29 call and
told the Tyson negotiators that this was her intention.
She did so during a conference call with Tyson's inhouse counsel Read Hudson and outside counsel
Millbank Tweed that had been set up to permit Tyson
to ask any questions it wanted regarding the
disclosure schedules. During that call, Hagen
specifically noted that the Schedule was to cover a
subject addressed during the December 29 call with
Shipley. [FN 1261 The evidence also reveals that
Hudson had reviewed Schedule 5.11 with Tyson
Senior Finance Vice President Dennis Leatherby,
who had participated in the December 29 call.
Hudson testified at his deposition that "Based on the
knowledge [Leatherby] had and based on the
representation and the exception from the
representation contained in there, I think he was
satisfied that, you know, he was willing to go forward
with that disclosure." [FN1271 Tyson elected not to
have any of its witnesses who participated in the
December 29 conference call about the disclosure
schedules testify, even though several of its
participants in that call were present throughout the
trial.
*37 The record therefore reveals that Tyson's
negotiators knew that Hagen believed that Schedule
5.11 covered the DFG items discussed at the
December 29 call. Reasonable and forthright
negotiators for Tyson would--and I fmd did....
understand Hagen as expressing her view that the
Schedule ensured that Tyson was accepting the fully
disclosed risk that IBP would recognize additional
charges because of the accounting improprieties at
DFG and that such additional charges would not give
Tyson a right to walk away. [FN1281
To the extent that the Tyson negotiators had a
question whether Hagen's carve- out was intended to
pennit IBP to recognize these additional charges
resulting from past accounting practices by way of a
restatement of the Warranted Financials, they should
have spoken up. The current, hairsplitting
interpretation that Tyson advances was never voiced

to Hagen at the time, and I do not think that the
Tyson negotiators embraced that interpretation at the
time. Rather, the Tyson negotiators' attitude reflected
the relative unimportance that Tyson's top executives
placed on DFG. The decisionmakers at Tyson were
comfortable with accepting the risk of further charges
to earnings from DFG because of past accounting
practices, without focus on the filing in which such
charges were taken. This conclusion is buttressed by
the fact that Tyson's top inside lawyer, Baledge, and
its top outside lawyer, Ledennan, were unaware of
the DFG Schedule until after the Agreement was
signed, as was Tyson's CEO John Tyson.
The later behavior of Tyson also supports this
inference. From at latest January 16, 2001 onward,
Tyson knew that IBP would almost certainly have to
restate the Warranted Financials to record additional
charges to earnings because of the DFG accounting
problems. [FN1291 At no time did it express the view
that such a restatement would, in itself: give rise to a
right on Tyson's part to walk away. To the contrary,
Tyson simply urged IBP to get the issue worked out
with the SEC promptly. Indeed, Hudson, the Tyson
in-house· lawyer who participated in approving
Schedule 5.11 congratulated Hagen when the
restatements were filed. John Tyson did not care
about the filing in which IBP disclosed the DFG
problem, he just wanted IBP to "get it right."
[FN 1321 This course of dealing under the Agreement
is at odds with Tyson's construction. [FN 1311
The reason for this later course of dealing is obvious:
none of the Tyson negotiators harbored the belief that
the particular filing in which IBP recognized the
charges had any relationship to whether the
Agreement was breached. [FN1321 After all, they
knew that the accounting problems at DFG were
likely caused by the fraudulent acts of Andrew Zahn,
who had left DFG during the period covered by the
Warranted Financials. Before the Merger Agreement
was signed, Tyson representatives suspected that a
restatement of the Warranted Financials might be
necessary [FN 1331 for just this reason. The problems
that gave rise to the need for additional charges had
occurred in the past, and the additional charges were
far larger than the previously disclosed $9 million
problem, and had to be recognized sometime.
Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that Tyson's
negotiators believed that these charges had been
carved out entirely by Schedule 5.11.
*38 I reach a different conclusion, however,
regarding the Impainnent Charge. While I have
found that the issue of a possible impairment was
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touched upon in the December 29 meeting, it was not
as clearly a focal point as the issue of additional
earnings charges. Most important, Hagen's draft of
Schedule 5.11 is not without boundaries as applied to
DFG. While Tyson's negotiators could not have
reasonably understood Schedule 5.11 as anything
other than a total carve-out for the earnings charges,
that is not the case with the Impainnent Charge. The
reason why is fundamental. Schedule 5.11 only
addresses additional Iiabilities--expansively defmed-"associated with certain improper accounting
practices at DFG Foods ." Hagen did not give Tyson
any reason to believe that she intended Schedule 5.11
to cover any problem lacking this "association." IBP
told the SEC that the impainnent study was not
triggered by the mismanagement and accounting
improprieties at DFG, but by an unexpected and
severe drop in sales in the fourth quarter. fFNJ341
Therefore, Schedule 5.11 does not cover that Charge.

3. Schedule 5.10 Does Not Cover The Impairment
Charge
IBP argues alternatively that the Impainnent Charge
was covered by Schedule 5.10 of the Agreement,
which states that "IBP may, as part of normal yearend adjustments consistent with past practices,
revalue assets ...." [FN135] According to IBP, its
impairment review of DFG's assets falls within this
clause, especially because IBP had taken what it
considers to be a similar $35 million non-cash charge
in FY 1999, when it wrote down assets associated
with its decision to exit the cow boning business.

that these issues would in themselves be sufficient to
give it a reason not to close in the event that the
DFG-related issues in the Restated Financials were
carved out by Schedule 5.11. As a result, I consider
Tyson to have waived any arguments about these
issues.
Because I may be found wrong on that point, I will
address these three issues briefly. Under Tyson's
literal approach, § § 5.07-5.09 of the Agreement
embrace the view of the world that any error in
applying the often-technical rules of GAAP
constitutes a breach of warranty, regardless of
whether the error would be material to a person using
the fmancial statements to make real world economic
decisions.

*.39 In their briefs, the parties do battle regarding
whether § §
5.07-5.09 embrace a particular
materiality standard. Tyson argues that those sections
are written in the language of the federal securities
laws and accountant opinion letters, and must be
interpreted as written. [FN13711BP argues that those
sections are contained in a merger· agreement
between sophisticated parties, and that materiality
must be defmed by reference to an objectively
reasonable acquiror in Tyson's position who has the
same mix of information as Tyson had. [FN1381

The Restated Financials dealt with three other issues
in addition to DFG, which have at times become
points of contention in this case.

As an initial matter, I am not sure that the parties'
fight about whether a reasonable acquiror or
reasonable investor standard is, in itself, material.
The more important question is whether the
restatements would
be
influential
in the
decisionmaking process of either a reasonable
investor or acquiror, having the same total mix of
information that Tyson possessed. The Agreement is
silent and thus ambiguous on the question of whether
materiality of the Restated Financials is to be viewed
in isolation, or in relation to the total mix of
infonnation. In this regard, I reject Tyson's notion
that it is utterly irrelevant whether it possessed full
knowledge of material facts that might have been
technically misreported in the Restated Financials.
Certainly, the plaintiffs knowledge of the underlying
facts may render an omission immaterial under the
federal securities law, because that law considers
materiality in light of the total mix of information
that the plaintiff had available. That is, even if Tyson
is correct that the contractual language is taken from
a federal securities context, that context is one that
deals with materiality in view of the totality of
information available to the user. [FN1391

In its opening post-trial brief: Tyson did not argue

The only reason one would take a different approach

IBP's position that it wrote down the DFG asset
values by 75% as part of
"normal year-end
adjustments" is not borne out by the evidence. As
previously noted, IBP itself told the SEC that the
DFG asset impainnent review was triggered by "an
unprecedented and precipitous decline in Q4 2000
sales ..." [FN1361 There was nothing "nonnal" about
the DFG review, it was quite unusual, and the
language of Schedule 5.10 is not easily read as
covering a large write down resulting from an
extraordinary impainnent review.
C. The Other Aspects OfThe Restated Financia/s Do
Not Evidence A Breach Of
Warranty
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here is if one has confidence that Tyson bargained for
the right to walk away if IBP's Warranted Financials
were technically imperfect in any manner. This
would have been an odd bargaining position for a
reasonable investor or acquiror to take, and there is
no evidence that Tyson contracted with this
idiosyncratic approach in mind. Indeed, if this
approach were the governing one under the
Agreement, it is hard to explain the presence of
subsections (e) and (h) of § 2 .01 in the Agreement,
since those subsections contemplate the correction of
financial statements that have become false.

treatment caused could be fixed as to future periods.
In the absence of the DFG problem, IBP most likely
could have made this accounting change on a
prospective basis only. Indeed, Tyson executives had
"discussed [this issue] on several occasions" b~fore
the Merger Agreement was signed. [FN 1411
Moreover, IBP had already come up with a fix to the
problem on a going-forward basis, which Tyson had
approved. [FN142]
The second issue is that IBP provided new segment
reporting in the Restated Financials. Segment
reporting is an SEC "hot topic. Absent the DFG
problem, IBP could have dealt with this problem on a
going-forward basis. No reasonable user of IBP
fmancial statements would have found any problems
with IBP's segment reporting material to prior
periods. Segment reporting in no manner affects
IBP's bottom line. And Tyson, of course, had access
to segmented results from IBP.
It

The course of dealing by the parties under the
Agreement reveals that Tyson had a different
understanding than it advocates now. Tyson did not
believe that a mere restatement of the Warranted
Financials would trigger a breach of warranty; rather,
it believed that a breach would occur if the
restatement was material. Tyson's pre-litigation
understanding comports with the commercial context
in which the parties were operating. Its present hairtrigger approach does not.
In any event, while this duel might have had great
importance if the DFG- related issues were not
carved out, it has little importance regarding the
remaining issues. As a distinguished expert testified
at trial, past fmancial reports are not restated merely
because the preparer had made a technical error under
GAAP. [FN140] Such technical errors can be fixed
on a prospective basis, so long as the errors did not
have a material impact on priorperiods. The three
remaining issues that were contained in IBP's
restatements were not material, when viewed from
the perspective of a reasonable "public" user of its
fmancial statements who was making a decision
whether to invest in IBP as of the end of2000.
*40 The frrst issue was the issue of accounting for
IBP's stock option plan as a "variable" rather than
"fixed plan." IBP had not hidden its prior accounting
from any user of its fmancial statements. It had
clearly told users of its fmancial statements that it
was treating the plan as a fIXed one, and indicated
that another treatment was possible. The actual
economic consequences of the plan were identical
under either approach, but for accounting reasons the
"variable" plan has an income statement effect. The
Restated Financials contained this income effect,
which in totality was basically a wash over all the
periods it affected. A reasonable user of the fmancial
statements would not view these effects as material
given what had already been disclosed about this
issue because the problem, if any, that this change in

The third issue is that IBP also agreed to change its
revenue recognition policies retroactively. This was
another SEC hot topic that was the subject of recent ·
SEC guidance requiring companies to comply with
new revenue recognition guidelines. fFN1431 IBP
voluntarily decided to adopt these guidelines
retroactively because it was already restating the
Warranted Financials. IBP had in fact announced its
intent to implement the new approach required by the
SEC in its original third quarter 10-Q for FY 2000.
[FN 144] IBP correctly indicated then that the
adoption of that new approach would not have a
material affect on the company's earnings. In March
2001, Tyson itself indicated that it would be adopting
the new SEC standard in the near future and that the
standard would have no material effect. [FN1451
Absent the need to restate because of the DFG issues,
IBP would not have had to restate the Warranted
Financials to deal with this minor issue and no
reasonable public investor would have cared if it had
not.
D. Was Tyson's Termination Justified Because IBP
Has Suffered A Material
Adverse Effect?
Tyson argues that it was also permitted to tenninate
because IBP had breached § 5.10 of the Agreement,
which is a representation and warranty that IBP had
not suffered a material adverse effect since the
"Balance Sheet Date" of December 25, 1999, except
as set forth in the Warranted Financials or Schedule
5.10 of the Agreement. Under the contract, a material
adverse effect (or "MAE") is defmed as "any event,
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occurrence or development of a state of
circumstances or facts which has had or reasonably
could be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect"
... "on the condition (fmancial or otherwise),
business, assets, liabilities or results of operations of
[IBP] and [its] Subsidiaries taken as whole ...."
[FNI46]
*41 Tyson asserts that the decline in IBP's
perfonnance in the last quarter of 2000 and the frrst
quarter of 2001 evidences the existence of a Material
Adverse Effect. It also contends that the DFG
Impainnent Charge constitutes a Material Adverse
Effect. And taken together, Tyson claims that it is
virtually indisputable that the combination of these
factors amounts to a Material Adverse Effect.
In addressing these arguments, it is useful to be
mindful that Tyson's publicly expressed reasons for
tenninating the Merger did not include an assertion
that IBP had suffered a Material Adverse Effect. The
post-hoc nature of Tyson's arguments bear on what it
felt the .contract meant when contracting, and
suggests that a short-term drop in IBP's perfonnance
would not be sufficient to cause a MAE. To the
extent the facts matter, it is also relevant that Tyson
gave no weight to DFG in contracting.
The resolution of Tyson's Material Adverse Effect
argument requires the court to engage in an exercise
that is quite imprecise. The simplicity of § 5.10's
words is deceptive, because the application of those
words is dauntingly complex. On its face, § 5.10 is a
capacious clause that puts IBP at risk for a variety of
uncontrollable factors that might materially affect its
overall business or results of operation as a whole.
Although many merger contracts contain specific
exclusions from MAE clauses that cover declines in
the overall economy or the relevant industry sector,
or adverse weather or market conditions, [FN1471 §
5.10 is unqualified by such express exclusions.
IBP argues, however, that statements in the
Warranted Financials that emphasize the risks IBP
faces from swings in livestock supply act as an
implicit carve-out, because a Material Adverse Effect

Earnings from Operations (in
thousands)

under that section cannot include an Effect that is set
forth in the Warranted Financials. I agree with Tyson,
however, that these disclaimers were far too general
to preclude industry-wide or general factors from
constituting a Material Adverse Effect. Had IBP
wished such an exclusion from the broad language of
§ 5.10, IBP should have bargained for it. At the same
time, the notion that § 5.10 gave Tyson a right to
walk away simply because of a downturn in cattle
supply is equally untenable. Instead, Tyson would
have to show that the event had the required
materiality of effect. [FN1481
The difficulty of addressing that question is
considerable, however, because § 5.10 is fraught
with temporal ambiguity. By its own tenns, it refers
to any Material Adverse Effect that has occurred to
IBP since December 25, 1999 unless that Effect is
covered by the Warranted Financials or Schedule
5.10. Moreover, Tyson's right to refuse to close
because a Material Adverse Effect has occurred is
also qualified by the other express disclosures in the
Schedule, by virtue of (i) the language of the
Annexes that pennits Tyson to refuse to close for
breach of a warranty unless that breach results from
"actions specifically permitted" by the Agreement;
and (ii) the language of the Agreement that makes all
disclosure schedules apply to Schedule 5.10 where
that is the reasonably apparent intent of the drafters.
Taken together, these provisions can be read to
require the court to examine whether a MAE has
occurred against the December 25, 1999 condition of
IBP as adjusted by the specific disclosures of the
Warranted Financials and the Agreement itself. This
approach makes commercial sense because it
establishes a baseline that roughly reflects the status
of IBP as Tyson indisputably knew it at the time of
signing the Merger Agreement.

*42 ,But describing this basic contractual approach is
somewhat easier than applying it. For example, the
originallBP 10-K for FY1999 revealed the following
five-year earnings from operations and earnings per
share before extraordinary items:

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

$ 528,473

373,735

226,716

322,908

480,096
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Net Earnings Per Share

3.39

$

The picture that is revealed from this data is of a
company that is consistently profitable, but subject to
strong swings in annual EBIT and net earnings. The
averages that emerge from this data are of EBIT of
approximately $386 million per year and net earnings
of $2.38 per share. If this average is seen as
weighting the past too much, a three-year average
generates EBIT of $376 million and net earnings of
$2.29 per share.
The original Warranted Financials in FY 2000 also
emphasize that swings in IBP's performance were a
part of its business reality. For example, the trailing
last twelve month's earnings from operations as of the
end of third quarter ofFY 2000 were· $462 million, as
compared to $528 million for full year 1999, as
originally reported. [FN 1491 In addition, the third
quarter 10-Q showed that IBP's earnings from
operations for the fIrst 39 weeks of 2000 were
lagging earnings from operations for the comparable
period in 1999 by $40 million, after adjusting for the
CFBA Charges. [FN1501
The financial statements also indicate that
Foodbrands was hardly a stable source of earnings,
and was still much smaller in importance than IBP's
fresh meat operations. Not only that, FY 2000
Foodbrands performance was lagging 1999, even
accounting for the unusual, disclosed items.
The Rawhide Projections add another dimension to
the meaning of § 5.10. These Projections indicated
that IBP would not reach the same level of
profitability as originally reported until FY 2004. In
FY 2001, IBP was expected to have earnings from
operations of $446 and net profits of $1.93 a share,
down from what was expected in FY 2000. This
diminishment in expectations resulted from concern
over an anticipated trough in the cattle cycle that
would occur during years 2001 to 2003. Moreover,
the performance projected for FY 2001 was a drop
even from the reduced FY 2000 earnings that Tyson
expected as of the time it signed the Merger
Agreement.
These negotiating realities bear on the interpretation
of § 5.10 and suggest that the contractual language
must be read in the larger context in which the parties
were transacting. To a short-term speculator, the
failure of a company to meet analysts' projected
earnings for a quarter could be highly material. Such

2.21

1.26

2.96

a failure is less important to an acquiror who seeks to
purchase the company as part of a long-term strategy.
[FN1511 To such an acquiror, the important thing is
whether the company has suffered a Material
Adverse Effect in its business or results of operations
that is consequential to the company's earnings power
over a commercially reasonable period, which one
would think would be measured in years rather than
months. It is odd to think that a strategic buyer would
view a short-term blip in earnings as material, so long
as the target's earnings-generating potential is not
materially affected by that blip or the blip's cause.
[FN1521

*43 In large measure, the resolution of the parties'
arguments turns on a difficult policy question. In
what direction does theburden of this sort of
uncertainty fall: on an acquiror or on the seller? What
little New York authority exists is not particularly
helpful, and cuts in both directions. One New York
case held a buyer to its bargain even when the seller
suffered a very severe shock from an extraordinary
event, reasoning that the seller realized that it was
buying the stock of a sound company that was,
however, susceptible to market swings. [FN1531
Another case held that a Material Adverse Effect was
evidenced by a short-term drop in sales, but in a
commercial context where such a drop was arguably
quite critical. [FN154] The non-New York authorities
cited by the parties provide no fImler guidance.
Practical reasons lead me to conclude that a New
York court would incline toward the view that a
buyer ought to have to make a strong showing to
invoke a Material Adverse Effect exception to its
obligation to close. Merger contracts are heavily
negotiated and cover a large number of specific risks
explicitly. As a result, even where a Material Adverse
Effect condition is as broadly written as the one in
the Merger Agreement, that provision is best read as
a backstop protecting the acquiror from the
occurrence of unknown events that substantially
threaten the overall earnings potential of the target in
a durationally-significant manner..[FN1551 A shortterm hiccup in earnings should not suffice; rather the
Material Adverse Effect should be material when
viewed from the longer-term perspective of a
reasonable acquiror. In this regard, it is worth noting
that IBP never provided Tyson with quarterly
projections.
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When
examined
from
this
seller-friendly
perspective, the question of whether IBP has suffered
a Material Adverse Effect remains a close one. IBP
had a very sub-par fIrst quarter. The earnings per
share of $.19 it reported exaggerate IBP's success,
because part of those earnings were generated from a
windfall generated by accounting for its stock option
plan, a type of gain that is not likely to recur. On a
normalized basis,IBP's first quarter of 2001 earnings
from operations ran 64% behind the comparable
period in 2000. If IBP had continued to perform on a
straight-line basis using its fIrst quarter 2001
performance, it would generate earnings from
operations of around $200 million. This sort of
annual perfonnance would be consequential to a
reasonable acquiror and would deviate materially
from the range in which IBP had performed during
the recent past. [FN 156]
Tyson says that this impact must also be coupled
with the DFG Impairment Charge of $60.4 million.
That Charge represents an indication that DFG is
likely to generate far less cash flow than IBP had
previously anticipated. [FN 157] At the very least,
the Charge is worth between $.50 and $.60 cents per
IBP share, which is not trivial. It is worth even more,
says Tyson, if one realizes that the Rawhide
Projections portrayed Foodbrands as the driver of
increased profitability in an era of flat fresh meats
profits. This deficiency must be considered in view of
the overall poor performance of Foodbrands so far in
FY 2001. The Rawhide Projections had targeted
Foodbrands to earn $137 million in 2001. In a
January 30, 2001 presentation to Tyson, Bond had
presented an operating plan that hoped to achieve
$145 million from Foodbrands. As of the end of the
first quarter, Foodbrands had earned only $2 million,
and thus needed another $135 million in the
succeeding three quarters to reach its Rawhide
Projection. IBP's overall trailing last twelve month's
earnings had declined from $488 million as of the
end of the third quarter of 2000 to $330 million.
[FN158]
*44 As a result of these problems, analysts following
IBP issued sharply reduced earnings estimates for FY
200 1. Originally, analysts were predicting that IBP
would exceed the Rawhide Projections in 2001 by a
wide margin. After IBP's poor first quarter, some
analysts had reduced their estimate from $2.38 per
share to $1.44 a share. [FNI59] Even accounting/or

drawn from the record evidence that is available is
that IBP will likely have its worst year since 1997, a
year which will be well below the company's average
perfonnance for all relevant periods. As important,
the company's principal driver of growth is
perfonning at markedly diminished levels, thus
compromising the company's future results as it
enters what is expected to be a tough few years in the
fresh meats business.
IBP has several responses to Tyson's evidence. IBP
initially notes that Tyson's arguments are
unaccompanied by expert evidence that identifies the
diminution in IBP's value or earnings potential as a
result of its first quarter performance. [FN160] The
absence of such proof is significant. Even after
Hankins generated extremely pessimistic projections
for IBP in order to justify a lower deal price, Merrill
Lynch still concluded that a purchase of IBP at $30
per share was still within the range of fairness and a
great long- term value for Tyson. The Merrill Lynch
analysis casts great doubt on Tyson's assertion that
IBP has suffered a Material Adverse Effect. [FN1611
IBP also emphasizes the cyclical nature of its
businesses. It attributes its poor fIrSt quarter to an
unexpectedly severe winter. This led ranchers to hold
livestock back from market, causing a sharp increase
in prices that hurt both the fresh meats business and
Foodbrands. Once April was concluded, IBP began to
perform more in line with its recent year results,
because supplies were increasing and Foodbrands
was able to begin to make up its winter margins.
Bond testified at trial that he expects IBP to meet or
exceed the Rawhide Projection of $1.93 a share in
2001, and the company has publicly indicated that it
expects earnings of $1.80 to $2.20 a share. Peterson
expressed the same view.
IBP also notes that any cyclical fall is subject to cure
by the Agreement's termination date, which was May
15, 2001. By May 15, IBP had two weeks of strong
earnings that signaled a strong quarter ahead.
Moreover, by that time, cattle that had been held back
from market were being sold, leading to plentiful
supplies that were expected to last for most of the
year.
Not only that, IBP notes that not all analyst reporting
services had been as pessimistic as Tyson portrays.
[FNI62] In March, Morningstar was reporting a
mean analyst prediction of $1.70 per share for IBP in
2001. [FN163] By May, this had grown to a mean of
$1 .74 a share. [FN164] Throughout the same period,
Morningstar's consensus prediction was an FY 2002

Tyson~
attempts to manipulate the analyst
community's perception o/IBP, this was a sharp drop.

Tyson contends that the logical inference to be
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performance of $2.33 range in March, and $2.38 in
May. [FN165] Therefore, according to Morningstar,
the analyst comInunity was predicting that IBP would
return to historically healthy earnings next year, and
that earnings for this year would fall short of the
Rawhide Projections by less than $.20 per share.
*45 IBP also argues that the Impairment Charge
does not approach materiality as a big picture item.
That Charge is a one-time, non-cash charge, and IBP
has taken large charges of that kind as recently as
1999. While IBP does not deny that its decision to
buy DFG turned out disastrously, it reminds me that
DFG is but a tiny fraction of IBP's overall business
and that a total shut-down of DFG would likely have
little effect on the future results of a combined
Tyson/IBP. And as a narrow asset issue, the charge is
insignificant to IBP as a whole.
I am confessedly torn about the correct outcome. As
Tyson points out, IBP has only pointed to two weeks
of truly healthy results in 2001 before the contract
termination date of May 15. Even these results are
suspect, Tyson contends, due to the fact that IBP
expected markedly better results for the second week
just days before the actual results come out. In view
of IBP's demonstrated incapacity to accurately
predict near-term results, Tyson says with some
justification that I should be hesitant to give much
weight to IBP's assurances that it will perfonn well
for the rest of the year.
In the end, however, Tyson has not persuaded me
that IBP has suffered a Material Adverse Effect. By
its own arguments, Tyson has evinced more
confidence in stock market analysts than I personally
harbor. But its embrace of the analysts is illustrative
of why I conclude that Tyson has not met its burden.
As of May 2001, analysts were predicting that IBP
would earn between $1.50 [FN1661 to around $1.74
[FN 1671 per share in 2001. The analysts were also
predicting that IBP would earn between $2.33
[FN 1681 and $2.42 [FN 1691 per share in 2002.
These members are based on reported "mean" or
"consensus" analyst numbers. Even at the low end of
this consensus range, mp's earnings for the next two
years would not be out of line with its historical
performance during troughs in the beef cycle. As
recently as years 1996-1998, IBP went through a
period with a three year average earnings of $1.85
per share. At the high end of the analysts' consensus
range, IBP's results would exceed this figure by $.21
per year.

This predicted range of performance from the source
that Tyson vouches for suggests that no Material
Adverse Effect has occurred. [FNI70] Rather, the
analyst views support the conclusion that IBP
remains what the baseline evidence suggests it was--a
consistently but erratically profitable company
struggling to implement a strategy that will reduce
the cyclicality of its earnings. Although IBP may not
be perfonning as well as it and Tyson had hoped,
IBP's business appears to be in sound enough shape
to deliver results of operations in line with the
company's recent historical performance. Tyson's
own investment banker still believes IBP is fairly
priced at $30 per share. The fact that Foodbrands is
not yet delivering on the promise of even better
perfonnance for IBP during beef troughs is
unavailing to Tyson, since § 5.10 focuses on IBP as
a whole and IBP's perfonnance as an entire company
is in keeping with its baseline condition.
*46 Therefore, I conclude that Tyson has not
demonstrated a breach of § 5.10. I admit to reaching
this conclusion with less than the optimal amount of
confidence. [FNI7Il The record evidence is not of
the type that pennits certainty. [FN172]
E. Tyson Was Not Fraudulently Induced To Enter
Into The Confidentiality
Agreement Or The Merger Agreement
Tyson argues that it was fraudulently induced to
enter into the Confidentiality Agreement and the
Merger Agreement. As a result, it contends that those
contracts should be rescinded, along with the contract
under which Tyson paid the Rawhide tennination fee
on IBP's behalf.
The basic elements Tyson must prove are wellestablished:
Under New York law, the essential elements of a
claim for fraudulent inducement are: (1)
misrepresentation of amaterial existing fact; (2)
falsity; (3) scienter; (4) deception; and (5) injury.
Plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant
knowingly uttered a falsehood intending to deprive
the plaintiff of a benefit and that the plaintiff was
thereby deceived and damaged. [FN173]
Tyson also contends that it was victimized by
negligent or innocent misrepresentations. New York
~aw permits rescission if IBP made a negligent or
innocent misrepresentation of material fact, so long
as
Tyson
reasonably
relied
upon
that
misrepresentation to its detriment. [FN 174]
"However, the alleged misrepresentation must be
factual in nature and not promissory or relating to
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future events that might never come to fruition."

[FN1751
Tyson also claims that it was injured by material
omissions of fact made by IBP during the Merger
negotiations. This claim is subject to somewhat
different requirements and requires Tyson to "prove
the existence of a fiduciary or confidential
relationship warranting the trusting party to repose
his confidence in the defendant and, therefore, to
relax the care and vigilance he would ordinarily
exercise in the circumstances. tt [FN 1761
Tyson bases its rescission claims on alleged
misrepresentations or omissions of material fact
related to three areas: (1) the Rawhide Projections;
(2) audit reports relating to DFG and Foodbrands;
and (3) the Comment Letter. I will address each in
tum.
Before doing that, it is important to place my more
specific analysis in some context. The negotiations
between IBP and Tyson did not take place between a
world-wise, globe-trotting capitalist with an army of
advisors on one side, and Jethro Bodine, on the other.
Instead, two equally sophisticated parties dealt with
each other at arms' length with the aid of expensive
and high'y skilled advisors. Caveat emptor is still the
basic law of New York, [FN] 771 and it applies with
full force in these circumstances.
Not only that, a contextually-specific factor--the
Confidentiality Agreement-- contributes to the
caution with which Tyson should have taken any oral
assurances or representations from IBP during the
Merger negotiation process. Tyson had agreed that it
could not use any oral or written due diligence
infonnation (or omissions therefrom) as a basis for a
lawsuit unless that issue was covered by a specific
provision of a subsequent, written contract. As a
result, Tyson could not have assumed that it could
place reasonable reliance on assurances of IBP that
were not reduced to a specific written promise in the
Merger Agreement. [FN1781

during the due diligence process would not fall
within the expansively defmed "Evaluation Material"
category. Likewise, Tyson has not convinced me that
the Confidentiality Agreement does not cover
information that was in IBP's possession that
constituted Evaluation Material, regardless of
whether that information was created by IBP or one
of its agents. The contractual defmition is much
broader. [FN 1791 Given these factors, Tyson should
have been very cautious, indeed. [FN 1801
Finally, the nature of the Merger Agreement itself
demonstrates the parties' attentiveness to the need to
cover material issues in writing, if they were a
concern. The Agreement contains numerous
representations and warranties, with lengthy
schedules of carve-outs. To the extent that a
contracting party chose not to negotiate for specific
language regarding an issue, the most plausible
inference is that the issue was simply not
fundamental enough to buttress a rescission claim.

1. Tyson Cannot Base Rescission On The Rawhide
Projections
Tyson's first argument is that it was assured that the
Rawhide Projections were conservative, that IBP
believed in them, and that IBP would meet them. It
further contends that IBP representatives made
statements about the Projections that they knew to be
false at the time they were made. I conclude
otherwise.
First, I do not believe that IBP ever made a
misrepresentation of material fact regarding the
Rawhide Projections. When fIrst prepared, the
Rawhide Projections were based on reasonable
assumptions. When the Projections were discussed
with Tyson, IBP informed Tyson of those
assumptions. IBP also told Tyson about the factors
that bore on whether IBP would achieve the
anticipated numbers. More fundamentally, Tyson was
on notice that it was to read the Rawhide Projections
in light of other infonnation that was available to it,
including IBP's most recent 10-Q. It was also on
notice about when the Projections had been prepared,
and that they had not been updated. These factors
should have indicated to Tyson in late November and
early December 2000 that IBP would likely fall short
of the EBIT target for FY 2000.

*47 While Tyson argues that the Confidentiality
Agreement itself should be rescinded, I fmd
otherwise as outlined below. Alternatively, Tyson
contends that the Confidentiality Agreement does not
cover the Warranted Financials or the Rawhide
Projections because those documents were publicly
filed. As such, Tyson argues convincingly that those
documents were not Evaluation Material for purposes
of that Agreement. What Tyson has not shown is that
oral statements about those documents that IBP made

Most important,' when Tyson signed the Merger
Agreement, Tys,on had been told that the Rawhide
Projections for FY 2000 would not be met by a wide
margin. It was also told that mp's CFO, Shipley,
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thought IBP could meet the Projections for FY 2001
but that there was no guarantee and that doing so
would depend on certain strategies working out.
Therefore, before it signed the contract, Tyson knew
that the Rawhide Projections were a prediction of
future events that had already been proven less than
accurate.
*48 Under New York law, the fact that IBP
management said that the Projections were based on
reasonable assumptions and that IBP expected to
meet the Projections does not constitute a material
misrepresentation of fact.
fFN1811 Expressing
confidence about a projection of future results will
not support a claim for material misrepresentation.
[FN1821
Nor am I persuaded that IBP management intended
to mislead Tyson in any way. The circumstances
simply do not support that inference. IBP told Tyson
too much information that placed Tyson on notice of
the uncertainty of predictions of IBP's future
perfonnance. Whatever confidence Peterson and
Bond expressed in their company was, I conclude,
heart-felt. Likewise, I fmd that Shipley lacked any
intent to deceive. While the IBP side of the
negotiation may not have been as promptly
forthcoming as was ideal, its failures in that respect
were, if anything, likely to lead a reasonable acquiror
to place less reliance on the Rawhide Projections,
rather than more. Put simply, it is odd to posit a
stranger scheme to mislead than the one IBP
supposedly carried out. The scheme involved
behaving in a manner that would naturally lead ffiP's
negotiating adversary to be skeptical and on notice of
possible problems. In any event, by the critical point
in time IBP had given Tyson all the information it
needed to assess the Rawhide Projections and their
inherent unreliability.
Finally, I conclude that Tyson did not reasonably
rely to its detriment on the Rawhide Projections. By
the time it signed the Merger Agreement, Tyson had
come to the conclusion that IBP management could
not be trusted, particularly Shipley, who they knew
prepared the Projections. To make sure that they were
making a sound deal, Tyson had its investment
banker run downside cases using numbers much
lower than were contained in the Projections. By the
time it signed the Merger Agreement, Tyson's
investment banker doubted whether DFG had ever
made money, and its CFO, Hankins, was openly
skeptical of IBP's ability to meet the Projections.
John Tyson believed that Foodbrands was broken.
Despite all these risk factors, Tyson proceeded

without securing any written representation and
warranty giving Tyson the right to walk away if IBP
did not perform in the frrst quarter of FY 2001 on a
pace to meet the Rawhide Projection for that year.
Nor did Tyson seek to escrow a portion of the Merger
consideration, pending IBP's perfonnance in 2001.
Notably, in January 2001, Tyson's Cash Offer
documents reprinted the Rawhide Projections,
revised as of December 20, 2000. In so doing, Tyson
warned as follows:

The Company has advised us that it does not as a
matter ofcourse make public forecasts as to future
revenues, earnings or other financial information,
and the Projections were not prepared with a view
to public disclosure.

***

The Projections were not prepared with a view to
public disclosure or compliance with published
guidelines of the SEC or the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants regarding prospective
fmancial infonnation. In addition, the Projections
were not prepared with the assistance of or
reviewed, compiled or examined by, independent
auditors. The Projections reflect numerous

assumptions, all made by the Company
management, with respect to industry performance,
general business, economic, market and financial
conditions and other matters, all of which are
difficult to predict and many of which are beyond
the Company's control. Accordingly, there can be
no assurance that the assumptions made in
preparing the Projections will prove accurate, and
actual results may be materially greater or less
than those contained in the Projections.
*49 The inclusion of the Projections in this
Supplement to the Offer should not be regarded as
an indication that the Company, Tyson or
Purchaser or any of the Company's, Tyson's or
Purchaser's respective representatives,
or
respective officers and directors, consider such
information to be an accurate prediction offuture
events or necessarily achievable. In light of the
uncertainties inherent in forward looking
information of' any kind, we caution against
reliance on such information. The Company has
advised us that it does not intend to update or
revise the Projections to reflect circumstances
existing after the date when prepared or to reflect
the occurrence of future events, unless required by
law. [FN1831
For all these reasons, the Rawhide Projections
provide IBP with no basis to rescind the Merger
Agreement or the Confidentiality Agreement.
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2. Tyson Cannot Base Rescission On Any
Deficiencies In The Due Diligence
Process Regarding DFG
Tyson's next argument is that it was misled by IBP
about the health of Foodbrands, and that it was
denied access to full due diligence regarding that part
of IBP. This argument is unavailing for several
reasons.
First, the assertion is barred by the Confidentiality
Agreement, which prohibits a claim based on a due
diligence omission. No representation or warranty in
the Merger Agreement specifically covers this
contention.
Second, IBP did not deny Tyson access to due
diligence about Foodbrands. It told Tyson that the
cost of access was permitting Smithfield to see the
same information. Tyson has not proven that ffiP
management thought there were problems outside of
DFG as of December 2000 and decided to deny
Tyson access to infonnation so as to conceal them.
Third, I conclude that Hagen did not intentionally
mislead Tyson about whether it had received audit
reports about all units of IBP. Tyson's request was
directed to the "company" and was never more
specific. Tyson never asked for audit reports specific
to DFG or Foodbrands after being told that it had
received all audit reports for the company. The type
of misunderstanding that emerged between Hudson
and Hagen is typical of those that are common in
discovery disputes. Given the large volume of
information Hagen turned over, I cannot infer that
she purposely hid any particular audit reports from
Tyson. Hudson could have followed up if he wanted
Foodsbrand-specific audit reports and had not
received any. Persistence by the requesting party is
expected when huge volumes of infonnation are
being produced in a hurry.

million in sales had caused an over $30 million loss,
that IBP still had not figured out how to account for
the problem, and was still studying whether an
impainnent was necessary. Tyson also knew that this
problem had been caused by fraud that had gone on
for a lengthy period, without detection by IBP's top
management. In part because of these events, Tyson
lacked confidence in IBP's CFO at the time it signed
the Merger Agreement.
*50 In view of what Tyson knew, anything in the
Brady memorandum would have been merely
cumulative. [FNI85] The key is that IBP told Tyson
~bout the problems identified in that memorandum.
And given Tyson's decision to increase its bid after
learning of the deepening problems at DFG and its
acceptance of Schedule 5.11, Tyson's argument that it
would not have signed the Merger Agreement if it
had seen the Brady memorandum is meritless.
3. Tyson Cannot Base Rescission On The Comment
Letter
Tyson argues that it was misled into signing the
Merger Agreement because of IBpts failure to
disclose the Comment Letter. Earlier in this litigation,
Tyson argued that IBP's failure to tum over the
Comment Letter was intentional. Tyson has dropped
that claim and contends that the failure was an
actionable innocent omission of a material fact. For
reasons discussed, this argument is barred by the
Confidentiality Agreement. Even if not barred by that
Agreement, this argument is without merit.
As is obvious, Tyson's Comment Letter claim is not
based on any statement that IBP made to Tyson. It is
based on IBP's failure to disclose the Letter. IBP was
not Tyson's fiduciary during the contractual
negotiations. It had no special duty to provide Tyson
with the Comment Letter, even assuming it had
focused on the Letter before the Agreement was
executed--which neither it nor its attorneys had.
The fact that IBP had no duty to disclose the
Comment Letter to Tyson is perhaps best illustrated
by Tyson's own behavior. In the weeks preceding the
Merger Agreement's execution, Tyson had
corresponded with the SEC about issues that IBP
would have found interesting. Tyson never turned
this correspondence over to IBP. In fact, after the
Merger Agreement was signed, Tyson breached its
obligation to turn over SEC correspondence to IBP
at the same time as it was complaining about the
Comment Letter. [FN 1861 Tyson's own behavior
demonstrates that the parties were dealing with each

Lastly, any failure on Hagen's part did not cause
Tyson to sign the Merger Agreement under a
misapprehension of material fact. The Brady
memorandum regarding DFG is the only potentially
material audit report that Tyson complains Hagen
failed to provide. But that memorandum contains no
information that, in words or substance, was not
communicated to Tyson before it signed the Merger
Agreement. By the time it signed on the dotted line,
Tyson doubted that DFG would contribute in FY
2001, and knew that a company with only $70
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other at arms' length, and that no special duty of
disclosure had arisen. For this reason alone, Tyson's
rescission claim fails. [FN 1871
As important, there is no basis to infer that Tyson
would not have signed the Merger Agreement if it
had seen the Comment Letter. [FN 1881 The
Comment Letter flagged no issues that Tyson had not
already identified and concluded were not obstacles
to going forward with the Merger Agreement.
[FN 1891 As of December 29, 2000, Tyson had far
more knowledge than the SEC had about the issues
raised in the Letter--especially DFG.
In the face of a grandstand full of waving red flags,
Tyson sped into the fmal round of the negotiation
process. The Comment Letter would not have slowed
it down. This conclusion is best demonstrated by the
fact that Tyson's board and stockholders voted to
approve the Merger Agreement after Tyson had
received the Comment Letter. [FN1901 Tyson's top
management deemed the Letter too insignificant-i.e.,
immaterial [FN1911--to share with the board or the
stockholders. [FNI92]

F. IBP Has Not Proven That Tyson's Termination Of
Its Cash Offer Breached The
Agreement
*51 The fmalmerits issue I must examine is IBP's
contention that Tyson's frrst breach of contract
occurred no later than February 28, 2001, when
Tyson did not close on its Cash Offer. [FN1931 As of
that time, the minimum tender condition of 50.1 % of
the IBP shares had been easily met and Tyson had
obtained Hart-Scott-Rodino clearance. For the
reasons discussed, Tyson did not have a basis to
terminate as of that date in reliance on the
Agreement's representations and warranties, because
none of them were breached. Even more important,
Tyson was required by Annex I of the Agreement to
make a reasonable good faith judgment that a
representation and warranty was breached as of the
time it decided not to close the Cash Offer. As
Baledge testified, Tyson had not made any such good
faith determination.
Therefore, Tyson must rely on some other basis to
excuse its failure to close the Cash Offer. The basis
that Tyson asserts is that mp's failure to fonnally file
the Restated Financials in time for Tyson to amend
its Cash Offer Documents made it impossible for
Tyson to comply with the relevant SEC regulations
and thus to close. In support of this argument, Tyson
cites to SEC regulations and guidance, which state

that "fp lro forma fmancial information is required in
a negotiated third-party cash tender offer when
securities are intended to be offered in a subsequent
merger or other transaction in which remaining target
securities are acquired and the acquisition of the
subject company is significant to the offeror ...."
[FN 194] Tyson was subject to this requirement
because IBP stockholders who did not elect to tender
into the Cash Offer would receive Tyson stock in the
Exchange Offer or ultimate Merger. Therefore,
Tyson's Cash Offer documents contained pro forma
information that was based on the original Warranted
Financials. As a result, Tyson contends that it had no
choice but to refuse to close, because IBP did not
formally file the Restated Financials until after the
contractual expiration of the Cash Offer on February
28, 200 I. To the extent that any party is at fault,
Tyson says, it is IBP, which failed to provide
corrected fmancial information pursuant to § 2.01(e)
in sufficient time to allow Tyson to update its Cash
Offer documents and close on February 28.
In January and February, Tyson put IBP on notice
that it was awaiting the outcome of IBP's SEC
discussions before updating its Cash Offer
documents. In this regard, Tyson notes that IBP never
demanded that Tyson update those documents on the
basis of interim information that was not contained in
formally Restated Financials. Indeed, once Tyson
terminated, IBP issued a press release stating that
Tyson's termination of the Cash Offer was "in
complete accordance with the" Merger Agreement.
[FN1951
IBP's response hinges largely on § 9.02 of the
Agreement, which imposed on Tyson the duty to use
its "reasonable best efforts" to close the Cash Offer.
According to IBP, Tyson breached this duty because
it took no steps to use the information that it
possessed before February 28, 2001 to construct pro
forma information that, with the inclusion of
appropriate qualifications, would pass muster under
the SEC regulations. For example, IBP says that
Tyson possessed drafts of the Restated Financials in
early February. [FN 1961 Not only that, Tyson had
received a copy of a February 7, 2001 SEC letter to
IBP, which indicated that the SEC would not decline
to accelerate the effectiveness of a registration
statement for Tyson's Exchange Offer, so long as the
statement included the restated fmancial statements.
[FN197] Even if that earlier information was not
sufficient, ffiP notes that it publicly disclosed the
substantive aspects of the Restated Financials on
February 22, 2001, including the quarters to which
the DFG charges would be allocated. [FN 1981 This
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disclosure also indicated that an asset impairment of
up to $108 million could be taken, and discussed the
effect that variable option plan accounting would
have.
*52 IBP therefore argues that if Tyson had used
"reasonable best efforts" it could have constructed
pro forma information that met the requirements of
the SEC Regulations, and disclosed that infonnation
in time for it to close the Cash Offer on February 28,
2001. In early February, Hagen had called Baledge to
discuss moving forward with the Cash Offer on the
basis of this infonnation. Baledge never responded to
her request.
IBP contends that the reason that Baledge never
responded has now become clear, and evidences a
breach of § 9.02: Tyson was trying to stall for time
so that Don Tyson could see more IBP results from
2001 before deciding whether to proceed,
renegotiate, or tenninate. The evidence does support
the conclusion that Tyson's principal motivation was
delay for reasons that had to do with Tyson's own
weakened fmancial condition and IBP's weak fIrst
quarter, rather than any of the issues pending before
the SEC.

dispute that Tyson had a duty to present pro forma
fmancial infonnation, and no question that its
presentation should be as accurate as possible.
Beyond that, the parties basically give me opinion
testimony about how the SEC would treat this kind of
question. Tyson says that the SEC wants tender
offerors to get it right, and that it is not adequate to
simply set forth pro forma infonnation and indicate
that there could be deviations based on unaudited
numbers in the target's press releases. IBP contends
that the SEC is more flexible than that, and that if
Tyson had constructed pro formas that factored in the
infonnation in the draft restatements provided to
Tyson in early February, this would have sufficed to
meet any fair disclosure obligation. IBP also adds
'that it was ludicrous for Tyson to fear litigation,
. . . . it is difficult to conceive how IBP
,~rs could have been injured by a disclosure
of a pro forma balance sheet, adjusted by the
information in the draft restatements and coupled
with an indication that an asset impairment of up to
$108 million could be taken at a later time.
*53 My suspicion is that a motivated tender offeror,
working with a cooperative target and the target's
accountants, could have put together Cash Offer
documents that would have satisfied SEC standards
and presented no likelihood of serious litigation risk
based on the information that Tyson had in its
possession in early to mid-February. This would have
required a collaborative effort with the target and
discussions with the SEC, but it probably could have
been done. That's my guess.

Yet, during February 2001, Tyson did not tell IBP
that its most important reason for not proceeding with
the Cash Offer had nothing to do with the SEC
issues. Instead, it issued public statements indicating
that it was committed to the transaction's prompt
consummation, but wished to assess the materiality
of any restatements resulting from the SEC process.
Indeed, on February 21, 2001, John Tyson publicly
reiterated that Tyson was "going to buy IBP," that it
was "a unique point in time and opportunity to create
the world's largest marketer of these proteins," and
that "IBP is a strong company." [FN1991 As a result,
IBP says it was lulled into a sense of false security
that led it to refrain from demanding that Tyson
speed up its efforts to close the Cash Offer. Had
Tyson disclosed its real motives, IBP would have
acted differently. IBP's public indication that Tyson's
tennination of the Cash Offer comported with the
Agreement must be understood in context: IBP was
expressing its reliance on the good faith of a merger
partner who it thought was exercising best efforts.
Therefore, its press release cannot be regarded as an
enforceable waiver of any breach on Tyson's part.

And that's my problem. IBP is hinging its present
argument on several "could have been" scenarios that
I am not well-positioned to evaluate with the
certainty that is required to sustain a fmding of
contractual breach. Under the Agreement, IBP had
the primary duty here, to provide Tyson with
corrected infonnation that would allow the Cash
Offer to close. Although IBP hinted that Tyson could
proceed with interim information in advance of the
fmal Restated Financials, it never demanded that
Tyson do so, and it never asked Tyson to request the
SEC's pennission to go forward on that basis. Thus,
IBP asks me to speculate that it was commercially
unreasonable for Tyson to wait until it had certified
restatements before proceeding.
While it is troubling that Tyson used IBP's troubles
with the SEC to prospect for more time, I am not
sufficiently persuaded that it was unreasonable for
Tyson to await the fonnally Restated Financials
before proceeding. Indeed, the SEC's February 7,

My ability to resolve the competing arguments of
Tyson and IBP is compromised by the murky nature
of the governing administrative law that has been
cited to me. As a general matter, there seems to be no
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2001 letter to Hagen is at best ambiguous about
whether the SEC was willing to permit a registration
statement based on draft restatements, rather than
filed restatements. And although more complete
information was publicly released by IBP on
February 22, 2001, that was a very short time before
the Cash Offer deadline and IBP has. not convinced
me that it was practical for Tyson to amend its pro
forma infonnation, and disclose that information in
time for IBP stockholders to consider it in their
decision- making process by the deadline. Therefore,
I conclude that Tyson did not breach the Agreement,
or any duty to the IBP stockholders, by failing to
close the Cash Offer on February 28,2001.
As a result of this conclusion, my merits
determination is that Tyson is in breach of the Merger
Agreement because it improperly terminated in late
March, 2001. That is, it is in breach of its obligation
to close the Cash Election Merger on or before May
15,2001. [FN2001

IV./BP Is Entitled To An Award O/Specific
Performance
Having detennined that the Merger Agreement is a
valid and enforceable contract that Tyson had no
right to terminate, I now turn to the question of
whether the Merger Agreement should be enforced
by an order of specific performance. Although
Tyson's voluminous post-trial briefs argue the merits
fully, its briefs fail to argue that a remedy of specific
performance is unwarranted in the event that its
position on the merits is rejected.
This gap in the briefmg is troubling. A compulsory
order will require a merger of two public companies
with thousands of employees working at facilities
that are important to the communities in which they
operate. The impact of a forced merger on
constituencies beyond the stockholders and top
managers of IBP and Tyson weighs heavily on my
mind. The prosperity of IBP and Tyson means a great
deal to these constituencies. I therefore approach this
remedial issue quite cautiously and mindful of the
interests of those who will be affected by my
decision.

whole unless it can specifically enforce the
acquisition agreement, because the target company is
unique and will yield value of an unquantifiable
nature, once combined with the acquiring company.
[FN2021 In this case, the sell-side of the transaction
is able to make the same argument, because the
Merger Agreement provides the IBP stockholders
with a choice of cash or Tyson stock, or a
combination of both. Through this choice, the· IBP
stockholders were offered a chance to share in the
upside of what was touted by Tyson as a unique,
synergistic combination. This court has not found,
and Tyson has not advanced, any compelling reason
why sellers in mergers and acquisitions transactions
should have less of a right to demand specific
perfonnance than buyers, and none has independently
come to my mind.
In addition, the determination of a cash damages
award will be very difficult in this case. And the
amount of any award could be staggeringly large. No
doubt the parties would haggle over huge valuation
questions, which (Tyson no doubt would argue) must
take into account the possibility of a further auction
for IBP or other business developments. A damages
award can, of course, be shaped; it simply will lack
any pretense to precision. An award of specific
perfonnance will, I anticipate, entirely eliminate the
need for a speculative detennination of damages.
[FN2031
Finally, there is no doubt that a remedy of specific
perfoll11ance is practicable. Tyson itself admits that
the combination still makes strategic sense. At trial,
John Tyson was asked by his own counsel to testify
about whether it was fair that Tyson should enter any
later auction for IBP hampered by its payment of the
Rawhide Tennination Fee. This testimony indicates
that Tyson Foods is still interested in purchasing IBP,
but wants to get its original purchase price back and
then buy IBP off the day-old goods· table. I consider
John Tyson's testimony an admission of the
feasibility of specific perfonnance. [FN204]
Probably the concern that weighs heaviest on my
mind is whether specific perfonnance is the right
remedy in view of the harsh words that have been
said in the course of this litigation. Can these
management teams work together? The answer is that
I do not know. Peterson and Bond say they can. I am
not convinced, although Tyson's top executives
continue to respect the managerial acumen of
Peterson and Bond, if not that of their fmancial
subordinates.

* S4 I start with a fundamental question: is this is a
truly unique opportunity that cannot be adequately
monetized? If the tables were turned and Tyson was
seeking to enforce the contract, a great deal of
precedent would indicate that the contract should be
specifically enforced. [FN201] In the more typical
situation, an acquiror argues that it cannot be made
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What persuades me that specific performance is a
workable remedy is that Tyson will have the power to
decide all the key management questions itself. It can
therefore hand-pick its own management team. While
this may be unpleasant for the top level IBP
managers who might be replaced, it was a possible
risk of the Merger from the get-go· and a reality of
lOOay's M & A market.
.
*55 The impact on other constituencies of this ruling
also seems tolerable. Tyson's own inves~ent banker
thinks the transaction makes sense for Tyson, and is
still fairly priced at $30 per share. One would think
the Tyson constituencies would be better served on
the whole by a specific performance remedy, rather
than a large damages award that did nothing but cost
Tyson a large amount of money.
In view of these factors, I am persuaded that an
award of specific performance is appropriate,
regardless of what level of showing was required by
IBP. That is, there is clear and convincing evidence
to support this award. Such an award is decisively
preferable to a vague and imprecise damages remedy
that cannot adequately remedy the injury to IBP's
stockholders.

its stockholders. The stockholder plaintiffs
were present at trial, but allowed IBP's
counsel to present their case.
The parties agreed to expedite the trial on
the merits and the question of whether
specific performance was appropriate, and to
defer any issues of damages. This approach
was designed to ensure that the passage of
time would not preclude IBP's chance at
specific perfonnance. For reasons that the
opinion suggests, it may be that any
damages issue has largely been obviated,
depending on the parties' cooperation and
the outcome on appeal.

FN2. PX 27, at IBP2000184.

FN3./d

FN4. This is a simplification of a very
complex issue that involves the timing of
Foodbrands' purchase of livestock at certain
costs and the timing of its sale of fmished
product, and the pricing of those respective
transactions, among other factors. The
simplicity of this rendering also applies to
the overall discussion of IBP's susceptibility
to changes in livestock supply.

v. Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, IBP's claim for
specific performance is granted. Tyson's claims for
relief are dismissed. The parties shall collaborate and
present a conforming partial fmal order no later than
June 27. In addition, the parties shall schedule an
office conference with the court to occur later that
same week.

FN5. Typically, this is defmed as Earnings
Before Interest and Taxes, but has been used
more loosely by the parties in this case. In
this opinion, earnings from operations and
EBIT are used interchangeably. They are the
terms the companies have used to describe
IBP's earnings.

FN168. First Call Earnings Estimate-IBP,
Inc. for thirty days prior as of June 12, 2001.

FN 1. This lawsuit started as a challenge by
stockholder plaintiffs to an earlier leveraged
buyout of IBP. The plaintiffs then drew fIre
on the Tyson Merger, contending it was
unfair, too. When the Tyson Merger went
away, IBP quickly moved for specific
performance. The stockholder plaintiffs had
the "flexibility" to adapt to these events and
have decided that the Tyson Merger is the
best deal and should be enforced. The
stockholder plaintiffs thus join in the
arguments made by ffiP, but have let IBP
take the lead on behalf of the company and

FN6. PX 531, at T41054.

FN7. Earlier in the litigation, Tyson leveled
senous fraud allegation at IBP based on
assertions by Baledge relating to the
November 24 meeting. Baledge claimed to
have been given access to a copy of the
Rawhide Projections before the November
24 meeting as a fraudulent inducement by
IBP to enter the bidding. The Arkansas court
was told that this document would be a key
one in this case. So flimsy did this
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accusation tum out to be that it was not even
made in Tyson's post-trial brief: Although
Baledge sticks to his story, Tyson did not
and Baledge's management colleagues have
not. I do not credit Baledge's version of
events, which is at best mistaken.

FN24. OX 306, at T53134.

FN25. Tyson Dep. at 74.

FN26. PX 243.
FN8. PX 531, at T41053 (emphasis added).

FN9. PX 40, at T40977.

FN27. OX 306, at 53132; OX 383, at
T53522.

FNIO. Jd at T40988.

FN28. Tr.2059-60; DX 383, at T53529.

FNl1. Tr.41.

FN29. McCaleb Dep. at 45.

FN12. PX 63.

FN30. DX 30.

FNI3.Id (emphasis added).

FN31. At trial, Hagen admitted she did not
review IBP's internal audit database in
compiling her response. Tr. 1569-70.
Nonetheless, Tyson has not argued that it
did not receive "IBP" audit reports, nor has
it produced any specific request by Hudson
for Foodbrands or DFG audit reports after
Hagen's assertion that she had sent all
company audit reports. In due diligence, as
in discovery, recipients of infonnation often
review what they receive in order to identify
possible gaps.

FNI4.Jd

FN16. McCaleb Dep. at 145.

FN17./d at 139.
FN32. PX 108.
FN18.Id at 45-46; PX 442.
FN33. PX 438; Tr. 2609-10; Tr. 833.
FN19. McCaleb Dep. at 104-105.

FN34. Tr. 835-36.
FN20. PX 561.
FN35. Tr. 834-35.
FN21. PX 74.
FN36. Tyson attempted to show that Shipley
had under-stated Foodbrands' performance,
by attempting to show that his December 20
estimates were rosier than were the
company's own weekly profit· and loss
statements as of that time. Those statements,

FN22. Peterson Dep. at 85; Tr. 1210-11.

FN23. DX 383, at T53527.
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however, backed out the CFBA Charges
previously discussed, as the record evidence
demonstrates. OX 528; OX 529. As a result,
Tyson's contention is without merit.

FN54. PX 122.

FN37. Tr. 2605-06.

FN55. PX 177.

FN38. OX 306, at 53162.

FN56./d

FN39. PX 116, at T23655.

FN57. PX 189.

FN40. Tr. 2592-93.

FN58. McCaleb Dep. at 166, 187.

FN41. Tr.2075-78.

FN59. PX 156.

FN42./d

FN60. PX 178.

FN43. Tyson Oep. at 47; Tr. 2309.

FN61. PX 156.

FN44. Tr. 2309-2310.

FN62./d

FN45. Tr.2094-95.

FN63. Tr.1961.

FN46. Tr.2096-2098; Tr.2063.

FN64. PX 208. These words were massaged
by Baledge at the request of Bond. The
original language indicated that Tyson
would assess the materiality of any of these
questions to the "transaction." Tr. 327.

FN47. McCaleb Dep. at 57-58, 91-96.

FN53./d

FN48. Emphasis added.
FN65. Tyson's expert says that IBP was
naive to think that the SEC would give such
counsel, and that IBP was in general less
than adroit in its dealings with the SEC. This
strategic issue does not bear on the outcome
of the case. Tyson's SEC expert essentially
believed that IBP should have simply agreed
to all of the SEC's concerns straight-away
and filed a large restatement. While this
would have, of course, shortened the
process, under Tyson's theory IBP would
still have been in breach. In addition, I note
that the SEC itself purports to encourage
registrants to discuss difficult issues like IBP
faced with it. SEC Staff Accounting

FN49. Agreement, Annex I(d), Annex III §
(14)(e) (emphasis added).

FN50. Agreement § § 5.07-5.10.

FN51.Id § 2.01(e), (h).

FN52.Id
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Bulletin: No. 99--Materiality, 17 CFR Part
211 [Release No. SAB 99] (Aug. 12, 1999).
FN83. PX 347.
FN66. DX 330, at T4414.
FN84. D. Tyson Dep. at 100-02, 180-82.
FN67. PX 237.
FN85. Tr. 2280-2282; D. Tyson Dep. at
100-102.
FN68. DX 164; OX 173.
FN86. Hudson Dep. Ex. S.
FN69. Tr. 2496-97.
FN87. I have not quibbled with this rare area
of agreement, although I note that the
Confidentiality
Agreement
and
the
agreement giving rise to Tyson's payment of
the Rawhide termination fee are governed
by the contract law of Delaware.

FN70./d

FN71. PX 277.

FN72. Tr. 2485-86.
FN88. It is fair to say that this is one of the
more tersely argued disputes in the briefs.
FN73. PX 274.
FN89. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co.
470

FN74. PX 370.

'0

F.Supp. 1308, 1324 CN.D.N.Y.1979).
FN75. PX 326.
FN90. In re Estate of Getchell, Del. Ch.,
C.A. No. 101037, 1994 WL 469153, *4 n. 3,
Jacobs, V.C. (Aug. 4, 1994) ("[c]ourts have,
in certain cases, required a party seeking an
order of specific performance to meet a
higher evidentiary burden, 'for fear of doing
greater wrong than by leaving the parties to
their legal remedy" ') (quoting 71 AmJur.2d
Spec. Perf § 208, at 266 (1973).

FN76. Tr. 109-115.

FN77. Tr. 122-25.

FN78. PX 297. Another March 13, 2001
document that evidences Tyson's desire to
retrade the deal is PX 310.

FN91. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts §
133 (1971).
FN79. PX 573.
FN92. /d; see also id § 135..
FN80. PX 317.
FN93. 71 Am.Iur.2d Spec. Pert: § 208
(1973) (the "established rule" is that more
than a "mere preponderance" is necessary to
support an award of specific performance).

FN81. Tr. 164-66.

FN82. Tr. 166-67.
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FN94. 96 N.Y. Jur.2d Spec. Pert: § 70
("[Tlhe defendant must establish by proper
proof any defense he interposes in an action
for specific performance...."); 84 N.Y.
Jur.2d Pleading § 153 (1990) (breach of
warranty is an affrrmative defense); Brignoli
v. Balch. Hardy, & Scheinman. Inc., 178
A.D.2d 290, 577 N.Y.S.2d 375, 375-76
<N.Y.App.Div.1991) ("The defendant bears
the burden of proof on an affirmative
defense."); Continental Coach Crafters Co.
v. Fitzwater, Del.Super., 415 A.2d 785, 787
(1980} (treating breach of warranty as an
affmnative defense); see also DicksonWitmer v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.,
DeI.Super., C.A. No. 92C-07-107, ]994 WL
164554, at *5, Barron, J. (Apr. 27, 1994)
(party seeking to avoid contractual
obligation on grounds of misrepresentation
bore burden to prove its affirmative
defense).

FN95. Gaidon v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.. 94
N.Y.2d 330,704 N.Y.S.2d 177,725 N.E.2d
598,607 (N.Y. 1999).

plaintiff seeks specific performance. But that
higher merits burden may be thought
important to advance the public policy of
Delaware.It is because these level-of-proof
issues are so bound up with public policy
concems--rather than trial procedure--that I
believe that New York law is applicable.

FN99. USA Cable v. World Wrestling
Federation Entertainment. Inc.. DeI.Supr.,
766 A.2d 462, 473 (2000} (citing Brown
Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Bean Constr.
Corp., 41 N.Y.2d 397, 393 N.Y.S.2d 350,
361 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (N.Y.1977); Kenyon
v. Delman. 38 F.Supp.2d 107, 110
(N.D.N.Y.1998}; 22 N.Y. Jur.2d Contracts §
30 (1996}).

FNIOO. 22 N.Y. Jur.2d Contracts §

214

(1996).

FNI01. First Development Corp. v. Delco
Plainview Realty Associates, 194 A.D.2d
711,
600
N.Y.S.2d
105,
106
<N.Y.App.Div.1993}.

FN96. NRG Barriers, Inc. v. Je/in, Del. Ch.,
C.A. No. 15013-NC, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS
99, at *20, Steele, V.C. (Aug. 6, 1996).

FN 102. Sutton v. East River Savings Bank.
55 N.Y.2d 550, 450 N.Y.S.2d 460, 435
N.E.2d 1075,1078 (N.Y.1982l.

FN97. Restatement (Second) of Conflicts §

.L!Jl, 135.

FNI03. Eighth Ave. Coach Corp. v. City of
New York, 286 N.Y. 84, 35 N.E.2d 907, 909
<N.Y.1941}.

FN98. For example, Tyson asserts that
Delaware law requires a party seeking
specific performance to demonstrate its
entitlement by clear and convincing
evidence. It does not dilate on whether that
burden applies to the court's determination
that the party resisting specific performance
is in breach of a written contract, or whether
that burden applies solely to the question of
whether the court is sufficiently persuaded
that an award of specific performance is
warranted. Given that one can recover
contractual damages simply by proving a
contractual breach by a preponderance, it is
somewhat inefficient to have the breach
determination be governed by a different
evidentiary burden solely because the

FNI04. S & S Media. Inc. v. Vango Media.
Inc.. 84 A.D.2d 356, 446 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54
CN.Y.App.Div.1982).
FNI05. Klein v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 173 A.D.2d 1006, 569 N.Y.S.2d 838,
842 <N.Y.App.Div.1991).

FNI06. World Wrestling. 766 A.2d at 473
(citing Mencher v. Weiss. 306 N.Y. I, 114
N.E.2d 177,181-82 CN.Y.1953).
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FNI07. See, e.g., A/land v. Consumers
Credit Corp.. 476 F.2d 951, 956 (2d
Cir.1973)
(subjective
understanding
expressed during negotiations may be
probative of meaning that the parties placed
on language); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 201(2) (1979) (same); Federal
Insur. Co. v. Americas Insurance Co.. 258
A.D.2d 39, 691 N.Y.S.2d 508, 512
CN.Y.App.Div.1999) (course ofperfonnance
is
persuasive
evidence
of intent);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202
emt. g ("The parties to an agreement know
best what they meant, and their action under
it is often the strongest evidence of their
meaning.").

FNl08. Tyson cites to another merger
agreement in which the WachteII, Lipton
fInn used this technique. DX 1207.

FNI09. Emphasis added.

FN110. Tyson is not always consistent,
however. In its brie~ Tyson argues that the
Restated Financials were evidence of a
breach, not the breach itself. But if the
breach itself was the DFG earnings charges
that resulted from accounting improprieties
during the periods covered by the Warranted
Financials, IBP was in breach from the date
of signing the Agreement and Tyson knew
it, thus turning the contract into a pure
option on Tyson's part.

FNI1l. Tr. 2270-72, 2617-19.

FN112. Tr. 2522.

FNI13. Wendel Foundation v. Moreda//
Realty Corp.. 282 N.Y. 239,26 N.E.2d 241,
243 (N.Y.1940).

CN.Y.App.Div.1978).

FN115. Tyson Post Tr. Ans. Br. at 12.

FNII6./d

FN 117. Securities lawsuits were filed based
on the DFG-related issues in the Restated
Financials. The record does not support the
conclusion that IBP faces material risk from
the suits, because its top management and
board were victimized by Zahn and did not
act with scienter.

FN118. Section 2.01(e) & (h) of the
Agreement also casts doubt on Tyson's rigid
reading. That provision requires IBP to
"correct promptly" any information (e.g., the
Warranted Financials) provided to Tyson for
use in its offer documents "which shall have
become false or misleading" so that Tyson
could file corrected offer documents with
the SEC. Section 2.01 thus appears to
contemplate the possibility that there would
be a need to correct historical--i.e., past-fmancial information IBP had previously
reported to the SEC and that this eventuality
in itself would not be fatal to IBP's right to
have the Merger consummated.

FN119. Agreement, Annex I(d), Annex III §
14(d).

FN120. Musak Corp. v. Hotel Taft Corp.. 1
N.Y.2d 42, 150 N.Y.S.2d 171, 133 N.E.2d
688, 690 CN.Y.1956); Bank of TokvoMitsubishi. Ltd v. Kvaerner. 243 A.D.2d 1,
671
N.Y.S.2d
905,
910
CN.Y.APD.Div.1998);2 Farnsworth on
Contracts § 7.11, at 284-285 (1998); 5
Corbin on Contracts § 24.23, at 254 (rev.
ed.I998).

FN 121. Model Stock Purchase Agreement,
1995 A.B.A. Sec. Bus. L. § 7, at 163.

FNl14. Id; see also Farrell Lines, Inc. v.
City of New York, 30 N.Y.2d 76, 330
N.Y.S.2d 358, 281 N.E.2d 162, 165
(N.Y.1972); In the Matter of Friedman. 64
A.D.2d 70, 407 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1006

FN122. Tyson Post Tr. Ans. Br. at 11.
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FN133. McCaleb Dep. at 91-95.
FN123. Agreement § 7.01(i).
FN134. DX 168.

FN 124. In a similar vein, it is plausible that
IBP would be specifically permitted to
restate its inventory based on the inventory
dispute with the IRS disclosed in Schedules
5.11 and 5.13.

FN135. Emphasis added.

FN136. DX 168.
FN125. Trans Pacific Leasing Corp. v. Aero
Micronesia, .Inc., 26 F.Supp.2d 698, 709
(S.D.N.Y.1998) ("separately negotiated or
added terms are given greater weight than
standardized terms or other terms not
separately
negotiated");
see
also
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(d)
(1979) (same).

FN137. Tyson cites among other authorities
TSC Indus.! Inc. v. Northway, Inc.! 426 U.S.
438, 449, 96 S.Ct. 2126, 48 L.Ed.2d 757
(1976) ( "reasonable investor" standard);
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts
No. 1 (public fmancial statements designed
to serve the common interests of a wide
variety of constituencies, including lenders
and investors).

FN126. Hlawaty Dep. at 95-98.
FN138. IBP cites cases including Recupito
v. Prudential Securities, Inc.! 112 F.Supp.2d
449, 459-60 (D.Md.2000) (where fmancial
statement was· not prepared in conformance
with GAAP, that problem was immaterial
where the relevant information was
disclosed elsewhere in the filing); Wollins v.
Antman.
638
F.Supp. 989, 994-95
(E.D.N. Y.1986) (where defendants had
disclosed to the buyer of a business
information about the company's value, a
lost account, and information from which to
calculate the value of that loss, the
defendants' failure to disclose the total
percentage of the company's sales
represented by the lost account was not
material in view of the total mix of
information).

FN127. Hudson Dep. at 174-179.

FN 128. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §
201(2) (1979).

FN129. PX 197.

FN130. Tr. 2270-2272.

FN131. Federal Ins. Co., 691 N.Y.S.2d at
512.

FN 132. If the parties had focused on this
particular nicety on the December 30
negotiation call, I have no doubt that
Tyson's negotiators would have accepted the
risk of the additional DFG charges,
regardless of the filings in which such
charges would be set forth. Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 21 A.D.2d 160, 249
N.Y.S.2d 208, 214 (N.Y.App.Div.1964),
aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 857, 271 N.Y.S.2d 287, 218
N.E.2d 327 CN.Y.1966).

FNI39.TSC Indus.! 426 U.S. at 449
(materiality viewed in context of total
infonnation mix); SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin: No. 99-- Materiality, 17 CFR Part
211 [Release No. SAB 99] (Aug. 12, 1999)
("In the context of a misstatement of a
fmancial statement item, while the 'total mix'
includes the size in numerical or percentage
terms of the misstatement, it also includes
the factual context in which the user of
fmancial statements would view the
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financial statement item....n); Statement of
Financial Accounting Concepts No.2, (nThe
better infonned decision makers are, the less
likely it is that any new information can add
materially to what they already know.").

FN140. Tr. 962 (testimony of Roman Weil
citing APB Opinion No. 20- Accounting
Changes).

FN141. PX 276.

FN142./d

FN143. S.E.C. Staff Accounting Bulletin
Number 101.

FN144. PX 40.

FN149. See PX 27, at 13; PX 40, at 3.

FN150. PX 40, at 3, 14.

FN 151. James C. Freund, Anatomy Of A
Merger: Strategies and Techniques for
Negotiating Corporate Acquisitions 246
(Law Journals Seminars-Press 1975)
(tt[W]hatever the' concept of materiality may
mean, at the very least it is always relative to'
the situation.tt).

FN152. Pine State Creamery Co. v. Land-OSun Dairies. Inc.. 201 F.3d 437, 1999 WL
1082539, at*6 (4th Cir.1999) (per curiam)
(whether severe losses during a two month
period evidenced a MAC was a jury
question where there was evidence that the
business was seasonal and that such
downturns were expected as part of the
earnings cycle of the business).

FN145. PX 370, at 5-6.
FN153. Bear Stearns Co. v. Jardine
Strategic Holdings, No. 31371187, slip. Ope
(N.Y.Supr. June 17, 1988), affd mem., 533
N.Y.S.2d 167 (App.Div.1988) (Tender
offeror who was to purchase 20% of Bear
Stearns could not rely on the MAC clause to
avoid contract despite $100 million loss
suffered by Bear Steams on Black Monday,
October 19, 1997, and the fact that Bear
Steams suffered a $48 million quarterly loss,
its fIrst in history. The buyer knew that Bear
Steams was in a volatile cyclical business.).

FN146. Agreement § 5.10(a) (specific
warranty dealing generally with MAE); §
5.01 (defming MAE for entire agreement).

FN147. See generally Rod J. Howard, Deal
Risk Announcement Rick and Interim
Changes--Allocating Risks in Recent
Technology M & A Agreements. 1219
PLI/Corp. 217 (Dec.2000); Joel I. Greenberg
& A. Julia Haddad, The Material Adverse
Change Clause, N.Y.L.J. 55 (Apr. 23,
2001).

FN154. In Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Airlines,
175 B.R. 438, 492-493 (S.D.N.Y.1994), Pan
Am airlines suffered sharp decline in
bookings over a three-month period that was
shocking to its management. The court held
that a MAC had occurred. It did so,
however, in a context where the party
relying on the MAC clause was providing
funding in a work-out situation, making any
further deterioration of Pan Am's already
compromised condition quite important.
In another New York case, Katz v. NVF Co.,
473 S.2d 786 (N.Y.App.Div.1984l, two
merger partners agreed that one partner has
suffered a material adverse change when its

FN148. But see Pittsburgh Coke & Chem.
Co. v. Bolio, 421 F.SuOP. 908, 930
(E.D.N.Y.1976) (where Material Adverse
Condition ("MAC") clause .applied to a
company's "financial condition", ''business'',
or "operations," court read that clause
narrowly to exclude "technological and
economic changes in the aviation industry
which undoubtedly affected the business of
all who had dealings with that industry").
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full year results showed a net loss of over
$6.3 million, compared to a $2.1 million
profit a year before, and steep operating
losses due to plant closure. Id at 788. The
Katz case thus presents a negative change of
much greater magnitude and duration than
exists in this case.

FN155. A contrary rule will encourage the
negotiation of extremely detailed "MAC"
clauses with numerous carve-outs or
qualifiers. An approach that reads broad
clauses as addressing fundamental events
that would materially affect the value of a
target to a 'reasonable acquiror eliminates the
need for drafting of that sort.

practical utility, as it leaves the
enforceability of contracts dependent on
whether predictions by third-parties come
true.

FN 162. I take judicial notice of these
publicly available estimates, D.R.E. 201,
and consider it important to do so given
Tyson's heavy reliance on analyst opinion to
prove that a Material Adverse Effect has
occurred.

FN163. Morningstar, Inc. estimate for ninety
days prior as of June 12, 2001.

FN164.Id, for thirty days prior as of June
12,2001.

FN 156. See Raskin v. Birmingham Steel
Corp., Del. Ch., 1999 WL 193326, at *5,
Allen, C. (Dec. 4, 1990) (while "a reported
50% decline in earnings over two
consecutive quarters might not be held to be
a material adverse development, it is, I
believe unlikely to think that might
happen").

FN165. Id, for thirty and ninety days prior
as of June 12, 200 I.

FN166. First Call Earnings Estimate-IBP,
Inc. for thirty days prior as of June 12, 200 I.

FN157. The Impainnent Charge was, of
course, signaled by Shipley's reduced
estimate for DFG in FY 2001, and his
indication that an impainnent study was
underway.

FN 167. Morningstar, Inc. estimate for thirty
days prior as of June 12, 2001.

FN168. Morningstar, Inc. estimate for thirty
days prior as of June 12, 200 I.
FN158. Tr.693-94.

FN169.Id
FN159. Tr.2791-92.
FN170. Again, I emphasize that my
conclusion is heavily influenced by my
temporal perspective, which recognizes that
even good businesses do not invariably
perfonn at consistent levels of profitability.
If a different policy decision is the correct
one, a contrary conclusion could be reached.
That different, more short-tenn approach
will, I fear, make merger agreements more
difficult to negotiate and lead to Material
Adverse Effect clauses· of great prolixity.

FN160. It has admittedly taken its own
payment multiples based on the Rawhide
Projections and simply "valued" the effect
that way. But IBP never warranted that it
would meet those Projections.

FN161. Tyson's only expert on this subject
testified that a MAE would have occurred in
his view even if IBP met the Rawhide
Projections, because those Projections were
more bearish than the analysts. This
academic theory is of somewhat dubious

FN 171. Tyson has tried to suggest that other
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factors exist that contribute to the conclusion
that IBP has suffered a Material Adverse
Effect. These include unsubstantiated
charges that other Foodbrands units suffer
the same type of serious accounting
problems as DFG and that other IBP assets
are impaired, as well as the effects of DFGrelated lawsuits that Tyson admits were
covered by Schedule 5.11. I fmd none of
Tyson's other Material Adverse Effect
arguments meritorious.

FN 172. If I am incorrect and IBP bore the
burden to prove the absence of a Material
Adverse Effect by clear and convincing
evidence in order to obtain an order of
specific perfonnance, it would not have met
that burden. It would prevail under a
preponderance standard, regardless of
whether it bore the burden of persuasion.

agreement that representations outside of
contract were not relied upon foreclosed
fraud in inducement claim); Danann Realty
Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 184
N.Y.S.2d 599, 157 N.E.2d 597, 599
CN.V.1959) (tt[P]laintiff has in the plainest
language announced and stipulated that it is
not relying on any representations as to the
very matter as to which it now claims it was
defrauded. Such a specific disclaimer
destroys the allegations in plaintiffs
complaint that the agreement was executed
in reliance upon these contrary oral
representations."); see also Harsco Corp. v.
Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 345-48 (2d Cir.1996)
(fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims barred by provision that "specifically
disclaims representations that are nat in the
agreement").

FN 179. Tyson's skillful advocacy swayed
IBP General Counsel Hagen to testify
otherwise. Her hurried answer contradicts
the text of the Confidentiality Agreement,
and the evident intent of the Agreement.
Under Tyson's approach, it could sue IBP
for damages if IBP's due diligence responses
did not provide a copy of a complaint filed
against IBP, which could be a common
subject of due diligence. The intent of the
Confidentiality Agreement is clear: it was
designed to require Tyson to waive any
deficiencies in due diligence as a basis for
suit, unless that deficiency constituted a
breach of a representation or warranty in the
resulting merger agreement.

FN173. Bradbury v. PTN Publishing Co.,
Inc.,
1998 WL 386485, at * 6
(E.D.N.Y.1998) (Block, J.) (citations and
quotations omitted). The Delaware fraud
elements are the same. See, e.g., Sanders v.
Devine, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 14679, 1997 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 131, at *23, Lamb, V.C. (Sept.
24, 1997).

FN174. Albanv Motor Inn and Restaurant.
Inc. v. Watkins. 85 A.D.2d 797, 445
N.V.S.2d 616, 617 (N.Y.App.Div.1981l.

FN175.
Hydro
Investors.
Inc.
v.
TrafalgarPower. Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 20-21 (2d
Cir.2000) (citations omitted).

FN 180. Tyson tries to compare the
Confidentiality
Agreement's
liability
limitation to a boilerplate integration clause.
But the Confidentiality Agreement is a short
and important contract knowingly entered
into by Tyson to govern its relationship with
IBP. Tyson thus seeks to have this court
relieve it of a risk that it assumed with full
knowledge and to deprive IBP of its
legitimate contractual expectations. Under
New York or Delaware law, the
Confidentiality Agreement is a clear and
enforceable contract that precludes Tyson's
plea to be excused from its own
commitment.

FN176. 60 N.Y. Jur.2d Fraud & Deceit § 2
(1987),

FN177.
Brass
v.
American
Film
Technologies. Inc.. 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d
Cir.1993).

FN178. Citibank, N.A. v. Plapinger. 66
N.Y.2d 90, 495 N.Y.S.2d 309, 485 N.E.2d
974, 975 (N.Y.1985l (specific contractual
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FN181. See D.H. Cattle Holdings Co. v.
Smith. 195 A.D.2d 202, 607 N.Y.S.2d 227,
231 CN.Y.App.Div.1994) (statements of
belief are "generally considered, not
actionable statements of fact, but mere
opinion and puffery"); see also San Leandro
Emergency Med Group Profit Sharing Plan
v. Philip Morris Cos.. Inc.. 75 F.3d 801, 811
(2d Cir.1996) (generally statements that a
company was optimistic about its prospects
were "puffery" that could not mislead a
reasonable investor and "cannot constitute
actionable statements under the securities
laws").

FN187. Brass. 987 F.2d at ISO. The Brass
case states that a duty to speak arises during
arms' length bargaining only where a party
possesses superior knowledge that is not
readily available to the other, and knows that
the other is acting on mistaken knowledge.
Id In this case, IBP's negotiators had no
actual knowledge of the contents of the
Comment Letter, Tyson had flagged all the
issues covered by that Letter and was thus
not at a disadvantage, and mp had no reason
to believe that Tyson was acting on the basis
of a mistaken belief about anything. See a/so
60 N.Y. Jur.2d Fraud & Deceit § 2.

FN182. Hydro Investors, Inc., 227 F.2d at
20.

FN t 88. Tyson's arguments that the
Comment Letter would have been a showstopper strain credulity. Lederman suggested
that Tyson would have boycotted the auction
if it had known that the SEC would question
the pooling treatment given the CFBA
merger. He would have counseled doing so
because pooling was important to
Smithfield. But Smithfield dropped any
pooling condition to its offer and Tyson had
already identified pooling as an issue. In the
end, the SEC--which questions pooling
whenever it sees it--agreed that IBP's
accounting for the CFBA transaction was
proper.
Tyson also contended that Stephens, Inc.
would not have given it a fairness opinion if
it had known about the Comment Letter,
because that Letter raised such serious
issues. But Stephens' witness indicated that
he had never been told by Tyson about the
$30-35 million in charges to earnings
expected at DFG, the fact that the
accounting problems at DFG were still not
resolved, and that they resulted from fraud
by DFG's fonner top manager. The witness
indicated that he would not have given an
opinion if he had known those facts, either.
Tyson, however, evidently viewed those
facts as so inconsequential that it did not tell
Stephens about them.

FN 183. PX 165 (emphasis added).

FN184.
As
to the Confidentiality
Agreement, Tyson cannot base rescission on
any failure on IBP's part to infonn Tyson
before December 28, 2000 that IBP would
not hit the Rawhide target for FY 2000. For
one thing, the oral cautions Tyson had
received, the disclaimers in the Rawhide
Proxy, and results reported in IBP's third
quarter 10-Q made any prior reliance
unreasonable. Even more important, Tyson
expressly reaffIrmed the Confidentiality
Agreement by signing the Merger
Agreement. See Agreement § 7.08.

FN 185. Tyson claims that Brady's opinion
that DFG was not viable as currently
configured is material because it contradicts
what Bond told it. But Bond's statement that
DFG is a viable business was, I conclude,
his true belief and was premised on the sort
of reconfiguration that Brady mentioned.
Tyson knew that IBP was trying to tum
around DFG and that there was no guarantee
of success. Indeed, Tyson was skeptical that
Bond would succeed. Don Tyson later told
Bond to just "blow the thing up."

FN189. Tyson has attempted to show that
the Comment Letter is out of the ordinary. I
am not convinced, given the expert
testimony to the contrary. The Comment
Letter largely addresses SEC hot topics and

FN186. See Agreement § 2.01(e), (h).
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the serious DFG situation that required a
restatement. Tyson's own CFO testified that
many of the SEC's concerns were trivial
accounting nits.
FN190. Cf Barrier Systems. Inc. v. A.F.C.
Enterprises. Inc.! 264 A.D.2d 432, 694
N.Y.S.2d 440, 442 (N.Y.App.Div.1999)
(rescission claim failed where plaintiff
learned of alleged fraud and then affmned
agreement); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 380(2) (1979) (nThe power of
party to avoid a contract for mistake or
misrepresentation is lost if after he knows or
has reason of the mistake or of the
misrepresentation ... he manifests to the
other party his intention to affmn it or acts
with respect to anything that he has received
in
a
manner
inconsistent
with
disaffrrmance. It).

FN191. In a footnote in its opening brief:
Tyson argues that the Merger Agreement
should be rescinded on grounds of unilateral
or mutual mistake. These arguments are
unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it is
inconceivable that the issues that Tyson
raises are fundamental enough to constitute
a "mistake" were not fundamental enough to
manifest themselves in the text of the
extensively negotiated Merger Agreement.
For example, Tyson premises its mistake
claim in part on the failure of the Rawhide
Projections to come true in 200 1. Yet, as of
the time of contracting, Tyson knew that
those Projections had already been well off
the mark in 2000 and did not seek a specific
representation and warranty or escrow tied
to the accuracy of the Projections. Tyson has
simply not met the heavy burden required
under New York law to set aside a contract
for mutual or unilateral mistake. See Shults
v. Geary. 241 A.D.2d 850, 660 N.Y.S.2d
497, 499 <N.Y.App.Div.1997) (discussing
standard for mutual mistake); Long v.
Fitzgerald, 240 A.D.2d 971, 659 N.Y.S.2d
544, 547 <N.Y.App.Div.1997) (discussing
standard for unilateral mistake).
Second, "[a] party who desires to rescind a
contract upon the ground of mistake must,
upon discovery of the facts, announce at
once his purpose and adhere to it. A failure
to notify immediately the other party of the

mistake may amount to a waiver of any
objection ora ratification of the mistake." 22
N.Y. Jur.2d Contracts §
131 (1996).
Tyson's belated cry of mistake comes far too
late to be fairly asserted.

FN192. See also PX 183 (e-mail indicating
that Tyson and its auditors had assured
lenders that the Comment Letter would not
affect the pro forma numbers Tyson had
given to lenders regarding the combination);
PX 181 (Tyson officer's certificate signed by
Leatberby to a banking syndicate indicating
that Tyson was unaware of any material
adverse condition that had occurred at IBP
since 9/30/00).

FN 193. The shareholder plaintiffs advanced
this argument, and have pennitted IBP to
take the lead in presenting it, as well as the
other issues in the case, to this stage.

FN194. SEC Schedule TO (Rule 14d-IOO,
Item 10, Instruction 5) (1999).
FN195.PX274.

FN 196. PX 232.
FN197. PX 237.
FN198. PX 263.
FN199. PX 258.

FN200. Throughout the course of this case,
IBP has urged upon me another proposition
that it believes compels a ruling in its favor.
IBP asserts that under New York law, a
party cannot refuse to close on a contract in
reliance upon a breached contractual
representation if that party knew that the
representation was false at the time of
contracting. Put directly, mp says it can win
this case even if there was a breach of a
representation in the Merger Agreement so
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long as it can prove that it infonned Tyson
of facts that demonstrate that the
representation was untrue and thus that
Tyson did n.ot in fact rely upon the
representation in deciding to sign the Merger
Agreement. IBP's arguments fmd some
support in some cases applying New York
law. See, e.g., Rogath v. Siebenmann. 129
F.3d 261,264-65 (2d Cir.1997) ("Where the
seller discloses up front the inaccuracy of
certain of his warranties, it cannot be said
that the buyer-- absent .the express
preservation of his rights--believed he was
purchasing the seller's promise as to the
truth of the warranties."). There is, however,
no defmitive authority from the New York
Court of Appeals to this effect, and the
leading case can be read as being at odds
with IBP's position. See CBS v. Ziff-Davis
Publishing Co.. 75. N.Y.2d 496, 554
N.Y.S.2d 449, 553 N.E.2d 997, 1000-01
(N.Y.1990). Most of IBP's cases also deal
with a distinct context, namely situations
where a buyer signed the contract on day
one, learned that a representation is false
from the seller on day three, closed the
contract on day five, and sued for damages
for breach of warranty on day 10. The public
policy reasons for denying relief to the
buyer in those circumstances are arguably
much different than are implicated by a
decision whether to pennit a buyer simply to
walk away before closing in reliance on a
specific contractual representation that it had
reason to suspect was untrue as of the time
of signing. In any event, my more traditional
contract analysis applies settled principles of
New York contract law and eliminates any
need to delve into these novel issues of
another state's law.
Likewise, there is no present need to address
IBP's other arguments, which are grounded
in equitable doctrines such as estoppel,
acquiescence, and waiver and ratification.
Nor do I address IBP's argument that Tyson
breached the Agreement's implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing by terminating
for pretextual reasons (i.e, DFG and the
Comment Letter) that had no relationship to
Tyson's actual motives (i.e, Tyson's alleged
desire to renegotiate the deal to a much
lower price or tenninate because of its own
poor performance).

FN201.
96
N.Y.
Jur.2d
Specific
Performance § 50 (1992) ("COUrts of equity
have decreed specific performance of
contracts for the sale of a business,
particularly where an award of damages
would
have
been
inadequate
or
impracticable.").

FN202. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has issued a thoughtful
opinion to this effect, in a case.dealing with
a merger agreement between two public
companies. Allegheny Energy. Inc. v. DOE.
Inc.. 171 F.3d 153 (3d Cir.1999); see a/so ~
& S/Sovran Corp. v. First Fed'/ Sav. Bank of
Brunswick. 266 Ga. ]04, 463 S.E.2d 892,
894-96 (Ga.1995) (specifically enforcing
merger agreement between two publicly
traded banks). This court has embraced this
reasoning on many occasions. See, e.g., True
North Communications. Inc. v. Publicist
S.A.. Del. Ch., 711 A.2d 34, 45, affd,
DeI.Supr., 705 A.2d 244 (1997). Indeed, this
premise is a foundation of this State's
jurisprudence in the takeover area, as
exemplified by Revlon. Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings. Inc.. Del.Supr., 506
A.2d 173, 184-85 (1986).

FN203. The parties need to consider the
issue of how any delay in payment of the
Merger consideration plays into an award of
specific perfonnance.

FN204. It may also be Tyson's preference, if
it has to suffer an adverse judgment. Any
damages award will be huge and will result
in no value to Tyson.
END OF DOCUMENT

Copra © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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Supplemental Material
Derming a "material adverse effect"
From the Agreement and Plan ofMerger, dated as ofOctober 7,2001, by and among AT&T
Wireless Services, Inc., TL Acquisition Corp. and TeleCorp pes, Inc.:
As used in this Agreement, a "TeleCorpMaterial Adverse Effect" means any
change, event, occurrence, effect or state of facts (a) that is materially adverse to
or materially impairs (i) the business, assets (including intangible assets),
liabilities, financial condition or results of operations of TeleCorp and its
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, or (ii) the ability of TeleCorp to perform its
obligations under this Agreement, or (b) prevents consummation of any of the
transactions contemplated by this Agreement; provided that none of the following
shall be considered a Material Adverse Effect except to the extent TeleCorp is
affected in a materially disproportionate manner as compared to other wireless
telecommunications service providers: (x) changes in general economic
conditions in the United States, (y) conditions affecting the wireless
telecommunications services industry generally, and (z) any changes resulting
from the announcement of the Merger.
[Introductory paragraph in Article II]
As used in this Agreement, an "AWS Material Adverse Effect" means any
change, event, occurrence, effect or state of facts (a) that is materially adverse to
or materially impairs (i) the business, assets (including intangible assets),
liabilities, financial condition or results of operations of AWS and its
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, or (ii) the ability of AWS to perform its
obligations under this Agreement, (b) prevents consummation of any of the
transactions contemplated by this Agreement; provided that none of the following
shall be considered a Material Adverse Effect except to the extent AWS is
affected in a materially disproportionate manner as compared to other wireless
telecommunications service providers: (x) changes in general economic
conditions in the United States, (y) conditions affecting the wireless
telecommunications services industry generally and (z) any changes resulting
from announcement of the Merger.
[Introductory paragraph in Article III]
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From the Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan ofRecapitalization and Merger,
dated as ofJuly 15, 2001, by and among USA Networks, Inc., Expedia, Inc., Taipei, Inc,
Microsoft Corporation, and Microsoft E-Holdings, Inc.
As used in this Agreement, the term "Material Adverse Effect" means, with
respect to Parent or the Company, as the case may be, a material adverse effect on
(i) the business, operations, results of operations. or financial condition of such
entity and its Subsidiaries taken as a whole or (ii) the ability of such entity to
timely consummate the transactions contemplated hereby.
[Excerpt from Section 4.1]
From the Agreement and Plan ofMerger, dated as ofDecember 2, 2000, among PepsiCo, Inc.,
BeverageCo, Inc. and The Quaker Oats Company:
"Material Adverse Effect" means, with respect to any entity any event, change,
circumstance or effect that is materially adverse to (i) the business, consolidated
financial condition or results of operations of such entity and its Subsidiaries
taken as a whole, other than any event, change, circumstance or effect relating (x)
to the economy or financial markets in general or (y) in general to the industries
in which such entity operates and not specifically relating to (or having the effect
of specifically relating to or having a materially disproportionate effect (relative
to most other industry participants) on) such entity or (ii) the ability of such entity
to consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. The term
"material" or "in all material respects" shall have a corresponding meaning of
similar importance.
[Section 8.11(h)]

See also William J. Haubert, Drafting Merger Agreements: Lessonsfrom IBP, Inc. v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Jan./Feb. 2002, at 16.
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• Replaces APB 16
• Poolings eliminated prospectively for business
combinations initiated after June 30, 2001
(1
I

Ul

• Application of purchase accounting, including:
- Separate recognition criteria for intangible assets
- Identifying the acquiring entity
- Accounting for negative goodwill - extraordinary gain
treatment
- Other APB 16 provisions generally carried forward
(5)

OVERVIEW
FAS 142 - Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets
• Replaces APB 17
• Primarily addresses the post-acquisition accounting for
goodwill and intangibles
Q

-

0"\

Nonamortization of goodwill and indefinite-lived intangibles

- Impairment testing for goodwill and indefinite-lived intangibles
- Amortize intangible assets over useful lives (no longer 40 yr.
max)

• Also addresses acquisition of a group of intangible assets in
other than a business combination (no goodwill)
(6)

• Includes multi-party business combinations

(1
I

• Does not include joint ventures (FASB did not modify
definition of a joint venture in APB 18 in this phase)

.....,J

• Does not change accounting for internally developed
intangible assets
• Does not change accounting for purchased IPR&D

(7)

INTANGIBLE ASSETS
Key Provisions/Issues - FAS 141/142
• Separate recognition and valuation of intangible assets
acquired in a business combination
• Amortizable intangible assets
~

- Determining useful lives
- Impairment testing - FAS 121

• Indefinite-lived intangible assets
- Nonamortization
- Impairment testing - FV VS. BV

• Transition rules and existing goodwill balances
(8)

EXAMPLES
Intangibles Acquired in a Business Combination
Contractual I
Legal Criteria
Trademarks

~

Noncompetition Agreements

~

I

Order or Production Backlog

~

Customer Contracts

~

\0

~

Noncontractual Customer Relationships

~

General Customer Base - "walk-ins"
Licensing / Royalty Agreements

~

Lease Agreements

~

Franchise Agreements

~

Broadcast Rights

~
~

Assembled Workforce
Databases
(9)

Not Separately
Recognized

~

Customer Lists

n

Separability
Criteria

~

INTANGIBLE ASSETS
Separate Recognition - Cornerstone of F AS 141
• Appendix A - Illustrative list of intangible assets
SEC
n
I

........

- SEC staff believe there is a rebuttable presumption that
any intangible asset identified in the listing will be
evaluated in a purchase price allocation

o

(10)

GOODWILL
When to Test for Impairment - Annual
• Goodwill must be tested for impairment at least annually
(changed from trigger-based approach)
n
I

......

......

• First annual (interim) goodwill impairment test after
acquisition / reorganization will set methods and key
assumptions used in future impairment tests

(11)

GOODWILL
When to Test for Impairment - Interim
• Interim impairment tests required if an event occurs or
circumstances change that would "more-likely-than-not"
reduce the fair value of a reporting unit below its carrying
value. Examples:
:2

- Significant adverse change in business climate, market, legal

tv

issue, regulation, competition, personnel
- A "more-likely-than-not" expectation arises that a reporting unit
(or significant portion) will be sold or otherwise disposed of
- A significant asset group is tested under FAS 121
- A subsidiary recognizes an impairment loss in its standalone
GAAP F/S
(12)

C-13

• Coordinates impairment with FAS 141/142
• Any component disposed of is a discounted operation
n

• Spin-off/exchange now requires loss recognition

I

~

~

• Clarification as to financial statement recognition

(14)
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• Exchanges within 6 months
- Options offered
- Restricted stock offered
n

~

• Exchanges outside 6 months
- Options, restricted stock
- Contingencies
• When is original option cancelled?

(16)

• Exchanges for 1.X at-the-money awards
• Implied cancellations
2
......:l

• Replacement awards granted immediately and in six
months
• Cancellation of unvested, compensatory award
without new grants

• Accounting for profit interests in an LLC
(17)

C-18

• Harvey Pitt appointed chairman,
succeeding Levitt
n

• Bob Herdman appointed chief
accountant, replacing Turner

I

~

\0

• Alan Beller replaces David Martin
• Robert Bayless becomes special
assistant to the Director of CorpFin
• A new and constructive SEC

(19)
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• Revenue recognition (SAB 101)
• Segment reporting (SFAS 131)
• M D&A
n
I

tv
~

• Alternate measures of performance

- Staff Training Manual Topic 8/FRP 202

(21)

• Revenue recognition
- Cut off
- "Bill· and hold" (AAER 108 &SAB Topic 13-A)
(l
I

tv
tv

- Contingent sales

• Valuation of shares and assets in exchange
transactions
• Materiality judgments
- Waste Management

(22)

• Audit Committees

- Charters and composition
- Disclaimers
n

~

- Non-audit fees
• SAB 74 - goodwill transitional impairments
• Interim review not completed by 10-Q filing date

(23)

t

.~

I
.
!
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"Impact of Current Economics and Businesses
Environment on Financial Reporting"

(j
I

tv

Ul

• Big 5 Accounting Firms
• AICPA

(25)

• Financing Reporting Release FR-60
(1
I
N

" Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About

0\

Critical Accounting Policies"

(26)

• Big Five Petition for additional MDA disclosure, followed
by Commission Statement
n
I

tv

- Liquidity and capital resources including "off balance
sheet" arrangements

......,J

- Trading activities that include non-exchanged-traded
contracts
- Relationships/transactions with non-clearly independent
third parties
(27)
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release Nos. 33-8039, 34-45124, FR-59]
AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission
ACTION: Cautionary Advice Regarding the Use of "Pro Forma"
Financial Information in Earnings Releases
SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission is issuing a statement regarding
the use by public companies of "pro forma" financial information in earnings releases.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John M. Morrissey, Deputy Chief
Accountant, at 202-942-4400, or Paula Dubberly, Chief Counsel of the Division of
Corporation Finance, at 202-942-2900.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
As we approach year end, we believe it is appropriate to sound a warning to public
companies and other registrants who present to the public their earnings and results of
operations on the basis of methodologies other than Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP"). This presentation in an earnings release is often referred to as "pro
forma" financial information. In this context, that term has no defined meaning and no
uniform characteristics. We wish to caution public companies on their use of this "pro
forma" financial information and to alert investors to the potential dangers of such
information.
"Pro forma" financial information can serve useful purposes. Public companies may quite
appropriately wish to focus investors' attention on critical components of quarterly or
annual financial results in order to provide a meaningful comparison to results for the
same period of prior years or to emphasize the results of core operations. To a large
extent, this has been the intended function of disclosures in a company's Management's
Discussion and Analysis section of its reports. There is no prohibition preventing public
companies from publishing interpretations of their results, or publishing summaries of
GAAP financial statements.
Moreover, as part of our commitment to improve the quality, timeliness, and accessibility
of publicly available financial information, we believe that - with appropriate disclosures
about their limitations - accurate interpretations of results and summaries of GAAP
financial statements taken as a whole can be quite useful to investors.
Nonetheless, we are concerned that "pro forma" financial information, under certain
circumstances, can mislead investors if it obscures GAAP results. Because this "pro
forma" financial information by its very nature departs from traditional accounting
conventions, its use can make it hard for investors to compare an issuer's financial
information with other reporting periods and with other companies.
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For these reasons, we believe it is appropriate to alert public companies and their advisors
of the following propositions:
First, the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to a company issuing
"pro forma" financial information. Because "pro forma" information is information
derived by selective editing of financial information compiled in accordance with GAAP,
companies should be particularly mindful of their obligation not to mislead investors
when using this information.
Second, a presentation of financial results that is addressed to a limited feature of a
company's overall financial results (for example, earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization), or that sets forth calculations of financial results on a
basis other than GAAP, raises particular concerns. Such a statement misleads investors
when the company does not clearly disclose the basis of its presentation. Investors cannot
understand, much less compare, this "pro forma" financial information without any
indication of the principles that underlie its presentation. To inform investors fully,
companies need to describe accurately the controlling principles. For example, when a
company purports to announce earnings before "unusual or nonrecurring transactions," it
should describe the particular transactions and the kind of transactions that are omitted
and apply the methodology described when presenting purportedly comparable
information about other periods.
Third, companies must pay attention to the materiality of the information that is omitted
from a "pro forma" presentation. Statements about a company's financial results that are
literally true nonetheless may be misleading if they omit material information. For
example, investors are likely to be deceived if a company uses a "pro forma" presentation
to recast a loss as if it were a profit, or to obscure a material result of GAAP financial
statements, without clear and comprehensible explanations of the nature and size of the
omissions.
Fourth, we commend the earnings press release guidelines jointly developed by the
Financial Executives International and the National Investors Relations Institute and we
encourage public companies to consider and follow those recommendations before
determining whether to issue "pro forma" results, and before deciding how to structure a
proposed "pro forma" statement. A presentation of financial results that is addressed to a
limited feature of financial results or that sets forth calculations of financial results on a
basis other than GAAP generally will not be deemed to be misleading merely due to its
deviation from GAAP if the company in the same public statement discloses in plain
English how it has deviated from GAAP and the amounts of each of those deviations.
Fifth, as always, and especially in light of the disclosure that we expect to see
accompanying these presentations, we encourage investors to compare any summary or
"pro forma" financial presentation with the results reported on GAAP-based financials by
the same company. Read before you invest; understand before you commit.
Companies with questions about the use of "pro forma" financial presentations in
earnings releases are encouraged to call John M. Morrissey, Deputy Chief Accountant, at
202-942-4400, or Paula Dubberly, Chief Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance,
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at 202-942-2900. Investors are encouraged to read our investor alert on "pro forma"
financial statements (available at http://www.sec.gov/investor.shtml).
By the Commission.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Dated: December 4, 2001

http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/33-8039.htm
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Impact of the Current Economic and Business Environment on
Financial Reporting
The purpose of this document is to provide those with a role in high-quality financial
reporting with information relevant to the current financial reporting environment. 1 It
includes an assessment of risk factors that may be important for financial statement
preparers, auditors, and audit committees to consider during the current reporting cycle.
It also offers suggestions as to how each of these major constituencies can contribute to
enhancing financial reporting for the benefit of investors.

******
The current economic downturn, the unprecedented events of September 11, and recent
business failures have combined to create a financial reporting environment unlike any in
recent memory. Investor confidence, already shaken by significant volatility in the
capital markets, has been further unsettled by highly publicized restatements of financial
statements, which have generated questions about the quality of financial reporting, the
effectiveness of the independent audit process, and the efficacy of corporate governance.
This environment is creating significant challenges for U.S. businesses and their
management, boards of directors, audit committees, and auditors.
Always fundamental to the well-being of our capital markets, reliable and transparent
financial reporting is particularly important in this troubled environment. Financial
reporting cannot forecast the strengths and weaknesses of the economy. However,
financial statements and related information, such as Management's Discussion and
Analysis (MD&A) can provide useful information that allows users to make informed
decisions and facilitates the continued efficient functioning of our capital markets. This
requires the attention of management, auditors, and audit committees, who not only must
carry out their unique responsibilities in their respective areas, but also must work
together to produce the high-quality financial reporting that is vital to our capital markets.
We have summarized the particularly challenging factors affecting financial reporting
today, and have identified some of the financial reporting issues that are especially
relevant in this difficult business environment. We also have highlighted the actions that
management, auditors, and audit committees can take to effectively address these risks
and produce reliable financial reporting.

Environmental Factors Affecting Financial Reporting
Difficult Economic Times
The economic slowdown began with a decline in business capital spending and
investment. With the burst of the dot.com bubble, businesses took a more pessimistic
view of the economic future and curtailed spending on equipment, software, real estate,
inventories, and other investments. One of the first sectors to suffer the effects of the
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reduction in capital spending was the high-tech industry, where earnings and share prices
nose-dived.
As the effects of cutbacks in corporate spending rippled through the economy,
temporarily soaring energy prices took money out of consumers' pockets and ate into
corporate revenues. Earnings sank, borrowing capacity dwindled, growth slowed, energy
prices dropped, and the stock market tumbled. Investor wealth declined by trillions of
dollars. Layoffs followed, and with the unemployment rate rising (although still
historically low), the surprisingly hardy consumer spending finally started to wane.
Companies initiated restructurings, inventory liquidations, and write-offs. The events of
September 11 and their aftermath only worsened already deteriorating economic
conditions.
These factors put downward pressure on earnings and other performance measures that,
for most of the previous decade, had been on an upward trend. This change in direction
has created a growing sensitivity in the capital markets to bad news.
Pressures to Perform
Businesses deal with pressures that arise from a variety of sources, both internal and
external. External pressures come primarily from the capital markets, with many
believing that Wall Street's expectations too often drive inappropriate management
behavior.
Management often is under pressure to meet short-term performance
indicators, such as earnings or revenue growth, financial ratios tied to debt covenants, or
other measures. Most often the intentions of management are to follow sound and ethical
practices, but pressure may build when analysts and shareholders demand short-term
performance and when competitors move closer to the edge of the range of acceptable
behavior.
Members of top management also may be pressured to demonstrate that shareholder
value has grown as a consequence of their leadership. Boards of directors often create
pressure on management to meet financial and other goals. There also is a wellestablished practice of motivating management with stock options and other equity
instruments that attempt to align management and shareholder interests. With their own
performance and compensation tied to operating or financial targets, management can in
turn push hard on personnel throughout the company, including those in operating
business units, to meet what may be overly optimistic goals. This high-pressure
environment can create an incentive to adopt practices that may be too aggressive or
inconsistently applied in an effort to meet perceived expectations of the capital markets,
creditors, or potential investors. At some point, the motivation behind earnings
management can become strong enough for individuals with the right opportunity to
move beyond acceptable practices, even though they are otherwise honest individuals.
The greater the pressures, the more likely individuals will rationalize the acceptability of
their actions.
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Complexity and Sophistication ofBusiness Structures and Transactions
The increasing sophistication of the capital markets and the creativity of investment
bankers and other financial advisers have fostered a wide variety of complex financial
instruments and structured financial transactions. Many companies now use complex
transactions involving transactions with one another in the form of purchases/sales of
assets, derivative transactions, and intricate operating agreements designed to meet a
specific reporting objective as well as an economic objective. Some companies have
transferred assets off-balance-sheet or arranged for units to be acquired by special
purpose entities, joint ventures, limited liability corporations, or partnerships, retaining
substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership but without "control." Recent
business failures, including the boom-bust cycle of dot.com enterprises, have focused
attention on the potential risks of these business structures and transactions and the
challenge of reporting them in a way that is easily understood by financial statement
users.
Many companies have adopted rapid and innovative forms of business expansion, either
through acquisitions and mergers, or internal development. Such rapid expansion may
have been necessary to support high price-to-earnings multiples. However, it also creates
many challenges, including integrating disparate operations, melding internal control
processes, and meeting expanded financing needs. Liquidity crises or financial reporting
failures may result.
Complex and Voluminous Standards
Adding to the challenges businesses face are the number of accounting standards,
interpretations, SEC staff positions, task force consensuses, statements of position, and so
on, that continue to expand the body of technical material that must be understood and
applied in the financial reporting process. Understanding this vast body of literature can
be a daunting task, even for large sophisticated companies. Furthermore, as transactions
become more complex, the accounting rules for them become highly technical and
detailed, such as Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, Accounting for
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities; No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and
Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities; No. 141, Business
Combinations; No. 142, Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets; and No. 144, Accounting
for the Impairment or Disposal ofLong-Lived Assets. Complex and detailed rules become
self-perpetuating, promising that their complexity will continue to increase. Every new
regulation specifying how a certain transaction should be accounted for presents an
opportunity for someone to find a way around it by creating an even more complex
transaction. This, in turn, creates the need for a new rule to tighten the loophole, and so
on. These rules have become so complex that management struggles increasingly to
comprehend and apply them. Proper application often requires the attention and
involvement of senior financial management and senior technical people in the auditing
firms, and even then the decisions are subject to alternative interpretations.
The SEC recently has announced its desire to help registrants "get it right the first time"
by discussing and pre-clearing registrants' proposed accounting for anticipated events,
planned transactions, or other unusual accounting matters prior to their inclusion in
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registrants' financial information. The pre-clearance process should help registrants
apply complex accounting standards to unusual situations, helping to ensure that financial
statements reflect appropriate accounting policies and disclosures and reducing the risk of
subsequent restatements.

Financial Reporting Issues
The fundamental objective of financial reporting is to provide useful information to
investors, creditors, and others in making rational decisions. The information should be
comprehensible to those who have a reasonable understanding of business and economic
activities and are willing to study the information with appropriate diligence. Financial
reporting, including MD&A, should provide investors with management's perspective on
the historical and prospective financial condition and results of operations.
A discussion of key financial reporting issues that are especially relevant in the current
environment follows.
Liquidity and Viability Issues

The current business environment and market conditions might lead to rapidly
deteriorating operating results and liquidity challenges for some companies, particularly
those with reduced access to capital. A company particularly sensitive to negative
changes in economic conditions can rapidly develop a liquidity crisis and ultimately fail.
Certain conditions, considered in the aggregate, may lead management or a company's
auditors to question the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. These include
negative trends such as recurring operating losses or working capital deficiencies,
financial difficulties in the form of loan defaults or denial of credit from suppliers,
dependence on the success of a particular product that is not selling well, legal
proceedings, loss of a principal customer or supplier, destabilization of a trading partner
or contract counterparty, and excessive reliance on external financing rather than funds
generated from operations.
Key in evaluating these risk factors is whether:
Existing conditions and events can be mitigated by management's plans and their
effective implementation.
The company has the ability to control the implementation of mitigating plans
rather than being dependent on actions of others.
The company's assumption about its ability to continue as a going concern is
based on realistic, rather than overly optimistic, assessments of its access to
needed debt or equity capital or its ability to sell assets in a timely manner.
Liquidity challenges have been appropriately satisfied and disclosed.
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Changes in Internal Control
Large layoffs, staff reductions, and notifications to employees of impending termination
can affect internal control over financial accounting and reporting systems. Remaining
employees may feel overwhelmed by their workloads, lack time to complete tasks and
consider decisions, and simply be performing too many tasks and functions to meet the
required levels of accuracy. In addition, rapid business expansion, changes in business
strategies, and integration of different businesses may outstrip the ability of a company's
financial systems to remain under effective internal control. Furthermore, controls at
business units whose divestiture has been announced may be disrupted. As a result of
any of these factors, internal control may become less effective or ineffective.
Relevant considerations are whether:
The attention to internal control has been maintained in the face of significant
changes in the business.
As a result of unfilled positions, key control procedures are no longer being
performed, are being performed less frequently, or are being performed by
individuals lacking proper understanding to identify and correct errors.
Layoffs of information technology (IT) personnel have had a negative effect on
the entity's ability to initiate, process, or record its transactions, or maintain the
integrity of information generated by the IT system.
Key functions that should be segregated are now being performed by one person.
The impact of changes to the control environment have altered internal control
effectiveness and potentially resulted in a material control weakness.
Changes in internal control caused by past or pending layoffs or staff reductions
create an opportunity for fraudulent activities, including misappropriation of
assets.
Unusual Transactions
Among the most frequently cited sources of financial reporting risk are significant
adjustments or unusual transactions occurring at or near the quarter-end or year-end.
Unusual transactions might include sales of assets outside the ordinary course of
business, significant or unusual period-end revenues, introduction of new period-end
sales promotion programs, and disposal of a segment of a business. These types of
transactions and adjustments often occur outside the company's ordinary course of
business and, therefore, may not be subject to the checks and balances imposed by the
internal control system.
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Key points include:
Recognizing the underlying business purpose for entering into unusual
transactions, as well as the resulting financial benefits or obligations.
Whether unusual transactions - particularly those executed close to period-end are subject to effective controls.
The impact of these types of transactions on annual and quarterly results, and
whether they have been appropriately described in the company's financial
reports.
Existence of any "special" or "side" arrangements not considered in determining
the appropriate accounting and disclosure for the transactions.
Whether so-called "non-standard" journal entries, including the adjusting entries
made at the end of the closing process, are subject to appropriate review and
oversight.
Transactions with Related Parties
Increased pressures on management to maintain or achieve financial targets may heighten
the risk of improper accounting or disclosure of related party transactions. Related party
transactions lack the independent negotiations as to structure and price that are present in
transactions with unrelated parties. Difficult economic times also increase the possibility
that the economic substance of certain transactions may be other than their legal form, or
that transactions may lack economic substance. Parties that have no independent
substance may have no separate ability to carry out transactions or stand behind
agreements.
Key to these issues is whether:
Management has a process in place to identify related parties and related party
transactions.
There is sufficient information available to thoroughly understand and evaluate
the relationship of the parties to the transaction.
The parties have substance and the ability to carry out the transaction.
The transaction's substance, including any unusual conditions, determines the
accounting for the transaction
The disclosures are complete with respect to the nature. and extent of the
transaction and relationship among the parties in conformity with FASB and SEC
rules.
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Transactions Involving Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements including Special Purpose
Entities
Some business entities make use of off-balance sheet arrangements to conduct financing
or other business activities. These may involve unconsolidated, non-independent, limited
purpose entities, often referred to as structured finance or special purpose entities (SPEs).
These entities may be used to provide financing, liquidity, or market risk or credit
support, or may involve leasing, hedging, or research and development services. These
arrangements or entities may result in contractual or other commitments by the company,
such as requirements to fund losses, provide additional funding, or purchase capital stock
or assets, or may otherwise have financial impacts resulting from the performance or nonperformance of the other party.
Transactions with special purpose entities intended to shift assets or liabilities offbalance-sheet require special attention due to the complicated accounting and disclosure
rules applicable to many of these transactions. The ownership structure of the entity and
the terms of the transactions may be critical to determining whether off-balance sheet
treatment is appropriate under generally accepted accounting principles. The adequacy of
disclosure' also is important since the potential impact of these transactions may not be
evident from the basic financial statements.
Key considerations in understanding transactions involving SPEs include whether:
The SPE is a so-called "qualifying special purpose entity" or a non-qualifying
SPE, since different accounting standards apply to each.
The SPE, if it is non-qualifying, is appropriately capitalized to support nonconsolidation, including whether a third party has made a substantive investment
that is residual equity in legal form, has voting control, and has substantive
residual risks and rewards of ownership of the SPE.
The level of capital in the non-qualifying SPE is adequate, particularly when
multi-tiered SPE structures are used.
The requisite outside investment in the non-qualifying SPE existed at the time of
the transaction and continues to exist.
Any involvement of related parties as investors or otherwise is consistent with
non-consolidation.
Any modifications have been made to an existing SPE in the current period that
could affect the accounting determined at the date of the transaction.
The arrangements are outside the normal course of business.
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Materiality
Materiality is a concept that plays a critical role in the judgments of various parties to the
financial reporting process. Although generally accepted accounting principles recognize
the concept that accounting standards need not be applied to immaterial items, this
recognition is more for matters of convenience than for the basic purpose of maintaining
accurate books and records. Therefore, while management may consider materiality in
selecting the accounting principles to use in the financial statements (including footnotes)
and in preparing MD&A, it is generally inappropriate to permit known errors to remain in
the financial information based merely on their immateriality.2
Management also may consider materiality in determining the disposition of identified
misstatements, including those identified by the auditors. Auditors consider materiality
in assessing the application of accounting principles, in planning the audit and designing
audit procedures, and in evaluating the significance of misstatements (also referred to as
audit differences) identified during the audit if management decides not to record some or
all of them.
Both quantitative and qualitative factors should be evaluated when assessing the
materiality of misstatements, focusing on:
Individual and aggregate misstatements and their impact on key financial
statement line items, totals, and ratios.
Whether a misstatement increases management's compensation by satisfying
requirements for the award of bonuses or other incentives.
Whether a misstatement masks a change in earnings or other trends or hides a
failure to meet analysts' consensus expectations.
A misstatement's impact on compliance with financial statement-related debt
covenants.
A misstatement indicative of intentionally misleading financial reporting or illegal
acts.
A misstatement particularly important to a segment of the business.
Adequacy ofDisclosure
In a recent op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, SEC Chairman Pitt summarized actions
management, auditors, and audit committees should take to enhance the current financial
reporting and disclosure system and reassure and restore investor confidence. Among his
recommendations, Chairman Pitt urged public companies and their advisers to identify
the three, four, or five critical accounting principles upon which a company's financial
status depends, and that involve the most complex, subjective, or ambiguous decisions or
assessments. Investors should be told, concisely and clearly, how these principles are
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applied, and be given information about the range of possible effects from different
applications of these principles.
As a follow-up to the Chairman's op-ed, the SEC recently issued cautionary advice
regarding disclosure about critical accounting policies, in which it indicated an intention
to consider new rules to elicit more precise disclosures about the accounting policies that
management believes are most "critical" - that is, that both are most important to the
portrayal of the company's financial conditions and results and require management's
most difficult, subjective, or complex judgments, often as a result of the need to make
estimates about the effect of matters that are inherently uncertain. The SEC points out
that. a technically accurate application of the disclosure rules may nonetheless fail to
communicate important information if clear analytic disclosures are not included to
facilitate an investor's understanding of the company's financial status, and the
possibility, likelihood, and implication of changes in its financial and operating status.
The SEC encourages companies to employ a disclosure regimen along the following
lines:
Management and the auditor should bring particular focus to the evaluation of the
critical accounting policies used in the financial statements.
Management should ensure that disclosure in MD&A is balanced and fully
responsive.
Prior to finalizing and filing annual reports, audit committees should review the
selection, application, and disclosure of critical accounting policies.
If companies, management, audit committees, or auditors are uncertain about the
application of specific GAAP principles, they should consult with the SEC's
accounting staff.
The SEC also has expressed continuing concern that some registrants are simply
repeating the financial statement disclosures in their MD&A or merely recalculating the
dollar and percentage changes in financial statement captions without providing
meaningful information about the underlying reasons for the changes as well as what
might happen in the future. MD&A requires disclosure about trends, events, or
uncertainties known to management that would have a material impact on reported
financial information. The SEC has observed that, even where trends, events, and
uncertainties are disclosed, the implications of those matters on the methods,
assumptions, and estimates used for recurring and pervasive accounting measurements
are not always addressed.
The SEC informally has suggested that the following matters be considered for MD&A
disclosure in the current environment: loss of a significant customer; impairments of
long-lived assets; business restructurings; factors affecting the cost or availability of
insurance coverage or energy; declines in the value of investment securities or pension
plan assets; violations, amendments or waivers of debt covenants; credit o~ market risks;
and effects of related party transactions.
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On another matter, over the past few years, companies increasingly have presented
earnings and results of operations on the basis of methodologies other than GAAP,
sometimes referred to as "pro forma earnings." Such information may be presented to
provide a meaningful comparison to results in prior years, to emphasize the results of
core operations, or for other purposes. While there is no prohibition against public
companies publishing interpretations of their results or summaries of GAAP financial
statements, there is a growing concern that pro forma financial information can mislead
investors if it obscures GAAP results.
The SEC recently issued cautionary advice to preparers, as well as an alert to investors,
about the use of pro forma financial information in earnings releases. The SEC staff
cautioned that earnings releases are subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws and should not be used to mislead investors through the inclusion of such
pro forma information. Earnings releases that contain pro forma and other non-GAAP
information without a plain English reconciliation to GAAP, including amounts and
appropriate explanations, may be viewed as misleading.
Furthermore, the SEC suggests that companies:
Provide an accurate description of the controlling principles that underlie the pro
forma presentation. For example, when a company purports to announce earnings
before "unusual or nonrecurring transactions," it should describe the particular
transactions and the kind of transactions that are omitted and apply the
methodology described when presenting purportedly comparable information
about other periods.
Consider the materiality of the information that is omitted from a pro forma
presentation. Statements about a company's financial results that are literally true
nonetheless may be misleading if they obscure GAAP results or omit material
information otherwise included in GAAP financial statements. For example,
investors are likely to be deceived if a company uses a pro forma presentation to
change a loss to a profit, or to hide a significant fact, without clear and
comprehensible explanations of the nature and size of the omissions.
Consider the guidelines jointly developed by the Financial Executives
International and the National Investors Relations Institute before determining
whether to issue pro forma results, and before deciding how to structure a
proposed pro forma statement. A presentation of financial results that is
addressed to a limited feature of financial results or that sets forth calculations of
financial results on a basis other than GAAP generally will not be deemed to be
misleading merely due to its deviation from GAAP if the company in the same
public statement discloses in plain English how it has deviated from GAAP and
the amounts of each of those deviations.
As an overall matter, clear and complete disclosure is key. In particular, complex
transactions such as those with related parties, special purpose entities, off-balance-sheet
vehicles, or situations that involve contingent obligations, derivatives, financial
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guarantees, and liquidity, among others, heighten the importance of financial disclosures
to present a complete picture of a company and its risks. Therefore, it is important not
only to assess whether the technical disclosure requirements of GAAP and MD&A have
been met, but also to consider the depth and transparency of the disclosures with a focus
on helping the reader more fully understand the substance of the company's risks and
rewards.
Specific Financial Statement Risks

In these difficult times, new risks directed at specific financial statement areas can arise,
among them:
Long-lived assets, goodwill, and other intangible assets

Are there events or changes in circumstances indicating that a long-lived asset's
carrying amount may not be recoverable, triggering an impairment consideration?
Are the assumptions underlying the calculation of fair values of hard-to-value
assets reasonable and based on current information? Are they based on
assumptions that are difficult to determine, such as occurrences over long periods
of time? Do the disclosures adequately portray the methods for calculating fair
value and the related degree of uncertainty?
Impairment of inventory

Are there events or changes in the demand or prIce indicating that carrying
amounts of inventory may be too high?
Revenue recognition

What are the significant judgment areas and estimates underlying the company's
revenue accounting?
Do the company's revenues meet required standards, including, where applicable,
the four criteria in SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, Revenue Recognition
in Financial Statements: (1) persuasive evidence of an arrangement; (2) delivery
occurred or services rendered; (3) price fixed or determinable, and (4)
collectibility reasonably assured?
Have any "special" or "side" arrangements been appropriately considered In
determining reportable revenues?
Are the company's revenue recognition policies adequately disclosed in the
financial statements?
Are there unusual seasonal trends or period-end "spikes" in revenue?
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Accounting estimates
What are the most significant estimates and judgments management makes in
preparing the financial statements?
Is enough attention - resources, rigor of process, level of review - given to these
estimates?
Are underlying assumptions based on reliable, up-to-date information?
Is there appropriate disclosure regarding significant assumptions, changes in
assumptions, and uncertainty in estimates?

Deferred taxes
Have there been cumulative losses in recent years or other conditions that may
require a valuation allowance for net deferred tax assets?

Restructuring charges
Does the company's initial and ongoing accounting and disclosure for
restructuring provisions meet the requirements of EITF Issue No. 94-3, Liability
Recognition for Certain Employee Termination Benefits and Other Costs to Exit
an Activity (Including Certain Costs Incurred in a Restructuring), and SEC Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 100, Restructuring and Impairment Charges?

Debt covenants
Is or has the company been in violation of debt covenants, possibly requiring
disclosure and reclassification of long-term debt to a current liability?
Are there cross-default provisions that could be triggered by a single debt
covenant violation?
Are there debt covenants relating to unspecified "material adverse changes"?

Other than temporary declines in value of marketable debt and equity securities, and
investments
Has there been an "other than temporary" decline in investment securities
classified as held-to-maturity or available-for-sale, or in equity- or cost-basis
investments, requiring loss recognition?
Is there a need to disclose an "early warning sign" related to a decline that has
been experienced but not yet deemed other than temporary?
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Pensions and other post-retirement benefits

Do factors such as falling securities market values, significant drops in interest
rates, and projected increases in health care costs require that management revise
key assumptions underlying accounting estimates related to pension and other
post-retirement plans?
Employee stock options

Has the company made changes to its options plans, such as reprlclngs or
extending the term of outstanding options, that require expense recognition and
disclosure?
Other risks and uncertainties

Is the company exposed to credit/default risk of a significant supplier/customer,
service provider, lessor/lessee, debtor, financial guarantor, investor/investee, joint
venture partner, derivative counterparty, and/or trading partner due to financial
problems or bankruptcy?
Have credit and default risks been adequately disclosed?
Have contingent liabilities been adequately identified and, as appropriate,
disclosed?
Newly issued standards

Have newly issued standards, such as Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities,
been fully addressed and disclosed?
Changes to accounting principles and methods

Have all discretionary changes to accounting principles and methods that,
individually or collectively, materially affect reported results of operations for an
interim or annual period been disclosed?
The risks described above are general in nature. Further information on financial
statement risks related to specific industries can be obtained by reading the industryspecific risk alerts produced by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

A Call to Action

Management, auditors, and audit committees each have their separate roles and
responsibilities. Still, their goal must be the same - making sure that a company's
financial reporting is of the highest quality.
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Following are the most important actions that should be taken to achieve this common
goal.

Management
Ensure the proper tone at the top and an expectation that only the highest-quality
financial reporting is acceptable.
Review all elements of the company's internal control- control environment, risk
assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring in light of changes in the company's business environment and with particular
attention to significant financial statement areas.
Ensure that appropriate levels of management involvement and review exist over
key accounting policy and financial reporting decisions.
Establish a framework for open, timely communication with the auditors and the
audit committee on all significant matters.
Strive for the highest quality, most transparent accounting and disclosure - not
just what is acceptable - in both financial statements and MD&A.
Make sure estimates and judgments are supported by reliable information and the
most reasonable assumptions in the circumstances, and that processes are in place
to ensure consistent application from period to period.
Record identified audit differences.
Base business decisions on economic reality rather than accounting goals.
Expand the depth and disclosure surrounding subjective measurements used in
preparing the financial statements, including the likelihood and ramifications of
subsequent changes.
When faced with a "gray" area, consult with others, consider the need for SEC
pre-clearance, and focus on the transparency of financial reporting.
Auditors
Understand how a company is affected by changes in the current business
environment.
Understand the stresses on the company's internal control over financial
reporting, and how they may impact its effectiveness.

C-47

Identify key risk areas, particularly those involving significant estimates and
judgments.
Approach the audit with objectivity and skepticism, notwithstanding prior
experiences with or belief in management's integrity.
Pay special attention to complex transactions, especially those presenting difficult
issues of form versus substance.
Consider whether additional specialized knowledge is needed on the audit team.
Make management aware of identified audit differences on a timely basis.
Question the unusual and challenge anything that doesn't make sense.
Foster open, ongoing communications with management and the audit committee,
including discussions about the quality of financial reporting and any pressure to
accept less than high-quality financial reporting.
When faced with a "gray" area, perform appropriate procedures to test and
corroborate management's explanations and representations, and consult with
others as needed.
Audit Committees

Evaluate whether management exhibits the proper tone at the top and fosters a
culture and environment that promotes high-quality financial reporting, including
addressing internal control issues.
Question management and auditors about how they assess the risk of material
misstatement, what the major risk areas are, and how they respond to identified
risks.
Challenge management and the auditors to identify the difficult areas (e.g.,
significant estimates and judgments) and explain fully how they each made their
judgments in those areas.
Probe how management and the auditors have reacted to changes in the
company's business environment.
Understand why critical accounting principles were chosen and how they were
applied and changed, and consider the quality of financial reporting and the
transparency of disclosures about accounting principles.
Challenge management for explanations of any identified audit differences not
recorded.
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Understand the extent to which related parties exist and consider the transparency
of the related disclosures.
Read the financial statements and MD&A to see if anything is inconsistent with
your own knowledge.
Consider whether the readers of the financial statements and MD&A will be able
to understand the disclosures and risks of the company without the access to
management that the committee enjoys.
Ask the auditors about pressure by management to accept less than high-quality
financial reporting.
When faced with a "gray" area, Increase the level of communication with
management and the auditors.
Management, auditors, and audit committees each must diligently fulfil its own role and
effectively work together with the others through proactive communication and
information sharing. In working together, we can collectively improve the financial
reporting process. This requires a renewed commitment by each of the parties to the
needs of financial statement users.

1 This document has been prepared and distributed by the five largest accounting firms
(Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers)
and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The five firms and the
AICPA recognize the responsibility of our profession to work toward enhanced financial
reporting and audit effectiveness and have made significant commitments toward those
ends. Preparing and distributing this document is just one of several actions taken to
fulfill this commitment.
2 The SEC staff has expressed their views on the subject of materiality in Staff
Accounting Bulletin No. 99, Materiality, issued August 12, 1999.
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Securities and Exchange Commission
[Release Nos. 33-8040; 34-45149; FR-60]
Agency: Securities and Exchange Commission

Action: Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical
Accounting Policies
Summary: The Securities and Exchange Commission is issuing a statement regarding
the selection and disclosure by public companies of critical accounting policies and
practices.
For Further Information Contact: Robert A. Bayless, Special Assistant to the Chief
Accountant, 202-942-4400.
Supplementary Information:
As public companies undertake to prepare and file required annual reports with us, we
wish to remind management, auditors, audit committees, and their advisors that the
selection and application of the company's accounting policies must be appropriately
reasoned. They should be aware also that investors increasingly demand full transparency
of accounting policies and their effects.
Reported financial position and results often imply a degree of precision, continuity and
certainty that can be belied by rapid changes in the financial and operating environment
that produced those measures. As a result, even a technically accurate application of
generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") may nonetheless fail to communicate
important information if it is not accompanied by appropriate and clear analytic
disclosures to facilitate an investor's understanding of the company's financial status, and
the possibility, likelihood and implication of changes in the financial and operating status.
Of course, public companies should be mindful of existing disclosure requirements in
GAAP and our rules. Accounting standards require information in financial statements
about the accounting principles and methods used and the risks and uncertainties inherent
in significant estimates.l Our rules governing Management's Discussion and Analysis
("MD&A") currently require disclosure about trends, events or uncertainties known to
management that would have a material impact on reported financial information.2
We have observed that disclosure responsive to these requirements could be enhanced.
For example, environmental and operational trends, events and uncertainties typically are
identified in MD&A, but the implications of those uncertainties for the methods,
assumptions and estimates used for recurring and pervasive accounting measurements are
not always addressed. Communication between investors and public companies could be
improved if management explained in MD&A the interplay of specific uncertainties with
accounting measurements in the financial statements. We intend to consider new rules
during the coming year to elicit more precise disclosures about the accounting policies
that management believes are most "critical" - that is, they are both most important to the
portrayal of the company's financial condition and results, and they require management's
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most difficult, subjective or complex judgments, often as a result of the need to make
estimates about the effect of matters that are inherently uncertain.
Even before new rules are considered, however, we believe it is appropriate to alert
companies to the need for greater investor awareness of the sensitivity of financial
statements to the methods, assumptions, and estimates underlying their preparation. We
encourage public companies to include in their MD&A this year full explanations, in
plain English, of their "critical accounting policies," the judgments and uncertainties
affecting the application of those policies, and the likelihood that materially different
amounts would be reported under different conditions or using different assumptions. The
objective of this disclosure is consistent with the objective of MD&A.
Investors may lose confidence in a company's management and financial statements if
sudden changes in its financial condition and results occur, but were not preceded by
disclosures about the susceptibility of reported amounts to change, including rapid
change. To minimize such a loss of confidence, we are alerting public companies to the
importance of employing a disclosure regimen along the following lines:
Investors may lose confidence in a company's management and financial statements if
sudden changes in its financial condition and results occur, but were not preceded by
disclosures about the susceptibility of reported amounts to change, including rapid
change. To minimize such a loss of confidence, we are alerting public companies to the
importance of employing a disclosure regimen along the following lines:

1.

Each company's management and auditor should bring particular focus to
the evaluation of the critical accounting policies used in the financial
statements. As part of the normal audit process, auditors must obtain an
understanding of management's judgments in selecting and applying accounting
principles and methods. Special attention to the most critical accounting policies
will enhance the effectiveness of this process. Management should be able to
defend the quality and reasonableness of the most critical policies, and auditors
should satisfy themselves thoroughly regarding their selection, application and
disclosure.

2.

Management should ensure that disclosure in MD&A is balanced and fully
responsive. To enhance investor understanding of the financial statements,
companies are encouraged to explain in MD&A the effects of the critical
accounting policies applied, the judgments made in their application, and the
likelihood of materially different reported results if different assumptions or
conditions were to prevail.

3.

Prior to finalizing and filing annual reports, audit committees should
review the selection, application and disclosure of critical accounting
policies. Consistent with auditing standards, audit committees should be
apprised of the evaluative criteria used by management in their selection of the
accounting principles and methods. J Proactive discussions between the audit
committee and the company's senior management and auditor about critical
accounting policies are appropriate.
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4.

If companies, management, audit committees or auditors are uncertain
about the application of specific GAAP principles, they should consult with
our accounting staff. We encourage all those whose responsibility it is to
report fairly and accurately on a company's financial condition and results to
seek out our staffs assistance. We are committed to providing that assistance in
a timely fashion; our goal is to address problems before they happen.

By the Commission.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
Dated: December 12, 2001

1 See, e.g., Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 22, "Disclosure of Accounting
Policies" (Apr. 1972); AICPA Statement of Position No. 94-6, "Disclosure of Certain
Significant Risks and Uncertainties" (Dec. 1994).

.2. The underlying purpose of MD&A is to provide investors with "information that the
registrant believes to be necessary to an understanding of its financial condition, changes
in financial condition and results of operations." Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K [17 CFR
229.303(a)]. As we have previously stated, "[i]t is the responsibility of management [in
MD&A] to identify and address those key variables and other qualitative and quantitative
factors which are peculiar to and necessary for an understanding and evaluation of the
company.'" Securities Act ReI. No. 6835 (May 18, 1989) [54 FR 22427] (quoting
Securities Act ReI. No. 6349 (Sept. 28, 1981) [not published in the Federal Register]).

J. See Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 380, Communication
with Audit Committees or Others with Equivalent Authority and Responsibility ("SAS
61 "). SAS 61 requires independent auditors to communicate certain matters related to the
conduct of an audit to those who have responsibility for oversight of the financial
reporting process, specifically the audit committee. Among the matters to be
communicated to the audit committee are: (1) methods used to account for significant
unusual transactions; (2) the effect of significant accounting policies in controversial or
emerging areas for which there is a lack of authoritative guidance or consensus; (3) the
process used by management in formulating particularly sensitive accounting estimates
and the basis for the auditor's conclusions regarding the reasonableness of those
estimates; and (4) disagreements with management over the application of accounting
principles, the basis for management's accounting estimates, and the disclosures in the
financial statements. Id.
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Securities and Exchange Commission
[Release Nos. 33-8056; 34-45321; FR-61]
Commission Statement about Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations
Agency: Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission")
Action: Commission statement
Summary: The Commission today is issuing a statement regarding Management's
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations. The release
sets forth certain views of the Commission regarding disclosure that should be considered
by registrants. Disclosure matters addressed by the release are liquidity and capital
resources including off-balance sheet arrangements; certain trading activities that include
non-exchange traded contracts accounted for at fair value; and effects of transactions with
related and certain other parties.
For Further Information Contact: Questions about this statement should be referred to
Jackson Day or Robert Bayless, Office of the Chief Accountant (202 942-4400) or Paula
Dubberly, Division of Corporation Finance (202 942-2900), Securities and Exchange
Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549-1103.
Supplementary Information:
I. Background
On December 31,2001, the Commission received a petition from the accounting firms of
Arthur Andersen LLP, Deloitte and Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.1 The petition, which was endorsed by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, requested that the Commission issue additional
interpretive guidance regarding Item 303 of Regulation S-K, Management's Discussion
and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations,2 Item 303 of Regulation
S-B, Management's Discussion and Analysis or Plan of Operations,J. and Item 5 of Form
20-F, Operating and Financial Review and Prospects1. (collectively, "MD&A" or "the
MD&A rules").~ The petition requested that additional guidance be provided to public
companies preparing their annual reports for the fiscal year just ended.
The petition identified three areas of concern regarding disclosure in MD&A:
•

liquidity and capital resources, including off-balance sheet arrangements;

•

certain trading activities involving non-exchange traded contracts accounted for at
fair value; and
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•

relationships and transactions with persons or entities that derive benefits from
their non-independent relationship with the registrant or the registrant's related
parties.

Generally, we believe that the quality of information provided by public companies in the
three areas identified in the petition should be improved. Because many companies are
currently preparing disclosures for fiscal 2001 annual reports, the Commission believes it
is appropriate to issue this statement so that public companies can consider the petition
and this statement in preparing year-end and interim financial reports and' other
disclosures made after the issuance of this release.
While the Commission intends to consider rulemaking regarding the topics addressed in
this statement and other topics covered by MD&A, the purpose of this statement is to
suggest steps that issuers should consider in meeting their current disclosure obligations
with respect to the topics described. This statement does not create new legal
requirements, nor does it modify existing legal requirements.

II. Regulation S-K. Item 303. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A)
Paragraph (a) of Item 303 of Regulation S-K identifies a basic and overriding
requirement of MD&A: to "provide such other information that the registrant believes to
be necessary to an understanding of its financial condition, changes in financial condition
and results of operations." The Commission has explained this requirement on a number
of occasions. In 1987, we said:
The Commission has long recognized the need for a narrative explanation
of the financial statements, because numerical presentations and brief
accompanying footnotes alone may be insufficient for an investor to judge
the quality of earnings and the likelihood that past performance is
indicative of future performance. MD&A is intended to give the investor
an opportunity to look at the company through the eyes of management by
providing both a short and long-term analysis of the business of the
company.fi
And, as we said in 1989, "[t]he MD&A requirements are intended to provide in one
section of a filing, material historical and prospective textual disclosure enabling
investors and other users to assess the financial condition and results of operations of the
registrant, with particular emphasis on the registrant's prospects for the future. ,,2
Disclosure is mandatory where there is a known trend or uncertainty that is reasonably
likely to have a material effect on the registrant's financial condition or results of
operations. ll Accordingly, the development of MD&A disclosure should begin with
management's identification and evaluation of what information, including the potential
effects of known trends, commitments, events, and uncertainties, is important to
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providing investors and others an accurate understanding of the company's current and
prospective financial position and operating results.2.
Investors have become increasingly concerned about the sufficiency of disclosure
regarding liquidity risk, market price risks, and effects of "off-balance sheet" transaction
structures. Also, many readers of financial statements have cited a lack of transparent
disclosure about transactions with unconsolidated entities and other parties where that
information appeared necessary to understand how significant aspects of the business
were conducted.
Accordingly, the Commission is reminding companies of the requirements of MD&A as
they relate to (1) liquidity and capital resources, including off-balance sheet
arrangements; (2) certain trading activities involving non-exchange traded contracts
accounted for at fair value; and (3) relationships and transactions on terms that would not
be available from clearly independent third parties on an arm's-length basis. This
statement suggests steps that companies should consider in meeting their disclosure
obligations.
We also want to remind registrants that disclosure must be both useful and
understandable. That is, management should provide the most relevant information and
provide it using language and formats that investors can be expected to understand.
Registrants should be aware also that investors will often find information relating to a
particular matter more meaningful if it is disclosed in a single location, rather than
presented in a fragmented manner throughout the filing.

A. Disclosures Concerning Liquidity and Capital Resources, Including "OffBalance Sheet" Arrangements
Paragraphs (a) (1) and (a)(2)(ii) of Item 303 of Regulation S-K set forth certain
"requirements for disclosures about "Liquidity" and "Capital Resources."
(1) Liquidity. Identify any known trends or any known demands,
commitments, events or uncertainties that will result in or that are
reasonably likely to result in the registrant's liquidity increasing or
decreasing in any material way.

*****
(2)(ii) Capital Resources. Describe any known material trends, favorable
or unfavorable, in the registrant's capital resources. Indicate any expected
material changes in the mix and relative cost of such resources. The
discussion shall consider changes between equity, debt and any offbalance sheet financing arrangements.
A registrant's liquidity and capital resources are closely aligned. Disclosures about each
are likely to be affected by many of the same facts and circumstances. And off-balance
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sheet financing arrangements often are integral to both. JO Management should consider
all of these items together, as well as individually, when drafting disclosures responsive
to the MD&A rules.
1. Liquidity Disclosures
MD&A disclosures should not be overly general. For example, disclosure that the
registrant has sufficient short-term funding to meet its liquidity needs for the next year
provides little useful information. Instead, registrants should consider describing the
sources of short-term funding and the circumstances that are reasonably likely to affect
those sources of liquidity.
For example, a registrant that identifies its principal source of liquidity as operating cash
flows may need also to disclose the extent of the risk that a decrease in demand for the
company's products would reduce the availability of funds. That risk might arise, to
further the example, where customer demand is reasonably likely to fluctuate in response
to rapid technological changes. Similarly, if commercial paper is a principal source of
liquidity, the registrant should consider the need to disclose how this facility· could be
adversely affected by a debt rating downgrade or deterioration in certain of the company's
financial ratios or other measures of financial performance. The discussion should be
limited to material risks, and, as with MD&A generally, should be sufficiently detailed
and tailored to the company's individual circumstances, rather than "boilerplate."
If the registrant's liquidity is dependent on the use of off-balance sheet financing
arrangements, such as securitization of receivables or obtaining access to assets through
special purpose entities, the registrant should consider disclosure of the factors that are
reasonably likely to affect its ability to continue using those off-balance sheet financing
arrangements. ll Registrants also should make informative disclosures about matters that
could affect the extent of funds required within management's short- and long-term
planning horizons.
Registrants are reminded that identification of circumstances that could materially affect
liquidity is necessary if they are "reasonably likely" to occur. This disclosure threshold is
lower than "more likely than not." Market price changes, economic downturns, defaults
on guarantees, or contractions of operations that have material consequences for the
registrant's financial position or operating results can be reasonably likely to occur under
some conditions. Material effects on liquidity as a result of any reasonably likely changes
should be disclosed pursuant to Item 303(a).
In 1989, the Commission identified two assessments management must make where a
trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is known:
1. Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty likely to come to
fruition? If management determines that it is not reasonably likely to occur, no
disclosure is required.
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2. If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate objectively the
consequences of the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, on
the assumption that it will come to fruition. Disclosure is then required unless
management determines that a material effect on the registrant's financial
condition or results of operations is not reasonably likely to occur. 12
The Commission further reminded registrants that each final determination resulting from
the assessments made by management must be objectively reasonable, as viewed at the
time the determination is made. I3
To identify trends, demands, commitments, events and uncertainties that require
disclosure, management should consider the following:
•

provisions in financial guarantees or commitments, debt or lease agreements or
other arrangements that could trigger a requirement for an early payment,
additional collateral support, changes in terms, acceleration of maturity, or the
creation of an additional financial obligation, such as adverse changes in the
registrant's credit rating, financial ratios, earnings, cash flows, or stock price, or
changes in the value of underlying, linked or indexed assets;

•

circumstances that could impair the registrant's ability to continue to engage in
transactions that have been integral to historical operations or are financially or
operationally essential, or that could render that activity commercially
impracticable, such as the inability to maintain a specified investment grade credit
rating, level of earnings, earnings per share, financial ratios, or collateral;

•

factors specific to the registrant and its markets that the registrant expects to be
given significant weight in the determination of the registrant's credit rating or
will otherwise affect the registrant's ability to raise short-term and long-term
financing;

•

guarantees of debt or other commitments to third parties; and

•

written options on non-financial assets (for example, real estate puts).

2. Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements
Registrants should consider the need to provide disclosures concerning transactions,
arrangements and other relationships with unconsolidated entities or other persons that
are reasonably likely to affect materially liquidity or the availability of or requirements
for capital resources. Specific disclosure may be necessary regarding relationships with
unconsolidated entities that are contractually limited to narrow activities that facilitate the
registrant's transfer of or access to assets. These entities are often referred to as structured
finance or special purpose entities. These entities may be in the form of corporations,
partnerships or limited liability companies, or trusts.
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Material sources of liquidity and financing, including off-balance sheet arrangements and
transactions with unconsolidated, limited purpose entities, should be discussed pursuant
to Item 303(a).14 The extent of the registrant's reliance on off-balance sheet arrangements
should be described fully and clearly where those entities provide financing, liquidity, or
market or credit risk support for the registrant; engage in leasing, hedging, research and
development services with the registrant; or expose the registrant to liability that is not
reflected on the face of the financial statements. Where contingencies inherent in the
arrangements are reasonably likely to affect the continued availability of a material
historical source of liquidity and finance, registrants must disclose those uncertainties and
their effects.
Registrants should consider the need to include information about the off-balance sheet
arrangements such as: their business purposes and activities; their economic substance;
the key terms and conditions of any commitments; the initial and ongoing relationships
with the registrant and its affiliates; and the registrant's potential risk exposures resulting
from its contractual or other commitments involving the off-balance sheet arrangements.
For example, a registrant may be economically or legally required or reasonably likely to
fund losses of an unconsolidated, limited purpose entity, provide it with additional
funding, issue securities pursuant to a call option held by that entity, purchase the entity's
capital stock or assets, or the registrant otherwise may be financially affected by the
performance or non-performance of an entity or counterparty to a transaction or
arrangement. In those circumstances, the registrant may need to include information
about the arrangements and exposures resulting from contractual or other commitments
to provide investors with a clear understanding of the registrant's business activities,
financial arrangements, and financial statements. Other disclosures that registrants should
consider to explain the effects and risks of off-balance sheet arrangements include:
•

Total amount of assets and obligations of the off-balance sheet entity, with a
description of the nature of its assets and obligations, and identification of the
class and amount of any debt or equity securities issued by the registrant;

•

The effects of the entity's termination if it has a finite life or it is reasonably likely
that the registrant's arrangements with the entity may be discontinued in the
foreseeable future;

•

Amounts receivable or payable, and revenues, expenses and cash flows resulting
from the arrangements;

•

Extended payment terms of receivables, loans, and debt securities resulting' from
the arrangements, and any uncertainties as to realization, including repayment that
is contingent upon the future operations or performance of any party;

•

The amounts and key terms and conditions of purchase and sale agreements
between the registrant and the counterparties in any such arrangements; and
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•

The amounts of any guarantees, lines of credit, standby letters of credit or
commitments or take or·pay contracts, throughput contracts or other similar types
of arrangements, including tolling, capacity, or leasing arrangements, that could
require the· registrant to provide funding of any obligations under the
arrangements, including guarantees of repayment of obligors of parties to the
arrangements, make whole agreements, or value guarantees.

Although disclosure regarding similar arrangements can be aggregated, important
distinctions in terms and effects should not be lost in that process. The relative
significance to the registrant's financial position and results of the arrangements with
unconsolidated, non-independent, limited purpose entities should be clear from the
disclosures to the extent material. While legal opinions regarding "true sale" issues or
other issues relating to whether a registrant has contingent, residual or other liability can
play an important role in transactions involving such entities, they do not obviate the
need for the registrant to consider whether disclosure is required. In addition, disclosure
of these matters should be clear and individually tailored to describe the risks to the
registrant, and should not consist merely of recitation of the transactions' legal terms or
the relationships between the parties or similar boilerplate.
3. Disclosures about Contractual Obligations and Commercial Commitments
Accounting standardsl l require disclosure concerning a registrant's obligations and
commitments to make future payments under contracts, such as debt and lease
agreements, and under contingent commitments, such as debt guarantees. Disclosures
responsive to these requirements usually are located in various parts of a registrant's
filings. We believe investors would find it beneficia~ if aggregated information about
contractual obligations and commercial commitments 16 were provided in a single location
so that a total picture of obligations would be readily available. One aid to presenting the
total picture of a registrant's liquidity and capital resources and the integral role of onand off-balance sheet arrangements may be schedules of contractual obligations and
commercial commitments as of the latest balance sheet date. Examples that could be
adapted to the registrant's particular facts are presented below.
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The preceding table could be accompanied by footnotes to describe provisions that
create, increase or accelerate liabilities, or other pertinent data.
Amount of Commitment Expiration Per

B. Disclosures about Certain Trading Activities that Include Non-Exchange Traded
Contracts Accounted for at Fair Value

The Commission is concerned that there may be a lack of transparency and clarity with
respect to the disclosure of trading activities involving commodity contracts that are
accounted for at fair value but for which a lack of market price quotations necessitates the
use of fair value estimation techniques. These contracts may be indexed to measures of
weather, commodities prices, or quoted prices of service capacity, such as energy storage
and bandwidth capacity contracts. Companies engaged to a material extent in trading
activities1I involving these contracts should consider providing disclosures in MD&A
that supplement those required in the financial statements by applicable accounting
standards. Investor understanding and financial reporting transparency may depend on
additional statistical and other information about these business activities and
transactions. That information should include any contracts that are derivatives involving
the same commodities that are part of those trading activities (for example, energy
derivatives that are part of energy trading activities18.).
The Commission reminds registrants that accounting standards require disclosures in
financial statements of material energy trading and risk management activities. 19
Discussion in MD&A of material trends and uncertainties arising from those activities is
also required. Information about these trading activities, contracts and modeling
methodologies, assumptions, variables and inputs, along with explanations of the
different outcomes reasonably likely under different circumstances or measurement
methods, should be considered for inclusion in management's discussion of how the
activities affect reported results for the latest annual period and subsequent interim period
and how financial position is affected as of the latest balance sheet date. The Commission
recently issued cautionary advice encouraging companies to include in their MD&A full
explanations, in plain English, of their "critical accounting policies," the judgments and
uncertainties affecting the application of those policies, and the likelihood that materially
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different amounts would be reported under different conditions or using different
.
-'0
assumptlons.'::Consistent with that advice, registrants should consider the need to furnish information,
quantified to the extent practicable, that does the following:
•

disaggregates realized and unrealized changes in fair value;

•

identifies changes in fair value attributable to changes in valuation techniques;

•

disaggregates estimated fair values at the latest balance sheet date based on
whether fair values are determined directly from quoted market prices or are
estimated; and

•

indicates the maturities of contracts at the latest balance sheet date (e.g., within
one year, within years one through three, within years four and five, and after five
years).

An example of this disclosure in the form of a schedule is provided below.
Fair value of contracts outstanding at the beginning of the period

xxxxxx

Contracts realized or otherwise settled during the period

xxxxxx

Fair value of new contracts when entered into during the period

xxxxxx

Changes in fair values attributable to changes in valuation techniques and
assumptions

xxxxxx

Other changes in fair values

xxxxxx

Fair value of contracts outstanding at the end of the period

xxxxxx

r[~"-~"~=·~~·"=="~~~::·-=~~~~-::~~~~·:::::::=:~·:~::~~~~~~il~~~~;f~~~~!i~~~:·li~~;!!~?~~~~.~::!::~=::.:::·=~~'=':=~I
~

:1

~

Source of Fair

Maturity

~

~ less than 1 ~

Maturity Maturity ~ Maturity In ~
~1
1 - 31
4 - 5
~ excess of 5 ~ Total fair
1

1~,~!£~~~~q~~~~j[===~L=~j[~~~~=~~j[=~~===~==~:~:~~~=:~~Ic====~

In addition, issuers should consider the need to disclose the fair value of net claims
against counterparties that are reported as assets at the most recent balance sheet date,
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11

based on the credit quality of the contract counterparty (e.g., investment grade;
noninvestment grade; and no external ratings).
Registrants should also consider their disclosure obligations regarding risk management
in connection with the trading activities discussed above. Registrants should consider
whether they should provide fuller disclosure regarding the management of risks related
to, for example, changes in credit quality or .market fluctuations of underlying, linked or
indexed assets or liabilities, especially where such assets are illiquid or susceptible to
material uncertainties in valuation.

c. Disclosures about Effects of Transactions with Related and Certain Other Parties
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 57 (FAS 57), Related Party
Disclosures, sets forth the requirements under GAAP concerning transactions with
related parties. 21 As noted in that standard, "[t]ransactions involving related parties
cannot be presumed to be carried out on an arm's len§th basis, as the requisite conditions
of competitive, free-market dealings may not exist.,,-l Accordingly, where related party
transactions are material, MD&A should include discussion of those transactions to the
extent necessary for an understanding of the company's current and prospective financial
position and operating results. In addition, Item 404 of Regulation S-K and Item 404 of
Regulation S-B require disclosure of certain relationships and transactions with related
parties. 23
Registrants should consider whether investors would better understand financial
statements in many circumstances if MD&A included descriptions of all material
transactions involving related persons or entities, with clear discussion of arrangements
that may involve transaction terms or other aspects that differ from those which would
likely be negotiated with clearly independent parties. 24 Registrants should consider
describing the elements of the transactions that are necessary for an understanding of the
transactions' business purpose and economic substance, their effects on the financial
statements, and the special risks or contingencies arising from these transactions.
Discussion of the following may be necessary:
•

the business purpose of the arrangement;

•

identification of the related parties transacting business with the registrant;

•

how transaction prices were determined by the parties;

•

if disclosures represent that transactions have been evaluated for fairness, a
description of how the evaluation was made; and

•

any ongoing contractual or other commitments as a result of the arrangement.

Registrants should also consider the need for disclosure about parties that fall outside the
definition of "related parties," but with whom the registrant or its related parties have a
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relationship that enables the parties to negotiate terms of material transactions that may
not be available from other, more clearly independent, parties on an arm's-length basis.
For example, an entity may be established and operated by individuals that were former
senior management of, or have some other current or former relationship with, a
registrant. The purpose of the entity may be to own assets used by the registrant or
provide financing or services to the registrant. Although former management or persons
with other relationships may not meet the definition of a related party pursuant to FAS
57, the former management positions may result in negotiation of terms that are more or
less favorable than those available on an arm's-length basis from clearly independent
third parties that are material to the registrant's financial position or results of operations.
In some cases, investors may be unable to understand the registrant's reported results of
operations without a clear explanation of these arrangements and relationships.
By the Commission.
Jonathan G. Katz
Secretary
January 22, 2002
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THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE l
Rutheford B Campbell, Jr.
Alumni Professor of Law
University of Kentucky College of Law

I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DOCTRINE
A.
Under the integration doctrine, a single "offering" or "issue" of securities cannot be split,
offering, for example, one-halfofthe shares under the private placement exemption from registration
provided by Section 4(2)2 of the 1933 Act and one-half of the shares under the intrastate exemption
provided by Section 3(a)(II).3 The rule similarly,prohibits splitting a single offering or issue
between a registration statement and any exemption from registration. In all events, therefore, the
whole of any discrete offering or issue of securities must be offered and sold only under one
exemption or registration statement. 4

lThis paper is based in parts on my recent article, The Overwhelming Case for Elimination
of the Integration Doctrine Under the Securities Act of 1933,89 Ky. L. J. 289 (2001). I take the
liberty of utilizing language and thoughts from that piece without further footnotes or quotation
marks so indicating. The author is indebted ,to Rodney Chrisman, Jonathan Helton and David
Longenecker for their research assistance in connection with the original article.
215 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2001). That section provides an exemption from registration for
"transactions by an issuer not involving any publi<;,offering."
3That section provides an exemption from registration for:
Any security which is a part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident
within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident and
doing business within, or, if a corporation incorporated by and doing business within, such
State or Territory.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(II)(2001).
4For the purposes of this article, the author generally uses simple and somewhat sterile
examples. While these examples are typical of situations one might encounter in practice, they are
far from exhaustive. A couple of other examples may be helpful in appreciating the pervasiveness
of the integration issues faced by companies engaged in capital formation.
One of the most difficult integration problems faced by this author in his practice days
involved the unseasoned and unsophisticated (but otherwise honest and efficient) entrepreneur who,
before seeking legal advice, made an offer of its securities in a manner that destroyed all available

D-l

Accordingly, if an issuer attempts to bifurcate a single offering into two separate components
and qualify each component under a separate exemption or, alternatively, under an exemption and
a registration statement, courts or the Commission may conclude that the two putatively separate
offering in fact amount to a single offering and thus may "integrate" the two transactions into a
single offering. Once this integration occurs, the breadth of the offering or issue is defined, and all
the offers and sales within this defined offer or issue must either meet all the requirements of a single
exemption or, alternatively, be made subject to an effective registration statement. 5
B.
Although the integration doctrine, described in these abstract terms, has a sensible ring to it,
commentators over the years have picked at the doctrine. 6

exemptions from registration. The only way to cure that problem is to separate the prior illegal offer
from the proposed financing through the application of the integration doctrine.
Another example arose some years ago when tax shelter deals were fashionable and,
apparently, at least, profitable. Entrepreneurs would form multiple limited partnerships for the
purpose of engaging in certain activities, dri,lling 'for oil and gas, for example. Each of these
partnerships would have different properties and investors but would have the same promoters and
be engaged in the same type of enterprises. The question' arose as to whether the separate offerings
by these separate entities would integrated. See, e.g., Donohoe v. Consolidated Operating &
Production Corp., 982 F. 2d 1130 (7 th Cir. 1992)(refusing to integrate separate limited partnerships
formed to drill separate oil wells). For a discussion of this in the context of multiple partnership
offerings, see Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts, and Unincorporated Associations, Integration
ofPartnership Offerings: A Proposal for identifying a Discrete Offering (hereinafter "Integration
ofPartnership Offerings"), 37 Bus. Law. 1591 (1982). This matter receives additional, but briefer,
treatment in ABA Task Force on Integration, Integration ofSecurities Offerings: Report ofthe Task
Force on Integration (hereinafter "Task Force on Integration), 41 Bus. Law. 595,621-23,624-31
(1986).
5The securities literature contains numerous fine discussions ofthe integration doctrine. See,
e.g., ill Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 1211-28 (3d ed. 1989); Darryl Deaktor,
Integration ofSecurities Offerings, 31 U. Fla. L. Rev. 465 (1979).
6For criticism from commentators, see, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Regulation A and the
Integration Doctrine: The New Safe Harbor (hereinafter, "Bradford, Regulation A"), 55 Ohio St.
L. J. 225 (1994)(characterizing changes to the safe harbor rules of Regulation A as "generally
positive and responsive to ... criticisms", but lamenting that "Rule 251(c) has failed to reach its
potential". Id., at 289); In his most recent, Professor Bradford has mounted a substantial criticism
of the integration doctrine, proposing a solution to the difficulties generated by integration through
adopting a "weighted exemption system". C. Stephen Bradford, Expanding the Non- Transactional
Revolution: A new Approach to Securities Registration Exemptions (hereinafter "Bradford,
Expanding"), 49 Emory L.J. 438 (2000); Lyman Johnson & Steve Patterson, The Reincarnation of
Rule 152: False Hope on the Integration Front, 46 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 539 (1989) (offering a
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1. Much of their critical comment has focused on the confusion and uncertainty in the
doctrine's terms7 and the pernicious impact such ambiguity has on the capital formation
activities of issuers. 8
2. On at least two occasions, therefore, committees of the American Bar Association have
tried their hands at bringing some sense and order to portions of the integration doctrine. 9
The most significant of these ABA initiatives occurred in the mid-1980s, when a prestigious
committee,10 driven primarily by concerns ofthe practicing bar over the unmanageable levels
of ambiguity in the doctrine, proposed regulatory amendments that would establish a series
of broadly available safe harbors from integration. 11 Interestingly, and tellingly, however,

critical analysis of Rule 152). Writing in 1986, this author criticized the doctrine as applied to
Regulation D offerings. Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Plight ofSmall Issuers (And Others) Under
Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems that Need Attention, 74 Ky. L. J. 127,162-70 (1985-86).
7Even those who generally support the concept of integration admit that the doctrine in its
application is confusing and inconsistent. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, The Integration ofSecurities
Offerings: A Proposed Formula that Fosters the Policies of Securities Regulation, 25 Loy. Chi.
V.L.J. 199,208-30 (1994).

8E.g., Johnson and Patterson provide some description of the "irksome manner in which the
integration doctrine constrains capital financing decisions", Johnson & Patterson, supra note 6, at
539, appropriately focusing on the special problems of start-up businesses. Id. at 540.
Interestingly, one author seems nearly prepared to argue that ambiguity in the integration
doctrine actually contributes to capital formation, albeit the type of capital formation she dislikes.
Professor Wade states: "The ability of issuers to manipulate the factors of the SEC's current
integration formula allows them to avoid the application of the integration doctrine and thereby
successfully evade the Act's registration requirements." Wade, supra note 7, at 240.

9See Integration of Partnership Offerings, supra note 4 (discussing and making proposals
respecting the application of the integration doctrine to successive offerings by affiliated
partnerships). This article and its proposals drew sharp criticism from Dean Morrissey. See,
Morrissey, supra note 5, at 77 (characterizing the proposal as "an elegant attempt to circumvent the
registration process by artificially expanding its carefully restricted exemptions"). The second ABA
paper was Task Force on Integration, supra note 4 (dealing more broadly with the integration
doctrine and making recommendations of broad application respecting the doctrine).
10For members of the Task Force, see Comments of Chair, ABA Task Force on Integration,
1 Selected Articles on Securities Law 230, note * (hereinafter "Comments of Chair")( 1991).
lIThe Task Force divided its safe harbor suggestions into six categories: "issuer distinctions,
temporal separations, differences in securities offered, purpose differences, policy considerations,
D-3

the Chair of the Task Force admitted some years later that "the hopes of the task force have
largely not been realized ... , with the result that integration issues remain a serious problem
,,12

C.
Even the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is the doctrine's principal architect,
appears to recognize that the integration doctrine has its problems.
1. For example, for a period during the late seventies and early eighties, the SEC refused to
respond to no-action requests, seemingly overwhelmed by the complexity of the issues and
the volume of requests from attorneys. 13 In 1985, however, the SEC reversed itself and again
began to issue no action letters on integration questions. 14
2. Over the years, the Commission has developed certain discrete, regulatory safe harbors
from integration and recently has been especially generous in its rules protecting issuers, at

and domestic and foreign offering distinctions." Task Force on Integration, supra note 4, at 624.
These proposals are discussed at ide at 624-41. The specific regulatory proposals of the Task Force
are found at ide at 642-43.
12Comments of Chair, supra note 10, at 230.'
The report of the Task Force reflects the extreme theoretical difficulties encountered when
one attempts to bring clarity and consistency to the integration doctrine. The problem is that the
integration doctrine itself is fundamentally nonsensical. Drafting rules without a principled
theoretical footing is, of course, a problematic exercise. Thus, one can sympathize with the Task
Force's frustration as it attempted to bring order in such circumstances.
In fact, the approach of the Task Force, in light of such circumstances, makes sense. The
Task Force opted to propose a series of safe harbor provisions designed to clarify, simplify and
reduce somewhat the application of the doctrine. This approach makes sense, because modest
reductions in the perniciousness of a nonsensical doctrine result if the rules respecting its application
are simple and clear. At least such clarification and simplification reduce the transaction costs in
those deals in which the doctrine is implicated, since, for example, the legal costs in determining the
application of the doctrine are reduced by the enhanced clarity of the rule. Further, to the extent the
scope of integration is reduced by such safe harbors, the perniciousness of the doctrine is once again
reduced.

13Some indication of this, as well as an indication of the significance of the doctrine to issuers
and thus to capital formation generally, is seen in the sheer numbers ofintegration no-action requests
received by the SEC. Professor Wade reports, for example, that from 1971 to 1979, the SEC
received nearly 200 no-action requests on integration. Wade, supra note 7, at 220.
14See 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 403 (Mar. 8. 1985).
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least in limited situations, from the perniciousness of the doctrine. 15

II. A BRIEF LOOK AT THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE
In connection with my recent article, The Overwhelming Case for Elimination of the
Integration Doctrine, 16 I researched the origins of the integration doctrine, and what I found was at
least mildly surprising.

A. The Original Securities Act of 1933 contained no clear mandate for an integration doctrine.
Some sections of the original 1933 Act suggest an integration doctrine; some sections suggest the
contrary. 17
B. The doctrine first appeared during the first year of the new act,18 1933, and was constructed and

15See, e.g., Rule 251(c) of Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c) (2001), which was amended
in 1992 in connection with the Commission's small business initiatives, Securities Act Release No.
6949, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 72,439 (July 30, 1992), and minimized the impact of integration
on Regulation A offerings. For an outstanding discussion ofthis provision, see Bradford, Regulation
A, supra note 6. Unfortunately, the Commission's effort to eliminate uncertainty in the application
of the integration doctrine has been unsuccessful in most instances.
16See Campbell, supra note 1.
17See Campbell, supra note 1, at 295-300.

18 Securities Act Release No. 33-1459,1 Fed. Sec.L. Rep. (CCH)<j[2261-62 (May 29,1937).
Apparently in the months following the adoption of the 1933 Act, the Federal Trade Commission
(the "FTC"), which was initially assigned administrative responsibility over the 1933 Act, began to
respond in letters to inquiries about the new 1933 Act. In 1933, therefore, the FTC issued the
foregoing Release, which consisted of excerpts from a number of these letters, including one letter
dealing with integration.
The facts underlying the FTC's opinion in the Release are as follows. Shortly after the 1933
Act was passed, a company apparently filed a registration statement for an offering of securities to
be sold to the public in various states. The question posed by the issuer was whether during the
waiting period it could begin to sell these securities under an intrastate exemption and then after the
effective date of the registration statement complete the offering across state lines pursuant to the
registration statement.
These facts, therefore, are particularly compelling for the administrative adoption of an
integration concept. The "issue" of securities clearly had been defined by the registration statement
D-5

promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission, which originally was assigned the administrative
oversight of the 1933 Act. 19
C. Five years later when the SEC had taken over from the FTC as the regulatory agency with
primary responsibility for the administration of the 1933 Act,20 the SEC with seeming facility
promulgated its famous Unity Gold opinion in which it reaffirmed the FTC's integration doctrine,
applied it to an offering under Section 3(b) and commenced an articulation of the criteria it proposed
to use to determine whether putatively separate offerings would be integrated.21 Integration at that

filed by the company, which proposed to register for sale a defined number of shares of the
company's stock. The issuer, by its own admission, proposed to sell a portion of those particular
securities pursuant to the intrastate exemption and then to sell the balance of the securities pursuant
to a registration statement.
When these unusually strong facts were considered by the inexperienced agency under the
relatively strong integration language in the original intrastate exemption, the FTC's adoption of an
integration concept in the opinion is, perhaps, unsurprising. Unfortunately, it was the wrong
conclusion and one that since 1933 has generated confusion and inappropriate outcomes. To make
matters even more unfortunate, the conclusion was one that was not required by the words of the
Act.
19Initially, the 1933 Act assigned primary administrative responsibility for the 1933 Act to
the Federal Trade Commission. See Securities Act of 1933, Sec. 2(5),48 Stat. 74,75 (1933)(current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(5) (2001); Securities Act of 1933, Sec. 19,48 Stat. 74,85 (1933)(current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2001)); Securities Act of 1933, Sec. 20,48 Stat. 74,86 (1933)(current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 77t (2001)); Securities Act of 1933,Sec. 21,48 Stat. 74,86(1933)(current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 77u (2001)).
2°Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 210.
21 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938). In March of 1937, Unity Gold sold 75,000 shares of its stock to Mr.
Cronan under Section 3(b) and the Commission' s· regulations that were the predecessor to today's
Regulation A. When in May of 1937 Unity Gold filed a registration statement for approximately
600,000 additional shares of its stock, the question arose as to whether that subsequent, registered
offering would be integrated back into the prior sales under Section 3(b), thereby destroying the
Section 3(b) exemption due to the failure to abide by the $100,000 amount limitation of that section.
The Commission easily found that the Section 3(b) offering was part of the same issue as the
registered offering and thus integrated the two, which destroyed the availability of the Section 3(b)
portion of the offering. The Commission concluded that the determination of whether the two
components will be considered a "single 'issue'" depends upon "various factors concerning the
methods of sale and distribution employed to effect the offerings". The following were cited by the
Commission as factors indicating the appropriateness of integration: "securities of the same class,
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point became firmly established as a Commission doctrine, and the Commission has never wavered
in its position that the integration is an integral part of the 1933 Act. 22
D. Courts did not get involved in any significant integration matters until nearly 1960, and then their
contribution to the development of the doctrine was simply to accept the doctrine as developed
previously by the Commission. 23 Thus, while these early judicial decisions on integration reflect
the inherent difficulty that unspecialized tribunals of general jurisdiction have in dealing with matters
as technical and complex as integration,24 courts without hesitation accepted the integration

offered on the same general terms to the public in an uninterrupted program ofdistribution" a "single
integrated plan f~r distribution" also indicates the appropriateness of integration. The Commission
cited "material differences in the use of the proceeds, in the manner and terms of the distribution"
as factors weighing against integration. Id. at 625.
22As discussed in this paper, the SEC has, however, developed different criteria for
integration, depending on the particular exemption or registration involved and has ameliorated the
impact of the doctrine in certain limited cases.
23For example, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Hillsborough Investment
Corporation,("Hillsborough I") 173 F. Supp. 86,88 (D. N.H. 1958), which this author considers the
second ever integration court case, the court relied on a 1937 SEC Release, Securities Act Release
No. 1459 (1937), in dealing with what the court considered to be an integration matter. A court in
the next series of significant integration cases then relied on Hillsborough I as a basis for its
integration decision. S.E. C. v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange, 186 F. Supp. 830, 871,
modified, aff'd and remanded 285 F. 2d 162 (9 th Cir. 1960). Professor Loss and Dean Seligman
observe that "the Commission's standard [for common law integration] in recent years has often
been followed by courts." Loss & Seligman, supra note 5, at 1213. Professor Deaktor, however,
seems to be of a different mind, stating that "a relatively large proportion of the integration cases
make no mention of the work of the SEC, nor of cases or authorities which have drawn on that
work." Deaktor, supra note 5, at 509.
24For example, the court's treatment of the integration issue in Shaw v. U.S., 131 F.2d 476
(9 Cir. 1942) is essentially unintelligible. The next following cases after Shaw, while broadly
intelligible, are nonetheless confusing and based on uncertain principles and fail to articulate with
clarity the criteria of integration.
th

Thus, in S.E. C. v. Hillsborough Investment Corporation ("Hillsbrough f'), 173 F. Supp. 86
(D.C.N .H. 1958), the second reported case dealing with integration, the Court held that Hillsborough
could not rely on the intrastate exemption because recent interstate sales of its securities. About the
only explanation offered for integration in this case was a statement of the court indicating that it
would integrate "'all the shares of common character originally though successively issued by the
corporation"'. Id. at 88, quoting from Shaw v. U.S.,131 F.2d 478,480 (9 th Cir. 1942). Obviously,
such a statement is overly broad and essentially useless as a single criterion for integration. The case
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essentially as it had been developed by the Commission and continue to apply the doctrine today.25

is otherwise devoid of meaningful reasoning or criteria for integration.
The third reported integration case once again involved Hillsborough. S.E. C. v. Hillsborough
Investment Corporation ("Hillsborough II"), 176 F. Supp. 789, af!'d Hillsborough Investment
Corporation v. S.E. C., 276 F. 2d 665 (1 st Cir. 1960). Shortly after the injunction was entered against
Hillsborough in Hillsborough I, Hillsborough offered New Hampshire residents holding the
previously issued shares the opportunity to exchange their shares for new shares that had somewhat
different contractual terms. Hillsborough planned to sell additional, similar shares to other New
Hampshire residents for cash, claiming that the entire new offering (i.e., both the part sold in the
exchange and the part sold for cash) was therefore exempt from registration under the intrastate
exemption. Apparently based on the its determination that the new securities "differ from the old
securities [that were sold illegally] ... only in a small degree ...", the court determined that the sale
of the new securities under such a condition would be in violation of the 1933 Act. While the
outcome seems based on the notion that the old offering must be integrated with the new offering,
once again, the analysis is far from crisp, relying more on generalized notions of bad faith and
providing no meaningful analysis of the application of the integration doctrine or the criteria used
to determine that the two offerings should be combined.
The fourth of the earliest integration cases is S.E. C. v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage
Exchange, 186 F. Supp. 830, modified, af!'d and remanded 285 F. 2eI 162 (9 th Cir. 1960), and once
again the analysis of the court is less than precise. In that case the Court seemed to apply the
integration concept to offerings purportedly made under the intrastate exemption. Apparently,
although once again this is less than entirely clear, the Court integrated the offerings because "the
terms and conditions under which [the offerings were made were] ... identical". 186 F. Supp. at 871.
The point of this overly long discussion is to demonstrate that courts had difficulty in their
early integration cases and also to express some sympathy for the courts, which were dealing with
complicated and technical matters for the first time.
25In addition to the cases cited in note 24, supra, the next earliest cases, listed in
chronological order include: Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus [1964-1966 Transfer Binder], Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) «][91,523 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)(holding that integreation did not apply under the
factors enumerated in SEC Release No. 33-4552 (1962); SEC v. Dunfee, [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <][91,970 (W.D. Mo. 1966)(refusing to integrate an offering of six
percent notes payable in twenty months with an offer of seven percent notes payable in thirty
months); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5 th Cir. 1969); Bowers v. Columbia Gen.
Corp., 336 F. Supp.609 (D. Del. 1971)(accepting the definitiion of integration contained in SEC
Release No. 33-4552 (1962)); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 326 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. (Fla.
1971 )(holding that two issues of securities by defendant were not part of a single plan of financing
and therefore should not be integrated; rev'd on other grounds, 463 F.2d 137 (5 th Cir. 1972); Livens
v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Mass. 1974)(accepting a definition of integration
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E. The author's conclusion from the foregoing is that. statutory language, history and precedent
provide no compelling support for the continuation of the integration doctrine.

III. THE STATE OF THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE TODAY
A. Over the years, able commentators have written on the integration doctrine and its application
both broadly and to specific situations. Some of the most significant works are cited in the
footnotes. 26
B. The discussion oftoday's integration doctrine can profitably be bifurcated into the common law
rules of integration and the Commission's discrete safe harbor rules of integration.

1. The Common Law ofIntegration
a.
The common law of integration is applicable to offerings of securities in the
absence of any specific Commission rule dealing with a particular integration matter.

The common law doctrine is best understood as the five factor integration test
b.
that is consistently articulated by the Commission. Thus in determining, for
example, whether securities sold in January of a particular year under the intrastate
offering will be integrated with securities sold in April of the same year under the
private placement exemption, courts (or the Commission) will consider whether the
two blocks of securities (i) "are part of a single plan of financing", (ii) "involve
issuance of the same class of securities", (iii) are offered "at or about the same time",
(iv) generate the "same type of consideration" for the issuer, and (v) are offered "for

based SEC Release No. 33-4552 (1962)and refusing to integrate six offerings made over an eight
month period because they were not part of a single plan of financing; Bayoud v. Ballard, 401 F.
Supp. 417 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Barrett v. Triangle Mining Corp., [1974-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <][95,438 (S.D.N.Y 1976); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225
(E.D.N.Y. 1976)(citing SEC v. Hillsborough Investment Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H. 1958) to
integrate two issues of securities which were part of a single plan of financing).
26The securities literature contains numerous fine discussions ofthe integration doctrine. See,
Loss & Seligman, supra, note 5; J. William Hicks, Exempted Transactions Under the Securities Act
of 1933 §§ 1.04[4][b][iii], 2.06[2],4.03,7.03[2], 11.04[2] (2000); Deaktor, supra, note 5; Daniel
J. Morrissey, Integration of Securities Offerings - The ABA's "Indiscreet" Proposal, 26 Ariz. L.
Rev. 41 (1984); Bradford, Regulation A supra, note 6; Johnson & Patterson, supra, note 6; Bradford,
Expanding supra, note 6.
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the same general purpose".27 In a common law analysis, therefore, the presence of
each of the foregoing is a factor that increases the probability that the January and
April blocks of securities will be integrated and thus considered a single offering.28

c.

The very nature of these criteria make them difficult to apply.29
(1)
In the first place, the meanings of the individual factors themselves
are generally ambiguous and confusing. The "single plan of financing"
factor, for example, not only is itself inherently ambiguous 30 but also appears
to be similar to the "same general purpose" factor. 31

27See the discussion in Loss & Seligman, supra note 5, at 1212-13. The Commission, for
example, both in Rule 147,17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (Preliminary Note 3) (2001), and in Regulation D,
17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a)(Note) (2001), cited these factors as the applicable criteria for integration
determinations made outside the safe harbor provisions of those particular rules.

28Professor Deaktor's 1979 article, Deaktor, supra note 5, at 529-38, and Professor Wade's
later, 1994 article, Wade, supra note 7, at 211-20, provide a separate, in-depth discussion of each
of the five common law factors of integration. The Report by the Task Force on Integration, Task
Force on Integration, supra note 4, at 600-23, is also particularly rich in its research on the five
common law factors ofintegration, although its discussion is organized around particular exemptions
rather than the factors themselves.
29Loss and Seligman state, for example, that this "multifactor test may fairly be criticized as
... 'indeterminate"'. Loss & Seligman, supra note 5, at 1213. Professor Wade, although clearly
supportive of the integration doctrine, concedes that doctrine is confusing in its application. See
Wade, supra note 7, at 211-27 ("the SEC's no-action letters and the opinions of courts have provided
very little guidance with respect to the analysis that must be performed under the five factor test."
Id. at 221.)
30Loss and Seligman conclude that the "Commission staff's no-action letters are not entirely
consistent" on the definition of a "single plan of financing". They state, however, that the term
"tends to refer to factors such as the method of offering the security, the timing of plans for raising
capital, and whether the offerings are financially interdependent." Loss & Seligman, supra, note 5,
at 1214. Professor Wade agrees with Loss and Seligman on the three factors that make up the single
plan of financing factor, also finding "... confusion ... from the SEC's and the courts' failure to
define precisely and apply consistently the three suggested components of the single plan of
financing factor." Wade, supra note 7, at 212. Professor Deaktor states that the staff's definition
of this factor "has lacked consistency". Deaktor, supra note 5, at 529.
31See Loss & Seligman, supra note 5, at 1214 ("there tends to be considerable overlap
between instances in which there is a 'single plan of financing' and those in which there is the 'same
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The other integration factors are equally uncertain in their meaning.
Thus, it is unclear what types of contractual variances 32 are necessary to
establish that two securities are not part of the "same class of securities.,,33
How different do the contractual terms have to be in order to be separate
classes? Are debt and equity always separate classes of securities? What if
the equity is a preferred stock and the debt is a subordinated debenture that
have essentially the same rights, except for the preference of the debentures
over the preferred in bankruptcy?
Finally, and certainly without attempting to be exhaustive regarding
the inherent ambiguity in the common law integration factors, consider the
"at or about the same time" factor. Obviously, the time between the sale of
two blocks of securities can be one day, one month, one year, etc. How far
apart do the two sales have to be in order not to be considered "at or about the
same time,,?34 A related uncertainty regarding the "at or about the same
time" factor is the question of whether it is an all or nothing matter or,
instead, a factor that counts more (or less) as the two offering become closer
(or more remote) in time? Under an all or nothing regime, the existence of
the factor might be established by a discrete line (six months, for example)
and all sales within that six month period would be considered "at or about
the same time" and would count the same toward integration, whether such
sales are one day apart or five months and twenty-nine days apart.

general purpose"'); Deaktor, supra note 5, at 529 ("In some inquiries, the single plan of financing
factors appears to have been equated with the purpose of the offerings factor."); Wade, supra note
7, at 213 ("cases and no-action letters commonly fail to distinguish between the single plan of
financing and the same general purpose factors").
32Interestingly, Professor Deakor in his discussion of the meaning of separate classes
emphasizes, instead of contractual differences between or among securities, the identity of the issuer
and the identity of the offerees. Deaktor, supra note 5, at 531-32.
See, Wade, supra note 7, at 216-18 ("the SEC and courts have failed to articulate a precise
formula to determine whether securities are of the same class." Id. at 216). Although Loss and
Seligman characterize the Commission's approach to this element as "relatively straightforward",
Loss & Seligman, supra note 5, at 1218, their subsequent discussion of the element suggests the
significantly uncertain nature of this element. Id. at 1219-21.
33

34For example, although Loss and Seligman opine that the six months safe harbor provision
of Rule 147 and Regulation D "suggests" that a six month period "will be necessary to demonstrate
that it was not made 'at or about the same time"', the authors state that a separation of "six months
or more will alone not necessarily lead to nonintegration." Loss & Seligman, supra note 5, at 122122.
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Alternatively, the factor could operate without a discrete line and vary in its
weight, depending on how far apart in time the two blocks are sold. Under
this analysis, offerings one year apart, for example, may still have a small
tendency to support integration, while offerings one day apart may have a
much stronger tendency to support integration. 35
(2) Ambiguity is also generated by the uncertainty about the particular mix
of the factors required for integration.36
Is one of the five factors sufficient to require integration? Are two
sufficient?
Do some factors count more than others?37 What is the
relationship between strength and number? Does the strength of a factor
count more than the number of factors, and thus perhaps three strong factors
count more than four weak factors ?38
(3)
Everyone concedes the ambiguity in the common law criteria of
integration and the difficulty of applying the criteria and that the search for
workable "rules of thumb" does not always resolve questions.

(4) Nonetheless, the author quotes from an old piece of his and offers this up
as some help:
A noted commentator "has taken the position that separate issues can
be established either by separate classes of securities [the

35Professor Deaktor opines that [p]roximity in time . . . has seldom been determinative".
Deaktor, supra, note 5, at 534.
36"Neither the Commission nor the courts have provided express guidance on how to weigh
these factors when analyzing an integration problem." Loss & Seligman, supra note 5, at 1222.
37Loss & Seligman suggest that "a review ofcases and no-action letters strongly suggests that
the "single plan of financing' and 'same general purpose' factors normally are given greater weight
than the other factors." Loss & Seligman, supra note 5, at 1222. Professor Deaktor opines that "even
if [offerings are] simultaneous [and thus made "at or about the same time], one or more of the other
integrations factors often will be viewed as more important." Deaktor, supra note 5, at 534. See
also, Wade, supra note 7, at 214 ("Like the single plan of financing factor, the weight of the same
general purpose factor in integration analysis is unclear.")
38At one point in its work the ABA Task Force on Integration lamented: "...nowhere is there
any indication of how to evaluate these five criteria. In a number of no-action letters, a single
criterion established in the release has taken precedence over the remaining four." Task Force on
Integration, supra note 4, at 623.
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commentator "warns, however, that 'the differences must be
substantial"] or separate plans of financing." Additionally, "the
position of the Commission seems to be that a one year delay may be
sufficient to ensure separate issues of stock."
Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Plight ofSmall Issuers Under the Securities
Act of1933: Practical Foreclosurefrom the Capital Market, 1977 Duke L.
J., 1139, 1149-50.

2. The SEC's Safe Harbors
a.
Over the years, the Commission has established a number of safe harbor
regimes respecting integration. 39 Compliance with the Commission's criteria for the
particular safe harbor ensures the absence of integration; failure to meet the specific
terms of any particular safe harbor, however, only means that the safe harbor is
unavailable and that integration, therefore, is determined under the common law
rules.
b.
One purpose for these regulatory safe harbors respecting integration was to
increase certainty. While the safe harbor rules may have decreased, at least to some
degree, the ambiguity ofintegration, the regulatory integration regimes are needlessly
and significantly complex and fail to connect the criteria for the safe harbor with any
legitimate policy.40 The complexity in the regulatory safe harbors is due at least in

39Although Commission's first safe harbor from integration appeared as early as 1935,
Securities Act Release No. 33-305, 1935 WL 2617 (Mar. 2, 1935)(the earliest version of what
became Rule 152), it was not until the 1970s that the Commission seriously pursued integration safe
harbors through its adoption of certain regulatory exemptions from registration. The first of these
was incorporated into old Rule 146,17 C.F.R. § 320.146 (1975), which became effective in 1974
and was the predecessor to today's Rule 506. Nearly contemporaneously with its adoption of Rule
146, the Commission also adopted Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2001), which contained an
integration safe harbor identical to the integration safe harbor of Rule 146.

4~ven

the Commission's more recent attempts to deal with integration through safe harbor
provisions draw fire from commentators. For example, Professor Bradford writing on the current
integration provisions of Regulation A states:
"The changes adopted [to the integration safe harbor rules in Regulation A] are generally
positive and responsive to some of [the] ... criticisms [from commentators,] ...[b]ut the
SEC's failure to explain or justify provisions like Rule 251 (c) produces unnecessary
ambiguity and uncertainty. As a result ..., Rule 251(c) has failed to reach its potential."
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part to the sheer number of safe harbor regimes and the differences among the
various regimes' criteria. 41 These complexities become especially apparent when two
of the regulatory regimes interface with one another.
c. Presently, the Commission has at least seven different integration safe harbor
regimes in its rules. 42
d.
In more recent years, the Commission seems to have made some effort to
simplify and reduce the pernicious effects of its safe harbor regimes, thereby
conceding, at least implicitly, the problematic worth of the integration doctrine.
Thus, for example, the 1992 amendments to Regulation A43 appear to be an attempt
both to simplify and ameliorate the impact of the integration doctrine in Regulation

Bradford, Regulation A, supra note 6, at 289.
41Even those regimes that appear to be similar are not. Compare, for example, the integration
regimes in Regulation D and Rule 147. Under Regulation D, offers and sales outside the six month
window period will not destroy the integration safe harbor, so long as during the six month window
periods the issuer makes no offers or sales of the same class of securities as are offered in the
Regulation D offering. 15 C.F.R. § 230.502(a)(2001). Under Rule 147, however, safe harbor from
sales outside the six month window periods requires not only clean windows but also that the sales
outside the window periods be made "pursuant to [emphasis added] the exemptions provided by
Section 3 or Section 4(2) of the Act or pursuant to [emphasis added] a registration statement ...."
15 C.F.R. § 230. 147(b)(2) (2001).
42These include: Rule 155, 17 C.F.R. § 230.155 (2001) (dealing with integration in certain
cases between public and private offerings); Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230. 147(b)(2) (2001) (safe harbor
from integration in intrastate offerings made under Rule 147); Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a)
(2001) (safe harbor for certain small offerings and private placements made under Regulation D);
Rule 701(b)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 230.701(b)(6) (2001) (safe harbor for certain offerings involving
employee compensation made under Rule 701); ,Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230. 144A(e) (2001) (safe
harbor for resales of restricted securities to certain qualified institutional buyers); Regulation A, 17
C.F.R. § 230.251(c) (2001) (safe harbor for small offerings made pursuant to the requirements of
Regulation A, and extra-territorial offerings (in the Release adopting Regulation S, the Commission
stated: "[o]ffshore transactions made in compliance with Regulation S will not be integrated with
registered domestic offerings or domestic offerings that satisfy the requirements for an exemption
from registration under the Securities Act, even if undertaken contemporaneously." Securities Act
release No. 6863 (1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 84,524, at 80,681 (Apr.
24, 1990).
43Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-6949,7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
172,439 (July 30, 1992).
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A offerings. 44 Briefly a Regulation A offering is now protected by safe harbor from
any prior offering and from certain prescribed subsequent offerings (including all
offerings made "more than six months after the completion of the Regulation A
offering"45), and the safe harbor ofRegulation A, when applicable, provides two-way
integration protection (Le., it protects the Regulation A offering from contamination
by the other offering and also protects the other offering from contamination by the
Regulation A offering).46
Rule 701,47 which essentially provides an exemption from registration for
employee stock purchase plans of non-1934 Act companies, offers an even more
generous safe harbor from integration by providing complete, two-way protection for
and from any Rule 701 offering. 48 In short, integration is not applied to Rule 701
offerings; accordingly, a Rule 701 offering cannot contaminate any other offering and
the other offering cannot contaminate the Rule 701 offering. 49
e. Regulation D's safe harbor is a regulatory regime YQU are likely are to encounter

44Regulation A provides an exemption from registration for offerings of up to $5 million by
non-1934 Act companies. The exemption is predicated upon the filing of an "offering statement"
with the Commission and providing each investor with an "offering circular". 17 C.F.R. §§
230.251-.263 (2001).
45Rule 251(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(2001).
46Id. Professor Bradford provides an excellent discussion of this matter. Bradford,
Regulation A, supra note 6, 270-73. Professor Bradford points out some scholarly disagreement on
the notion that the integration protection under Regulation A is two-way. Id., at note 89, citing 3A
Harold S. Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law 5-12 to 5-14 (1992 rev.)
47 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2001).
480nce again, Professor Bradford provides a discussion of this integration provision.
Bradford, Regulation A, supra note 6, at footnote 82. Professor Bradford points out that Professor
Hicks has characterized the safe harbor as only "one directional", but Bradford argues that Hicks is
wrong on this particular issue. Id.
49The Commission has also taken a special, generous integration approach for extra-territorial
offerings made in compliance with Regulation S. In the Release adopting that Regulation, the
Commission stated: "[o]ffshore transactions made in compliance with Regulation S will not be
integrated with registered domestic offerings or domestic offerings that satisfy the requirements for
an exemption from registration under the Securities Act, even if undertaken contemporaneously."
Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6863 [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 84,524, at 80,681 (Apr. 24, 1990).
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when representing clients in financings.
(1) Regulation D offerings are protected by safe harbor from:
Offers and sales that are made more than six months before the start
of a Regulation D offering or are made more than six months after
completion of a Regulation D offering ... so long as during those six
month periods there are no offers or sales of securities by or for the
issuer that are of the same or a similar class as those offered or sold
under Regulation D, other than those offers or sales of securities
under an employee benefit plan as defined in Rule 405 under the
Act. 50
(2) In most cases, the protection of the Regulation D offering from
contamination depends on "clean window periods" and transactions that
occur outside the "window period".
(3) But, there are lurking complexities, including, for example, the matter of
"one-way" protection. That is, the safe harbor of Regulation D only protects
the Regulation D offer and thus offers no protection for the other nonRegulation D offering that may be matched with the Regulation D offering.

f. Rule 155 is the Commission's newest regulatory safe harbor respecting
integration. The Rule provides safe harbor in certain cases where private offerings
are abandoned and followed by registered offerings and in certain cases where a
registered offering is abandoned and followed by a private offering.
(1) Rule 155(b) provides a safe harbor for an abandoned private offering
followed by a registered public offering.
(A) This is a classical integration problem. The private offering
exemption is destroyed if the private offering is integrated with the
subsequent public offering, and integration causes the offers made
earlier in the private offering to amount to "gun jumping" in respect
of the public offering.
(B) Safe harbor under Rule 155(b) is conditioned on the following: (i)
No sales having been made in the private offering; (ii) terminating all
offering activity in the private offering before the registration
statement is filed; (iii) the prospectus in the registered offering must

50

17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2001).
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disclose the abandoned offering; (iv) unless the private offering was
limited to "Accredited" or sophisticated investors, the issuer must
wait 30 days after the last selling activity before filing its registration
statement.
(C) The private offering must have been undertaken under Section
4(2), Section 4(6) or Rule 506. This means, for example, the safe
harbor will not work if the "private offering" were under Rule 504 or
Rule 505.
(2) Rule 155(c) provides a safe harbor for an abandoned registered offering
followed by a later private offering.
(A) Safe harbor under Rule 155(c) is conditioned on the following:
(i) No sales having been made pursuant to the registered public
offering; (ii) the formal withdrawal of the registration statement; (iii)
the passage of 30 days between the withdrawal of the registration
statement and the start of the private offering; (iv) providing the
private offerees with certain disclosures (including that the private
offering is not registered, that the securities they take will be
restricted, that the private purchasers do not have the protection of
Section 11 of the 1933 Act, and facts about the abandonment of the
original public offering); and (v) disclosure of any changes in the
issuer occurring after the registration statement was filed.
(B) The private offering must have been undertaken under Section
4(2), Section 4(6) or Rule 506. This means, for example, the safe
harbor will not work if the "private offering" were under Rule 504 or
Rule 505.
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I. INTRODUCTION

T

he in.tegration doctrine is one of the most vexing and pointless concepts of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933
Act").l

•Alumni ProfessorofLaw, University ofKentucky College of Law. B.A. 1966,
Centre College; J.D. 1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1972, H31Vard
University. The author is indebted to Rodney Chrisman, Jonathan Helton and
David Longenecker for their research assistance.
1 Some indication of this, as well as an indication of the significance of the
doctrine to issuers and thus to capital formation generally, is seen in the sheer
numbers of integration no-action requests received by the Securities Exchange
Commission (the "SEC"). Professor Wade reports, for example, that from 1971 to
1979, the SEC received nearly 200 no-action requests Oil jilwgrativn. C~eryl L.
Wade, The Integration ojSecurities o.tftrlngs: A. Proposed Formula That Fosters
the Policies ofSecuritia Regulation, 25 LoY. U. CHI. L.I. 199,220 (1994). Indeed,
the SEC was apparently so overwhelmed by the volume of letters that in 1979 it
announced it would no longer respond to no-action letters respecting integration
matters. Clover Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 \\'L 13557, at·7 (Apr. 5,
1979) (ci~g as reasons for discontinuing its prior practice of issuing no-action
letters on'-integration "the complexity" ofthe matter and "the possibility that staff
positions ... may be misconstrued and misapplied"). In 1985, the Commission's
Corporation Finance Division announced it would resume responding to no-action
requests on'integration matters. 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 403 (Mar. 8, 1985)
(stating that the five factors in § S02(a) ofRegulation D would be considered in the
letters).
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Under the integration doctrine, a single "offering" or "issue" of
securities cannot be split. Offering, for example, one-half of the shares
under the private placement exemption from registration provided by
section 4(2)2 of the 1933 Act and the other one-half under the intrastate
exemption provided by section 3(a)(11).3 The rule similarly prohibits
splitting a single offering or issue between a registration statement and any
exemption from registration. In all events, therefore, the whole of any
discrete offering or issue ofsecurities must be offered and sold under only
one exemption or a registration statement.4

2 IS U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). That section provides an exemption from registration for "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."
3 That section provides an exemption from registration for:
Any security which is a part ofan issue offered and sold only to persons
resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security
is a person resident and doing business within Of, if a corporation,
incotpOrated by and doing business within, such State or Territory.

15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1994).
4 For the purposes of this Article, the author generally uses simple and
somewhat sterile examples. While these examples are typical, they are far from
exhaustive. Several additional examples may be helpful in appreciating the
pervasiveness of the integration issues faced by companies engaged in capital
fonnation.
One of the most difficult integration problems that this author faced in his
practice days involved the unseasoned and unsophisticated (but otherwise honest
and efficient) entrepreneur who, before seeking legal advice, made an offer of its
securities in a IllaIillf;C that destroyed all avai:&.ble ex"mptioDS rror.tl registration.
The only way to cure such a problem is to separate the prior illegal offer from the
proposed financing through application of the integration doctrine.
Another example is derived from an actual case arising some years ago when
tax shelter deals were fashionable. Entrepreneurs would form multiple limited
partnerships for the purpose of engaging in certah, activities-drilling for oil and
gas, for example. Each of these partnerships would have different properties and
investors but would have the same promoters and be engaged in the same type of
enterprises. The question arose whether the separate offerings by these separate
entities must be integrated. See, e.g., Donohoe v. Consol.Operating & Prod. Corp.,
982 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1992) (refusing to integrate separate limited partnerships
formed to drill separate oil wells). For a discussion ofthis in the context ofmultiple
partnership offerings, see ABA Subcomm. on P'ships, Trusts and Unincolporated
Ass'ns, Integration o/Partnership Offerings: A Proposal/or IdentifYing a Discrete
Offering, 37 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1982) [hereinafter Integration of Partnership
Offerings]. For additional treatment, see ABA Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sec.,
Integration afSecurities Offerings: Report ofthe Task Force on Integration, 41
Bus. LAW. 595, 621-23, 624-31 (1986) [hereinafter Task Force on Integration].
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Accordingly, ifan issuer attempts to bifurcate a single offering into two

separate components and

~

each component under a separate

exemption or, alternatively, lliD.lt~ an exemption and a registration
statement, courts or the Commission may conclude that the two putatively
separate offerings in fact amount to a single offering and thus may
uintegrate" the two transactions into a single offering. Once this integration
occurs, the breadth of the offering or issue is defined, and all the offers and
sales within this defined offer or issue must eithermeet all the requirements
of a single exemption or be made subject to an effective registration
'
statement. s
Although the integration doctrine, described in these abstract terms, has
a sensible ring to it, commentators over the years have picked at the
doctrine.6 Much oftheir critical comment has focused on the confusion and
uncertainty in the doctrine's terms 7 and the pernicious impact such
ambiguity has on the capital formation activities of issuers.!

5 In more recent years, the integration doctrine attracted the attention of a
number of scholars. See, e.g., 3 LoUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1211-28 (3d ed. 1989); Darryl B. Deaktor, Integration o/Securities
Offtrings, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 465 (1979); Lyman Johnson & Steve Patterson.. The
Reincarnation o/Rule 152: False Hope on the Integration Front, 46 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 539 (1989); Daniel J. Morrissey, Integration ofSecurities Offerings-The
ABA's "Indiscreet" Proposal, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 41 (1984).

6 For criticism from commentators, see, for example, C. Steven Bradford,
Regulation A andthe Integration Doctrine: The New Safe Harbor, S5 OHIO ST. L.].
255, 289 (1994) [hereinafter Bradford, Regulation Al. Bradford characterizes
changes to the safe harbor roles of Regulation A as "generally positive and
responsive to ... criticisms," but laments that "Rule 251(c) has failed to reach its
potenti~I.n Id. S~e also Joh!lson & Patterso!l~ supra note ~ {(\ff~rillg 1'. entical
analysis of Rule 152). Writing in 1986,this authorcriticized the doctrine as applied
to Regulation D offerings. RuthefordB Campbell, Jr., The Plight ofSmall Issuers
(And Others) Under Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems That NeedAttention,
74 Ky. L.I. 127, 162-70 (1985-86). In his most recent article, Professor Bradford
mounted a substantial criticism ofthe integration doctrine, proposing a solution to
the difficulties generated by integration through adoption ofa''weightedexemption
system. ,t C. StevenBradford, Expanding the Non-Transactional Revolution: A New
Approach to Securities Registration Exemptions, 49 EMORY L.J. 437, 473-85
(2000) [hereinafter Bradford, Expanding].
1 Even those who generally support the concept of integration in theory admit
that the doctrine is confusing and inconsistent in application. See, e.g., Wade, supra
note 1, at 208-30.
8 For example, Johnson and Patterson provide a description of the "irksome
manner in which the integration doctrine constrains capital financing decisions."
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On at least two occasions, committees ofthe American Bar Association
(the "ABA'') tried their hands at bringing some sense and order to portions
ofthe integration doctrine.' The most significant of these ABA initiatives
occurred in the mid-1980s, when a prestigious committee,IO driven
primarily by concerns ofthe practicing bar over the unmanageable levels
ofambiguity in the doctrine, proposed regulatory amendments to establish
a series of broadly available safe harbors from integration. I I Interestingly
and tellingly, however, the Chair of the Task Force admitted some years
later that "the hopes of the task force ~ve largely not been realized, ...
with the result that integration issues remain a serious problem."12

Johnson & Patterson, supra note 5, at 539. The authors appropriately focus on the
special problems of start-up businesses. Id. at 540.
Interestingly, one author seems prepared to argue that ambiguity in the
integration doctrine actually contributes to capital fonnation, albeit the type of
capital fonnation she dislikes. Professor Wade states: "The ability of issuers to
manipulate the factors of the SEC's current integration fonnula allows them to
avoid the application ofthe integration doctrine and thereby successfully evade the
Act's registration requirements." Wade, supra note I,at 240.
9 Integration ofPartnership Offerings, supra note 4 (discussing and suggesting
proposals respecting the application of the integration doctrine to successive
offerings by affiliated partnerships). This article and its proposals drew sharp
criticism from Dean Morrissey. Morrissey, supra note 5, at 76 (characterizing the
proposal as "anelegantattempt to circumventthe registration process by artificially
expanding its carefully restricted exemptions"). The second ABA paper was Task
Force on Integration, supra note 4 (dealing more broadly with the integration
doctrine and making recommendations of broad application respecting the
doctrine).
10 For a list of the Clem~ers en the Task Fvrcc, S~ DatI L. Goldwasser,

Comments to ABA Comm. on Fed. Reg. o/Sec., Integration ofSecurities Offerings: .
Report ofthe Task Force on Integration, in 1 SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAW: GWBAL CAPITAL MARKETs AND THE DISTRIBtrrlON OF
SECURITIES 230 n.* (1991).
11 The Task Force divided its safe harbor suggestions into six categories: "issuer
distinctions, temporal separations, differences in securities offered, purpose
differences, policy considerations, and domestic and foreign. offering distinctions."
Task Force on Integration, supra note 4, at 624. For a discussion of these
proposals, see id. at 624-41. For a reproduction ofthe specific regulatory proposals,
see id. at 642-43.
12 Goldwasser, supra note 10, at 230-31.
The report of the Task Force reflects the extreme theoretical difficulties
encountered when one attempts to lend clarity and consistency to the integration
doctrine. The problem, from the author's perspective, is that the doctrine itself is
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Even the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is the doctrine's
principal architect, appears to recognize that the integration doctrine bas its
problems. As a result, the Commission has developed certain discrete,
regulatory safe harbors from integration 13 and recently has been especially
generous in its roles protecting issuers, at least in limited situations, from
the perniciousness of the doctrine. 14
Scholars and the Commission, however, misperceive the true
nature of the integration problem, an~ as a result, their prescriptions
are overly modest. The fundamental problem with integration
is not its terms; rither, the problem lies in the essential vacuousness
of the doctrine itself. At its core, the doctrine makes no sense.
Indeed, the doctrine is so utterly unsupported by any valid policyls that

fundamentally nonsensical. Drafting roles without a principled theoretical footing
is, of course, a problematic exercise. Thus, one can sympathize with the Task
Force's frustration as it attempted to establish order in such a context
In fact, the approach of the Task Force, in light ofsuch circumstances, makes
some sense. The Task Force opted to propose a series of safe harbor provisions
designed to clarify, simplify, and reduce the application ofthe doctrine. See supra
note 11. The perniciousness of a nonsensical doctrine is ameliorated if the roles
respecting its application are simple and clear. At least clarification and
simplification reduce the transaction costs in those deals in which the doctrine is
implicated, since, for example, the legal costs in detennining the l'..p ptication ofthe
doctrine are reduced by the enhanced clarity ofthe role. Similarly, to the extent the
scop~ of integration is reduced by such safe harbors, the perniciousness of the
doctrine is once again mitigated.
13 For a list ofthe Commission's integration safe harbor rules, see infra note 77.
14 See, e.g., Rule 25 1(c) ofRegulation~ 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 1(c) (2000). The
P_l!!~ w&s 3I:lenced in 19~2 in ccnn~icL ;:vit.'l the Co mnl issic,n t S zililall busiiless
initiatives. Securities Act Release No. 6949, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) , 72,439
(July 30, 1992). The new Rule minimized the impact ofintegration on Regulation
A offerings. For an outstanding discussion of this provision, see Bradford,
Regulation A, supra note 6.
Unfortunately, the Commission's effort to eliminate uncertainty in the
application ofthe integration doctrine has been unsuccessful in most instances. See
discussion infra accompanying notes 56-65.
IS Other commentators, however, are able to find purpose and sound policy at
the core of the integration doctrine. See, e.g. , Wade, supra note 1, at 209. (stating
that the doctrine was designed "to prevent issuers from circumventing the Act's
registration requirements"), and ide at 240 (concluding that without the doctrine,
issuers may "successfully evade the Act's registration requirements"); Johnson &
Patterson, supra note 5, at 542-43 (remarking that "the doctrine of integration still
is needed"), and ide at 543 (finding 44a ll-important ... policy underpinnings" for the
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one can only marvel that it has existed essentially unchallenged since
1933. 16
The thesis of this Article is that the Commission should entirely
eliminate the integration doctrine from the 1933 Act. The doctrine is
expensive for society 17 and furthers no valid policy ofthe 1.933 Act. More

integration doctrine); Morrissey, supra note 5, at 76-77 (characterizing the
integration 40ctrine as a way to prevent issuers from "artificially expanding . . .
carefully restricted exemptions" and opining further that "[ilf a combination of
offerings would place the total issuance outside the well considered exemptions to
registration, an SEC filing is in order"); Task Force on Integration, supra note 4,
at 641 (stating that "[t]he integration doctrine was born out of the necessity to
protect the registration process from circumvention").
16 As indicated above, commentatOrs have occasionally argued for a limited
elimination ofthe integration doctrine. For example, Professor Deaktor, writing in
1979, expressed a preference for the SEC to "exercise its rulemaking authority to
eliminate the applicability of integration to all offerings made pursuant to a
transactional exemption other than section 3(a)(9)." Deaktor, supra note 5, at 550.
Professor Deaktor apparently would condition this limited elimination of
integration on the Commission 's enactment of a series of new rules pursuant to the
transactional exemptions ''whichwillcontain every precaution necessary to protect
investors who are offered or purchase securities in the offerings made pursuant to
these rules." ld. at 544.
17 The integration doctrine increases the costs of capital formation in various
ways, some of which are apparent and some of which are not Obvious costs are
encountered, for example, when the integration doctrine necessitates the
registration of an offering when a valid exemption from registration otherwise
would be available. At least one author, however, may even dispute the
significance of this cost. See Morrissey, supra note 5, at 77 (stating that
"registration is not . . . a serious impediment to c8!>ital fonnatiop"). Oean
Morrissey, however, may be in a minority in bis view on this issue. See# e.g., 1
THOMAS LEE HAzEN, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.6, at
49 (2d eel. 1990) (estimating that in 1990 the costs of a public offering, including
underwriting fees, may have been "more than several hundred thousand dollars'·);
Carl W. Schneider et aI., Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences,
27 VILL. L. REv. 1, 31 (1981) (estimating in 1981 that costs for an initial public
offering, not including underwriting fees, ran $175,000 to $350,000).
A less obvious economic cost of the integration doctrine, however, is the
economic costs of the risk it generates. To use a simple example, an issuer may
propose to sell a block of securities under a section 4(2) exemption today and
another block under the section 3(a)(11) exemption four months from now. The
lawyer may tell the issuer: "It is more likely than not that the two offerings will not
be integrated, but there is a 20% chance, nonetheless, of integration. If integration
occurs, your liability will be approximately $1 million." This risk is a cost to the
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specifically, the doctrine does not promote investor protection but does
retard capital formation, an outcome that is contrary to the presently
articulated purposes of the 1933 Act. 11
Part IT of this Article traces the history ofthe adoption ofthe integration doctrine both by the Commission and the courts, demonstrating the
less than compelling case for the original adoption of the rule. 19 Part ill
then outlines the shape ofthe role today, in an attempt to demonstrate its
uncertainty, complexity, and lack ofconnection to any valid principle.2O In

Part N, the Article proposes the author's simple prescription for the
problems of integration, and that prescription is the complete elimination
of the doctrine. 21

II. A HISTORY OF THE INTEGRATION DocTRINE

A. The Original 1933 Act
As originally signed into law, the 1933 Act contained no clear
statement ofan integration doctrine.22 Thus, while at various points in the
original 1933 Act one finds words that can be interpreted as relevant to the
matter ofintegration, the statutory language is inconclusive. Indeed, to the
extent the original language is suggestive of integration, it actually
indicates different iutegration regimes for differel:lt types of offerings.23

At least four ofthe major exemptions from registration in the original
version ofthe 1933 Act contained language that can be considered relevant
to the matter ofintegration, and no language from any ofthe four sections

issuer. It is not unlike the risk that a building will bum, a risk that certainly
amounts to an economic cost, since most owners are willing to pay insurance

premiums to eliminate the risk.
18 See infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text
19 See infra notes 22-47 and accompanying text
20
21

See infra notes 48-95 and accompanying text
See infra notes 96-108 and accompanying text

22 Although, not surprisingly, the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act") has
been amended on numerous occasions since it was originally enacted, the structure
ofthe original 1933 Act and, indeed, even its content, are fundamentally similar to
today's version. Compare Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74, with 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994). For a discussion of the four major exemptions in the
original 1933 Act, see infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. For a history of
the enactment ofthe 1933 Act, see 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 168-223.
23 A valid policy reason supporting multiple integration schemes is difficult to
imagine. See infra note 32 and accompanying text
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is consistent with the language from any other section. Consider first the
original private placement exemption, which was found in section 4(1} of
the original version of the 1933 Act and stated that "[t]he provisions of
section 5 shall not apply to ... [t]ransactions by an issuer not with or
through an underwriter and not involving any public offering."24 On its
face, this exemption arguably excludes any application of an integration
concept. If a ''transaction'' meets the requirements ofthe exemption, prior
or subsequent additional transactions appear, under the terms ofthe statute,
to be irrelevant.
Next, consider the exemption provided by the fJISt clause of the
original section 4(3), which was essentially the same exemption for single
company reorganizations provided by today's section 3(a)(9).25 The
original section 4(3) stated that "[t]he provisions of section 5 shall not
apply to ... [t]he issuance of a security of a person exchanged by it with
its existing security holders exclusively."26 Once again, an integration
concept does not appear on the face of this exemption. Instead, the
language seems to exempt from registration the issuance of any security
that is sold in exchange for an outstanding security, without regard to
whether the issuer, for example, may recently have sold securities under
another exemption. Nothing in the language of the section suggests that
such prior sales would ever exclude the availability of the exemption,
unless one is able to bend the word "exclusively" into some indication of
an integration concept, and that appears to be something of an interpretative stretch. 27

24

Securities Act of 1933, cb. 38, § 4(1),48 Stat 74, 77 (current version at 15

u.s.c. 9 770(2) (1994»). The modem private placement exemption is found in
section 4(2) of the 1933 Act and now exempts from registration '~sactions by
an issuer not involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
2S Compare Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 4(3), 48 Stat 74, 77, with IS
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1994).
26 Securities Act of 1933, § 4(3).
27 Notwithstanding the author's view about the clear language ofthe exemption,
the Commission later took the position that the word "exclusively" required the
application of the integration concept Securities Act Release No. 33-2029, 1939
WL 1053 (Aug. 8, 1939). See also 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1232.
These distinguished authors disagree with the author regarding the proper
interpretation of the statute, and give the Commission's interpretation mild
approval by characterizing the Commission's interpretation as one "which seems
as logical as any." Id. Professor Loss and Dean Seligman characterize the
Commission's interpretation ofthe word "exclusively" as doing '~double duty." Id.
In fact, the word does triple duty: It means that shareholders making the exchange
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The third significant original exemption was section 3(b), which
authorized the appropriate administrative agency to enact additional
exemptions, ifsuch regulatory exemptions were consistent with the "public
interest" and "investor protection." Exemptive regulations under section
3(b) were subject to the following limitation, however: ''no issue of
securities shall be exempted [if] ... the aggregate amount at which such
issue is offered to the public exceeds SIOO,OOO."28 This language seems
significantly more suggestive of an integration doctrine than does the
language ofthe two exemptions discussed above, since, at least arguably,
the perimeter of the section 3(b) "issue" must be established in order to
calculate whether the amount limitation has been exceeded.
Finally, consider the original intrastate exemption, which at the time
ofthe adoption ofthe 1933 Act was in section 5(c) and provided that the
registration obligation "shall not apply to the sale ofany security where the
issue of which it is a part is sold only" pursuant to the terms of the
intrastate exemption. 29 This language may seem even more indicative of

cannot throw in any additional contribution, that the sale of any security to a nonshareholder is not eligible for the exemption, and that the common law integration
doctrine is applied to the exemption.
For an outstanding discussion of section 3(a)(9), see J. William Hicks,
Recapitalizations Under Section 3(a)(9) ofthe Securities A.ct of1933, 61 VA. L.
REv. 1057 (197S).
28 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 3(b), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994». The original section 3(b) provided:
The Commission may ..• add any class of securities to the securities
exempted . . . , if it fmds that the enforcement of this title with respect to
s'Jch s~urities is not necessary in the !>ublic interest and for the protection
ofinvestors by reason ofthe small amount involved or the limited character
of the public offering; but no issue of securities shall be exempted under
this subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered
to the public exceeds $100,000.
Id. at 76-77.
19 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 5(c),48 Stat 74, 77-78. Section 5(c) ofthe
original 1933 Act was effective from May 27, 1933 to July 1, 1934. Securities Act
of 1933, § S(c), repealed by Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 204, 48
Stat. 905, 906. Section 202 ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 substituted the
modem section 3(a)(11) for the repealed section 5(c). Securities Act of 1933, ch.
404, sec. 202(c), § 3(a)(11), 48 Stat. 905, 906 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
77(c)(a)(11) (1994». The revised intrastate exemption contained only minor
changes from the original version, except as concerns the jurisdictional basis for
the exemption. See In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147, 158
(1935).
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integration than the language in the original section 3(b). Arguably, the
language of this original intrastate exemption suggests that valid sales
under the exemption would be lost if subsequent sales, which were part of
.;' the same issue, were sold under another exemption or a registration
statement.30
One must, however, be careful not to overstate the validity of any of
the foregoing interpretations.31 In~ while this discussion suggests that

30

Even this original intrastate exemption, however, is amenable to other

interpretations that would avoid the problems of integration. For example, a court
could define ''the issue ofwhich [the intrastate sale] is a part" to include only offers
and sales that meet the requirements of the intrastate exemption. To illustrate this
interpretation, assume that on January 1 an issuer offered and sold 100 shares of
stock pursuant to the private placement exemption, on January 5 offered and sold
100 shares of stock pursuant to the intrastate exemption, and, fmally, on January

10, offered and sold 100 shares illegally. Under the interpretation proffered here,
the criteria for including the January 1 and January 10 offerings in the January 5
"issue" would not include, for example, whether the January 1 and January 10
offerings were made virtually contemporaneous with and involved the same class
ofsecurities as the January 5 offering. Rather, the criteria for including the January
1 and January 10 offerings as a part of the "issue" of January 5 would require
assessing whether the January 1 and January 10 offerings were made to persons
residing in the same state as that in which the issuer was incorporated and doing

business.
By defining "issue')' in such a way, the court could avoid the pernicious effect
of permitting offers and sales taking place around the intrastate offering from
eliminating the availability of the exemption when the policy bases for its
application are otherwise legitimate. Notice that underthis interpretation pu!"Chase~
of securities in the January 1 offering and the January S offering would not have
a cause of action, while those purchasing in the illegal January 10 offering would
have a cause ofaction. This is the sensible and correct outcome. This interpretation
( would also bring the interpretation of the integration matter with respect to the
intrastate exemption into line with the plain meaning of the private placement
exemption, which has no hint of any integration concept See supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
Another, less pernicious interpretatioll ofthe integration matter in the intrastate
exemption is offered later in this Article. See infra note 40 and accompanying text
31 While the point of this section is to recount the birth of the integration
doctrine, it is also relevant to consider the modem language respecting integration
and the question whether the post-1933 amendments have altered the obligation to
read an integration concept into the 1933 Act.
The original private placement exemption provided an exemption for
"transactions by an issuer not with or through an underwriter and not involving any
public offering." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 4(1), 48 Stat. 74, 77 (current
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the language ofthe particular exemptions provides essentially no support
for integration in the case ofthe original private placement exemption, only
a small amount ofsupport for integration in the case ofthe original single
company recapitalization exemption, but more support for integration in
the cases of the section 3(b) exemption and the old intrastate exemptions,
in fact, none ofthese conclusions is founded on anything approaching clear
language.32
The other interesting and somewhat confounding observation to be
made here is the fact that those original exemptions contain such different
language respecting a possible integration concept. The problem, ofcourse,
is that a valid policy reason supporting multiple integration schemes is
difficult to imagine. Thus, one is hard pressed to articulate, for example, a
plausible basis for different roles defming the scope of an "issue" or an
"offering" made under the intrastate exemption, on the one hand, and one
made under the private placement exemption, on the other.

version at IS U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994». Today's private placement language is
identical, except that the requirement that the transaction not be "with or through
an underwriter" has been eliminated. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). This change appears
irrelevant to the matter of integration.
The original exemption for single company reorganizations and today's
exemption contain only minor differences, and those changes concern only the
prohibition against paying for solicitation services in connection with an exchange.
Compare Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 4(3),48 Stat 74, 77, with IS U.S.C. §
77c(a)(9) (1994). These Challges do not deal with integration.
The original section 3(b) exemption is substantially unchanged in the modem
version ofthe 1933 Act; the only difference is that the amount limitation has been
mserl fro~ $IOOs000 to $S,OOO~OOO. Compare Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, §
3(b), 48 Stat 74, 76-77, with IS U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1994).
As originally adopted, the intrastate exemption excluded from the registration
obligation "any security where the issue ofwhich it is a part is sold only to" local
residents. Securities Act of 1933, ell. 38, § S(c),48 Stat 74, 77-78 (current version
at IS U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1994». Today's intrastate exemption excludes from
registration "[a]ny security which is part ofan issue offered and sold only to" local
residents. IS U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11). This change appears to be immaterial as concems
integration.
32 See, e.g., discussion supra note 30.Iohnson and Patterson, in their thoughtful
work on Rule 152, state that the integration doctrine is "not expressly a part of
federal securities statutes." Iohnson & Patterson, supra note 5, at 542. Instead, they
describe integration as "a doctrinal constJUct born of regulatory necessity." Id.
Unlike the author, however, these authors find several "all important ... policy
underpinnings of the integration doctrine" and argue that the doctrine "still is
needed." ld. at 543.
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Perhaps one can argue that Congress had more faith in one or the other
ofthose exemptions, and thus, through varying the terms of the integration
concept, determined to expand the scope of the doctrine for sound
e~emptions while contracting it for those less sound Such an indirect way
of limiting exemptions, however, makes little sense. It: for example,
Congress were afraid that offerings under the intrastate exemption would
simply get too big to justify an exemption, it could have imposed an upper
limit on the exemption, perhaps $1,000,000. To argue that Congress
somehow purposefully chose to deal with such a matter by ini.posing
differing integration concepts on the various exemptions seems farfetched 33

B. The UCreation" o/the Doctrine
Over time, the task of interpreting the provisions of the 1933 Act fell
to administrative agencies and to courts. Not surprisingly, it was an
administrative agency, specifically the Federal Trade Commission (the
"FfC"),34 that first constructed and promulgated the integration concept,
and, significantly, this occurred within the flISt year ofthe effectiveness of
the 1933 Act.3S
As luck would have it, the fU"St administrative opinion on the matter of
integration involved an interpretation ofthe original intrastate exemption,36

33 On the other hand, a more plausible explanation for the "differing" approaches to integration in the four original exemptions may be that no one ever envisaged
an integration doctrine at all or certainly ever imagined it would take on such a life
as ii(lcesenliy enjoys. For this author, therefore, the apparently differing treatments
of integration in the original 1933 Act actually weaken any argument that
integration is required by the language of the 1933 Act.
34 Initially, the 1933 Act assigned primary administrative responsibility for the
1933 Act to the Federal Trade Commission. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 2(5),
48 Stat 74, 75 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(5) (1994»; Securities Act of
1933, ch. 38, § 19,48 Stat 74, 85-86 (current version at IS U.S.C. § 77s (1994»);
Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 20,48 Stat 74, 86 (current version at IS U.S.C.
§ 77t (1994 & Supp. IV 1998»); Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 21,48 Stat 74,
86 (current version at IS U.S.C. § 77u (1994».
35 See infra note 36 and accompanying discussion.
36 Securities Act Release No. 33-97, 1933 WL 2080 (Dec. 28, 1933). Apparently in the months following the adoption of the 1933 Act, the Federal Trade
Commission (the "FTCU), which was initially assigned administrative responsibility
over the 1933 Act, began to respond in letters to inquiries about the new 1933 Act.
In 1933, therefore, the FTC issued the foregoing Release, which consisted of
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which, as described above, contained some of the most .compelling
language supportingan integrationconcept. Also, as luck would have it, the
facts involved in that first opinion appear about as strong as one can

imagine for the application ofan integration concept. Since this opinion is
the genesis ofthe integration doctrine, it merits discussion.
Shortly after the 1933 Act was passed, a company apparently filed a
registration statement for an offering of securities to be sold to the public
in various states. The question posed by the issuer was whether during the
waiting period it could begin to sell these securities under an intrastate,
exemption and then after the effective date of the registration statement
complete the offering across state lines pursuant to the registration
statement.37

These facts, therefore, wereparticularlycompelling for the administrative adoption of an integration concept. The "issue" of securities clearly
had been defined by the registration statement filed by the company, which
proposed to register for sale a defmed number ofshares ofthe company's
stock. The issuer, by its own admission, proposed to sell a portion ofthose
particular securities pursuant to the intrastate exemption andthen to sell the
balance ofthe securities pursuant to a registration statement.38
Considering these unusually strong facts, the agency's lack of
experience, and the relatively compelling integration language of the
original intrastate exemption, the FrC's adoption ofan integration concept
in its opinion is perhaps not surprising.39 Unfortunately, it was a wrong
decision andone that since 1933 has generated confusion and inappropriate
outcomes. To make matters even more unfortunate, the decision was one
that was not required by the words of the Act.40

excerpts from a number of these letters, including one letter dealing with
integration. Id. at ·1.
37Id. at .5.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 An administrative opinion by the SEC two years later provides support for
interpreting the language of the intrastate exemption as intended to deal with
resales, a vertical matter, instead of integration, a horizontal matter.
In In re Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935), the issuer, a
New York Cotporation, attempted to utilize the intrastate e~emption by selling
bonds to four New York banking houses. The banking houses, however, resold the
bonds to non-New York residents. The Commission relied on the language in
section 3(a)(11), which limited the availability of the exemption to a "security
which is a part of an issue sold only to persons resident within a single State," and
found that this language prohibited quick resales ofsuch securities to persons who
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Nonetheless, five years later, after the SEC had taken over for the FrC
as the regulatory agency with primary responsibility for the administration
of the 1933 Ac~41 the SEC with seeming facility promulgated its famous
In re Unity GoldCorp. opinion in which it reaffirmed the Fre's integration
~doctrine, applied it to an offering under section 3(b), and commenced an
articulation of the criteria it proposed to use to determine whether
putatively separate offerings would be integrated.42 Integration at ~at point
resided outside the state of New York. ld. at 161-62. In broad terms, the
Commission found that to be "an issue sold only to persons resident within" New
'Yo~ all shares of the offering had to come to rest in the hands of New Yorkers.
The FTC could have taken the same position in its Release and further concluded
that the language ofthe intrastate exemption was intended only to limit resales.
Interestingly, theIn reBrooldynManhattan Transit Corp. opinion is sometimes
cited-mistakenly, in the author's view-as an integration case. See Morrissey,
supra Dote S, at SS n.133 (stating that it was "the SEC's first application of the
integration doc1rine to intrastate offerings").
Ina release promulgated in 1937, two years after its opinion in In re Brooklyn
Manhattan Transit Corp., the Commission once again interpreted the same
language in section 3(a)(11) (language predicating the availability ofthe exemption
on the fact that the securities are "part of an issue sold only to persons resident
within" a particularstate) as limiting interstate resales until the shares had "reached
the hands of [local] purchasers buying for investment and not with a view to further
distribution or for purposes ofresale," or, as the Commission said elsewhere, until
the shares 4~actually come to rest in the hands of resident investors." Securities Act
Release No. 33-1459, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)' 2260, at 2261-62 (May 29,

1937).
41

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 201, 48 Stat. 881, 908-09.

In re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938). In March of 1937, TJ"ity G('!d
sold 75,000 shares of its stock to Mr. Cronan under section 3(b) and the
42

Commission's regulations that formed the predecessor to the modem Regulation
A. When, in May of 1937, Unity Gold rued a registration statement for
approximately 600,000 additional shares of its stock, the question arose as to
whether that subsequent registered offering would ~ integrated back into the prior
sales under section 3(b), thereby destroying the section 3(b) exemption due to the
failure to abide by the 5100,000 amount limitation of that section. Id. at 624·25.
The Commission easily found that the section '3(b) offering was part of the
same issue as the registered offering and thus integrated the two, which destroyed
the availability of the section 3(b) portion of the offering. The Commission
concluded that the detennination whether the two components should be
considered a "single 'issue'" depended upon "various factors concerning the
methods of sale and distribution employed to effect the offerings." The following
were cited by the Commission as factors indicating the appropriateness of
integration: "securities ofthe same class, offered on the same general terms to the
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became firmly established as a Commission doctrine, and the Commission
has never wavered in its position that integration is an integral part of the
1933 Act.43
Interestingly, courts did not get involved in any significant integration
matters until nearly 1960,"" and even then their contribution to the
development ofthe doctrine was simplyto accept the doctrine as developed
previously by the Commission.4S Thus, while these earlyjudicial decisions
on integration reflect the inherent difficulty that unspecialized tribunals of
general jurisdiction have in dealing With matters as technical and complex
as integration,46 courts without hesitation accepted the integration doctrine

public in an uninterrupted program ofdistribution," and a "single, integrated plan
for the distribution.9t The Commission cited "material differences in the use ofthe
proceeds, [and] in the manner and terms of [the] distribution" as factors weighing
against integration. Id. at 625.
43 The SEC ~ however, developed different criteria for integration, depending
on the particular exemption or registration involved. See infra notes 70-77 and
accompanying text. Also, the Commission has ameliorated the impact of the
doctrine in certain limited cases. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text
44 For a discussion of the early integration cases, see infra note 45.
4S For example, in SEC v. Hillsborough lnv. Corp. ("Hillsborough Itt), 173 F.
Supp. 86, 88 (D.N.H. 1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960), which the author
considers the second-ever integration court case, the court relied on Securides Act
Release No. 33-1459, 1937 WL 1425 (May 29, 1937), in dealing with what the
court deemed an integration issue. A court in the next series of significant
integration cases then relied on Hillsborough las a basis for its integration
decision. SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830,
87. (S.D. Cal), modified, a.lJ'd, and remanded, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960).
Professor Loss and Dean Seligman observe that '~tbe Commission's standard
(for common law integration] in recent years has often been followed by courts."
3 Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note S, at 1213. Professor Deaktor, however, seems to
disagree, stating that "a relatively large proportion ofthe integration cases make no
mention ofthe work ofthe SEC in the area, nor of cases or authorities which have
drawn on that work." Deaktor, supra note 5, at S09.
~ For example, the court's treatment ofthe integration issue in Shaw v. United
States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942), is essentially unintelligible. The cases
following Shaw, while broadly intelligible, are nonetheless confusing and based on
uncertain principles and fail to articulate with clarity the criteria of integration.
Thus, in Hillsborough I, 173 F. Supp. at 86, the second reported case dealing
with integration, the court held that Hillsborough could not rely on the intrastate
exemption because of recent interstate sales of its securities. Virtually the only
explanation offered for integration in this case was a statement of the court
indicating that it would integrate" 'all the shares of common character originally
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essentially as it had been developed by the Commission and continue to
apply the doctrine today.47

though successively issued by the corporation.' '" Id at 88 (quoting Shaw, 131 F.2d
at 478, 480). Obviously, such a statement is overbroad and essentially useless as
a single criterion for integration.
The third reported integration case once again involved Hillsborough. SEC v.
Hillsborough Inv. Corp. ("'Hillsborough II'"), 176 F. SUPPa 789 (D.N.H. 1959),
a./J'd, 276 F.2d 665 (1 st eir. 1960). Shortly after the injunction was entered against
Hillsborough in Hillsborough It Hillsborough offered New Hampshire residents
holding the previously issued shares the opportunity to exchange their shares for
new shares that had somewhat different contractual terms. Hillsborough planned
to sell additional, similar shares to other New Hampshire residents for cash,
claiming that the entire new offering (i.e., both the part sold in the exchange and
the part sold for cash) was exempt from registration under the intrastate exemption.
Id. at 790.
Apparently based on its determination that the new securities "differ from the
old securities [that were sold illegally] . . . only in a small degree, the court
detennined that the sale of the new securities under such a condition would be in
violation ofthe 1933 Act. Id. While the outcome seems based on the notion that the
old offering must be integrated with the new offering, the analysis is far from crisp
and relies more on generalized notions ofbad faith. In short, the opiuion provides
no meaningful analysis ofthe application ofthe integration doctrine or the criteria'
used to detennine that the two offerings should be combined.
The fourth of the earliest integration cases is Los Angeles Trust Deed &
Mortgage Exch., 186 F. SUppa at 830; here, too, the analysis ofthe court is less than
precise. That case involved the application of the integration concept to offerings
purportedly made under the intrastate exemption. The court apparently integreted
the offerings because "[t]he terms and conditions under which [the offerings were
made were] . . . identical." Id. at 871.
The pwpose of this review is to point out that courts had difficulty in early
integration cases. Such difficulty is understandable, given that the courts were
dealing with complicated and technical matters for the fIrSt time.
47 In addition to the cases cited in supra note 46, the next earliest cases (listed
in chronological order) include: Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)191,S23 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding that
integration did not apply under the factors enumerated in Securities Act Release
No. 33-4552, 1962 WL3573 (Nov. 6, 1962»; SECv.Dunfee, [1964-1966 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)' 91,970 (W.O. Mo. 1966) (refusing to integrate
an offering of six percent notes payable in twenty months with an offer of seven
percent notes payable in thirty months); Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419
F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969); Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. SUPPa 609 (D.
Del. 1971) (accepting the defmition of integration contained in Securities Act
Release No. 33-4552,1962 WL3573 (Nov. 6, 1962»; SECv. Continental Tobacco
tt
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c. Observations and Conclusion
The author offers two obselVations from his examination ofthe history
ofthe integration doctrine. The first is that the original statutory language
of the 1933 Act provided a less than compelling mandate for agencies or
courts ever to adopt the integration doctrine in the fJ.rSt place. In some
instances, the wording ofthe exemptions contained absolutely no language
suggesting an integration doctrine; in other cases, the language was
suggestive of integration but amenable toaltemative interpretations. The
second observation is that the entire integration doctrine goes back to an
administrative opinion rendered by the FTC only a few months after the
1933 Act was passed. Thus, the doctrine was created approximately
seventy years ago in the middle ofthe Great Depression by a completely
inexperiencedagency interpreting anew, highlytechnical statutoryregime.
The conclusion of the author, therefore, is that statutory language,
history, and precedent provide no compelling support for the continuation
of the integration doctrine.

ill. THE STATE OF THE INTEGRATION DocTRINE TODAY
Over the years, able commentators have written on the integration
doctrine and its application both broadly and in the context of specific
situations. Professor Deaktor's article,48 although now over twenty years
old, continues to be the most exhaustive law review article on the doctrine.
Later works by Dean Morrissey,49 Professor Johnson and Steve Patterson,so

Co., 326 f. Supp. 588 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (d-:>Jding tl1at :W-o isst:es of securities off~red
by the defendant were not part of a single plan of financing and therefore should
not be integrated), rev'd on other grounds. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Livens
v. William D. Witter, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1104 (0. Mass. 1974) (accepting the
defInition of integration in Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 1962 WL 3573
(Nov. 6, 1962» and refusing to integrate six offerings made over an eight month

period because they were not part ofa single plan offmancing); Bayoud v. Ballard,
401 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Tex. 1975); Barrettv. Triangle Mining Corp., [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) , 95,438 (S.D.N.Y 1976); SEC v.
Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1243 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (citing Hillsborough
I, 173 F. Supp. at 86, as support for the integration of two issues of securities that
fonned part ofa single plan offmancing), affd, 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1977).
48 Deaktor, supra note 5.
49 Morrissey, supra note 5.
~o Johnson & Patterson, supra note 5.
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Professor Bradford,sl and Professor Waden all make significant contributions to the literature on integration. as do, ofcourse, treatises, such as the
definitive work by Professor Loss and Dean Seligman'3 and the fine treatise
by Professor Hicks. 54
The point of this section of the Article, therefore, is not to restate the
work ofprior commentators by describing in detail the integration doctrine
and its application to various situations. Instead, the description of the
doctrine offered here is only for the purpose of supporting the author's
critical points by highlighting the doctrine's ambiguity, the absence of any
relationship between the criteria ofintegration and the purposes ofthe 1933
Act, and, finally, the doctrine's overwhelming and unnecessarycomplexity.
The discussion of today's integration doctrine can profitably be
bifurcated into the common law rules ofintegration and the Commission's
discrete safe harbor rules of integration.
A. The Common Law ofIntegration
The common law ofintegration traces its roots to the earlyadministrative and court decisions described in the immediately preceding sectionSS
and is applicable to offerings of securities in the absence of any specific
Commission role dealing with a particular integration matter.
The common law doctrine is best understood as the five factor
integration test that is consistently articulated by the Commission. Thus in
determining, for example, whether securities sold in January ofa particular'
year under the intrastate offering will be integrated with securities sold in
April of the same year under the private placement exemption, courts (or
the Commission) will consider whether the two blocks of sectJrities are (i)
''part of a single plan of financing," (ii) "of the same class of securities,"
(iii) offer~ "at or about the S3JD.e timet" (iv) offered to generate the "same
type ofconsideration" for the issuer, and (v) offered "for the same general
purpose."S6 In a common law analysis, therefore, the presence of each of

Bradford, Regulation A, supra note 6.
Wade, supra note I.
S3 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1211-28.
54 7 J. WILLIAM HICKS, EXEMPTED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933 §§ 1.04[4][b][iii], 2.06[2], 4.03, 7.03[2], 11.04[2] (2000).
55 See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text
56 See the discussion in 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1212-13. The
Commission, for example, both in Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 preliminary note
3 (2000), and in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) note (2000), cited these
SI

52
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the foregoing is a factor that increases the probability that the January and
April blocks ofsecurities would be integrated and thus considered a single
offering.57
The very nature ofthese criteria makes them difficult to apply. 58 In the
first place, the meaning ofthe individual factors themselves are generally
ambiguous and confusing. The "single plan of financing" factor, for
example, not only is itself inherently ambiguous59 but also appears to be
similar to the "same general pwpose" factor. 60

factors as the applicable criteria for integration determinations made outside the
safe harbor provisions of those particular rules.
57 Professor Deaktor's 1979 article, Deaktor, supra note 5, at 529-38, and
Professor Wade's later 1994 article, Wade, supra note I, at 211-20, provide
separate, in-depth discussions of each of the five common law factors of
integration. TaskForce on Integration, supra note 4, at 600-23, is also particularly
rich in its research on the five common law factors of integration, although its
discussion is organized around particularexemptions rather than around the factors
themselves.
58 Loss and Seligman state, for example, that this "multifactor test may fairly
be criticized as ... 'indetenninate:" 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1213.
Professor Wade, although clearly supportive of the integration doctrine, concedes
that the doctrine is confusing in its application. Wade, supra note 1, at 211-27.
"[Tlhe SEC's no-action letters and the opinions ofcourts have provided very little
guidance with respect to the analysis that must be perfonned under the five- factor
test." Id. at 221.
59 Loss and Seligman conclude that the "Commission statrs no-action letters
are not entirely consistent" on the definition ofa "single plan offinancing." 3 Loss
& SELIGMAN, supra note S, at 1214. They state, however, that the term "tends to
refer to factors such as the methoci of offering th~ security, the timing ~f p!acs fer
raising capital, and whether the offerings are financially interdependent" Id.
Professor Wade agrees with Loss and Seligman on the three factors that make up
the usingle plan of fmancing" factor, also fmding "confusion ... from the SEC's
and the courts' failure to defme precisely and apply consistently the three suggested
components of the single plan offmancing factor." Wade, supra note It at 212.
Professor Deaktor states that the staff's defmition of this factor "has lacked
consistency." Deaktor, supra note S, at 529.
60 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1214 ("[T]here tends to be considerable
overlap between instances in which there is a 'single plan offmancing' and those
in which there is the 'same general purpose. t "); Deaktor, supra note S, at 529 ("In
some inquiries, the single plan of fwancing factor appears to have been equated
with the purpose of the offerings factor."); Wade, supra note 1, at 213 ("[Clases
and no-action letters commonly fail to distinguish between the single plan of
financing and the same general purpose factors.").
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The other integration factors are equally uncertain in their meaning.
For example, it is unclear what types of contractual variances61 are
necessary to establish that two securities are not part ofthe "same class of
securities.''62 How different do the contractual terms have to be in order to
be separate classes? Are debt and equity always separate classes of
securities? What if the equity is a preferred stock and the debt is a
subordinated debenture that have essentially the same rights, except for the
preference of the debentures over the preferred in bankmptcy?
Finally, and certainlywithout attempting to be exhaustive regarding the
inherent ambiguity in the common law integration factors, consider the "at
or about the same time" factor. Obviously, the time between the sale oftwo
blocks ofsecurities can be one day, one month, one year, etc. How far apart
do the two sales have to be in order to be considered not "at or about the
same time',?63 A related uncertainty regarding the "at or about the same
time" factor is the question of whether it is an all-or-nothing matter Of,
instead, a factor that counts more (or less) as the two offerings become
closer (or more remote) in time. Under an all or nothing regime, the
existence ofthe factor might be established by a discrete line (six. months,
for example) and all sales within that six month period would be considered "at or about the same time" and would count the same toward
integration, whether such sales are one day apart or five months and
twenty-nine days apart. Alternatively, the factor could operate without a
discrete line and could vary in its weight, depending on how far apart in
time the two blocks are sold. Under this analysis, offerings one year apart,
for example, may still have a small tendency to support integration, while

~l.lnterestin.gly,Fro[~sor Deaktor in his discussion ofthe meaning ofseparate

classes emphasizes, instead ofcontractual differences between oramong securities,
the identity ofthe issuer and the identity ofthe offerees. Deaktor, supra note 5, at

531-32.
62 Wade, supra note 1, at 216-18. "[T]he SEC and courts have failed to
articulate a precise formula to detennine whether securities are ofthe same class."
Id. at 216. Although Loss and Seligman characterize the Commission's approach
to this element as "relatively straightforward," 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note S,
at 1218, their subsequentdiscussion ofthe elementsuggests significant uncertainty.
Id. at 1219-21.
63 For example, although Loss and Seligman opine that the six months safe
harbor provision ofRule 147 and Regulation D "suggests that a six-month period
. . . will be necessary to demonstrate that it was not made 'at or about the same
time,'" 3 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1221, the authors state that a
separation of "six months or more will alone not necessarily lead to
nonintegratioa." Id. at 1222.
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offerings one day apart may have a much stronger tendency to support
integration.64
Beyond the inherent ambiguity in the common law integration factors
themselves, an additional and perhaps even more significant ambiguity is
generated bythe uncertainty about the particular mix offactors required for
integration." Is one out of five factors sufficient to require integration?
Two out of five? Do some factors count more than others?66 What is the
relationship between strength and number? Does the strength of a factor

64 Professor Deaktor opines that "[p]roximity in time . . . has seldom been
detenninative." Deaktor, supra note S, at 534.
65 "Neither the Commission Dor the courts have provided express guidance on
how to weigh these factors when analyzing an integration problem." 3 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note S, at 1222.
One is, of course, reminded of the old Treasury Regulations for detennining
whether a business entity other than a trust (called an "association" by the
regulations) was to. be taxed as a partnership or a corporation. In order to make this
detennination, the regulations set forth four major corporate characteristics that
distinguished a corporation from a partnership. These characteristics were (1)
continuity of life, (2) centralized management, (3) limited liability, and (4) free
transferability of ownership interests~ Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (as amended
in 1960). An entity exhibiting any three ofthese corporate characteristics would be
taxed as a cotpOration, while an entity exhibiting less than that number would be
taxed as a partnership. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1960). See
Thomas M. Hayes, Note, Checkmate, the Treasury Finally Sun-enders: The Checkthe-Box Treasury Regulations and Their Effect on Entity Classification, S4 WASH.
&LEE L. REv. 1147, lIS 1-1160 (1997), for a discussion ofhow the old regulations
functioned.
Interestingly, and perhaps instructively for this paper, the Treasury eventually
replaced the corporate resemblance test with a regime allowing the taxpayer, within
broad rules, to elect whether it will be taxed as a partnership or a corporation.
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -6 (as amended in 1996). See generally Hayes, supra,
at 1160 (describing the function ofthe new regulations).
66 Loss & Seligman suggest that "[a] review of the cases and no-action letters
strongly suggests that the 'single plan offmancing' and 'same general pwpose'
factors nonnally are given greater weight than the other factors." 3 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 1222. ProfessorDeaktor opines that "even if[offerings
are] simultaneous [and are thus made 'at or about the same time'], one or more of
the other integration factors often will be viewed as more important" Deaktor,
supra note 5, at 534. See a/so Wade, supra note 1, at 214 ("Like the single plan of
fmancing factor, the weight of the same general purpose factor in the integration
analysis is unclear.").
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count more than the number of factors-for example does three strong
factors weigh more heavily than four weak factors?,7
The point need not be belabored. Essentially, everyone concedes the
ambiguity in the common law criteria of integration and the difficulty of
applying the criteria. Indeed, this view appears to be held even by
commentators who, unlike this author, are able to find a policy basis for
integration and thus (broadly, at least) support some continued role for the
doctrine.68
An even more troubling aspect ofthe current common law of integration is the absence of any connection between the integration criteria and
sound policy. Indeed, the common law criteria of integration actually
encourage conduct on the part ofissuers that is socially counterproductive.
This problem is best demonstrated by focusing on the common law
integration factors and the steps an issuer may take under those tests in
order to avoid integration. Assume once again a simple situation in which
an issuer completes an intrastate offering of its common stock in January
and then proposes to offer more securities in April under the private
placement exemption. To avoid integration in such a case, the issuer is
encouraged by the common law integration criteria to offer a different class
of securities, perhaps preferred shares, in its subsequent April offering and
to delay the proposed April offering, perhaps for many months. 69

67 At one point in its work the ABA Task Force on Integration lamented:
"[N]owhere . . . is there any indication of how to evaluate these five criteria. In a

number of no-action letters, a single criterion established in the release has taken
precedence over the remaining four." Task Force on Integration, supra note 4, at

623.
See, for example, Wade, supra note 1, at 211-20. and the disc~lssicn of
ideas in supra notes 57-60,62.
69 Another option for the issuer, a response that some commentators fmd to be
socially advantageous, is for the issuer to register the offering. See supra note IS.
This alternative, however, is problematic, both for its facts and for its policy. First,
if the total offering is small, registration is practically impossible because costs are
prohibitively high. Second, registration ofthe April tranche following the January
intrastate offering will likely destroy the intrastate exemption for the JanuaIy
offering, ifout-of-state offers are made in April. Registration ofthe April offering
does not protect the January offering from backwards integration. Finally,
registration is not always an attractive outcome for society. Indeed, Congress has
detennined that, based on policy consideration, certain types of offerings and
certain types of offerees and purchasers do not need the special protections of
mandated, scheduled disclosures that accompany registration. See infra text
accompanying notes 99-105.
68

rrcfe~f \\tacie's

D-40

2000-2001]

SECURITIES ACT OF 1933

311

One is, ofcourse, at a total loss to find any social benefit in varying the
class of securities or delaying the April offering. Neither of these steps
protects investors nor generates any other perceivable benefit. The January
investors are unaffected by the issuer's alteration ofeither the contractual
terms ofthe securities to be off~red in April or the timing ofthe proposed
April offering. Similarly, the subsequent April investors are accorded no
additional protection as a result of such a change.
Importantly, ofcourse, the incentives created by these criteria generate
societal and economic costs, as' the issuer is forced (or is, at least,
encouraged) to change the terms of its optimal investment contract and
postpone its offering. In economic terms, such outcomes raise the issuer's
cost ofcapital and make the issuer less competitive in the product market.
Stated alternatively, in more human terms~ such an outcome is unfair to the
issuer and its constituents, especially in light of the fact that such issuers
are often small entrepreneurs with limited opportunities to acquire capital.
Indeed, in extreme situations these criteria may effectively deny the issuer
access tocapitaI.
. In short, issuers, in order to avoid integration under the common law
criteria for integration, are encouraged to act in ways that are actually
socially detrimental. To avoid integration, they are likely to offer investment contracts that have inefficient fmancial terms and to market their
securities pursuant to inefficient strategies, and these societal costs are not
counterbalanced by any enhanced investor protection or any other apparent
social benefit.

B. The Commission's Safe Harbor Rules
Over the years, the Commission in a number of instances abandoned
a common law approach to integration matters in favor of a safe harbor
regime. While the terms of the various safe harbor regimes differ,
compliance with the Commission~ s criteria for a particular safe harbor
ensures the absence ofintegration; failure to meet the specific terms ofany
particular safe harb9r, however, only means that the safe harbor is
unavailable and that integration, therefore, is detennined under the
common law rules.

1. Earlier Safe Harbors
Although the Commission's fIrSt safe harbor from integration appeared
as early as 1935,70 it was not until the 19708 that the Commission seriously

70 In 1935 the Commission adopted what appears to be the earliest safe harbor
provision, which amounted to an earlierversion of today' s Rule 152. Securities Act
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pursued integration safe harbors through its adoption ofcertain regulatory
exemptions from registration. The first of these was incorporated into old
Rule 146,71 which became effective in 1974 and was the predecessor to
today's Rule 506.72 Virtually contemporaneously with its adoption ofRule
146, the Commission also adopted Rule 147,73 which for the fust time
established intelligible criteria for compliance with the intrastate exemption. Rule 147 also contained an integration safe harbor, which w8;S

Release No. 33-305, 1935 WL 2617 (Mar. 2, 1935). This early version of the
modem Rule 152 was subsequently rescinded, readopted, and consolidated.
Securities Act Release No. 33-627, 1936 WL 3434 (Jan. 21, 1936) (adopting the
General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933). The current
version ofRule 152 is codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (2000). For an outstanding
work OD Rule 152, see Johnson & Patterson, supra note 5.
71 Rule 146 was initially proposed in November of 1972. Securities Act
Proposed Rule 146, Securities Act Release No. 33-5336, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (Cell)' 79,108 (Nov. 28, 1972). As finally adopted, the
safe harbor language in Rule 146 stated:
For purposes of this rule only, an offering shall be deemed not to include
offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sates of securities of the issuer
pursuant to the exemptions provided by section 3 or section 4(2) ofthe Act
or pursuant to a registration statement ftled under the Act, that take place
prior to the six month period immediately preceding or after the six month
period immediately following any offers, offers for sale or sales pursuant
to this role, Provided, That there are during neither of said six month
periods any offers, offers for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer
of the same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or sold
pursuant to the rule.
17 C.F.R. § 230.146(b)(1) (1975) (adopted by Notice of Adoption of Rule 146,
Securities Act Release No. 33-5487,4 S.E.C. Docket 154 (Apr. 27, 1974».
72 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2000). The safe harbor integration language for
Regulation D differs from the safe harbor language in old Rule 146. Specifically,
Regulation D offerings are protected by safe harbor from:
Offers and sales that are made more than six months before the start of a
Regulation D offering or are made more than six months after completion
of a Regulation D offering ... so long as during those six month periods
there are no offers or sales of securities by or for the issuer that are of the
same or a similar class as those offered or sold under Regulation D, other
than those offers or sales of securities under an employee benefit plan as
defined in role 405 under the Act.
Id. § 230.502(a).
73 Id. § 230.147.
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identical to the integration safe harborofRule 146.'4 Although the new safe
.harbors in Rule 146 and Rule 147 mitigated, at least to some degree, the
ambiguity ofintegration, the new regulatory integration regimes introduced
by these rules were significantly and needlessly complex and again failed
to connect the criteria for the safe harbor with any legitimate policy.7s
The complexity inherent in these early safe harbors and, indeed, in all
ofthe Commission's integration safe harbors, is due at least in part to the
sheer number of safe harbor regimes
the differences among the various
regimes' criteria. '6 Presently, for example, the Commission has at least

and

74Id. § 230.147(b)(2). The safe harbor language of Rule 147 states:
For purposes of this role only, an issue shall be deemed not to include
offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer
pursuant to the exemption provided by section 3 or section 4(2) ofthe Act
or pursuant to a registration statement filed under the Act, that take place
prior to the six month period immediately preceding or after the six month
period immediately following any offers, offers for sale or sales pursuant
to this rule, Provided, That, there are during either ofsaid six month periods
no offers, offers for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer of the
same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or sold pursuant to
the rule.
ld.
This language is essentially identical to the safe harbor language in old Rule
146. See supra note 71, for the language ofthe safe harbor provision in Rule 146.
75 Even the Commission.. smore recent attempts to deal with integration through

safe harbor provisions have drawn fire from commentators. Forexample, Professor
Bradford, writing on the current integration provisions of Regulation A, bas
observed:

TIle changes adopted (to the L.'"ltegration safe harbor rules in Regulation A]
are generally positive and responsive to some of [the] ... criticisms [from
commentators]. But the SEC's failure to explain or justify provisions like
Rule 251(c) produces unnecessary ambiguity and uncertainty. As a result
... , Rule 251 (c) has failed to reach itspotentiaI.
Bradford, Regulation A, supra Dote 6, at 289.
76 Even those regimes that appear Wbe similar are not. Consider, for example,
the integration regimes in Regulation D, seesupra note 72, and Rule 147, see supra
note 74. Under Regulation D, offers and sales outside the six-month window
periods do not destroy the integration safe harbor, so long as during the six-month
window periods the issuer makes no offers or sales ofthe same class ofsecurities
as are offered in the Regulation D offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). Under Rule
147, however, safe harbor from sales outside the six-month window periods
requires not only "clean windows" but also that the sales outside the window
periods be made ''pursuant to the exemptions provided by section 3 or section 4(2)
of the Act or pursuant to a registration statement." Id. § 230. 147(b)(2) (emphasis
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seven different integration regimes in its roles. 77 Accordingly, even
ignoring the difficulty ofthe interfaces among the safe harbor regimes and
the interfaces between each ofthose regimes and the common law rules of
integration, one struggles to understand why the Commission would
... complicate integration with so many differing sets ofintegration criteria. 78
When one begins to apply these safe harbors in instances where two or
more various integration regimes interface with one another, the complexities ofthe safe harbor rules increase dramatically. Consider the following
example, which is built primaril9' around the safe harbor ofRuIe 147. That
particular safe harbor protects a Rule 147 offering from integration with
prior sales, ifsuch prior sales were made more than six-months prior to the
Rule 147 offering, if such sales were made "pursuant to" a section 4(2)
exemption, a section 3 exemption, or a registration statement, and if during
the last six months the issuer has made no offers or sales of a "similar"

added}.
77 These include: Rule 152, 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (2000) (dealing with
integration in ce~cases between public and private offerings); Rule 147, ide §
230.147(b)(2) (1999) (safe harbor from integration in intrastate offerings made
under Rule 147); Regulation D, id. § 230.502(a) (safe harbor for certain small
offerings and private placements made under Regulation D); Rule 701(f), id. §
230.701(f) (safe harbor for certain offerings involving employee compensation
made under Rule 701); Rule 144A, ide § 230.144A(e) (safe harbor for re~les of
restricted securities to certain qualified institution buyers); Regulation A, id. §
230.2S1(c) (safe harbor for small offerings made pursuant to the requirements of
Regulation A). In the Release adopting Regulation S, the Commission stated:
"[o]ffshore transactions made in compliance with Regulation S will not be
integrated with registeJl'.et domesti~ offerin.gs or do:n=stic cfferings tb&t satisfy the
requirements for an exemption from registration under the Securities Act, even if
undertakencontemporaneously." Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release
No. 33-6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)' 84,524, at
80,681 (Apr. 24, 1990).
78 Even if the Commission wants different integration standards as a way to
open up or shut down exemptions that it considers more or less desirable, a more
principled and direct path is open to the Commission to reach this objective.
Suppose, for example, the Commission wishes to limit the availability of intrastate
offerings underRule 147 because (for whatever reason) the Commission concludes
that such offerings are especially ripe for fraud. Rather than' making integration
more expansive, which is haphazard in its outcome and essentially unprincipled,
the Commission could impose additional, substantive conditions on the availability
of the exemption-such as limiting the dollar limit of the exemption (e.g., limit
Rule 147 to $1,000,000 per year) or requiring disclosure as a condition for
exemption.
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class of securities like those in the Rule 147 offering. This last criterion is
referred to as a requirement ofhaving "clean windowsn or "clean window
periods."79
In this example, assume that on January 1 Issuer sold a block of its
common stock in reliance on the private placement exemption provided by
the common law of section 4(2), and that on July 1 Issuer sold additional
common shares under a valid registration statement. On August 1, Issuer
propoSes a third offering of its common stock, this time as an intrastate
offering'under Rule 147. In evaluating the availability of the Rule 147
exemption, Issuer must determine whether either ofthe prior offerings will
be integrated into its August offering.
Applying the safe harbor criteria from the Rule, one first finds that the
Rule 147 offering in August will not be protected from the July offering,
even though the July offering was registered and thus represents, one
assumes, the ideal way for the distribution to take place. The problem,
obviously, is that the July offering was within six months of the proposed
August offering, and accordingly the Issuer lacks the clean windows that
are required for safe harbor qualification under Rule 147.80
Consider now whether the safe harbor provisions of Rule 147 protect
the proposed August offering from integration with the prior January
offering. Since the section 4(2) offering in January was more than six
months prior to the Rule 147 offering in August, one may preliminarily
think that the safe harbor is available to protect the August offering fr~m
the January offering. The obvious problem, however, is that the safe
harbor, even for sales outside the six month period, requires clean
windows, and the July sale ofcommon stock destroyed the clean windows
for the August sale. 81

79 17 C.F.R § 230.147(b)(2). For the text ofthe integration safe harbor provision in Rule 147, see supra note 74.
80 If, however, the July securities are not of"tbe same or similar class" as the
August securities, safe harbor may still be available, since under Rule 147 safe
harbor from the effects ofoffers and sales outside the six-month window period is
lost ifoffers or sales within the six-month window period involve securities "ofthe
same or similar class as those offered ... pursuant to" Rule 147. 17 C.F.R. §
230. 147(b)(2). For the language ofthe safe harbor provision ofRule 147, see supra
note 74.
81 The contamination ofsales during the six-month window period is eliminated
only if those securities are not "ofthe same or similar class as the Rule 147 stock.
17 C.F.R. § 230. 147(b)(2). The fact that the sales during the window period were
made pursuant to a registration statement, therefore, is irrelevant. For the language
of the safe harbor provision of Rule 147, see supra note 74.
tt
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Even if, however, the Issuer were able to ensure that the July sale
involved securities that were not of the "same or similar class" as the
August sale, the safe harbor may not protect the August sale from the
.. January sale. Assume that in looking at the January offering, Issuer
discovers that an offer was made to an unsophisticated person, thereby
. destroying the availability of the section 4(2) exemption for the January
offering. 82 Given this new fact, the safe harbor may not be available to
, protect the August Rule 147 offering from the January offering, even
though the window periods are clean and the January offering was more
than six months before the August offering. The possible loss ofthe safe
harbor rests on the argument that the January offering was not made
"pursuant to" (i.e., in compliance with) the exemption "provided by"
section 4(2), as required by the integration language of Rule 147, which
under the Rule is a prerequisite to safe harbor protection. 83
Even if, however, the January offering were at the time entirely in
compliance with the requirements ofsection 4(2), safe harborprotection for
the August offering still may be uncertain. Now the problem is the notion
ofone-way integration.84 Although the safe harbor ofRule 147 is available
to protect the August offering, it does not protect the section 4(2) January
offering. Thus, the question of whether the January offering is contaminated by either the registered offering in July or the Rule 147 offering in
August is determined by the common law of integration. The bizarre
outcome here is that, ifunder common law integration the July offering or
the August offering is integrated backwards into the January offering, then
the January offering does not meet the requirements of section 4(2). This,

Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act provides an exemption from registration for
an issuer not involving any public offering." 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2)
(1994). Broadly, this exemption is predicated on all offerees and purchasers having
sufficient sophistication to be able to evaluate the merits and risks of the offering
and having access to the same infonnation that would be contained in a registration
statement See THOMAS LEE HAzEN, nIE LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.21,
at 224-34 (3d ed. 1996) (suggesting that "[2.] literal reading of more recent cases"
leads one to conclude that "[e]ach offeree must have access to the types of
information which would be disclosed" in a registration statement, ide at 229
(emphasis added), "offerees must also be sophisticated," id., and "each offeree
must be provided with an opportunity to ask questions of the issuer and verify
information," id. at 231 (emphasis added».
83 Professor J. William Hicks, certainly one of the leading authorities on Rule
147, reaches a similar conclusion. 7 HICKS, supra note 54, § 4.03[3], at 4-28.
84 A compact and excellent discussion of one-way integration is found in
Bradford, Regulation A, supra note 6, at 270-72.
82

'~actions by
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in tum, may mean that the January offering was not made ''pursuant to"
section 4(2), and thus the safe harbor may no longer be available to protect
the August Rule 147 offering from the January offering. 8s
While instinctivelyone is skeptical that suchoverwhelming complexity
can ever be justified, the problematic nature ofthese safe harbor roles can
be fully appreciated only when one realizes that, as was the case with the
common law rules ofintegration, the safe harbor criteria for integration are
"unconnected to any sound policy. Thus, the Commission's regulatory
criteria to qualify for a safe harbor from integration again lead issuers to
engage in conduct that is socially counterproductive.
To illustrate this point, consider the steps that the Issuer in the
foregoing example may be encouraged to take in order to gamer safe
harbor protection for its proposed August offering in light of potential
contamination by the January offering. Most obviously, the Issuer will
likely take steps to ensure that the August offering has clean windows. This
could be done either by varying the contractual terms between the 1uly
offering and the August offeringS' or by delaying the August offering for
another five months.81
Once again, however, one is unable to find any social benefit for the
requirement that the Issuer take such steps. Neither ofthese steps protects
the January, July or August investors nor generates any other perceivable
benefit for society. Importantly, such cumbersome steps once again
generate societal and economic costs, as the Issuer is forced to change from
its optimal investment contract or delay its optimal offering date for the
August offering.
Safe harbor criteria, therefore, have done nothing to relieve the
disconnect between the criteria of integration and any valid economic or

85 Professor Hicks opines that such a result would "defeat the whole purpose of
the [safe harbor integration provision of the] Rule." 7 HICKS, supra Dote 54, §

4.03[3], at 4-27. He characterizes such an outcome as "perverse" and generously
concludes that it is "very unlikely that the SEC would intend such a result." Id.
86 Under Rule 147, the July offering would not destroy the safe harbor protection the August offering otherwise enjoys, so long as the July offering does not
involve "offers ... or sales of securities ... ofthe same or similar class as those
[securities] offered ... or sold" in the August, Rule 147 offering. 17 C.F.R. §
230. 147(b)(2) (emphasis added).
87 By delaying the August, Rule 147 offering for an additional five months (a
total of six months from the July offering), the Rule 147 offering would be
protected from the January and the July offering, since those prior offerings would
then be outside the six-month window period and no sales would have occurred
during the window period. 17 C.F.R. § 230. 147(b)(2).
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societal policies. Underthe safe harbor criteria, issuers are still encouraged
to offer inefficient investment contracts and to market their securities
inefficiently. Thesecosts are not counterbalancedby any enhancedinvestor
protection or any other apparent social benefit.
2. More Recent Safe Harbors
In more recent years, the Commission seems to have made some effort
to simplify and reduce the pernicious effects of its safe harbor regimes.
Thus, for example, the 1992 amendments to Regulation A88 appear to be an
attempt both to simplify and ameliorate the impact of the integration
doctrine in Regulation A offerings.89 Briefly, a Regulation A offering is
now protected by safe harbor from any prior offering and from certain
prescribed subsequent offerings (including all offerings "made more than
six months after the completion of the Regulation A offering'~, and the
safe harbor ofRegulation A, when applicable, provides two-way integration protection (Le., it protects the Regulation A offering from contamination by the other offerings and also protects the other offerings from
contamination by the Regulation A offering).9l
Rule 701,92 which essentially provides an exemption from registration
for employee stock purchase plans ofnon-1934 Act companies, offers an
even more generous safe harbor from integration by providing complete,
two-way protection for and from any Rule 701 offering.93 In short,

8. Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Release No. 33-6949, 7 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH)' 72,439 (July 30, 1992).
89 Regulation A providf}S an exemilticn trOLl registration for offerings of up to
$5,000,000 by oon-1934 Act companies. The exemption is predicated upon the
filing ofan "offering statement" with the Commission and providing each investor
with an "offering circular." 17 C..F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2000).
90 Id. § 230.2S1(c)(2)(v).
91 Id. § 230.251(c). Professor Bradford provides an excellent discussion of this
matter. Bradford, Regu/ation A, supra note 6, at 270-73. Professor Bradford points
out some scholarly disagreement on the notion that the integration protection under
Regulation A is two-way. Id. at 272 0 .. 89 (citing 3A HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL &
SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw 5-12 to 5-14 (2d 00.
2000».
92 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2000).
93 Once again, Professor Bradford provides an excellent discussion of this
integration provision. Bradford, Regulation A, supra note 6, at 270 n.82. Professor
Bradford points out that Professor Hicks has characterized the safe harbor as only
"one directional," but Bradford argues that Hicks is wrong about this. Id. (citing 7A
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integration is not applied to Rule 701 offerings. Accordingly, a Rule 701
offering cannot contaminate any other offering, and the other offering
cannot contaminate the Rule 701 offering.94
These are, of course, encouraging signs, although the Commission is
moving in an extremely slow, uneven, and piecemeal manner and, at least
from the perspective of some commentators, is still leaving substantial
ambiguity and problems untreated. 9S Nonetheless, these regulatory
developments reflect, on the part ofthe Commission, some appreciation of
the nonsense ofthe integration concept and may signal a willingness by the
Commission to engage in a broader reexamination ofthe concept.

IV. INTEGRATION PRESCRIPTION

The prescription offered by this Article for the problems created by the
integration doctrine is simple and direct: the integration doctrine should be
entirely eliminated from the 1933 Act.96

HICKS, supra note 54, § 8.03[3][b], at 8-48 (1993».
94 The Commission has also taken a special, generous integration approach for
extra-territorial offerings made in compliance with Regulation S. In the Release
adopting that Regulation, the Commission stated: "[0]ffshore transactions made in
compliance with Regulation S will not be integrated with registered domestic
offerings ordomestic offerings that satisfy the requirements for an ex~mption from
registration under the Securities Act, even ifundertaken contemporaneously." See
Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6863, [1989-1990
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 84,524, at 80,681 (Apr. 24, 1990).
9$ Professor Bradford is somewhat critical of the continued ambiguity in the
new Regulation A integration safe harbor, characterizing it at one point as
"expansive yet enigmatic." Bradford, Regulation At supra note 6, at 255.
M The wholesale elimination ofthe integration doctrine would Dot eliminate the
necessity of resolving certain integration-like problems. For example, the
Commission in recent years has always had some type ofregulatory small-offering
exemption from registration enacted under section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, and that
exemption bas always had some size limitation. Today, that exemption is found in
Rule S04 and is limited to $1,000,000 within any twelve month period. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.504 (2000). In a world without an integration concept, an issuer might sell
$200,000 in securities on Monday under the exemption provided by section 4(2),
and $200,000 on Tuesday under section 3(a)(II). If the issuer on Wednesday
decides to sell additional securities under Rule 504, a rule would be needed to
detennine whether the issuercould then sell securities in the amount ofSI ,000,000,
5800,000 or $600,000 under the Rule.
Obviously, it would not be difficult to construct a rule dealing with that matter
and to do so without resorting to the integration doctrine.
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While the uncertainty, complexity and misdirected criteria described
in the immediately preceding section are important to the analysis
underlying this recommendation, these problems, standing alone, may be
insufficient to compel a complete elimination ofthe integration doctrine. 97
Such problems are not, of course, unique to securities laws and, more
importantly, are ones that often can be eliminatedor at least ameliorated by
procedural and doctrinal adjustments that are less drastic than the

elimination of an entire doctrine.
In the case of the integration doctrine, however, these less drastic
adjustments are inappropriate prescriptions because the doctrine itself
makes no sense.98 Indeed, the integration doctrine is inconsistent with the
very policies underpinning the 1933 Act itself:
The 1933 Act strikes a balance between investor protection and capital
formation. 99 The common sense of this is overwhelming, of course. The
1933 Act could never have been intended to protect investors to such a
degree that capital formation is precluded. Atthe same time, investors must
be protected, even if the price of raising capital is increased somewhat.
This balance was in recent years reiterated in the National Securities
Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (''NSMIA,,).I00 Specifically,
sectionI06(a) ofNSMIA101 amended section 2 ofthe 1933 Act to indicate
91 The uncertainty and complexity of the integration doctrine have captured
most consistendy the attention of commentators and the bar. An interesting
manifestation of this was the charge to the Task Force on Integration, which did its
work in·the early 1980s. The charge was "to make proposals that would help the
Commission and the securities bar to 8nswer questioDSof integration." Task Force
on Integration, supra note 4, at 596.
In this writer's view, that was aD unfortunate and overly modest charge.
98 In Part III of this Article, the author arga.led that ta'le criteria for the

application ofthe integration doctrine ate nonsensical. See supra notes 48-95 and
accompanying text. Here the author makes a somewhat similar but different
argument, arguing now that the doctrine itselfis nonsensical.
99 Wade, supra note 1, at 227 (recognizing, before NSMIA, "the emerging
importance of the Act's policy to assist in capital formation where disclosure
through registration would be unduly burdensome''). An example at the
Commission level of the recognition of the balance can be seen in the way the
Commission developed and ultimately approved Regulation D, with its
increasingly rigorous investor protection as deal size increases. See Campbell,
supra note 6, at 127-31 (outlining the history leading to the adoption ofRegulation
0).
100 National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-290,110 Stat. 3416.
1011d. § 106(a), 110 Stat. at 3424 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b)
(Supp. IV 1998».
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that the 1933 Act was intended both to provide for ''protection ofinvestors"
and to "promote efficiency, competition, and capital fonnation."l02
These articulated policies, in tum, can be reconciled with a sensible
economic view of the 1933 Act. Under this economic interpretation, the
1933 Act is seen as a legislative scheme requiring mandatory disclosure of
investment information in situations where bargaining between or among
the parties for investment information is inefficient or impossible. This
explains, then, the fundamental rule of section S of the 1933 Act, which
mandates disclosure by the issuer to offerees and purchasers in connection
with a public offering ofsecurities. Bargaining for individuallycustomized
investment information between the issuer, on the one hand, and, on the
other hand, each of the hundreds or thousands of investors in the public
offering, could be considered to be either prohibitively expensive or
literally impossible. As a result, the 1933 Act through section 5 mandates
particularized disclosures that must accompany such public offerings.
Consistent with this analysis, the ruleaf mandatory disclosure is
relaxed through the exemptions in the 1933 Act in situations where
bargaining for investment information is possible and efficient. 103
Accordingly, in the private placement exemption in section 4(2), mandatory disclosure is not required, because the investors have "access to ...
information" and thus are able to "fend for themselves. "104 Similarly, in the

102 Section 2(b) of the 1933 Act now requires the Commission, when engaged
in rulemaking in the public interest, to "consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation." 15 U.S.C. §77b(b).
103 This is somewhat of an overly simplistic view of the 1933 Act, because in

certain instanees the 1933 Act eliminates mandatory discliJ~ure fot fCti\lDS other
than ease ofbargaining for investment information. For example, in section 3(a)(2)
of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1994), offerings by banks are exempt from
registration, and one may conclude that this exemption is based, not on the ability
to bargain for investment information, but on the protection of investors by the
regulatory scheme applicable to banks. Another example is section 3(a)(4), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4), which provides an exemption for securities issued by charitable
organizations and may best be understood as designed to promote charities.
104 These are the

broad criteria for the availability ofsection 4(2) as announced

by the u.s. Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125
(1953). Today, probably the two most important requirements for exemption from
registration under section 4(2) are the requirement that the offerees be sophisticated
and the requirement that they have access to the same infonnation that would be
contained in a registration statement. For a good discussion of this, see HAZEN,
supra note 82, § 4.21, at 224-34.
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intrastate exemption in section 3(a)(11), Congress apparently concluded
that geographic proximity between the investors and the issuer ensures
efficiency in bargaining for investment information, thereby alleviating the
need for mandated disclosure. lOS
..,., With these basic ideas in hand, one is able to demonstrate that the
integration doctrine is antithetical to the balances struck within the 1933
Act and thus leads to a mandatory disclosure regime in instances where
Congress indicatedthat the proper balance between investor protection and
capital formation called for investors and issuers to bargain for investment
information.
Again, this is best demonstrated by an example. Imagine an intrastate
offering in January under the common law ofsection 3(a)( II) and a private
placement in April ofthe same year under the common law of ~tion 4(2).
Assuming integration is inapplicable, the January tranche is exempt from
mandated disclosure because, presumablYt Congress determined that the
geographic proximity of the parties eliminated any need for mandated
disclosure. All investors in that intrastate block 'of securities are able to
protect themselves by bargaining for their investment information, and
capital formation is encouraged by eliminating the requirement that the
issuer underwrite the costs of mandatorily providing information that the
investors may not desire. Continuing the assumption that integration is
inapplicable, the April private placement tranche is also exempt from
mandated disclosure, in this instance because Congress determinedthat the
investors' access to information eliminated the need for mandated

lOS Some uncertainty exists regarding the basis for the intrastate exemption in
section 3(a)(11). In his early .article on Rule 147, Professor Hicks stated:
The following reasons have been offered from time to time in support ofthe
intrastate exemption: (1) In terms ofeconomic policy, it is useful to allow
securities offerings by a small businessman to his friends, relatives, business
associates, and othcrst without federal restrictions; (2) registration for such
small offerings would, as a practical matter, be almost impossible; (3)
investors in local financings are protected by the sanctions of public
opinion; (4) such investors are protected by their proximity to the issuer; (5)
such investors are protected by state regulation; and (6) intrastate offerings
do not present questions of national interest
I. William Hicks t Intrastate Ojftrings Under Rule 147, 72 MICH. L. REv. 463,499
(1974) (footnotes omitted). In its Release adopting Rule 147, the Commission
stated that if the conditions ofsection 3(a)(11) were met, '4[i]n theory, the investors
would be protected both by their proximity to the issuer and by state regulation."
Conditions for Intrastate Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release 33-5450, 1
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 2340, at 2611-2 (Jan. 7, 1974).
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disclosure. Once again, all investors in the private placement block are able
to protect themselves by bargaining for investment information, and the
costs ofcapital formation are reduced by eschewing mandated disclosure.
In this case, therefore, rejecting any application of integration and
thereby preserving each exemption is the sensible outcome, since it
maintains the statutory balance struck between investor protection and
capital formation. The critical point here, ofcourse, is that the existence of
neither tranche compromises the policy bases for the other tranche's.
exemption from registration. Thus, the policy bases for not imposing a . ,
regime ofmandated disclosure on the January offering is unaffected by the
subsequent April offering. With or without the April offering, the January
investors have the same geographic proximity to the issuer and accordingly
are able to bargain with equal efficiency for their investment information.
The same holds true for the April investors. With or without the January
offering, the April investors have the same access to information and
sophistication levels that support the private placement exemption
contained in section 4(2). Sales by an issuer, therefore, whether before or
after an exempt offering, are neutral events as concerns the policy bases for
the exemption.
Applying the integration doctrine to this situation, however, reverses
all this and leads to an inappropriate result. Assume, for example, that the
outcome of applying the integration doctrine to our example is tOC8use the
exemptions from registration to become unavailable, thus forcing the issuer
to register the entire offering.
.
This result is inconsistent with the 1933 Act and the balance it strikes
between investor protection and capital formation. Congress determined
that the proper balance between investor protection and capital formation
was to be achieved by foregoing registration in instances where either
geographic pro,cimity (the 11'trasf=1te exemption) or investor sophistication
and access to information (the private placement exemption) made private
bargaining for investment information efficient. By hypothesis, those
conditions exist in our example, and as a result, integration, which forces
this offering into a mandated disclosure regime, essentially and inappropriately reshapes the policies of and balances struck in the 1933 Act.
Some commentators, however, object to the elimination of the
integration doctrine, fearing that such an approach would allow issuers to
evade the strictures ofthe 1933 Act, specifically the registration requirements, by permitting a single public offering to be fragmented under
multiple exemptions-.thereby avoiding registration. 106

106 Professor Bradford makes this argument in its most persuasive form. He
argues that elimination of the integration doctrine "allows an issuer to avoid
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To demonstrate this concern, consider an extreme example in which an
issuer sells 100 shares ofstock under section 4(2) on January 1, 100 shares
under the intrastate exemption on January S, 100 shares under section 4(2)
on January 10, and 100 shares under the intrastate exemption on January
IS. The issuer may continue this basic pattern, selling at every opportunity
100 shares under the private placement exemption or the intrastate
exemption. Devotees of integration would likely consider this example
strongly demonstrative of the need for the application of the integration
doctrine, arguing as they would that without the doctrine the issuer is able
to make a continual unregistered public offering while evading the
registration obligations of section 5. 107
When examined closely, however, the argument in favor of an
integration doctrine, even in this extreme case, flounders for the very
reasons stated above. Even in this extreme example, each 100 share tranche
is made in a situation in which Congress concluded that free bargaining is
the most efficient way to generate investment information and, accordingly,
that society in such transactions is better offby allowing free bargaining to
determine the scope of disclosure. None of the investors is in any way
harmed by the fact that other securities are sold around the same time as
her or his purchase. The legitimate bases for Congress's willingness to
forego mandated disclosure are similarly uncompromised by the ather
offerings.
In short, the integration doctrine makes no sense in any setting. The.
availability of an exemption should be entirely independent of the fact.
that other offers or sales have (or have not) been made by the issuer. lOS
Other such sales are irrelevant to the question ofwhether or not the policy
bases for an exemption exist for a particular sale. Such other offers and
sales are neutral events respecting the question iJf \vhether in·,estmcnt
information should be mandated or be the subject of free bargaining
between parties.

registration even where it may be cost effective." Bradford, Expanding, supra note
6, at 472. It: he argues, issuers are able to combine exemptions, the total amount
issuers are able to raise through exempt offerings increases. At some point, he
concludes, the total transaction gets large enough that costs of registration are not
prohibitively large, and, at that point, society benefits from registration.
101 See supra note IS.
108 This should not be understood as limiting the Commission's right to enact
regulatory exemptions that contain size limitations, or the right ofthe Commission
to impose "bad boy" provisions on exemptions (see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §
230.505(b)(2)(iii) (2000».
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CONCLUSION

The 1933 Act contains no clear mandate for an integration doctrine.
Nonetheless, the Commission tumbled into the doctrine shortly after the
enactment ofthe 1933 Act, and thereafter neither the Commission nor the
courts ever bothered to consider whether the doctrine is consistent with the
policies ofthe 1933 Act.
This exceedingly thin doctrinal history should not be overlooked when
iptegration doctrine are considered.
adjustments to or elimination of
Thus, the thinness-indeed, the non-existence--of the mandate for the
creation of the integration doctrine should free the Commission and the
courts from the normal restraints of precedent, if they were to choose to
make sense out ofthis messy situation.
The prescription proposed by this paper is the complete elimination of
the integration doctrine.' The doctrine is confusing and complex for issuers
and thus expensive for society. The criteria ofintegration provide perverse
incentives and thus lead issuers to engage in conduct that is counterproductive. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the doctrine is antithetical to
the balances struck in the 1933 Act between mandatory disclosure and free
bargaining for investment information, often forcing into a mandatory
disclosure regime offerings in which the policy bases for free bargaining
are intact.
The Commission and its predecessor, the FTC, created this mess. The
Commission, therefore, should through the exercise of its role-making
power take the lead in eliminating integration. Not only would such
Commission action be consistent with agency accountability, but also the
Commission is best positioned and equipped to effect an efficient remedial
action.

the
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

The Purposes Of The PSLRA

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") was enacted by
Congress on December 22, 1995 over President Clinton's veto. Several district courts have
stated that the PSLRA was intended "to combat the filing of abusive and meritless lawsuits."
Carson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, No. 97-5147, 1998 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 6903, at
*10 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 30, 1998) (citing Conf. Rpt. on Securities Litigation Reform, H.R. Rep.
No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1995), reprinted in, 1995 u.S. Code Congo & Admin. News
730)); see also In re Milestone Scientific Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 165, 174 (D.N.J. 1999)
("Congress enacted the PSLRA to remedy perceived abuses in private securities class action
litigation. If) (citing, inter alia, In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144, 145 (D.N.J.
1998)). See generally Craig C. Martin & Matthew H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of
Institutional Investors in Securities Litigation, 56 Bus. Law. 1381, 1382 (2001) ("Martin &
Metcalf, Institutional Investors") (outlining PSLRA's stated purposes and extensive legislative
history).
Since December 1995, approximately 1,250 securities fraud cases have been filed in
federal district courts. As set forth herein, approximately 25% of those cases have settled, and an
additional 25% have been dismissed, in whole or in part. The passage of six years and this
litigation experience allows one to draw some preliminary conclusions about the effectiveness of
the PSLRA and the so-called "reforms" of securities fraud class action litigation that it heralded.
While reasonable people could endlessly debate the need for securities litigation
"reform," compare Harvey L. Pitt, et aI., Promises Made, Promises Kept: The Practical
Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 San Diego L. Rev. 845
Member, California and Virginia bars. Managing Partner of the Los Angeles office of Hagens Berman
LLP. B.A., with Honors, University of North Carolina, 1977; J.D., University of North Carolina School of Law,
1980.
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(1996) ("Pitt, Promises Made") with Leonard B. Simon and William S. Dato, Legislating on a
False Foundation: The Erroneous Academic Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995,33 San Diego L. Rev. 959 (1996), it cannot be disputed that since December
1995 the procedural skirmishing in class actions brought under the Securities Act of 1933 (the
"Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") has been more
intense and time-consuming than that experienced under the prior statutory scheme, adding time
and expense to the bur(jens inherent in such cases. See generally Sherrie R. Savett, The Merits
Matter Most and Observations on a Changing Landscape Under the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 525, 531 (1997) ("Savett, Observations") (observing that
the PSLRA "produces great delay in getting the case moving to the merits") (emphasis omitted).
On the other hand, as set forth herein, the PSLRA "era" has witnessed a near-doubling in the
average settlement value of securities fraud class actions, as well as the settlement of several
"mega" cases in which plaintiffs' counsel achieved unprecedented results for defrauded
investors.
B.

The Effectiveness Of Statutory
Litigation

Refo~s

Of Securities

If, as numerous commentators have asserted, the purpose of the PSLRA was to remedy
perceived securities litigation "abuses" by empowering "institutional investors" with the
incentive and ability to control such cases, one could logically conclude that the statutory
purpose has largely gone unfulfilled because such institutions have shown limited interest in
becoming involved as lead plaintiffs. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons
from Securities Litigation, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 533, 537-50 (1997) ("Fisch, Class Action Reform").
As one commentator stated in 1998:
[T]he [PSLRA] has not yet brought the dramatic revolution in the leadership of
these actions Congress intended. According to several studies, institutional
investors have remained passive observers in securities litigation, volunteering to
serve as lead plaintiff only infrequently. The institutional default has allowed the
traditional plaintiffs bar to consolidate its control over these cases....
Moreover, institutional investors have not maximized their influence over
the actions in which they have intervened....
What must be most disappointing to reform proponents
historic indifference of institutional investors has continued ....

IS

that the

Seth Goodchild, Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained: Ten Lessons for Institutional Investors
From the 1995 Reform Act, 4 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 583, 583-84 (Feb.-Mar. 1998)
(footnotes omitted); see' also Peter M. Saparoff & Adam L. Sisitsky, The Role of Institutional
Investors in Class Actions Under the PSLRA - Are They Walking on a Slippery Slope? Two
Years Later, Securities News 9 (ABA Sec. of Litig. Winter 1999) ("Saparoff & Sisitsky, Two
Years Later") ("The predicted trend of institutional investors hesitating to assume the role of lead
plaintiff in class action lawsuits in the wake of the [PSLRA's] enactment continues. If) (footnote
omitted); Paul Paradis, Appointing Lead Plaintiff, Counsel: Securities Class Action Background,
N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 23, 1998) at S3 ("While Congress purportedly intended to encourage institutional
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investors to step forward and serve as lead plaintiffs, for a variety of reasons this has largely
failed to materialize. It). Indeed, in 1997 the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") drew
the same conclusion:
Congress' efforts to encourage more active participation by institutional and other
large investors has not yet taken hold.... In the 105 cases filed in the first year
after passage of the [PSLRA], we have found only eight cases in which
institutions have moved to become lead plaintiff.
SEC Office of the General Counsel, Report to the President and the Congress on the First Year
of Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 51 (Apr. 15, 1997),
reprinted in 3 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 27, 56 (May 1998). At the same time, another
commentary was more equivocal in its judgment:
The jury appears still to be out on the question of whether institutions will
take advantage of the invitation presented by the [PSLRA] to participate actively
as a plaintiff in securities fraud actions. To date, only a handful of institutions
have sought appointment as lead plaintiff, and it is too early to tell whether this
provision will have its intended effect.
Richard L. Jacobson & Joshua R. Martin, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
A Survey of the First Two Years, 5 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 168, 173 (May 1998)
("Jacobson & Martin, Survey"); see also James M. Finberg & Melanie M. Piech, The Impact of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Unintended Consequences, 6 Securities Reform
Act Litig. Rptr. 295 (Dec. 1998) ("With a few exceptions ... institutions have been reluctant to
step forward and seek lead plaintiff status. ") (footnote omitted).
It is still unclear that the presence of such institutional investors as plaintiffs in securities
fraud class actions will increase the size of the recoveries obtained for the class relative to
claimed damages. See Savett, Observations, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 531-32; but see Richard
Schmitt, Pension Fund Plans Crucial Role in Suit, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1998, at B19 (lead
plaintiff State of Wisconsin Investment Board agreed to $14.6 million settlement of CellStar
securities litigation; settlement reportedly amounted to more than 40% of estimated damages
incurred by investors). Recent commentary claims that under certain circumstances, the
involvement of institutional investors in securities fraud litigation leads to benefits for all
shareholders. See also Martin & Metcalf, Institutional Investors, 56 Bus. Law. at 1394 (asserting
that institutional investors' participation "provides a systemic benefit where such investors
control litigation [and] pursue meritorious [securities fraud] claims").

c.

The PSLRA's Effective Date

The PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995), which amended the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb, and the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111, applies to private
securities actions brought pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 15 U.S.C. § 77zl(a)(I); Lax v. First Merchants Accep. Corp., No. 97-C-2715, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866, at
*5 (N.D. lil. Aug. 6, 1997). The statutory text makes clear that it does not apply to shareholder
derivative actions brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1. The PSLRA amended the Exchange Act
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by adding Section 21D, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. Section 21D(a)(i), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(a)(I), entitled "Private class actions," states that the provisions of that subsection "shall
apply in each private action arising under this chapter that is brought as a plaintiff class action
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." See Simon DeBartolo Group, 985 F. Supp. at
430 (Congress intended to limit application of § 21D(a) of PSLRA to securities fraud class
actions).
The PSLRA does not apply to actions commenced before and pending on its effective
date: December 22, 1995. See Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,758, § 108; compare Stevens
v. O'Brien Environ. Energy, Inc., Civil Action No. 94-4577, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6660, at *3
n.1, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,475 (E.D. Pa. May 10,1999) (PSLRA "do[es] not apply to this
action because it was commenced before the Reform Act became effective") (citation omitted);
Lyons v. Scitex Corp., 987 F. Supp. 271, 273 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (PSLRA did not apply to
securities class action "commenced on December 14, 1995") with Simon DeBartolo Group, L.P.
v. Richard E. Jacobs Group, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 427,429 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The PSLRA applies
here because SDG's complaint, which asserts claims under the Exchange Act, was filed on
September 5, 1997, and related to events which occurred in 1997."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 186 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 982 F. Supp. 1031,
1036 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (same: because dismissed securities class action complaint was filed after
enactment of PSLRA, district court was required to make findings regarding whether plaintiff
has complied with requirements of Rule 11(b)); see also Wilson Land Corp. v. Smith Barney,
Inc., No. 5:97-CV-519-BR(2), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12879, at *46 (E.D.N.C. May 17, 1999)
(PSLRA applied to securities fraud case filed in 1997). Obviously, given the passage of six
years since the PSLRA's passage, this issue is of less interest than it once was.
What if the securities class action was filed after December 22, 1995, but concerns
alleged wrongdoing committed by defendants before the PSLRA's effective date? In one case,
In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (D. Nev. 1998), plaintiffs' securities
fraud claims arose out of a secondary stock offering commenced on December 19, 1995, and the
alleged class period continued until July 1996, thereby "straddling" the effective date of the
PSLRA (December 22, 1995). On motion to dismiss, Judge Pro held that the PSLRA could be
applied retroactively to encompass defendants' alleged wrongdoing in connection with that
securities offering, reasoning that retroactive application would not result in the impairment of
any rights because intentional material misstatements of the type· alleged by plaintiffs were
actionable before and after enactment of the PSLRA. Id. at 1104-06.
D.

Elimination Of So-Called "Professional Plaintiffs"

One supposed problem confronting private securities litigation when the PSLRA was
enacted was the so-called "professional plaintiff," defined by one court as "persons who purchase
a nominal number of securities and then bring [complaints alleging] violations of the federal
securities laws in the hope that defendants will quickly settle to avoid the expense of litigation. "
Carson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6903, at *11 (citing 1995 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News
731-32); see also Gluck V. CellStar Corp., 976 F. Supp. 542,543-44 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
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In this regard, the PSLRA clearly changed the rules of the game, requiring plaintiffs who
bring securities class actions to comply with certain procedural requirements and limiting the
number of times that a plaintiff may serve as Lead Plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a) and 78u4(a); see also Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. SUppa 2d 1146,
(N.D. Cal. 1999)
(district court disqualifies institutional investor - Florida State Board of Administration - as lead
plaintiff because it was already serving as lead plaintiff in six other securities fraud class
actions). It is unclear, however, whether these statutory limitations apply to institutional
investors.
See also Martin & Metcalf, Institutional Investors, 56 Bus. Law. at 1388-89
(collecting cases: "Although some district courts have held that this requiremen't does not apply
to institutional investors, other courts have reached the opposite conclusion.") (footnotes and
citations omitted).
E.

Small vs. Institutional Shareholders

Judge Coar has asserted: "'The manifest intent of the [PSLRA] is determining the plaintiff
most capable of pursuing the action and representing the interests of the class.'" Lax, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11866, at *5 (quoting Fischler v. Amsouth Bancorp., No. 96-1567-CIV-T-17A,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2875, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 1997)).
Judge Black has stated that the PSLRA "appears to reflect a congressional intent to
transfer power from counsel who win the race to the courthouse to those shareholders who
possess a sufficient financial interest in the outcome to maintain some supervisory responsibility
over both the litigation and their counsel. In re Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. Sec. Litig., 3 F.
SUppa 2d 1208, 1212 (D.N.M. 1998) (citing Michael Y. Scudder, Comment, The Implications of
Market-Based Damages Caps in Securities Class Actions, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 435, 437 (1997),
and Note, Investor Empowerment Strategies in the Congressional Reform of Securities Class
Actions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 2056, 2058 (1996)). Once again citing these law review articles,
Judge Black stated that "Congress appears to have harbored the hope that substantial institutional
investors ... would advance their resources and expertise to fulfill this responsibility.
Horizon/CMS, 3 F. SUppa 2d at 1212 n.5 (citations omitted). See also Pitt, Promises Made, 33
San Diego L. Rev. at 882-83 ("Part of Congress' intent in adopting the [PSLRA] was to ...
attempt[] to encourage, but not require, institutional shareholders to supervise this litigation, and
to select their own counsel whom these institutions would monitor and supervise. "); Fisch, Class
Action Reform, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 537-41 (same); Martin & Metcalf, Institutional Investors, 56
Bus. Law. at 1383 (same).
II

II

Given the passage of six years since the enactment of the PSLRA and the filing of
approximately 1,250 securities class actions during that period, it could be asserted that this
supposed salutary purpose of the statute has largely gone unfulfilled; however, Professor Weiss
stated in 1997:
It is far too early to draw many definitive - or even tentative-conclusions. Indeed,
given the pace at which securities class actions typically had proceeded, and the
slower pace at which they seem to be proceeding under the [PSLRA], it probably
will be five years or more before we have enough data to reach more than very
tentative conclusions as to how the lead plaintiff provisions have affected the
conduct of securities class actions.
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Elliott J. Weiss, The Impact to Date of the Lead Plaintiff Provisions of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 561,563 (1997) ("Weiss, The Impact to Date").
In his 1997 law review article, Professor Weiss could point to only one reported case in
which a "major institutional investor has moved successfully to be appointed lead plaintiff and
has appointed new lead counsel," ide at 565 (referring to Judge Buchmeyer's 1997 decision in the
CellStar litigation), and he acknowledged that Professor Jill Fisch has identified a number of
factors which may well preclude institutional investor participation in securities class actions.
Id. at 563 n.16; see also Fisch, Class Action Reform, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 541-50; Pitt, Promises
Made, 33 San Diego L. Rev. at 882-90 (discussing institutional investors' motivations vis-a-vis
participating in securities litigation). As two securities practitioners have stated:
The number of institutional investors who have sought to participate as
lead plaintiffs in securities class actions has still remained relatively few. In
recent cases where institutional investors have undertaken to participate, however,
courts have refrained from automatically conferring lead plaintiff status upon
them, in some cases ordering that the role be shared instead. Such judicial
resistance likely will only continue the trend of institutional investors "shying
away" from pursuing the role of lead plaintiff in class actions, thus undermining
one of the important purposes of the PSLRA.
Saparoff & Sisitsky, Two Years Later, Securities News at 11. More recently, we have seen
substantial settlements in securities fraud class actions in which institutional investors served as
lead plaintiffs.

II.

THE PSLRA'S DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
A.

Plaintiff's Sworn Certification

The PSLRA imposes strict disclosure requirements upon plaintiffs in securities fraud
actions, requiring that a plaintiff "seeking to serve as a representative party on behalf of a class
shall provide a sworn certification" with the complaint. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(2)(A) and 78u4(a)(2)(A). The sworn statement must certify that the plaintiff (1) reviewed and authorized the
filing of the complaint; (2) did not purchase the securities at the direction of counselor in order
to participate in a lawsuit; and (3) is willing to serve as the lead plaintiff on behalf of the class.
Id. In addition, the statement must also identify any of the plaintiffs transactions in the security
that is at issue. Id.; see Carson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6903, at *11-12 (explicating disclosures
required in securities class action complaints under PSLRA); Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 544 (same).
In Blaich v. Employee Solutions, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Cj[ 90,403 (D. Ariz. 1997),
the court held that institutional investors seeking to become lead plaintiffs after the filing of an
initial complaint need not comply with the certification requirement. However, one commentary
states that "[i]n light of the important information provided by this certification, including a
statement of the potential lead plaintiff's interests in the action, it would seem prudent for the
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courts to require all plaintiffs, including institutional investors, to file such certifications."
Martin & Metcalf, Institutional Investors, 56 Bus. Law. at 1384-85.
The PSLRA's certification requirement has not impeded the filing or effective
prosecution of securities class actions. Moreover, a plaintiffs filing of a sworn certification
obviates the need for expensive and time-consuming "class certification discovery" that
defendants' counsel often seek to engage in once plaintiffs have filed amotion for class
certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. In Epstein v. MCA, 54 F.3d 1422, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995), a
securities tender offer case, the Ninth Circuit reversed a trial court's order that plaintiff investors
and their counsel be held in contempt for refusal to comply with irrelevant discovery requests.
Defendants had sought discovery of what the appellate court described as "detailed information"
about whether plaintiffs owned MCA shares, how they invested their tender offer proceeds,
whether their investment history made it likely they would have elected to receive preferred
stock instead of cash and whether they would pay taxes on cash proceeds they received. As the
Ninth Circuit stated: "The first piece of information Matsushita sought to obtain through
discovery - whether plaintiffs owned MCA stock - is without doubt relevant to the subject
matter of this litigation. The other information Matsushita sought to discover however, is not. ").
See also Schlagal v. Learning Tree Int'l, No. CV 98-6384 ABC (Ex), 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS
2157, at *14-18, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,435 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 1999) (granting plaintiffs'
class certification motion and denying defendants' request to conduct discovery of proposed lead
plaintiffs and class representatives; plaintiffs successfully argued that the lead plaintiffs' sworn
certifications provided all the information that defendants needed in order to challenge plaintiffs'
adequacy); compare In re DIGIInt'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., Master File No. 97-5, Memorandum Order
(D. Minn. Feb. 24, 200~) (refusing to permit defendants to depose co-lead plaintiffs who had not
been identified as proposed class representatives) with In re Grand Casinos, Inc. Sec. Litig., 181
F.R.D. 615, 619-21 (D. Minn. 1998) (recognizing need for defendant, in securities fraud
litigation, to be able to depose named plaintiffs so as to be able to rebut presumption of reliance
provided by fraud-on-the-market theory).
B.

Notice Requirements

1. Statutory Text
Section 21D(a)(3) sets forth procedures for early notice to potential class members of the
filing of a securities class action. The relevant statutory provision states:
Not later than 20 days after the date on which the complaint is filed, the plaintiff
or plaintiffs shall cause to be published, in a widely circulated national businessoriented publication or wire service, a notice advising members of the purported
plaintiff class:
(i) of the pendency of the action, the claims asserted therein, and the
purported class period; and
(ii)
that, not later than 60 days after the date on which the notice is
published, any member of the purported class may move the court to serve as lead
plaintiff of the purported class.
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15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A)(i) and 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i). See Yousefi v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 70
F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (detailing notice procedures under PSLRA); accord
Tarica v. McDermott Int'l, Inc., Civil Action No. 99-3831,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5031, at *710 (E.D. La. Apr. 13, 2000); see also Pitt, Promises Kept, 33 San Diego L. Rev. at 883
(discussing notice provision); Weiss, The Impact to Date, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 564-65 (same).

2. Application Of Notice Provisions
If multiple actions are filed on behalf of a class asserting substantially the same claim or
claims arising under either the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, only the plaintiff -- or
plaintiffs -- who filed first shall be required to cause notice to be published. See id.; Julia C.
Kou, Note, Closing the Loophole in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 73
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 253, 265-66 (1998) ("Kou, Closing the Loophole") (explicating notice provisions
ofPSLRA).

3. Timing And Content Of Notice
Under these statutory provisions, the named plaintiff in the first filed action must file
notice within twenty (20) days of filing suit in order to inform potential class members of their
right to file a motion seeking to be appointed lead plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(A)(i)
and 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i); Kou, Closing the Loophole, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 265-66.
This notice must identify the claims alleged in the lawsuit and the purported class period,
and shall inform potential class members that within sixty (60) days they may move to serve as
the lead plaintiff. See Lax, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866, at *10-16 (explicating notice
requirements of PSLRA); accord In re Aetna, Inc. Sec. Litig., MDL Docket No. 1219, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12546, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 1999); see also Kou, Closing the Loophole, 71
N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 265-66. Judge Waters has stated: "The notice requirement was included in the
PSLRA to provide a method for determining the most adequate plaintiff." Carson, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6903, at *12 (citing 1995 U.S. Code Congo & Admin. News 732).

4. Publication Of Notice
Such notice must be published in a "widely circulated national business publication or
wire service." See Kou, Closing the Loophole, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. at 265-66. In Lax, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11866, at *15, Judge Coar rejected the contention that publication of notice in
Investor's Business Daily failed to satisfy the statutory requirement:
The PSLRA does not define "widely circulated." Thus, the court must make its
own interpretation as to what the term means. In this case, the court finds that,
while Investor's Business Daily might not have as large a circulation as the Wall
Street Journal, it is nevertheless widely circulated and, more importantly,
apparently read by sophisticated investors. The likelihood of a First Merchants'
investor actually seeing a notice in the Investor's Business Daily "is arguably as
great as finding such information by skimming the back pages of the Wall Street
Journal."
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Id. (quoting Greebel v. FTP Software, 939 F. Supp. 57,63 (D. Mass. 1996)). Accord In re Nice
Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206,216 & n.8 (D.N.J. 1999); see also D'Hondt v. Digi Int'l, No. 975(JRT/RLE), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17700, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr. 2, 1997) ("Defendants do not
challenge the sufficiency of the Notice provided by means of Business Wire and, in fact, at least
one Court has held that this wire service adequately seeks to provide notice to potential class
members, including institutional investors, of pending class claims. that are subject to the
provisions of the [PSLRA]") (citing Greebel, 939 F. Supp. at 64); Tarica, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5031, at *9 ("Courts have repeatedly recognized Business Wire as a business-oriented wire
service within the meaning of the PSLRA, and as an acceptable means of publishing notice under
the statute) (citation omitted); Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 ("Since the passage of the
[PSLRA], district courts, including this Court, have repeatedly recognized that the Business Wire
as a 'widely circulated national business-oriented ... wire service,' as required by the [PSLRA].")
(citations omitted); cf. In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 105 n.10 (D.N.J. 1999) (liThe
PR Newswire appears to be a business-oriented wire service within the meaning of the PSLRA.")
(citations omitted).

5. Effect Of Failure To Give Notice
In Carson, 1998 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 6903, where plaintiff brought a purported class action
on behalf of a class of persons who purchased warrants from a Merrill Lynch offering, plaintiff
failed to comply with the disclosure and notice provisions of the PSLRA. Id. at *10. Granting
plaintiffs motion to amend his complaint, Judge Waters held that the failure to comply with the
provisions of the PSLRA is not fatal to the maintenance of a securities class action:
The PSLRA does not direct a court to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails to
comply with either the certification requirement or the notice provisions.... [I]f
Congress had wanted the courts to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff failed to
file a sworn certification or publish timely notice, then Congress could have
included such language in the PSLRA.
Id. at * 16. Accordingly, in Carson Judge Waters distinguished as dicta language to the contrary
in Chief Judge Tauro's opinion in Greebel, 939 F. Supp. at 60, where the district court stated that
"[f]ailure of the named plaintiff to file a certification with the complaint and to serve notice to
class members are fatal to maintenance of the putative class action. As Judge Waters explained:
II

Defendants contend that Greebel stands for the proposition that the complaint
must be dismissed when the plaintiff fails to comply with either the certification
or the notice requirements of the PSLRA. We disagree. The court in Greebel was
simply stating in dicta that if a plaintiff never complies with the provisions of the
PSLRA, then the class action cannot go forward. The court did not state that a
named plaintiff could not correct such a failure to comply by filing a certification
with an amended complaint and serving such notice within 20 days of the
amended complaint. Therefore, we conclude that nothing under the PSLRA
prohibits the court from allowing a plaintiff to file a sworn certification with an
amended complaint and to publish belated notice to the other purported class
members.
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Carson, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6903, at

*16-17

(footnote omitted). In that decision, Judge

Waters also stated:
The facts in Greebel are also dissimilar to the facts in the present case. In
Greebel, the parties had already reached the stage in the lawsuit where notice had
been published and other class members had·come forward and moved the court
to be appointed lead plaintiff. Thus, the court was in the process of determining
which plaintiff should be appointed lead plaintiff. At that point, it is important
that a plaintiff has properly complied with the certification and notice provisions
of the PSLRA, so that the court can determine the most adequate plaintiff to
represent the class.
Id. at *17 n.3.

The PSLRA's notice requirement has, according to one commentary, provided
unexpected benefits for plaintiffs' counsel:
One clearly unintended effect [of the PSLRA's notice provision] has been
that the notices issued by law firms announcing the filing of class actions and
providing notice of the opportunity to seek appointment as lead plaintiff have
served as public relations material for the plaintiffs' bar in soliciting new business.
Jacobson & Martin, Survey, 5 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. at 176 n.8. One plaintiffs'
lawyer has similarly observed that "the plaintiffs counsel publishing the notice may attract other
shareholders who consult with and retain him, thus enhancing his position and enabling that law
firm to become lead counsel." Savett, Observations, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 529.

III.

APPOINTMENT OF LEAD PLAINTIFFS
A.

Outline Of Procedures

The PSLRA establishes new rules requIrIng (and governing) appointment of lead
plaintiff(s). Professor Weiss has stated that the statute's lead plaintiff provisions "actually
comprise four elements," the first of which - notice to class members - is discussed above:
First, the Act requires any person filing a securities class action to provide early

notice to members of the purported class of the filing of the action, the nature of
the claims made, and the purported class period. Second, the Act instructs courts
(a) to provide an opportunity for members of the purported class to seek
appointment as lead plaintiff and (b) to appoint to that position the "most adequate
plaintiff," which a court must presume is the aspiring plaintiff "with the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class." Third, the Act directs courts to
allow other members of the purported class to engage in discovery relating to
appointment of the lead plaintiff only if they "first demonstrate[] a reasonable
basis for a finding that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff is incapable of
adequately representing the class." Finally, the Act authorizes the most adequate
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plaintiff, subject to court approval, to "select and retain counsel to represent the
class. "
Weiss, The Impact to Date, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 563-64 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted); see
also Pindus v. Fleming Cos., 146 F.3d 1224, 1225 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998) (under PSLRA, "within
110 days of the date a class -action is filed, the district court must resolve any outstanding
motions from putative class members who wish to be appointed as lead plaintiff); Martin &
Metcalf, Institutional Investors, 56 Bus. Law. at 1385 (outlining PSLRA notice procedures).
As a result, § 78u-4(a) of the Exchange Act effectively requires the district court to
appoint a lead plaintiff and lead counsel at the very beginning of securities fraud class action
litigation. See Christman v. Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 251,254 (N.D. ill. 1999)
("The PSLRA contemplates that a lead plaintiff will be appointed early in the litigation. The
PSLRA requires that notice be filed within 20 days after the complaint is filed, that motions for
appointment as lead plaintiffs be filed within 60 days after the notice is published, and that the
court consider any such motions within 90 days after the notice is published. If); see also Cendant,
182 F.R.D. at 146-47 (outlining procedures for selection of lead plaintiff(s) and lead counsel);
Chill v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 181 F.R.D. 398, 407 (D. Minn. 1998) (same); see also Yousefi,
70 F. Supp. 2d at 1066 (same); Winn v. Symons Int'l Group, No. IP 00-0310-C-B/S, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3437, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 91,364 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 21,2001) (same).

B.

Purpose Of Lead Plaintiff Provisions

In Greebel, Chief Judge Tauro stated that the "inspiration" for the PSLRA's lead plaintiff
provisions was a law review article that Professor Weiss co-authored with Professor John S.
Beckerman. 939 F. Supp. at 58 n.2. Professor Weiss claimed in a subsequent law review article
that "[0 ]ur goal in proposing a notice requirement was to provide institutional and other investors
with early notice of the pendency of a class action that had the potential to affect their rights."
Weiss, The Impact to Date, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 564 (citing Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman,
Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in
Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053, 2108-09 (1995)); see also Fisch, Class Action
Reform, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 537-39. As Judge Green commented on the procedures for selecting
lead plaintiffs under the PSLRA:
The PSLRA envisions a mixed inquisitorial/ adversarial model for
developing a record to make the Lead Plaintiff decision. In a case where more
than one group vies for Lead Plaintiff status, the Court usually receives the benefit
of the adversarial process to have the merits developed before rendering a
decision ... [W]here no opposition has been noted, Congress envisioned that the
courts still would play an independent, gatekeeping role to implement the
PSLRA. At the same time, Congress envisioned that the Court would do this with
dispatch.

In re The Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214,215 (D.D.C. 1999) (footnote omitted).
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c.

Time Periods

In several cases where the appointment of lead plaintiffs has been contested, the time
periods prescribed by Congress have not been met. As Magistrate Judge Lefkow commented:
Because the issue of appointment of lead plaintiffs has been contested, the
statutory requirement to appoint the lead plaintiff within 90 days after the
publication of early notice to class members of the litigation has not been
accomplished. See SEC Report to President and Congress on the First Year of
Practice Under the [Reform Act] at 43 (Part VI, C. 3, "The Lead Plaintiff
Provision Has Added Delay and Expense"). In light of the inevitable delay
necessitated by the motions, including an effort to launch discovery under § 78u4(a)(3)(B)(iv), the court has appointed the Minnesota State Board of Investment
(MSBI), the plaintiff which it has preliminarily concluded is the presumptively
most adequate plaintiff to represent the class, to act as interim lead plaintiff. The
court has also approved MSBI's counsel, Heins, Mills & Olson, to serve as
interim lead counsel in order that this bottleneck not prevent the litigation from
moving forward.
Raftery v. Mercury Fin. Co.,No. 97 C 624, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12439, at *2-3 (N.D. TIL Aug.
7, 1997). In a similar vein, one plaintiffs lawyer has asserted:

The [PSLRAJ produces great delay in getting the case moving to the
merits. Under the [PSLRA], the early notice to potential class members must be
filed twenty days after the first complaint is filed. The notice allows sixty days
for applications to be made for lead plaintiff, and the lead plaintiff, once selected,
hires lead counsel subject to court approval. The [PSLRA] provides that the court
should select lead plaintiff and lead counsel by ninety days, provided
consolidation has occurred.
It often takes even longer than ninety days for the court to select lead
plaintiffs and lead counsel, especially if there are competing applications.
Savett, Observations, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. at 531 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

D.

Statutory Provisions

Section 21D of the Exchange Act establishes a rebuttable presumption that the "most
adequate plaintiff," for purposes of appointment as lead plaintiff, is "the person or group of
persons" that
(aa)
has either filed the complaint or made a motion [seeking
appointment as lead plaintiff];
(bb) in the determination of the court, has the largest financial interest
in the relief sought by the class; and
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(cc)
otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I). See Reiger v. Altris Software, No. 98cv0528J(JFS), 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14705, at *5-6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 1998) (outlining lead plaintiff appointment
procedure); Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1066 (same); Cendant, 182 F.R.D. at 146-47 (same);
Martin & Metcalf, Institutional Investors, 56 Bus. Law. at 1385-86 (offering analysis of statutory
provisions and summarizing relevant case law).
E.

Rebutting The Presumption

As Judge Buchmeyer has explained the applicable procedures governing appointment of
lead plaintiffs and how the above-referenced presumption may be rebutted:
The court is directed to consider all motions made by purported class members
seeking to be appointed Lead Plaintiff and to determine the "member or members
of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of
adequately representing the interests of class members." 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(B)(i). In so determining the "most adequate plaintiff," the court is
directed to adopt a presumption that the most adequate plaintiff is the person or
group of persons that filed a motion, that "has the largest financial interest in the
relief sought by the class," and that "otherwise satisfies the requirements of Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (iii)(I).
This presumption may be rebutted only by proof of another member of the
purported plaintiff class that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff "will not
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class", or "is subject to unique
defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class~"
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B) (iii)(II).

Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 544.
Thus, a member of the purported plaintiff class who wishes to challenge the appointment
of a presumptively most adequate plaintiff must present proof that the presumptively most
adequate plaintiff "either (i) will not fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class or (ii)
is subject to unique defenses that render that plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the
class." Id. at 547 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)); see also Reiger, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14705, at *14-15; Martin & Metcalf, Institutional Investors, 56 Bus. Law. at 1387-88
("Rebutting the Presumption").
Under the PSLRA, some district courts have instituted competItIve bidding (or
"auctions") governing the selection of lead plaintiffs' counsel. See, e.g., In re Lucent
Technologies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 137, 156-57 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Banc One
Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784-85 (N.D. Ill. 2000). In two securities fraud
class actions that were consolidated for motion practice - In re Quintus Sec. Litig. and In re
Copper Mountain Networks Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. Cal. 2001) - Judge Walker issued
a lengthy opinion explaining his view of the respective lead plaintiffs' "adequacy." In one case,
the court rejected the lead plaintiff candidates with the largest losses and instead appointed the
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plaintiff who, in the court's opinion, had negotiated the best attorney's fee arrangement with
prospective class counsel. In the companion case, Judge Walker found no plaintiff with the
ability to negotiate a favorable arrangement with counsel, and so the court appointed a "nominal
lead plaintiff' and initiated a competitive bidding procedure to select class counsel. This unusual
approach, however, has not found favor with other district courts.
Indeed, in In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3 rd Cir. 2001), the Third Circuit
addressed the question of whether a district court may use an auction to select lead counsel.
Cendant, a securities fraud class action, involved the appeal of a $3.2 billion settlement of
securities fraud class action litigation; objectors to the settlement challenged the district court's
use of an auction to choose lead counsel and establish the attorney's fee compensation structure.
The Third Circuit held that the PSLRA does not generally permit an auction to select lead
counsel in a securities class action. But an auction might be permissible under limited
circumstances, which the court explained in the context of how to evaluate the lead plaintiff's
choice of counsel under the statute. The import of the court's decision was summarized by one
recent commentary:
The 3d Circuit has struck a sharp blow against the increasing use of auctions to
select lead counsel in a class action, but only in the PSLRA context. It has placed
control over counsel selection and retention under the PSLRA back into the hands
of the lead plaintiff, absent extraordinary circumstances. Other courts and circuits
will likely follow its lead in varying degrees.
Carol V. Gilden, Courts grapple with lead-counsel auctions, Nat'l L.I., Oct. 8,2001, at C6.

F.

Combinations Of Persons Or Entities

The district courts remain divided as to whether members of the class or a group of
persons (or entities) may combine to constitute the "largest financial interest" and thereby jointly
serve as the "most adequate plaintiff"; many reported cases hold that such combinations are
proper. See Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 ("[T]he majority of courts addressing this issue have
permitted the aggregation of claims.") (citing In re Advanced Tissue Sciences Sec. Litig., 184
F.R.D. 346, 353 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (allowing aggregation of six plaintiffs); In re Oxford Health
Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42,45-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (appointing three plaintiffs as lead
plaintiffs); and Chill, 181 F.R.D. at 409 (aggregating six plaintiffs)).
Judge Cedarbaum, however, rejected the appointment of six lead plaintiffs in a securities
class action, asserting that it would defeat the purpose of the PSLRA:
To allow an aggregation of unrelated plaintiffs to serve as lead plaintiffs defeats
the purpose of choosing a lead plaintiff. One of the principal legislative purposes
of the PSLRA was to prevent lawyer-driven litigation. Appointing lead plaintiff
on the basis of financial interest, rather than on a "first come, first serve" basis,
was intended to ensure that institutional plaintiffs with expertise in the securities
market and real financial interests in the integrity of the market would control the
litigation, not lawyers. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, at 31-35 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679,730,730-34. To allow lawyers to designate
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unrelated plaintiffs as a "group" and aggregate their financial stakes would allow
and encourage lawyers to direct the litigation. Congress hoped that the lead
plaintiff would seek the lawyers, rather than having the lawyers seek the lead
plaintiff.... Counsel have not offered any reason for appointing an aggregation of
unrelated institutional and individual investors as lead plaintiffs other than the
argument that the language of the statute does not expressly forbid such a result.

In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 157-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Following Judge Cedarbaum's lead, the aggregation of plaintiffs has been disallowed by
several district courts in securities fraud class actions. See, e.g., Banc One, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 783
(choosing lead plaintiff "based on the number of shares held by such an assemblage of small
holders would really subvert the purposes of the [PSLRA] by maximizing the prospect that the
lawsuit would truly be run by the lawyers and not by the client class members"); In re Network
Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (based upon assumption that
"[t]he whole point of the [PSLRA] was to install a lead plaintiff with substantive decision
making ability and authority," court held that aggregations of unrelated investors cannot satisfy
lead plaintiff provisions of PSLRA); Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 115354 ("The strictest approach forbids aggregation of unrelated plaintiffs.... *** The court adopts
this narrow view.... "); In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803,813 (N.D. Ohio 1999)
("[T]he context and structure of the PSLRA evince an intent that a 'group' consist of more than a
mere assemblage of unrelated persons who share nothing in common other than the twin
fortuities that (1) they suffered losses and (2) they entered into retainer agreements with the same
attorney or attorneys") (emphasis in original). See generally Jonathan C. Dickey, et al., Defense
Strategies in Securities Class Actions 5-6 (ALI-ABA 2001) (collecting and analyzing cases); W.
Reece Bader, Further Developments in the Lead Plaintiff/Lead Counsel Wars, 8 Securities
Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 802 (Mar. 2000) (same); R. Chris Heck, Comment, Conflict and
Aggregation: Appointing Institutional Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 u.
Chi. L. Rev. 1199, 1214-16 (1999) (same).
In Oxford Health Plans, the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association
(CoIPERA) sought appointment as sole lead plaintiff in a securities class action. In its motion,
ColPERA alleged losses in excess of $20 million due to Oxford's allegedly fraudulent activities.
A competitor for appointment as lead plaintiff - a group consisting of 35 individuals (the "Vogel
Group") - alleged collective losses of $10 million. Another institutional holder, PHBG Funds
("PHBG"), alleging an estimated $2.76 million in losses, also moved for appointment as lead
plaintiff.

The SEC filed an amicus curiae brief in support of CoIPERA's motion, "urging the court
to reject the request for multiple lead plaintiffs because it would undercut Congress' intent to
curb lawyer-driven cases." Karen Donovan, Oxford Suits Raise Lead Counsel Issue, Nat'l L.J.,
June 15, 1998 at B-1; see also Saparoff & Sisitsky, Two Years Later, Securities News at 9.
Judge Brieant, however, overruled the SEC's argument, stating that "in the circumstances of this
particular case, the interests of the proposed class will be best served by a group of three co-lead
plaintiffs." Oxford Health Plans, 182 F.R.D. at 45. Accordingly, the court appointed ColPERA,
the Vogel Group and PHBG as co-lead plaintiffs. Id. at 49. The court then appointed the three

E-15

law firms proposed by each of the respective co-lead plaintiffs as co-lead counsel. Id. at 50. In
October 1998, the Second Circuit held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider
ColPERA's appeal of the district court's denial of its motion for sole lead plaintiff status. Metro
Svcs., Inc. v. Wiggins, 158 F.3d 162 (2 nd Cir. 1988).
In the view of this author, the position taken by Judge Brieant in Oxford Health Plans
upholding the aggregation of investors (both institutional and individual) to serve as co-lead
plaintiffs clearly represents the majority (and correct) view of the PSLRA. See, e.g., In re Bank
One Shareholders Class Actions, 96 F. Supp. 2d 780 (N.D. TIL 2000) ("Pension Group" consisting of six employee benefit funds whose aggregate purchases during Class Period totaled
77,200 shares - chosen as "lead plaintiff'); Tarica, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5031, at *15-16
(court approves appointment of group of four to serve as "lead plaintiff'); In re The First Union
Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 3:99CV237-MCK, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2267, at *11-12 (W.D.N.C. Jan.
28, 2000) (approving stipulation between plaintiffs' counsel appointing two groups of investors
as co-lead plaintiffs); Baan, 186 F.R.D. at 216 ("The text of the PSLRA does not limit the
composition of a 'group of persons' to those only with a pre-litigation relationship, nor does the
legislative history provide a sound enough foundation to support such a gloss"; rejecting
appointment of 20-person group as too large to control litigation, but appointing three individual
members of 466-person shareholder group as co-lead plaintiffs); Takeda v. Turbodyne Tech.,
Inc., Case No. CV 99-00697 MMM, 7 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 783 (C.D. Cal. May 28,
1999) (rejecting proposed group of more than 100 investors, but appointing seven-person
subgroup as lead plaintiff; each of the seven had sustained losses of more than $100,000 and
subgroup included institutional investment adviser); Reiger, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14705, at
*13 ("By using the phrase 'group of persons,' Congress made clear that a court can consider the
aggregate group's losses in" determining which group has the largest financial interest. "). Cf
Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 546, 549 (recognizing that "aggregating the shares of several plaintiffs for
purposes of this calculation is proper under the statutory language," but finding that the financial
interest of a group of plaintiffs was "significantly smaller" than that of an institutional investor,
which was appointed as lead plaintiff; declining to appoint co-lead plaintiffs "as it would
inevitably delegate more control and responsibility to the lawyers for the class and make the
class representatives more reliant on the lawyers") (citing Donnkenny, 171 F.R.D. at 157-58).

Echoing Judge Cedarbaum's reasoning in Donnkenny, other district courts have
concluded that a large group of co-lead plaintiffs would be unable to control the litigation,
effectively negotiate retention agreements, and supervise the conduct of counsel. See, e.g.,
Sakhrani v. Brightpoint, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 845, 849-54 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (appoints individual
investor with greatest losses as lead plaintiff and approves his selection of two law firms as colead counsel; court criticizes practice of aggregating groups of unrelated investors as lead
plaintiffs and concludes that absent an institutional investor stepping forward, the individual with
the greatest losses should serve as lead plaintiff); Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 (refusing to
appoint group consisting of three named plaintiffs and "134 unrelated class members"; court
appointed as lead plaintiffs two shareholders -- one institutional shareholder and one individual
shareholder -- who had sustained the largest losses of the group); Baan, 186 F.R.D. at 217
(rejecting proposal that 466-member shareholder group or 20-person committee be appointed as
co-lead plaintiffs and appointing three shareholders, each with unrealized losses in excess of
$300,000, as co-lead plaintiffs); Advanced Tissue Sciences, 184 F.R.D. at 352-53 ("The idea of
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appointing over 250 unrelated individual investors as lead plaintiffs runs afoul of Congress's
intent in enacting the PSLRA"; granting alternate motion to appoint six designated group
members as co-lead plaintiffs); Chill, 181 F.R.D. at 408-09 (winnowing 300-person plaintiffs
group to six co-lead plaintiffs). See generally William F. Alderman, Recent Developments in the
Lead Plaintiff/Lead Counsel Wars, 8 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 663 (Feb. 2000)
(collecting and analyzing cases).
The SEC has taken the position that "ordinarily this group should be no more than three
to five persons." Baan, 186 F.R.D. at 215 (citing amicus curiae brief submitted by SEC); see
also Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1068 ("In fact, when courts appoint multiple class members as
lead plaintiffs, they typically appoint less than ten plaintiffs. ") (citations omitted); Memorandum
of SEC as Amicus Curiae at 8, LaPerriere v. Vesta Ins. Group, Inc., No. CY-98-AR-1407-S
(N.D. Ala. 1998) ("[T]he Court should limit the proposed lead plaintiff 'group' to a small number
capable of most effectively managing the litigation and exercising control over counsel. ").
In those districts where the courts have allowed groups of investors to serve as lead
plaintiffs, certain plaintiffs' counsel have aggressively sought to enlist shareholders to join such a
group. These tactics have led, in turn, to ethical challenges brought by competing plaintiffs'
counsel. For example, in Knisley v. Network Assocs., Inc., No. C99-1729, 8 Securities Reform
Act Litig. Rptr. 18, 59 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 1999), Judge Armstrong held that a law firm seeking
to assemble a lead plaintiff group in a securities fraud class action did not violate the PSLRA or
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct when it paid broker-dealers to distribute a notice
regarding the class action to the broker-dealers' customers who had purchased the security in
question.

G.

Discovery Regarding Most Adequate Plaintiff(s)

The PSLRA directs that discovery regarding whether a member of the purported plaintiff
class is the most adequate plaintiff may be conducted by a competing plaintiff only if that
challenger first demonstrates a reasonable basis for a finding that the presumptively most
adequate plaintiff is incapable of adequately representing the class. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(3)(B)(iv); Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 547 ("If the challenging member of the purported class can
demonstrate a reasonable basis for a finding that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff is
incapable of adequately representing the class, then discovery on the issue may be conducted
before the Court appoints a Lead Plaintiff. "); see also Martin & Metcalf, Institutional Investors,
56 Bus. Law. at 1388 (discussing when such discovery of "most adequate" plaintiff(s) is
appropriate).
In In re Cephalon Sec. Litig., No. 96-CY-0633, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10546, at *1-2
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 1996), Judge Green addressed the issue of discovery in the context of a
leadership struggle between proposed lead plaintiffs and their counsel:
Pursuant to Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ... limited discovery
relating to whether a member of the purported plaintiff class may be had where
there is a reasonable basis for finding that the presumptively most adequate
plaintiff is incapable of adequately representing the class. As Sands Point has
asserted that it is a uniquely situated institutional investor to which the Act affords
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preference in appointing the lead plaintiff, and as the Hooshmand plaintiffs have
raised concerns challenging this position, this court finds that discovery on the
issue of determining the most adequate plaintiff is appropriate.
Id.; see also Party City, 189 F.R.D. at 106 (discussing propriety of discovery directed at
proposed "most adequate" plaintiff).

H. What Do Defendants Have To Say About "Lead
Plaintiffs"?
What is the position of defendants in the event of a contest between competing "most
adequate" plaintiffs? Most courts have held that defendants have no standing in this contest,
with Magistrate Judge Erickson stating that "it is doubtful" that defendants "have standing to
object to the adequacy of the Lead Plaintiffs that have been proposed." D'Hondt, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17700, at *11 n.6 (citing Greebel, 939 F. Supp. at 60). See also Nice Sys., 188 F.R.D. at
218 n.11 ("A defendant or defendants may not object to the adequacy or typicality of the
proposed lead plaintiff at this preliminary stage of the litigation. ") (citations omitted); Baan, 186
F.R.D. at 215 n.l ("Defendants generally have been held to lack standing to challenge
appointment of lead plaintiffs.") (citations omitted); Fischler, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2875, at *6
("The plain language of the [PSLRA] dictates only members of the plaintiff class may offer
evidence to rebut the presumption in favor of the most adequate plaintiff. "). Other district courts
have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., King v. Livent, Inc., 3.6 F. Supp. 2d 187, 190
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[N]othing in the text of the [PSLRA] precludes or limits the right of
defendants to be heard on this issue"). Accord First Union, 2000 U.s. Dist. LEXIS 2267, at *6
("nothing in the [PSLRA] prevents this Court from considering the arguments raised and
authorities cited by Defendants"); Koppel v. 4987 Corp., No. 96 Civ. 7570 (RLC), 1999 u.s.
Dist. LEXIS 12340, at *24-25, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,640 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1999)
(stating that "[t]here is some disagreement as to whether the PSLRA grants standing to
defendants to challenge a motion to appoint a lead plaintiff and class counsel") (citations
omitted).
One recent commentary states the majority rule:
A recurring issue in lead plaintiff cases under the [PSLRA] is whether
defendants have standing to challenge the presumption that a particular plaintiff is
the most adequate plaintiff. The courts have generally held that defendants do

not have such standing, but each court also has noted that defendants would
have the opportunity to raise any objections in subsequent class certification
proceedings.
Jacobson & Martin, Survey, 5 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. at 173 (emphasis added). See
also Seth Goodchild & Stephenie L. Brown, Do Defendants Have Standing To Challenge Lead
Plaintiff Applicants Under the PSLRA?, 4 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 145, 148 (Nov.
1997) (asserting that "allowing defendants standing to raise challenges to the lead [plaintiff]
applicants is antithetical to the purpose underlying the PSLRA").
As noted above, the district courts have recognized that defendants' right to contest class
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certification on various grounds under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 "is preserved," even if they are
accorded no voice to contest the appointment of "lead plaintiffs." Nice Sys., 188 F.R.D. at 218
n.11 (citations omitted); accord Party City, 189 F.R.D. at 106 n.12 ("The opportunity for Party
City and/or the Individual Defendants to contest class certification on these grounds is
preserved. ") (citations omitted).

I.

Criteria For

Dete~ining

Most Adequate Plaintiff

In Gluck, 976 F. Supp. at 545-47, Judge Buchmeyer ruled that an institutional investor
was the presumptively most adequate plaintiff, noting that (i) its motion for appointment as lead
plaintiff was timely; (ii) it had the largest financial interest of any class member; and (iii) it met
the class requirements of Rule 23. In Lax, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11866, Judge Coar further
stated:
The PSLRA does not state how the court should determine who has the largest
financial interest, but four factors are surely relevant: (1) the number of shares
purchased; (2) the number of net shares purchased; (3) the total net funds
expended by the plaintiffs during the class period; and (4) the approximate losses
suffered by the plaintiffs.
Id. at *17.

As noted above, any member of the purported class may rebut the presumption upon
proof "that the presumptively most adequate plaintiff ... will not fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class ... [or] is subject to unique defenses that render such plaintiff incapable of
adequately representing the class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II) (aa), (bb). See In re
Nanophase Tech. Corp. Litig., No. 98 C 3450, 1999 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 16171, at *15, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) <J[ 90,686 (N.D. TIL Sept. 30, 1999); Martin & Metcalf, Institutional Investors, 56
Bus. Law. at 1385-86.
In ruling on such challenges, the district court can and should take into account the
individual facts and circumstances of each proposed "lead plaintiff." For example, in Ravens v.
Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 651 (N.D. Cal. 1997), Judge Walker held that the proposed plaintiffs did not
meet the statutory requirement of "most adequate plaintiff" because they did not purchase their
stock until the class period was one-half over and did so after the defendant company had issued
partial disclosures.
IV •

APPOINTMENT OF LEAD COUNSEL

A.

Statutory Text

The PSLRA requires the lead plaintiff, "subject to the approval of the court, [to] select
and retain counsel to represent the class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v); see also Nanophase,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16171, at *15 n.3; Yousefi, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1071; Gluck, 976 F. Supp.
at 545; Donnkenny, 171 F.R.D. at 158. A court may disturb the lead plaintiffs' choice of counsel
only if it appears necessary to "protect the interests of the class." Advanced Tissue, 184 F.R.D. at
353; see also Milestone, 187 F.R.D. at 175-76 (detailing statutory provisions governing
appointment of lead counsel). In Bank One, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6254, relying upon this
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statutory exception, Senior Judge Shadur recently employed a "bidding process" to select lead
counsel in a securities fraud case, choosing a law firm that had not been selected by lead
plaintiffs (an aggregation of six employee benefit funds). Id. at *15-33.
B.

Multiple Lead Counsel

In Nager, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19601, at *4-5, Judge O'Toole approved the selection
of three law firms to serve as an "executive committee" to manage the litigation, stating in·
pertinent part:
There is no question that any of the firms is qualified to represent the plaintiff
class. There is some question whether it is necessary to approve the selection of a
"committee," when anyone firm would be qualified to handle the matter.
However, because this matter now involves five consolidated cases, each initially
brought by particular plaintiffs represented by different law firms, it seems
sensible to employ the "committee" approach to minimize the potential for
disputes about the direction of the litigation. There should be no concern that
duplicative legal efforts will result in higher legal costs to the class because the
statute limits total attorneys' fees to "a reasonable percentage of the amount of any
damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class." 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(a)(6). That limit should make it a matter of indifference to the class whether a
reasonable fee is paid to one or divided among cooperating recipients.
Id.

This ruling represents the majority rule adopted by the district courts under the PSLRA..
See also Advanced Tissue, 184 F.R.D. at 353 (approving appointment of three law firms to
represent co-lead plaintiffs); In re Sunbeam Sec. Litig., No. 98-8258-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21490, at *15-16 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 1998) (appointing four law firms as
co-lead counsel and appointing two law firms as co-liaison counsel); Lax, 1997 u.S. Dist. LEXIS
11866, at *26 (approving retention of two law firms to serve as co-lead counsel, "provided that
there is no duplication of attorneys' services, and the use of co-lead counsel does not in any way
increase attorneys' fees and expenses"); In re Cephalon Sec. Litig., No. 96-CV-0633, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13492, at *2, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 99,313 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 1996)
(appointing three law firms as co-lead counsel for plaintiffs).
Some recent decisions observe that the appointment of co-lead counsel for lead plaintiffs,
or appointment of lead counsel "executive committees" is inconsistent with the PSLRA's goals
because they create a significant potential for inefficient management of the litigation and make
it more difficult for the lead plaintiff to monitor the conduct of lead counsel. See, e.g., In re Nice
Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206,221-24 (D.N.J. 1999). See also Yousefi, 70 F. SUppa 2d at 1072
(refusing to appoint three law firms as co-lead counsel; "the Court will only permit one law firm
to serve as lead counsel in this case on the basis that class interests are better served by a central
law firm"; in that case, Judge Baird of the Central District of California refused to appoint as colead counsel the Philadelphia-based law firm whose client, a Pennsylvania-based municipal
employees retirement fund, was the institutional investor that had been selected as one of two colead plaintiffs; on reconsideration, however, the court relented and appointed the disappointed
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law firm as co-lead counsel); Milestone, 187 F.R.D. at 180 (rejecting proposal that court appoint
several co-lead counsel, executive committee and liaison counsel); In re Orbital Sciences Corp.
Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 237, 240 (E.D. Va. 1999) ("[T]he purpose of the [PSLRA] favors the
choice of one law firm to act in this capacity absent a specific reason to use multiple firms")
(citing Milestone). Cf In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 114-17 (D.N.J. 1999)
(appointing co-lead counsel, but noting that this was a rare case that called for more than one
lead counsel, due to the potential size of the class and the nature of the litigation).

v.

RULE 9{B) PLEADING WITH PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT
A.

The Level Of Particularity Required

Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is applicable to securities fraud
claims, requires that allegations of fraud be specific enough to give defendants notice of the
particular misconduct so that they can defend against the charge(s) and not just deny that they
have done anything wrong. Powers, 977 F. Supp. at 1036. Rule 9(b) requires plaintiff to plead
with sufficient particularity attribution of the alleged misrepresentations or omissions to each
defendant; the plaintiff is obligated to "'distinguish among those they sue and enlighten each
defendant as to his or her part in the alleged fraud.'" Id. at 1036-37 (citation omitted); see also
Silva Run Worldwide v. Gaming Lottery Corp., No. 96 Civ. 3231(RPP), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4699, at *27, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,196 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 1998). However, "the
complaint need only provide a reasonable delineation of the underlying acts and transactions
allegedly constitut[ing] the fraud." Fischler v. AmSouth Bancorp, No. 96-1567-CIV-T-17A,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17670, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 1996) (citation omitted).
A sufficient level of factual support for a Rule 10b-5 claim maybe found where the
circumstances of the fraud are pled "in detaiL" Rehm v. Eagle Fin. Corp., 954 F. Supp. 1246,
1251 (N.D. TIL 1997). Thus, plaintiffs complaint must set forth in detail such matters as the
time, place and contents of the false representations and the identity of the person making each
representation. For each statement alleged to be false or misleading, plaintiffs must identify who
made the statement, where and when the statement was made, and why the statement was false
or misleading. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 305-06 (2 nd Cir. 2000); In re Advanta Corp.
Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525,534 (3 rd Cir. 1999); In re Grand Casinos, Inc. Sec. Litig., 988 F. Supp.
1273, 1281 (D. Minn. 1997); In re Phycor Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 3:98-0834, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2218, at *8 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 17,2000) Cherednichenko v. Quarterdeck Corp., Case No.
CV 97-4320 GHK, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *5, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,108 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 26, 1997); see also Bryant v. Apple South, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1379 (M.D. Ga. 1998)
(plaintiffs adequately pled that defendants' statements were false when made), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999);
Robertson v. Strassner, 32 F. Supp. 2d 443,448 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (same).
In the words of Judge Kimball, the PSLRA "imposes even more rigorous pleading
requirements on plaintiffs alleging fraud in the securities context" because the complaint "must
'specify each statement alleged to have been misleading' as well as 'the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading.''' Karacand v. Edwards, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (D. Utah 1999)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)); see also SEC v. ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d
1097, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (PSLRA's "more rigorous" pleading requirements "go beyond the

E-21

Rule 9(b) [pleading] requirements"). Thus, plaintiffs complaint must set forth with particularity
facts that create a strong inference that defendants knew that their statements were false or
misleading at the time they were made. See Grand Casinos, 988 F. Supp. at 1281 (allegations of
fraud concerning construction of casino were adequately pled); Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at
1110-12 (same). However, Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement is relaxed where factual
information is peculiarly within defendant's knowledge or control. See Bell v. Fore Sys., Inc., 17
F. Supp. 2d 433, 437 (W.D.Pa. 1998); Tsev. Ventana Med. Sys., No. 97-37-SLR, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16760, at *18 (D. Del. Sept. 23, 1998); Queen Uno Ltd. Partnership v. Coeur
D'Alene Mines Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1354 (D. Colo. 1998); In re MobileMedia Sec. Litig.,
28 F. Supp. 2d 901,935 (D.N.J. 1998).
B.

Allegations Based Upon

Info~ation

And Belief

Under the PSLRA, a complaint must specify each statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and if the allegation is based
on information and belief, the complaint must state with particularity all facts on which that
belief is formed. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(I). See Carney v. Cambridge Tech. Partners, Inc., 135 F.
Supp. 2d 235,
(D. Mass. 2001) (dismissing nondisclosure claims for lack of particularity
about defendants' knowledge of falsity); Sabratek Corp. v. Keyser, No. 99 Civ. 8589 (HB), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4981, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19,2000) (same). In Chalverus v. Pegasystems,
Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 226, 233 (D. Mass. 1999), the court held that investors provided required
factual support for allegations of revenue overstatement by company made on "information and
belief" by listing SEC filings and news stories containing optimistic statements regarding
company's earnings. See also In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., Civil Action No. 1:99-CV141-TWT, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3676, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) en 91,362 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 2,
2001) (permitting claims to proceed once plaintiffs identified insider statement that contradicted
contemporaneous public declarations; detailing standards for "information and belief' pleading
under PSLRA).
However, in Branca v. Paymentech, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:97-CV-2507-L, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1704 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2000), Judge Lindsay reached the opposite conclusion:
Plaintiffs have not met their duty to plead "with particularity" the facts supporting
their belief that these statements are actually [actionable] misrepresentations ...
Plaintiffs' general statement that the allegations in the Complaint are based on
public filings, news articles, press releases, analyst reports, and meetings with
consultants does not sufficiently identify the facts upon which Plaintiffs' beliefs
are based. Plaintiffs have not identified the particular articles, releases, filings,
documents, or other information, including the substance of the meetings with
consultants, that would support their allegations that Defendants made false
representations....
Id. at *22-23 (citations omitted).

Numerous plaintiffs have sought to "plead around" the statutory requirements by alleging
that their claims are based upon "an investigation of counsel" or "information obtained from
former employees" of the defendant company, rather than "information and belief"; however, the
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courts are divided on whether this strategy passes muster under the PSLRA. Indeed, the courts
are sharply divided on whether plaintiffs must divulge the sources of their information in order to
allege falsity with the requisite particularity. Compare In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
970 F. Supp. 746, 763 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (rejecting plaintiffs' characterization of their complaint
as "based upon the investigation of their counsel" and holding that "because the sources [cited]
do not provide plaintiffs with personal knowledge, the complaint must be based on information
and belief "), aff'd, 183 F.3d 970, 985 (9 th Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiffs to divulge sources of
information in order to allege falsity with requisite particularity) with Novak, 216 F.3d at 313
(finding that if sources must be revealed in order to provide an adequate basis for believing that
statements were false, plaintiffs generally may provide particularized information about the
source's position rather than stating the source's name). The Second Circuit's holding in Novak
that named identification of confidential sources was not required was followed by district courts
(N.D. Ga. 2001), and Fitzer
in In re Theragenics Corp. Sec. Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1342,
v. Security Dynamics Tech., 119 F. Supp. 2d 12,
(D. Mass. 2000).
One commentator sought to elucidate the applicable rules of pleading and procedure:
Section 21D(b)(1) of the [PSLRA] imposes a tough standard for pleading
securities fraud which can provide the basis for attacking an "information and
belief" complaint that is distinct from that available under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 9(b).
In responding to a securities fraud complaint, defense counsel initially should
determine whether the complaint, wholly or in part, is pled on information and
belief. Such a determination depends, significantly, on whether the facts
supporting the allegations are within plaintiffs or a third-party's knowledge.
Where the allegations are stated to be based on facts acquired through counsel's
investigation - and even when plaintiff denies that the allegations are based on
information and belief - defense counsel may still be able to prevail on an
argument that the complaint is based on information and belief and is required,
but fails to meet the "particularity" requirements of [Section] 21D(b)(1) of the
[PSLRA].
By the same token, in preparing a complaint, counsel should give careful
consideration to whether some or all of the allegations are based on information
and belief. Those which are should include a statement of the actual sources
relied upon. A boilerplate clause generally describing the types of documents
reviewed is inadequate. Where third party witnesses, such as consultants or
former employees, are referred to as having supplied information that forms the
basis of the complaint, they, too, should be identified in the complaint.
Miranda S. Schiller & Haron W. Murage, "Information and Belief" Pleading Under the Reform
Act, 8 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 8, 12-13 (Oct. 1999) (footnote omitted).
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VI.

PLEADING SECTION lOeB) VIOLATIONS
A.

Primary Violators Only:

No Aiding Or Abetting Liability

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the "use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security, ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b). Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the SEC under § 10(b), makes it unlawful for any person
"to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements made in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
To state a claim under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5, plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1)
made a misstatement or an omission of a material fact; (2) with scienter; (3) in connection with
the purchase or the sale of a security; (4) upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied; and (5) that
the plaintiff's reliance was the proximate cause of his or her injury. See Semerenko v. Cendant
Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3 rd Cir. 2000).
Only primary participants in a violation of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 may be held liable.
Section 1O(b)/Rule 10b-5 did not create liability for aiding and abetting the securities violations
of others; such secondary participation is beyond the scope of the statute. Central Bank, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994); see also Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031,
1040 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing claims against defendants who were not specifically alleged to
have made false or misleading statements that did not fall within scope of group-published
information).

B.
"Secondary" Actor's Misconduct May Lead To Primary
Liability
However, primary liability under Section 10(b)/SEC Rule 10b-5 may be imposed "'not
only on persons who made fraudulent misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge
of the fraud and assisted in its perpetration.'" SEC v. First Jersey Sec., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d
Cir. 1996) (quoting Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512,517 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also In
re Health Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). The Second
Circuit has held that more than significant participation by the "secondary" actor is needed to
incur primary liability. Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997). The
misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor at the time of publication
dissemination, that is, in advance of the investment decision. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152
F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit has held that "secondary" parties may be
primarily liable for statements made by others in which the former significantly participated. In
re Software Toolworks Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615 (9th eire 1995). See generally Jill E. Fisch,
Symposium: The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for
Secondary Defendants, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1293 (1999).

C.

The Elements Plaintiff Must Allege To State A Claim

1. Introduction
To state a valid claim for violations of Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5, plaintiff must allege
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that defendant (1) made a misstatement or omission, (2) of material fact, (3) with scienter, (4) in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, (5) upon which the plaintiff relied, and (6) that
reliance proximately caused the plaintiffs injury. In re Peritus Software Svcs., Inc., 52 F. Supp.
2d 211, 219 (D. Mass. 1999); Bryant, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1377; see also Powers, 977 F. Supp. at
1037. Chief Judge Young elucidated the pleading requirements established by the PSLRA:
[A] securities fraud plaintiff must allege with particularity the who, what, when,
where, and why of each materially false or misleading misrepresentation or
omission. This Court concludes that [plaintiff] has satisfied this requirement.
The Complaint sets forth the content of each statement alleged to be false or
misleading, the name of the speaker, the date on which each statement was made,
the document in which each statement was made public, and a detailed
explanation of why each statement was false.
Chalverus, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 232-33 (citations omitted).

2. Falsity
Plaintiffs securities fraud complaint must set forth what is false and misleading about the
statement and why it is false. See Chalverus, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 232-33 (quoted above);
Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1308 (complaint alleged in sufficient detail precise dates,
manner, content and nature of statements alleged to be fraudulent); In re Olympic Finan. Ltd.
Sec. Litig., Civil File No. 97-496, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14789, at *5-11 (D. Minn. Sept. 10,
1998) (refusing to dismiss claims alleging misrepresentation of nature of loan portfolio and
mischaracterization of loans as "prime"); Warman v. Overland Data, Inc., Case No. 97cv833 JM,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2009, at *9-10, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,167 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 23,
1998) (same; failure to disclose problems with products). Plaintiffs may satisfy this requirement
by alleging facts demonstrating "'that the statements failed to reflect the company's true
condition at the time the statements were made.'" Id. (citation omitted).
A complaint must set forth precisely what statements or omissions were made in what
documents or oral presentations, who made the statements, the time and place of the statements,
the contents of the statements or manner in which they misled the plaintiff, and what defendants
gained as a consequence. In re Valujet, Inc., Sec. Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1472, 1477 (N.D. Ga.
1977); see also Summit Med., 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (Rule 9(b) pleading requirements held
satisfied).

3. Materiality
A fact is material if it is substantially likely that the fact would be viewed by a reasonable
investor as significantly altering the "total mix" of information available, and if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important to the investment
decision. Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43,49 (1 st Cir. 1999); Marksman Partners,
927 F. Supp. at 1305; see also Bryant, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1379; Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23107, at *12; Valujet, 984 F. Supp. at 1478; Varljen, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10493, at
*18. Ordinarily, whether a fact is material is a jury question requiring assessment of inferences
that a reasonable investor would draw from a given set of facts. Marksman Partners, 927 F.
Supp. at 1306; Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *12-13 (refusing to dismiss
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complaint on materiality grounds; "[W]e cannot conclude that none of the alleged
misrepresentations would have significantly altered the 'total mix' of information available to the
market"); Valujet, 984 F. Supp. at 1478 (same; airline's safety record was material).

4. Duty to Disclose
If defendant chooses to reveal relevant, material information even though it had no duty
to do so, there is a duty to make the disclosure complete and accurate. In re Boeing Sec. Litig.,
40 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1167 (W.D. Wash. 1998); see also Schaffer v. Evolving Sys., Inc., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 1213, 1221 (D. Colo. 1998) (defendants released only positive financial information
but should have revealed potentially negative information as well).
Plaintiff must show that the defendant had a duty to disclose arising from a relationship
of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction. Vento & Co. of New York, LLC v.
Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7751 (JGK), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3020, at *25,
·Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,460 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1999). A duty to disclose arises when
there is (1) insider trading; (2) a statute or regulation requiring disclosure; (3) an inaccurate,
incomplete or misleading prior disclosure; and/or (4) when one of two parties to a securities
transaction "'possess superior knowledge, not readily available to the other, and knows that the
other is acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge.'" Id. at *26 (citation omitted). Insiders are
defined as those who are in a special relationship with the corporation and are thereby privy to
confidential information. Insiders assume an affirmative duty of disclosure when trading in
shares of their own corporation. Tse v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., Civil Action No. 97-37-SLR,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16760, at *28, *30 n.11 (D. Del. Sept. 23,1998).
Statements may be rendered false and misleading by the failure to fully disclose
information. A ""'duty to speak the full truth arises when a defendant undertakes the duty to say
anything."'" Zuckerman, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (defendants' statements held actionable as
unfounded predictions) (citation omitted). Defendant has duty to disclose or abstain from insider
trading. See Bryant, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (plaintiffs satisfied pleading requirements for Rule
10b-5 violation based upon insider trading); Voit, 977 F. Supp. at 368-69 (trading on non-public
information creates duty to disclose).

D.

Pleading Scienter Under The PSLRA
1. Introduction: The Circuits Are Divided

To sufficiently allege scienter, the complaint must "state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added). "However, the [PSLRA] does not give a good definition of
'strong inference,'" Schaffer, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1225, and the circuit and district courts are clearly
divided as to the methods by which a plaintiff can plead scienter. See, e.g., Phillips v. LeI Int'l,
Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 621 (4 th Cir. 1999) ("We have not yet determined which pleading standard
best effectuates Congress's intent. Nor need we do so here because the stockholders have failed
to allege facts sufficient to meet even the most lenient standard possible under the PSLRA, the
two-pronged Second Circuit test."; affirming dismissal of complaint alleging that company had
falsely claimed that it was not for sale in order to depress its stock price and facilitate merger;
there was no motive for scienter because contentions that corporate officer somehow benefited
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from depressing company's stock price were too speculative); see also In re Ciena Corp. Sec.
Litig., Civil No. JFM-98-2946, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7305, at *17-18 (D. Md. May 15,2000)
(same); Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 804 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("We do not address ... the
question of what exactly a 'strong inference' of the appropriate scienter is, an issue that has vexed
the courts since the PSLRA's enactment.") (citing circuit and district court opinions); In re Next
Level Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., Case No. 97 C 7362,2000 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 149, at *3-13, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,738 (N.D. TIl. Jan. 4, 2000) (refusing to reconsider prior denial of company's
motion to dismiss for failure to plead scienter, and reiterating that plaintiff had sufficiently pled
scienter through circumstantial evidence of company's recklessness; surveying previous
decisions addressing scienter pleading requirements under PSLRA); In re Orbital Sciences Corp.
Sec. Litig., 58 F. Supp. 2d 682, 688 n.6 (E.D. Va. 1999) (after noting that the "[t]he Fourth
Circuit has yet to determine the point at which a Complaint will suffice to meet this standard"
and that "the other circuits are deeply divided in this regard," stating that "[t]he Court need not
determine the appropriate interpretation [of the PSLRA] to use, because whether applied to a test
of motive and opportunity or to a test of heightened recklessness, unusual insider trading is
sufficient to create a strong inference of recklessness"; holding that insiders' sales of 15% and
72% of stockholdings during class period created strong inference of scienter) (citation omitted).
See generally Laura R. Smith, Comment, The Battle Between Plain Meaning and Legislative
History: Which Will Decide the Standard for Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995?, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 577 (1999); Miranda S. Schiller & Haron
w. Murage, The Circuit Courts Divide on Key Securities Litigation Reform Act Issue, 8
Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 406 (Dec. 1999); Richard H. Walker & J. Gordon Seymour,
Recent Judicial and Legislative Developments Concerning the Private Securities Fraud Class
Action, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 1003 (1998).

2. The Second Circuit Standard
a. "Motive and Opportunity"
Prior to the PSLRA's enactment, in the Second Circuit a strong inference of fraudulent
intent could be established in a securities fraud case either (1) "by alleging facts that constitute
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness" or (2) "by alleging
facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud." The High View
Fund, L.P. v. Hall, 27 F. Supp. 2d 420, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Shields v. Citytrust
Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2 nd Cir. 1994); see also In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 187
F.R.D. 133, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

b. The Press Decision and Its Progeny
Following enactment of the PSLRA, there was some confusion among the district courts
as to the level of pleading scienter required by the statute. See High View Fund, 27 F. Supp. 2d
at 426 n.2 (collecting cases and holding that allegations of officers' misuse of funds cannot
support inference of scienter for earlier alleged misrepresentations); Holding v. Nu-Tech BioMed, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 0764 (HB), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20399, at *11, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) <j[ 90,417 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 1998) ("The PSLRA raised the bar at the pleading stage and
requires the allegation of facts that give rise to a strong inference of reckless or conscious
behavior on behalf of the defendant. ") (citation omitted).
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In one of the first appellate court opinions addressing the issue, however, the Second
Circuit held (albeit without much analysis) that the PSLRA "heightened the requirement for
pleading scienter to the level used by the Second Circuit." Press v. Chemical Inv. Svcs. Corp.,
166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2 nd Cir. 1999). In Press, the plaintiff purchased a $100,000 Treasury Bill
through a registered broker-dealer. After he had purchased it, he was told that he could not pick
up a check for the proceeds in New York City on the date of maturity but, rather, would have to
wait for the proceeds to arrive via regular mail. (He could, however, have the proceeds sent via
express mail or wire transfer for an additional fee.)

Press sued the broker-dealer and its clearing firm, alleging that they fraudulently failed to
disclose that the funds would not be immediately available to him at maturity. He alleged that
the yield should have been calculated over a longer period of time, thus making the advertised
. yield fraudulently inaccurate. He also claimed that defendants had structured the transaction in
this manner to allow themselves more time to use the funds.
Defendants sought dismissal of Press's complaint, contending that he had not pled
scienter in accordance with the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirement. After citing the
statute's requirement that a plaintiff must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind," 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2), the
Second Circuit stated without analysis that this requirement could be satisfied by its traditional
two-pronged standard. 166 F.3 fd at 538. Under this standard, fraud could be established by
allegations of either (1) "both motive and opportunity to commit fraud" or (2) "strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness." Id. (citation omitted).
The Press court also noted that it had "been lenient in allowing scienter issues to
withstand summary judgment based on fairly tenuous inferences" because "we are not inclined to
create a nearly impossible pleading standard when the 'intent' of a corporation is at issue." Id.
The investor in Press alleged that defendants "had a motive to keep possession of his proceeds to
have the 'float' or use of the funds," and that they "had the opportunity to do this since the
proceeds of the T-bill at maturity were in their control." Id. While characterizing the allegations
before it as "the barest of all pleading that would be acceptable," the Second Circuit nevertheless
found that they were sufficient to satisfy the PSLRA. Id.
In Stevelman v. Atlas Research, Inc., 174 F.3d 79 (2 nd Cir. 1999), the Second Circuit
found that violations of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or SEC accounting
rules were not, in and of themselves, sufficient to support an inference of scienter. Id. at 84.
However, the appellate court found that the "motive an.d opportunity" test could be satisfied by
the fact that the CEO, along with other officers, "sold off large portions of his stock holdings
during the period of the misrepresentations." Id. at 85. As the court elaborated:
Some of the sales occurred after the representations were made, several officers
made large sales, and a motive for inflation of the stock price can be inferred from
these sales. Moreover, the statements that continued to be made after the sales
that followed the earlier statements could well be probative of an intent to keep
the stock price high in order to avoid detection of the alleged fraud.
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174 F.2d at 86. Thus, the court held that the insider trading, in combination with the timing of
the misrepresentations, satisfied the pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA. Id.
More recently, in Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2 nd Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit
reaffirmed that the PSLRA
•
•
•
•

Did not change .the substantive standard of scienter and, therefore, continued to include
recklessness
Would permit facts raising a strong inference of state of mind or evidence including
motive and opportunity to defraud to satisfy a scienter allegation
Would not require name identification of confidential informants who provide a basis for
"information and belief' allegations
Would not require all information upon which "information and belief' pleadings were
based

See also In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 74-76 (2 nd Cir. 2001) (reversing district
court decision holding that securities fraud plaintiff's complaint was not sufficiently particular
and that it failed to allege facts showing a strong inference of scienter; investor relations officer's
sale of 80% of his stock within single week following material, negative event that went
unreported met "motive and opportunity" test for pleading scienter; court also followed Novak's
rule on pleading on "information and belief'); see also In re Carter-Wallace Sec. Litig., 220 F.3d
36, 39 (2 nd Cir. 2000).

The Second Circuit has made clear, however, that a strong inference of scienter does not
arise merely by pleading facts that are common to all corporate insiders. See Chill v. General
Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 268 (2 nd Cir. 1996). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that
"defendants benefited in some concrete and personal way from the purported fraud," Novak, 216
F.3d at 307-08, and received "special benefit" not shared by all corporate insiders or all
shareholders. Kalnit v. Eichler, 224 F.3d 131, 142 (2 nd Cir. 2001).

c. District Courts Apply The Second Circuit's "Motive and
Opportunity" Test
In a variety of factual settings, district courts within the Second Circuit have applied the
"motive and opportunity" formulation for pleading scienter. See, e.g., In te Complete Mgmt. Sec.
Litig., No. 99 Civ. 1454 (NRB), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3663, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Cj[ 91,361
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2001) (company failed to disclose that its critical receivables were tainted by
fraud and uncollectible; scienter alleged as to individual officers because collectibles were huge
proportion of business and defendants were members of top management; company's need to
inflate share value to conduct acquisitions was evidence of motive to commit fraud); In re
Revlon, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99 Civ. 10192 (SHS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3265 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
27, 2001) (denying motion to dismiss claims that defendants prematurely booked revenue,
dumped inventory, and engaged in counterproductive cost-cutting measures in order to inflate
revenue; scienter was satisfied by allegations of defendants' monitoring and awareness of
challenged practices); Rizzo v. MacManus Group, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 772 (WHP), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3655, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <JI 91,354 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001) (denying motion to
dismiss claims by former CEO who negotiated a severance agreement and received payment for
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his stock after receiving misleading representations about the prospect of an imminent merger;
plaintiff alleged that defendants "knew but concealed" material information); Fellman v. Electro
Optical Sys. Corp., No. 98 Civ. 6403,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5324, at *29-30 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25,
2000) (allegations that defendant corporate insiders were compensated via direct payment, stock
ownership, or through other "financial dealings" were insufficient to allege their motivation to
commit fraud); In re MCI Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99-CV-3136 (ILG), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5038, at *16-22 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13,2000) (denying motion to dismiss claims by former
shareholders of acquired company who alleged that acquirer had implied that it had no plans just
days before completing takeover; plaintiffs asserted that MCI was motivated to deflate SkyTel's
stock price in order to keep the acquisition price lower and yet make terms of offer more
attractive to SkyTel shareholders); In re American Bank Note Holographies, Inc. Sec. Litig., No.
99 Civ. 0412 (CM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5367, at *51-60 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2000) (denying
motion to dismiss securities fraud claims against officers and company that spun off subsidiary
whose financial statements were seriously misstated and subsequently went bankrupt; alleged
GAAP violations were so large and perpetuated for such a long time that court found that they
created strong circumstantial evidence of scienter, even though plaintiffs failed to alleged
individual defendants' motive to commit fraud).
In one case, In re Fine Host Corp. Sec. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 61 (D. Conn. 1998), Judge
Hall held that the language in the PSLRA relating to "information and belief" pleading applies
only to pleading fraud, not scienter. Thus, there is no requirement that plaintiff plead the source
of the information upon which the allegations regarding a particular defendant's scienter are
based. In that case, the court held that allegations of specific facts indicating that a defendant
corporate officer had falsified the company's financial statements were sufficient to plead
scienter, where plaintiffs alleged that he admitted in a telephone call that he had knowingly (and
improperly) capitalized current expenses to increase the company's earnings.

d.

Other District Courts Apply "Motive and Opportunity"

Numerous district courts in other circuits "have concluded that Congress did not intend
for the [PSLRA] to abolish" the "motive and opportunity" formulation for pleading scienter. See
Branca, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1704, at *17 ("Because the PSLRA did not amend or alter
existing pleading standards, the court joins those other courts who have recognized the
continuing validity of the motive and opportunity test for pleading scienter. ") (citations omitted);
In re Datastream Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., CIA No. 6:99-0088-13, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1468, at
*8 n.3, *9 (D.S.C. Jan. 31,2000) (noting that "the Fourth Circuit has not adopted a standard for
pleading scienter under the PSLRA" but asserting that "this Court believes the Second Circuit
offers a sufficient standard for determining whether a 'strong inference' exists"; upholding
complaint's allegations of defendants' motive and opportunity); McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals
Ltd., 57 F. Supp. 2d 396, 408 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (citations omitted) (dismissing securities fraud
action against potential business partner and underwriter, financial adviser, securities analysts
and engineering consultant of company that allegedly misrepresented its gold reserves;
complaint's reliance on "must have known" scienter grounded in defendants' visits to site gold
reserves held insufficient to plead scienter, even under "motive and opportunity" test); Next
Level, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149, at *12 (asserting that "[t]he majority of courts agree with the
Second Circuit, including those within this district [N.D. lil.]") (citations omitted); In re
BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 976, 990-91 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (permitting
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plaintiffs to proceed with claims that merger partner failed to disclose major investment losses
and that merger was falsely portrayed as marriage of equals; expressly adopting Second Circuit
"motive and opportunity" standard for pleading scienter); In re Transcrypt Int'l Sec. Litig., No.
4:98CV3099, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17540, at *23 (D. Neb. Nov. 4, 1999) ("The Second Circuit
has led the way in interpreting the PSLRA and specifically addressing the scienter requirement
for claims under' 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.") (citing Press). See generally Lisa A. Herrera,
Comment, Will Motive, Opportunity or Recklessness No Longer Constitute Scienter for Fraud?
A Survey of Recent Federal District Court Decisions After the Enactment of the 1995 Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 26 Pepp. L. Rev. 379 (1999).

3. The Third Circuit Follows Second Circuit Decisions On "Motive And
Opportunity"
a. The Advanta Decision
In In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3 fd Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit stated

that the PSLRA's requirement for pleading scienter mirrors that previously adopted in the Second
Circuit, holding that it "remains sufficient" for plaintiffs to plead scienter by alleging facts
"establishing a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud, or by setting forth facts that
constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior." Id. at 534-35
(citations omitted). "Motive and opportunity, like all other allegations of scienter (intentional,
conscious, or reckless behavior) must now'be supported by facts stated 'with particularity' and
must give rise to a 'strong inference' of scienter." Id. at 535 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)).
Advanta involved a class action against a credit card issuer that attracted new customers
with unusually low introductory interest rates ("teaser" rates) that remained in effect for a limited
period of time, after which the interest rate would then return to a higher, permanent level.
Advanta shareholders brought suit against the corporation and several of its officers, alleging that
they had made false and misleading statements and material admissions regarding the company's
earnings potential.

The focus of the securities fraud litigation was a $20 million loss that Advanta announced
in the first quarter of 1997. In September 1996 -- about six months before this loss -- one of
Advanta's officers had projected a "large increase in revenues" as Advanta converted more than
$5 billion in accounts from teaser rates to its normal interest rate. 180 F.3 fd at 528. Nine months
later -- and three months following Advanta's announcement of its first quarter 1997 loss -Advanta's chairman and former CEO explained that "[w]hat happened is that when the
introductory period ended, we were probably not as aggressive as we could have been" in
repricing the interest rates. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that the latter statement (Alter statement)
demonstrated that the earlier statement (Point) statement was fraudulent when made. They also
alleged that Advanta had made a series of false "positive portrayals" about its earnings and
future. Id.
The Third Circuit found that the "precise extent to which Congress intended to adopt the
Second Circuit standard is not clear," ide at 531, and that the PSLRA's legislative history on this
point was "ambiguous and even contradictory." Id. Given the contradictory and inconclusive
nature of the legislative history, the appellate court instead focused on the statute's plain
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language "requir[ing] the plaintiff to allege facts supporting a 'strong inference' of ... the required
state of mind." Id. at 533-34. Because this language "closely mirrors" the language employed
by the Second Circuit, ide at 533, the Third Circuit concluded that
Congress's use of the Second Circuit's language compels the conclusion that the
[PSLRA] establishes a pleading standard approximately equal to that of the
Second Circuit. Because the Second Circuit standard was regarded as the most
restrictive prior [to] the [PSLRA], this interpretation is consistent with Congress's
stated intent of strengthening pleading requirements and deterring frivolous
securities litigation.
Id. at 534.

The court also held that recklessness was still sufficient to satisfy the scienter
requirement, and that the PSLRA "did not purport to alter the substantive contours of scienter."

Id.

Unlike the Second Circuit's opinion in Press, 166 F.3 fd at 538, in Advanta the Third
Circuit conducted an in-depth analysis of the PSLRA's legislative history to arrive at a similar
standard. 180 F.3 fd at 530-33. Advanta sought to determine congressional intent by reviewing
the legislative debate surrounding the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,
which included a discussion regarding the pleading requirements necessary to allege scienter
under the PSLRA. Id. at 533.
The Third Circuit found that the pleading at issue did not satisfy its standard. Id. at 539.
First, the statement that Advanta "'will experience a large increase in revenues'" was found to be
a "forward-looking" statement under the PSLRA. Id. Accordingly, it was protected under the
PSLRA's safe harbor, unless it was made with "actual knowledge" that it was false and
misleading. Id.
Plaintiffs argued that the falsity of the statement was proven by Advanta's CEO's later
statement that "'we were probably not as aggressive as we could have been'" in repricing the
company's interest rates. The Third Circuit found that this was not sufficient to support an
inference that Advanta had actual knowledge that the forward-looking statement was false at the
time it was made:
The complaint's only specific factual allegation regarding the falsity of the Point
statement is the existence of the Alter statement some nine months later. But the
Point statement and the Alter statement are not inconsistent: Point stated in
September 1996 that Advanta planned to reprice its teaser rates to 17%; nine
months later, Advanta expressed regret that Advanta did not reprice to that level.
Id. Accordingly, the appellate court found that the statement was protected by the safe harbor

provision for forward-looking statements under the PSLRA.
The Third Circuit also found that the plaintiffs had not alleged facts sufficient to support
an inference that the positive portrayals of Advanta's business were made with scienter. Id. at
539. The court found that these positive portrayals fell into two categories: "accurate reports of
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past earnings" and "non-actionable expressions of optimism for the future." Id. With respect to
the first category, the Third Circuit states that "[fJactual recitations of past earnings, so long as
they are accurate, do not create liability under Section 10(b)" of the Exchange Act. Id. at 538
(citation omitted). The second category of statements, expressing optimism for the future, were
found to "'constitute no more than 'puffery' and are understood by reasonable investors as such. '"
Id. (citation omitted).
Even if these positive portrayals had been materially misleading, the Third Circuit found
that the complaint should still be dismissed because it contained no more than conclusory
allegations that the "defendants must have been aware of the impending losses by virtue of their
positions within the company." Id. at 539. Such "[g]eneralized imputations of knowledge do not
suffice," the court held, "regardless of the defendants' positions within the company." Id.
b. Third Circuit District Court Opinions
District courts within the Third Circuit have applied the standard for alleging scienter in a
wide variety of securities fraud cases. See, e.g., In re Reliance Sees. Litig., MDL Docket No.
1304, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5111 (D. Del. Apr. 19, 2000) (refusing to dismiss claims by
shareholders who objected to failure of officers, directors and an outside accounting firm to
disclose seriously deteriorating state of company's loan portfolio; substantial inference of
recklessness held established by combination of GAAP violations, fact that loan losses were
increasing substantially at same time that reserves were declining substantially, and fact that new
chief financial officer identified problem quickly after taking office); In re Cendant Corp. Sec.
Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536-38 (D.N.J. 1999) (permitting investment management firm to
proceed with § 10(b) claims against company and two executives who assured plaintiff that
original announcement of need for income restatement was accurate when, soon thereafter,
company had to substantially increase size of restatement; sufficient allegations of scienter found
where individual defendants were aware of requests for very large transfers of money from
merger reserves into income statements, thereby exceeding the size of original restatement; court
noted that one of the insiders had sold all of his shares in the company before the original report
was issued); In re Tel-Save Sec. Litig., Master File No. 98-CV-3145, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16800, at *16, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <J[ 90,693 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 1999) ("After the [PSLRA],
catch-all allegations that defendants stood to benefit from wrongdoing and had the opportunity to
implement a fraudulent scheme are no longer sufficient, because they do not state facts with
particularity or give rise to a strong inference of scienter ... a defendant's motive and opportunity
to commit fraud must be clearly stated by the plaintiff"; denying securities fraud .claims against
officer of company that disguised marketing expenses and artificially inflated financial
statements; complaint alleged his direct participation in scheme and he had direct financial
interest in propping up stock price to better enable sale of his shares and use them as collateral
for loan); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 60 F. Supp. 2d 354, 369 (D.N.J. 1999) (denying most
of motion to dismiss by defendants charged with omissions and misleading disclosures of
accounting irregularities that later required substantial downward restatement of revenue;
scienter held sufficiently pled because individual defendants were company insiders privy to
knowledge of problems and many of them engaged in substantial stock sales during class period;
allegations also supported strong inference of reckless on part of accounting firm defendant);
Kenilworth Partners L.P. v. Cendant Corp., 59 F. Supp. 2d 417, 428 (D.N.J. 1999) (claims
dismissed because complaint alleged little more than that corporate officer and director
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defendants "must have known" of the true facts simply by virtue of their positions at company;
"if the court inferred scienter from mere fact of director's position, then 'executives of virtually
every corporation in the United States would be subject to fraud allegations"') (citation omitted).

c.

Other District Courts Follow Advanta

District courts in other circuits have followed the Third Circuit's formulation of the
PSLRA's scienter requirement. See, e.g., In re Green Tree Finan. Corp. Stock Litig., 61 F. Supp.
2d 860, 870 (D. Minn. 1999) ("The Court believes the Advanta court's analysis of the issue may
be the most persuasive, and, to the extent 'motive and opportunity' remains a valid inquiry,
Advanta's admonishment regarding the PSLRA's heightened pleading requirements correctly
states the plaintiffs' burden."; court dismissed claims that company's failure to promptly disclose
erroneous loan prepayment assumption that affected incentive-based compensation did not
suffice as scienter; while defendants' compensation was based on company's earnings, they could
not profit from artificially inflated earnings because they suffered substantial losses when
earnings were restated; individual defendants' increase in shareholdings during class period
countered alleged motive to defraud shareholders); accord In re Engineering Animation Sec.
Litig., Civil No. 4-99-CV-I0117, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5118, at *20-22 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 24,
2000) (following Advanta and Green Tree); In re Spyglass, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99 C 512, 1999
u.s. Dist. LEXIS 11382, at *20, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) CJ[ 90,607 (N.D. TIL July 21, 1999)
("[t]he scienter requirement can still be established by a motive and an opportunity to commit
fraud, or by establishing facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of reckless or conscious
behavior"; "The change made by the PSLRA is that the complaint itself now must allege
particular facts supporting a strong inference of scienter as to each defendant."; holding that
individual officer defendants' sale of 34% to 94% of their stockholdings during three-month class
period was unusual enough to support inference of scienter) (citations omitted); Coates v.
Heartland Wireless Comm., Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (indicating that in
the absence of post-PSLRA guidance from the Fifth Circuit, it would follow Third Circuit
approach); Hartsell v. Source Media, Inc., No. 3:98-CV-1980-R, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13082,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 1999) (reiterating that "allegations of 'motive and opportunity' are
sufficient to satisfy" scienter pleading requirement); RGB Eye Assocs., P.A. v. Physicians Res.
Group, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:98-CV-1715-D, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17665, at *25, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) CJ[ 90,711 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 28, 1999) (dismissing action brought by physicians
against medical support company that misrepresented its abilities in order to win contract with
plaintiffs; plaintiffs failed to allege "motive and opportunity" scienter because only motive
asserted was defendants' general desire to preserve capital by offering stock to plaintiffs and this
was too general a motive to support scienter under PSLRA).
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4. Other Formulations Of The Scienter Pleading Requirement
a. Introduction
Some courts hold that "motive facts can be considered in determining whether the
complaint raises a strong inference of scienter, even though satisfaction of the motive test alone
does not conclusively establish an inference of the required state of mind" under the PSLRA.
McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 57 F. Supp. 2d 396, 411 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (collecting cases).

b. Silicon Graphics: The Ninth Circuit's Approach
In a district court opinion issued following enactment of the PSLRA, Judge Smith held
that in order to state a private securities fraud claim, "plaintiffs must create a strong inference of
knowing or intentional misconduct," explaining that "[m]otive, opportunity, and non-deliberate
recklessness may provide some evidence of intentional wrongdoing, but are not alone sufficient
to support scienter unless the totality of the circumstances creates a strong inference of fraud."
Silicon Graphics, 970 F. Supp. at 757. Judge Zilly termed this the "Second Circuit plus" test for
determining whether plaintiffs have adequately pled scienter. In re Boeing Sec. Litig., 40 F.
Supp. 2d 1160, 1176 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (holding that knowing misstatements and defendants'
motive to complete corporate merger were sufficient to establish a strong inference of scienter).
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's Silicon Graphics decision, district courts within the circuit
were divided as to what allegations of scienter passed muster under the PSLRA. Compare In re
Ascend Comm. Sec. Litig., No. CV 97-8861 MRP, 1999 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 20716 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
2, 1999) (recognizing that motive and opportunity method of pleading scienter is still
appropriate, but finding plaintiffs' allegations that defendants wished to inflate company's stock
prices too conclusory to suffice); Head v. Netmanage, Inc., No. C 97-4385 CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20433, at *11-14, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,412 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 1999) (allegations
of insider trading held insufficient to establish scienter because they did not establish sales that
were unusual or suspicious enough); Lawrence v. Zilog, Inc., No. C-98-20420-JF, 6 Securities
Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 220, 224 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1998) (forward-looking statements;
complaint dismissed because plaintiffs conclusory allegations were insufficient to give rise to a
strong inference of actual knowledge under "any possible standard") and Plevy v. Haggerty, 38
F. Supp. 2d 816, 834-35 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (shareholders failed to adequately allege scienter on
part of corporate officers and directors; allegations that defendants were motivated to issue
misleading statements to cash in on artificially inflated stock prices failed to raise strong
inference of scienter because plaintiffs failed to show that defendants' trades were unusual) with
PETsMART, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 990 (recognizing that Second Circuit's "motive and opportunity"
test to plead scienter under PSLRA was still valid, but failing to determine whether plaintiffs'
allegations were sufficient because of other pleading deficiencies); Schlagal v. Learning Tree
Int'l, Inc., No. CV 98-6384 ABC, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20306, at *48-56, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) <j[ 90,403 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 1998) (recognizing that Second Circuit standard for pleading
scienter remained viable; allegations grounded on the boosting of executives' bonus
compensation and inflating corporation's stock price met "motive" test, and evidence of
"conscious" or "reckless" behavior met by alleging stock sales shortly after positive
announcements, violations of GAAP, and defendants' regular receipt of internal corporate
reports); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp., Master File No. CV 96-
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0872 WJR, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12743, at *2-4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 1998) (refusing to dismiss
'10(b) claims brought against corporation alleged to have participated in ship-hold-and-return
scheme aimed at fraudulently inflating stock price of related concern where it was alleged to
have made knowingly false statements to securities analyst); In re Ancor Comms., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 22 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1006 (D. Minn. 1998) (failure to disclose product's incompatibility
with another manufacturer's component, combined with allegations of insider trading and GAAP
violations, were sufficient even under Silicon Graphics "conscious behavior" test).
The Ninth Circuit adopted the most stringent pleading standard in In re Silicon Graphics,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3 fd 970 (9 th Cir.), rehearing denied, 195 F.3 fd 521 (9 th eire 1999) (en
banc), holding that
a private securities plaintiff proceeding under the PSLRA must plead, in great
detail, facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless
or conscious misconduct.... [A]lthough facts showing mere recklessness or a
motive to commit fraud and opportunity to do so may provide some reasonable
inference of intent, they are not sufficient to establish a strong inference of
deliberate recklessness.
183 F.3 fd at 974 (emphasis in original).
The Silicon Graphics court's holding rested on the conclusion that Congress intended to
elevate the pleading requirement above the Second Circuit standard requiring plaintiffs merely to
provide facts showing simple recklessness or a motive to commit fraud and opportunity to do so.
Instead, as the Ninth Circuit held:
In order to show a strong inference of deliberate recklessness, plaintiffs must state

facts that come closer to demonstrating intent, as opposed to mere motive and
opportunity. Accordingly, we hold that particular facts giving rise to a strong
inference of deliberate recklessness, at a minimum, is required to satisfy the
heightened pleading standard under the PSLRA.
Id. See also Heliotrope Gen'l, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3 fd 971, 980 (9 th Cir. 1999)
(plaintiffs complaint did not "state facts that create a strong inference of the required degree of
intent") (citing Silic;on Graphics).

Several district courts within the Ninth Circuit have applied this stringent standard and
nevertheless found plaintiffs allegations to be sufficient. See Marks V. Simulation Sciences,
Case No. SA CV 98-546 GLT, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4536, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28,2000)
(plaintiffs sufficiently pled specific facts regarding fraudulent accounting practices to survive
defendant company's motion to dismiss); In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., Case No.
CV 98-8842 SVW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2340, at *6-8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2000) (plaintiffs
alleged defendants' scienter with sufficient particularity by alleging "numerous e-mails and
internal reports" raising a strong inference that defendants knew that their public statements were
false and misleading at time they were made); In re Sonus Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Sec. Litig., No.
C98-1164Z, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11517, at *3-4 (W.D. Wash. July 21, 1999) (sustaining
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plaintiffs' amended complaint against defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that allegations that
Sonus failed to report FDA inspections revealing problems with pending approval of its drug
showed strong inference that defendants acted with required state of mind); In re Imperial Credit
Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., Case No. CV 98-8842 SVW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2340, at *5-9 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 22, 2000) (complaint pled defendants' scienter with sufficient particularity by
"point[ing] to numerous e-mails and internal reports that raise a strong inference that Defendants
knew [their public statements] were false .or misleading at the time they were made"; "inference
of scienter" was supported by plaintiffs' allegations of motive: "Defendants had a strong
incentive to inflate SPF's financial status because they were shopping SPF for a buyer and sought
to attract a large bid"; "[a]lthough evidence of motive is not sufficient to support an inference of
scienter" under the Ninth Circuit's decision in Silicon Graphics, "it is still probative to the
inquiry")
In In re Southern Pacific Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., Civil No. 98-1239-MA, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20833 (D. Or. Dec. 7, 1999), Judge Marsh offered an extensive discussion of the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Silicon Graphics, explaining first the concept of "deliberate
recklessness" :

I find that the Silicon court raised the substantive standard applicable to § 1O(b)
claims to that of deliberate recklessness and that "deliberate recklessness"
constitutes a higher degree of recklessness than previously contemplated. I
further find that "deliberate recklessness," means that the defendants must have
acted with full knowledge of the risks of the consequences of their actions in a
manner akin to that of a driver that attempts to speed across railroad tracks in
front of a rapidly approaching and clearly visible oncoming train. This
formulation takes into account the level of risk as measured against the severity
of the consequences and the knowledge of the defendant of both factors.
Id. at *13. The court also found that "materiality" and "factual context" are "critical factors in
examining the adequacy of pleading scienter." Id. at *14. As Judge Marsh explained:

If a corporate president receives a report that his largest factory has burned to the
ground and nevertheless attends a stock holder meeting and publicly claims that
there will be no slow down in a production schedule, the degree of materiality of
the omission must have a bearing upon just how wrong his public statement was
at the time. The greater the materiality, the greater inference of scienter~ Thus,
while motive and opportunity are insufficient to give rise to a strong inference of
scienter standing alone, motive and opportunity coupled with highly material
misrepresentations or omissions may well satisfy the standard. It is one thing to
ignore reports of potential bad weather; it is quite another to set sail in the face of
a storm.
Id.
Finding that plaintiffs had met the heightened particularity requirement of the PSLRA,
Judge Marsh analyzed the allegations of the complaint:
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Overall, the complaint paints a picture of a group of corporate insiders who knew
that the entire mortgage lending industry was facing significant hardships due to
the drop in lending rates. The complaint further reveals that the defendants
attempted to distinguish SPF from others in the industry by assuring investors that
SPF was utilizing particularly conservative assumptions relative to pre-payment
rates and delinquencies such that the general industry downturn should not have
adversely affected SPF. In spite of these assurances, the complaint alleges that
defendants were aware, over a lengthy period, of the fact that their pre-payment
and delinquency assumptions were grossly inaccurate and that these inaccuracies
threatened the financial stability of the company. Board meeting minutes and email reveal that defendants were aware of the seriousness of the situation SPF
faces. I find that these allegations satisfy the "deliberate recklessness" pleading
standard set forth in Silicon [Graphics}. If proven, the facts alleged support a
finding that the defendants knew that they were driving in front of a speeding
freight train and that there was a high likelihood ofgetting hit.
Id. at *17-18 (emphasis added). See also Symposium, Securities Fraud Litigation After Silicon
Graphics, 7 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 798 (Aug.-Sept. 1999).
In SEC v. Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d 852 (9 th Cir. 2001), where the Ninth Circuit

reversed a dismissal of an SEC action brought against an investment banker that allegedly
participated as an underwriter in Orange County's too-risky investment strategy, resulting in the
county's bankruptcy and its consequent defaults on bonds used to finance the strategy, the court
defined scienter without reference to Silicon Graphics. The court stated that "[s]cienter is
satisfied by recklessness." Id. (citing Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69
(9 th Cir. 1990) (en banc)). Whether this opinion signals an abandonment of the stringent
pleading standard stated in Silicon Graphics remains to be seen.
Thus far, none of the other circuit courts have adopted the Ninth Circuit's rigorous
formulation of the scienter pleading requirement. See generally Susan J. Becker, Circuit Courts
Split on Scienter Pleading and Proof Requirements, 25 Litigation News, No.2, at 1, 4-5 (ABA
Section of Litigation Jan. 2000) ("Becker, Circuit Courts").
c. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits

In contrast to the approach taken in the Second and Third Circuits, other appellate courts
have held that alleging defendants' "motive and opportunity" is no longer sufficient to plead
scienter, reasoning that the PSLRA was enacted to heighten pleading standards for securities
fraud claims. In one case, In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542,549-51 (6th Cir. 1999),
the Sixth Circuit held that under the PSLRA, plaintiffs may plead scienter by alleging facts
giving rise to strong inference of recklessness, but not by alleging facts merely establishing that
defendant had motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud. Accord In re Prison Realty
Sec. Litig., No. 3:99-0452,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2228, at *10-11 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 17,2000)
("Defendants' alleged knowledge of facts that contradicted public statements, in combination
with the proximity in time between the alleged misrepresentations and the disclosure ... are
enough to create a strong inference of scienter"). See also Phycor, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2218,
at *12 (amended complaint "alleges sufficient circumstantial evidence of knowing or reckless
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misconduct to satisfy scienter requirement ... Defendants' alleged knowledge of facts that
contradict public statements, in combination with the alleged insider sales at pivotal times and in
unusual amounts, are enough to create a strong inference of scienter"); Hines v. ESC Strategic
Funds, Inc., Case No. 3:99-0530, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15790, at *31-32, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) <j[ 90,684 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 17, 1999) (applying Comshare standard). Other courts
followed the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in Comshare. See In re Ceridian Corp. Sec.
Litig., Civ. No. 97-2044 MJD/AJB, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15611, at *38-39 (D. Minn. Mar. 29,
1999); cf New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Fruit of the Loom, Inc., Civil
Action No. 1:98-CY-99-M, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12999, at *23-27 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 18, 1999)
(holding that plaintiffs' allegations regarding defendants' scienter satisfied Comshare test).

In Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540 (6 th Cir. 2001), however, by a 7-6 en banc
decision the Sixth Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's holding in Silicon Graphics that
"recklessness" is insufficient to establish scienter under Rule 10b-5. The Sixth Circuit adopted
the Second Circuit's view of the PSLRA'spleading standard for scienter (as elucidated in
Novak) thereby representing a shift from the prior perception that the Sixth Circuit had rejected
"motive and opportunity" facts as inadequate. The Sixth Circuit's pleading standard for scienter
is now congruent with the standard followed in the First and Second Circuits, which require a
"strong inference" of scienter (which may be mere recklessness), and allowing any facts to show
this strong inference including, but not limited to, facts which show "motive and opportunity" to
defraud sufficient to raise that "strong inference."
In Bryant, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1379-81, Judge Fitzpatrick adopted the Second Circuit's
standard for pleading scienter, refusing to dismiss § 10(b) claims against a restaurant company
that was alleged to have fraudulently inflated the price of its stock. The court held that plaintiffs'
allegations raised a sufficient inference of scienter where they charged that the individual
defendants' knowledge of the corporation's problems were at odds with the company's public
statements. Moreover, three of the individual defendants had sold substantial portions of their
stockholdings. The district court, however, coupled its rulings in favor of plaintiffs with a
recommendation that the Eleventh Circuit permit an immediate interlocutory appeal of the
decision. See also In re Baker Hughes Sec. Litig., No. H-99-4281 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2001)
(rejecting "motive and opportunity" as basis for scienter); Malin v. Ivax Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d
1345, 1357-58 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (ruling that allegations regarding defendants' motive and
opportunity do not suffice to allege scienter under PSLRA); In re Physician Corp. of America
Sec. Litig., No. 97-3678-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7229, at *33, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,479 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 1999) ("We disagree ... that 'motive and
opportunity' evidence alone will meet the pleading requirements in the Eleventh Circuit. ").
The Eleventh Circuit addressed the scienter pleading issue in Bryant v. A vado Brands,
Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999), where it stated that "we are in basic agreement
with the Sixth Circuit," and it "reject[ed] the notion that allegations of motive and opportunity to
commit fraud, standing alone, are sufficient to establish scienter in this Circuit." Accord
Theoharous v. Fong, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15499, at *8 (11 th Cir. July 11, 2001) (plaintiff
must allege facts "giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 'in a severely reckless
manner"') (quoting Bryant). See also In re World Access, Inc. Sec. Litig., Civil Action No. 1:99CY-43-0DE, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4245, at *22-24 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2000) (plaintiffs met
pleading threshold by alleging eight identifiable problems associated with a switch identified in
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defendants' press release, averring that defendants' financial statements were false or misleading
because they did not make appropriate accounting entries to reflect non-payments arising from
disputes about the switches, and by alleging that defendants routinely employed "bill and hold"
practices).

d. The First Circuit Follows the Sixth Circuit
Prior to the PSLRA, the First Circuit required securities fraud plaintiffs to allege "specific
facts that make it reasonable to believe that defendant knew that a statement was materially false
or misleading." Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992). Following the
statute's enactment, the court asserted that "we do not interpret the [PSLRA] standard to differ
from that which this court has historically applied." Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1,9 n.5
(1st Cir. 1998) (citing Greenstone); see also Peritus, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 219. In Greebel v. FTP
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999), however, the First Circuit generally followed the
Sixth Circuit's approach, offering an extensive analysis of the PSLRA's statutory language and
legislative history, ide at 191-97, before adopting the following standard for pleading scienter:
Our view of the [PSLRA] is thus close to that articulated by the Sixth
Circuit [in Comshare] ....
Without adopting any pleading litany of motive and opportunity, we reject
defendants' argument that facts showing motive and opportunity can never be
enough to permit the drawing of a strong inference of scienter. But ... merely
pleading motive and opportunity, regardless of the strength of the inferences to be
drawn of scienter, is not enough. [The Second, Third and Fifth] [C]ircuits have
interpreted the PSLRA as permitting use of motive and opportunity type pleading
if it raises a strong inference. Like the Third Circuit, we caution that "catch-all
allegations that defendants stood to benefit from wrongdoing and had the
opportunity to implement a fraudulent scheme are [not] sufficient."
Similarly, the PSLRA neither prohibits nor endorses the pleading of
insider trading as evidence of scienter, but requires that the evidence meet the
"strong inference" standard. Unusual trading or trading at suspicious times or in
suspicious amounts by corporate insiders has long been recognized as probative
of scienter. The vitality of the inference to be drawn depends on the facts, and
can range from marginal to strong. This continues to be true in litigation after the
effective date of the PSLRA. Indeed, ... we still think today, that allegations of
unusual insider trading by a defendant with access to material non-public
information can support a strong inference of scienter. We similarly caution that
mere pleading of insider trading, without regard to either context or the strength
of the inferences to be drawn, is not enough. At a minimum, the trading must be
in a context where defendants have incentives to withhold material, non-public
information, and it must be unusual, well beyond the normal patterns of trading
by those defendants.
194 F.3d at 197-98 (footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535). See
also Gelfer v. Pegasystems, Inc., No. CV 98-12527-JLT, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 834, at *11-25,
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Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,749 (D. Mass. Jan. 27,2000) (denying motion to dismiss securities
fraud claims complaining of series of income and revenue overstatements that had to be
corrected through substantial restatements; court found that continuance of similar problems,
magnitude and frequency of need for restatements, warnings that company received from its
outside auditors, and departure from internal accounting standards and GAAP combined to
create necessary inference of recklessness). See generally Matthew Roskoski, Note, A Case-ByCase Approach to Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
97 Mich. L. Rev. 2265 (1999); Ryan G. Meist, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The
Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82
Minn. L. Rev. 1103, 1126 (1998).

e. Other Circuits Join The Fray
Recently, in Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5 th Cir. 2001), and City of
Philadelphia v. Fleming Co., 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001), the Fifth and Tenth Circuits
weighed in on this issue. In Nathenson, plaintiffs contended that defendants had sold as a large
amount of stock at a price inflated by misrepresentations. The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded
by the arguments of plaintiffs and the SEC (as amicus curiae) that the motive-and-opportunity
method of pleading scienter survived passage of the PSLRA. The Fifth Circuit viewed the
debate over whether the PSLRA adopted the Second Circuit's pleading standard as somewhat
beside the point because motive and opportunity "was only an analytical device for assessing the
logical strength of the inferences arising from particularized facts." 267 F.3d at 411. The court
'observed that "simply because motive and opportunity is alleged does not of itself automatically
and categorically mean that that the necessary strong inference of scienter is present." Id. at 412.
The court held that the plaintiff must allege "particularized facts giving rise to a strong inference
of scienter." Id. at 410.
In City of Philadelphia, the Tenth Circuit found insufficient plaintiffs' allegations that
defendants fraudulently concealed facts to facilitate an offering of the company's securities, to
avoid jeopardizing the success of the company, to minimize the possibility of other similar
lawsuits, to protect and enhance their executive positions and compensation, and to enhance the
value of their stock positions. 264 F.3d at 1256-57.

VII.

ACCOUNTING FRAUD: PLEADING SCIENTER UNDER THE PSLRA
A.

SEC Focus On Accounting Fraud

In response to the erosion in the quality of financial reporting, several years ago the SEC
commenced an intensive initiative to challenge what it deems "accounting hocus pocus." Such
practices, which include the immediate write-off of a huge percentage of an acquired company's
value as a charge to in-process research and development ("IPR&D"), and avoiding future
earnings degradation from the amortization of goodwill, manipulate earnings revenue and
diminish the integrity and reliability of financial reporting in the U.S. securities markets. See
Remarks by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt made at the Center for Law and Business at New York
University (Sept. 28, 1998), available at «www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch220.txt» and
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comment letter submitted by SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner to the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (Oct. 9, 1998).
The SEC's expressed concern is understandable: Since January 1997, at least $33 billion
in market value has been wiped out as a result of accounting errors (based upon the decline in
stock prices following disclosures by more than a dozen companies, including:
Oxford Health Plans:

market value lost

$4.25 billion

Sunbeam:

market value lost

$3.75 billion

Green Tree Financial:

market value lost

$1.62 billion

Philip Services:

market value lost

$1.42 billion

According to a recent study published by accounting firm Arthur Andersen, over the last
four years nearly one in five accounting restatements - red flags for potential misconduct - have
been by companies in California. During the same four-year period, the total number of
restatements has nearly doubled. According to the Arthur Andersen study of accounting
restatements from 1997 to 2001, 27% of the restatements nationwide were filed in the software
and computer industries. See Karl Schoenberger, When the Numbers Just Don't Add Up, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 19, 2001.
The most visible indicator of improper accounting - and source of new
[SEC] investigations - is the growing number of restated financial reports.
Restatements ballooned to 233 last year, twice the number in 1997, according to a
recent study by Arthur Andersen LLP. Of those, only 9% resulted from new
accounting methods required by the SEC.
Michael Schroeder, SEC List ofAccounting-Fraud Probes Grows, Wall S1. J., July 6,2001.
Financial Executives International (FEI), which studies accounting issues, reported in the
Spring of 2001 that there have been 464 cases of financial statements being restated during the
previous three years. That's more than all restatements during the previous seven years. Matt
Krantz & Greg Farrell, Fuzzy accounting raises flags, usatoday.com, June 22, 2001. FEI says
that more than $31.2 billion in market value was wiped out following earnings restatements in
2000. Id.
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TEN NOTABLE ACCOUNTING RESTATEMENTS
(1997-1998)

Mercury Finance (April 1997)

Auto finance company
Restated 1996 results: In Jan. 1997, initially
reported earnings of $120.7 million; Apr. 1997
"update" anticipated 1996 loss of $48-$55
million
1995 results changed from net income of 57
cents per share to 43 cents per share

Centennial Technologies (June 1997)

$2.64 billion market value lost
Maker of computer memory cards
Restated results for 14 quarters through end of
1996
$28.1 million loss for restated period, versus
aggregate net income of $12.1 reported for 42month period
Restatement resulted from audit following
dismissal and arrest of founder and ex-CEO
on securities fraud charges
Restatement showed that company never had
profitable quarter during period in which it
often reported record earnings growth
Stock was top-performing issue on NYSE for
1996

Informix (Nov. 1997)

Securities fraud claims settled for $24 million
Database software maker
Restated 14 quarters of financial statements
due to accounting irregularities
1996 reported net income of $97.8 million
restated to net loss of $73.6 million
Company recognized revenue from software
that was shipped to distributors, even though
products were never sold through to final
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customers
Disclosed that federal regulators were
examining its bookkeeping practices

Medaphis (Nov. 1997)

Securities fraud claims settled for $142
million
Provider of business management and
software services to doctors and hospitals
Restated earnings for three and one-half fiscal
years

Securities fraud claims settled for $75 million

Sybase (Jan. 1998)

Database software company
Restated results for first three quarters of 1997
Reported profit of $5.2 million changed to loss
of $25.5 million

Fine Host (Feb. 1998)

Adjustments made for improper revenueboosting tactics at Japanese subsidiary
Food concession operator
Restated financial results for four years,
wiping out all of its earnings during that time
and posting losses due to "accounting
irregularities"
Wall Street Journal reported: "In revising its
results downward, Fine Host cited a failure to
properly record expenses and a tendency to
prematurely record profit. "

Stock delisted by NASDAQ

Waste Management (Apr. 1998)

$244 million market value lost
Trash-hauling company
Restated four years of financial results (19921996)
Restated earnings downward by $1.32 billion
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SEC reportedly investigating Arthur Andersen
audit of financial statements

$4.76 billion market value lost

Vesta Insurance (Aug. 1998)

Securities fraud claims settled for $220
million
Property and casualty insurer
Earnings were restated for four years due to
improper accounting practices
Restatement lowered net income by $72.4
million
$874 million market value lost

Livent (Aug. 1998)

Theatrical production company
Announced it would restate earnings because
of "serious irregularities" in its financial
records
Company said it was "virtually" certain it
would restate financial results back to 1996
due to "millions of dollars" in irregularities
Subsequent bankruptcy filing
$113 market value lost

Cendant (Aug. 1998)

Product of $14 billion merger in late 1997
between HFS (franchise operator) and CUC
Int'l (membership club operator)
Announced it had uncovered substantial
accounting irregularities in former CUC
business unit
Revealed that CUC had been padding its
results since 1995, creating more than $500
million of imaginary profits to meet Wall
Street "expectations"
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$100 million restatement of reported income
caused stock price to plummet by 46% B more
than $17 per share B in one day, vaporizing
$15 billion of shareholder equity

$3.1 billion settlement ofsecurities fraud
claims
In 2000, Virginia-based MicroStrategy, Inc.'s common stock price fell $140 (to $86.75), a
decline of 62%, after the company reported that its auditors had forced it to defer about onequarter of the $205.4 million in revenue it had reported for 1999. The plunge wiped out nearly
$12 billion in market value for the company. See Floyd Norris, MicroStrategy Shares Plunge
On Restatement, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21,2000, at C1; Greg Miller, Software Stock Falls 62% After
Sales Revision, L.A. Times, Mar. 21,2000, at C1.
And then we come to the recent revelations about Enron Corp., a pioneer of energy
trading, a way of using financial techniques of trading forward commitments in natural gas and
electricity to establish future prices on long-term supply contracts. As the business boomed,
Enron's reported revenue soared, from $20 billion in 1997 to $100 billion in 2000. Through the
first three quarters of 2001, the firm was on course to exceed $200 billion in revenue. But in
October 2001, Enron announced that it had lost more than $600 million in the third quarter, and
that it needed to reduce shareholder equity by $1.2 billion due to certain undisclosed transactions
with one of its partnerships. Then, on November 8, 2001, Enron restated its accounts back to
1997. The restatements resulted in a reduction ofreported profit by more $586 million. James
Flanigan, Enron's Troubles Could Spur Securities Reform, L.A. Times, Nov. 25,2001, at C1; see
also Andersen Could Face SEC Sanction, Suits Over Enron Accounting Error, L.A. Times, Nov.
13,2001, at C7.
Recent disclosures about the "culture" of fraud at Cendant Corp. (the successor to CUC
International) made clear that for more than ten years (from approximately 1985 to 1998) its top
executives directed a conspiracy to inflate profit so as to meet Wall Street analysts' forecasts and
to keep the stock price high. See Floyd Norris & Diana B. Hendriques, 3 Admit Guilt in
Falsifying CUC's Books, N.Y. Times, June 15, 2000, at C1 ("Three former executives of CUC
International pleaded guilty today to federal charges in what the authorities said was the largest
and longest accounting fraud in history, continuing at least 12 years and costing investors $19
billion."). One commentator wondered how the comp.any's auditors missed the fraud:
For all those years, the books were audited by Ernst & Young or its
predecessor, Ernst & Whinney. In hindsight, they missed more than a few red
flags. A report by Arthur Andersen, another accounting firm hired after the fraud
was exposed, described meetings in which Ernst & Young officials asked
questions and got odd answers. In one case, there was no explanation or
documentation for $25 million in profits. The auditors decided that was not a
material amount, and let it go. The Andersen report did not criticize Ernst &
Young, but that was no surprise. Ernst & Young had refused to supply
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information to Andersen until it was promised that the report would not comment
on the quality of the Ernst & Young audits.
The S.E.C. says that the fraud was easier to pull off because CUC officials
knew which subsidiaries would be audited, and therefore hid the most obvious
frauds in subsidiaries that they knew the auditors would not look at.
As the fraud grew, CUC's old tactics of inflating revenues and suppressing
expenses were no longer adequate. So it took to manipulating merger reserves,
which are supposed to cover one-time costs related to takeovers and are often
ignored by investors. The reserves became a cookie jar in which operating losses
could be fraudulently concealed. Unfortunately for CUC, some of its acquisitions
were such dogs that the merger reserves were soon exhausted, making it
necessary to make more acquisitions.
Did the auditors know what was going on? They deny it, and there is no
proof that they did. But they didn't show much suspicion when confronted with
some odd-looking transactions of funds between various accounts.
Floyd Norris, Asleep at the Books: A Fraud That Went On and On and On, N.Y. Times, June
16, 2000, at Cl; see also Floyd Norris, Cendant Says Accounting Firm Knew of Fraudulent
Practices, June 20,2000, at C5 ("The Cendant Corporation contended in a court filing yesterday
that the accounting firm Ernst & Young knew of widespread fraud at CUC International, a
predecessor to Cendant, by 1997 and chose to help the fraud along rather than expose it.").
In litigation arising out of Cendant's cross-claims against its auditor, Ernst & Young
("E& y"), for settlement payments made to defrauded investors, the district court held:
•

•
•
•

Contribution by E&Y was barred on both the Section 11 (Securities Act) and Rule 10b-5
(Exchange Act) claims because § 21D of the Exchange Act bars contribution claims
against a settling defendant, and that rule applies where Securities Act (or other) claims
are "integrally related" to the Exchange Act claims.
Section 21D of the Exchange Act does not bar indemnity claims, although indemnity is
not ordinarily available for securities law violations.
State law claims for tort, breach of contract and/or breach of fiduciary duty may be
actionable.
Under a standard audit engagement, an auditor contracts to report fraud to the nondefrauding managers or directors. Whether an account acting in any capacity is a
fiduciary presents a question of fact.

In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D.N.J. 2001).
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B.

Specific Allegations Of Accounting Fraud Supporting
Strong Inference Of Scienter Under The PSLRA

1. Earnings/Revenue Misrepresentations
"A defendant's failure to recognize revenue in accordance with GAAP does not, by itself,
suffice to establish scienter." Chalverus, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (citation omitted). Rather, the
court must determine "whether the alleged GAAP violations, combined with other
circumstances indicative offraudulent intent, raise a strong inference that the defendants acted
with scienter." Id. at 233 (emphasis added) (citing In re Ancor Comms., 22 F. Supp. 2d at 1005
(noting that "violations of GAAP, in combination with other factors, may support a strong
inference of scienter"».
A number of district courts have held that misrepresentations about the company's
earnings or revenue, if pled with requisite particularity, satisfy the applicable standard for
pleading scienter under the PSLRA. See Gelfer, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 834, at *18-19
(magnitude of revenue overstatements during class period tends to support strong inference of
scienter); Phycor, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS , at *16 ("Plaintiffs ... allege in the Amended
Complaint that Defendants not only violated GAAP, but also made false and misleading public
statements as a result. This is sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss."); Cendant, 60 F.
Supp. 2d at 372-73 (allegations that public accounting firm failed to discover that corporation's
operating income and earnings per share were overstated, that firm's audits were not performed
in accordance with GAAP, and that its unqualified audit reports filed with SEC were materially
false and misleading adequately pled scienter); Chalverus, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 234-36 (investors
adequately pleaded scienter in suit involving overstatement of revenue; investors alleged
overstatement of $5 million in single quarter, in violation of GAAP; violation of internal policies
on income recognition; failure to disclose that cross-license agreement cited as source of $50
million of income over next few years required payment of $12.9 million to cross-licensee; and
alleged that both CEO and CFO had motive and opportunity to commit fraud; significant
financial restatements may support a conclusion that defendants acted with scienter); Gross, 977
F. Supp. at 1472 (allegation that insiders engaged in elaborate accounting fraud scheme designed
to ensure that company met earnings and revenue projections); In re Health Mgmt., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (allegation that corporate insider approved of
plans for accounting fraud and false revenue recognition evidence of scienter); In re Wellcare
Mgmt. Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 964 F. Supp. 632,640 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (allegation that corporate
executive "had knowledge of, condoned, and/or encouraged ... the deliberate overstatement of
earnings by a number of means"); Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1255-56 (overstatement of earnings by
persons responsible for calculating and releasing financial information shows scienter);
Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *11-12 (court found strong circumstantial
evidence of conscious behavior); Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharmaceutical Corp.,
927 F. Supp. 1297, 1313-14 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (overstated revenues when method of recognition
was inconsistent with SFAS 48); Varljen, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10493, at *2, *15 (defendants
falsely inflated earnings by including income from fraudulent medical billings); In re Miller
Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (defendants understated
acquired companies' pre-merger revenues which overstated growth of company's post-merger
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revenues, overstated company's revenue growth in core manufacturing business by combining it
with revenue from non-manufacturing activities, reported income misrepresented size of onetime gain from litigation settlement, accounted for trade-ins at cost which was substantially
greater than market price, misrepresented other one-time gains, engaged in "channel stuffing" by
artificially stimulating revenues by offering extraordinary discounts and trade-ins and extended
payment terms and other unusual financing arrangements to mask deterioration in revenues);
Employee Solutions, 1998 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 16444, at *3, *8 (setting aside low workers'
compensation reserves enabled defendants to present falsely as a highly profitable company);
Fine Host., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (plaintiffs alleged that top officer admitted in phone call that he
knowingly capitalized certain expenses to increase earnings); In re Olympic Finan. Ltd. Sec.
Litig., Civil File No. 97-496 (MJD/AJB), 1998 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 14789, at *11 (D. Minn. Sept.
10, 1998) (defendants knowingly overstated quality of loan portfolio); Hudson Venture Partners,
L.P. v. Patriot Aviation Group, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 4132 (DLC), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1518, at
*11, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) en 90,431 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,1999) (closely-held corporation under
reported losses and accounts payable and over reported accounts receivable and overstated
profits by 80% for first two months of fiscal year).

2. Violations of GAAP Can Form Part Of The Basis Supporting Strong
Inference Of Scienter
A violation of GAAP is generally insufficient to establish fraud. See Peritus, 52 F. Supp.
2d at 223 ("A host of courts have held that a mere failure to recognize revenue in accordance
with GAAP does not, by itself, suffice to establish scienter.") (citations omitted). When
combined with other circumstances suggesting fraudulent intent, however, "such violation may
be used to show scienter." Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *10 (citing
Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1313) (premature recognition of earnings from consignment
sales, combined with significant extent of alleged overstatement, as well as other factors, created
strong inference that defendants acted with either specific or reckless intent to defraud), and
Wellcare Mgmt., 964 F. Supp. at 640 (finding that knowledge of deliberate overstatement of
earnings and other accounting improprieties, as well as other misconduct, tended .to show
scienter)). See also In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 290, 294-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to dismiss claims against auditors because allegations of GAAP
violations, defective computer system and state regulatory discovery of fraud held sufficient to
support strong inference of scienter); Gross, 977 F. Supp. at 1472 (allegations that corporate
insiders "improperly recognized income that [d]efendants knew should not have been recognized
under GAAP principles" is sufficient to establish scienter); Ancor Comms., 22 F. Supp. 2d at
1005-06 (overstating revenues by reporting consignment sales in violation of GAAP; defendants
continually represented in SEC filings that financial results were prepared in accordance with
GAAP); Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1313 (violating GAAP by early recognition of
consignment sales resulting in overstated revenues); Health Mgmt., 970 F. Supp. at 203 (holding
sufficient allegations of GAAP and GAAS violations, the auditor's six-year engagement, the
magnitude of the misrepresentations, and the auditor's ignorance of "red flags"); Miller Indus., 12
F. Supp. 2d at 1332 (overstatement of revenues and income in violation of GAAP may constitute
violation of Rule 10b-5).

3. Improper Revenue Recognition Of A Significant Portion Of Revenues
In the words of one district court, "[w]hile it is true that the mere fact that a company's
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financial reporting was inaccurate does not establish scienter, the magnitude of reporting errors
may lend weight to allegations of recklessness where defendants were in a position to detect the
errors. The more serious the error, the less believable are defendants protests that they were
completely unaware of [the Company's] true financial status and the stronger is the inference that
defendants must have known about the discrepancy." Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1256 (citations
omitted); see also Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1314 (overstated revenues constituted
significant portion of company's total revenues); Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23107, at *7 (substantial overstatement by reporting consignment sales as revenues); Varljen,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10493, at *15 (defendants falsely inflated earnings by including income
from fraudulent Medicare billings).

c.

Standard Of "Recklessness" For Accountant's Liability

1. Plaintiff's Burden
Plaintiffs must show "'highly unreasonable [omissions or acts], involving not merely
simple negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so
obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.'" Retsky, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17459, at
*26-27 (citation omitted); see also First Merchants, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17760, at *29
(same).
"[Plaintiffs] must prove that the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit
amounted to no audit at all, or "an egregious refusal to see the obvious or to investigate the
doubtful," or that the accounting judgments which were made were such that no reasonable
accountant would have made the same decisions if confronted with the same facts. '" Retsky,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17459, at *27 (citation omitted); see also Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1255;
First Merchants, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17760, at *29; Health Mgmt., 970 F. Supp. at 202; see
also Jacobs v. Coopers & Lybrand, L.L.P., No. 97 Civ. 3374 (RPP), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2102, at *44, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,443 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1999) (finding sufficient
allegations of GAAS violations, including a failure to confirm accounts receivable properly, to
support strong inference of auditor scienter; "Failing to adhere to one or two Auditing
Interpretations may be only negligence, but Coopers is alleged to have disregarded many
different Auditing Interpretations. Based on the facts as alleged, a trier of fact could find
Cooper's audit so reckless that Coopers should have had knowledge of the underlying fraud, and
acted in blind disregard that there was a strong likelihood that Happiness was engaged in the
underlying fraud. ") (citation omitted).

2. Ignoring "Red Flags" Of Accounting Fraud
Circumstances suggesting fraudulent intent can include the presence of "red flags" or
warning signs.
See Great Neck Capital Appreciation Investment P'ship, L.L.P. v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P., Case No. 99-C-0598, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5235 (E.D. Wis.
Mar. 30, 2001) (accounting firm was potentially liable for GAAS violations in financial
statements in light of firm's knowledge of "red flags"). See also Transcrypt Int'l, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17540, at *29 (denying motions to dismiss claims against auditor for company that
had to substantially restate its financial statements; because, the corrected accounts receivable
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were less than 30% of the original number, the magnitude of the discrepancy, along with alleged
"red flags" and GAAS violations, was sufficient to create necessary strong inference of scienter);
Rehm, 954 F. Supp. at 1256 ("[T]he more serious the error, the less believable are defendants[']
protests that they were completely unaware of [the company's] true financial status and the
stronger the inference that defendants must have known about the discrepancy. "); Health Mgmt.,
970 F. Supp. at 199 (outside auditor's ignorance of "red flags" present evidence of its fraudulent
intent) (citation omitted); In re Leslie Fay Cos., Inc. Sec. Litig., 835 F. Supp. 167,175 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (rejecting independent auditor's motion to dismiss where allegations of large accounting
errors gave rise to inference of scienter).
In Retsky, 1998 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 17459, at *29-32, plaintiffs satisfied the applicable
pleading requirements by alleging that Price Waterhouse knew of "red flags" involved with
customer contract because (1) Price Waterhouse reviewed and commented on a report prepared
by the Company's internal audit department noting concerns of premature revenue booking; (2)
Price Waterhouse noted that contract contingencies set forth in contract precluded certain
revenue recognition; and (3) Price Waterhouse noted that the MD&A discussion in the Form 10K report concerning product risks failed to comply with Reg S-K.
In First Merchants, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17760, at *17-20, Judge Coar of the Northern
District of lllinois permitted a complaint to proceed against corporate auditors whose
recklessness was evidenced by GAAP violations, "red flags," and the magnitude of the fraud in
the company's false financial statements. The court held that plaintiffs satisfied the applicable
pleading requirements by alleging that accountants should have known of "red flags" including
(1) bad debt reserves were out of line with bad debt write-offs; (2) there were dramatic increases
in the rate of 60- and 90- day delinquencies; and (3) there was an increase in the average length
of loans reflecting higher risk borrowers.

VIII.
A.

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LIABILITY
Primary Liability

In Central Bank, the Supreme Court held that there can be no liability under Section
10(b)/Rule 10b-5 for aiding and abetting securities fraud. Unless the defendant committed a
manipulative or deceptive act within the meaning of Section 10(b), the defendant has not
violated the securities laws. Following Central Bank, however, the federal courts have split
over the threshold required to show that a "secondary" actor's conduct constitutes primary
liability. Compare In re Software Toolworks, Inc., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994)
(secondary actors may be held primarily liable for statements made by others in which the
former significantly participated) with Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir.
1998) ("[A] secondary actor cannot incur primary liability ... for a statement not attributed to that
actor at the time of its dissemination"). See also Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir.
1998) (denying Deloitte & Touche's motion to dismiss securities fraud claims when complaint
alleged that accountants certified false revenues); Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche
LLP, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1333-36 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (refusing to dismiss claims that accounting
firm had primary liability for its client's material misrepresentations, including improper revenue
recognition, in financial statements; the accountants' direct involvement in the representations,
the magnitude of the GAAP violations, and Deloitte's dual role as management consultant and
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auditor combined to create strong inference of scienter), certification for interlocutory appeal
denied, 1999 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 1368, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,429 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 1999)
B.
Secondary Actor's Conduct May Constitute Primary
Liability

However, primary liability under Rule 10b-5 may be imposed '''not only on persons who
made fraudulent misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of the fraud and
assisted in its perpetration.'" SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1471 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512,517 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Health Mgmt.,
970 F. Supp. at 209. More than significant participation by the secondary actor is needed to
incur primary liability. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720. The misrepresentation must be attributed to
that specific actor at the time of publication dissemination, that is, in advance of the investment
decision. Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998). Secondary parties
may be primarily liable for statements made by others in which the secondary party significantly
participated. Software Toolworks, 50 F.3d 615.
C.

Fraudulent Scheme Liability

Although in Central Bank the Supreme Court eliminated liability for aiders and abettors
of securities fraud, under § 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 primary liability may be imposed not only on
persons who made fraudulent misrepresentations but also on those who had knowledge of the
fraud and assisted in its perpetration. See Health Mgmt., 970 F. Supp. at 203; Page, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3673, at *11-15; Marksman Partners, 1998 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 12743, at *4
(defendants' involvement in ship-hold-and-return scheme).
D.

"Group Published" Doctrine

When alleging securities fraud based on false and misleading statements in prospectuses,
registration statements, annual reports, press releases, or other "group published" information,
there is a presumption that these statements are the collective work of those individuals who
have high level positions with the issuer; are involved in the day-to-day operations; directly
participate in management; and were involved in drafting, reviewing, and/or disseminating the
false and misleading statements. Prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports, press
releases, or other group published information are presumed to be collective actions. Schaffer,
29 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
Defendants argue that the "group pleading" doctrine was abolished by the PSLRA, and
some district courts have agreed, see Marra, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7303, at *13 ("[T]he court
concludes that the presumption inherent in group pleading is inconsistent with the PSLRA's
purpose") (citing Coates, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16, and Allison v. Brooktree Corp., 999 F. Supp.
1342, 1350 (S.D. Cal. 1998)). In Coates, the court reasoned that because the PSLRA requires
plaintiffs to set forth facts raising a strong inference that each defendant acted with the required
state of mind, group pleading is inconsistent with the statutory language and purpose: "[I]t is
nonsensical to require that a plaintiff specifically allege facts regarding scienter as to each
defendant, but to allow him to rely on group pleading in asserting that the defendant made the
statement or omission." 26 F. Supp. 2d at 916. The Allison court reached the same conclusion
for the same reasons, holding that group pleading was suspect because the "judicial presumption"
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of group pleading could not "be" reconciled with the statutory mandate that plaintiffs must plead
specific facts as to each act or omission by the defendant." 999 F. Supp. at 1350. Accord
Branca, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1704, at *26 (adopting the reasoning in Coates and Allison that
"bars the use of group pleading techniques in PSLRA cases"); Calliott v. HFS, Inc., Civil Action
No. 3:97-CV-0924-I, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4368, at *16 & n.3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 2000)
(same); Thompson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., Civil Action No. 99-3439, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4380, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 2000) ("[T]he PSLRA codifies a ban on the group pleading
doctrine") (citing Coates and Branca).
The greater weight of authority, however, holds that the PSLRA did not prohibit the
"group pleading" doctrine. See, e.g., BankAmerica, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 988 ("[B]ecause the group
pleading doctrine is a rebuttable presumption applicable only to a limited group of persons
within the company, the court finds that the presumption is not inconsistent with the PSLRA");
In re PeopleSoft Sec. Litig., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10953 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (same); In re Oxford
Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 187 F.R.D. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("The PSLRA has not
altered the group pleading doctrine.... "); Learning Tree, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20306, at *18
("Until the Ninth Circuit speaks otherwise, the Court finds the rationale behind the grouppleading doctrine sound and will not disturb it. Given that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that
Defendants ran LTI on a day-to-day basis, Defendants are not entitled to a dismissal on this
basis.") (footnote omitted); Miller Indus., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1329 (group pleading survives
enactment of PSLRA); Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (holding that the PSLRA did not
abolish the "group pleading" doctrine); Powers v. Eichen, 977 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (S.D. Cal.
1997) (same), reconsideration denied, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10881 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (same); In
re Health Mgmt. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 192,208-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (same).

IX.

PSLRA SAFE HARBOR FOR "FORWARD- LOOKING" STATEMENTS
AND "BESPEAKS CAUTION" DOCTRINE

A.

When Forward-Looking Statements Are Protected

Following long-standing efforts by the SEC to create a "safe harbor" for certain forwardlooking statements made by corporate management, see SEC Securities Act Release No. 336084,44 F.R. 33810 (June 25,1979) (promulgating Rule 175 under Securities Act and Rule 3b-6
under Exchange Act), and judicial attempts to immunize statements accompanied by sufficient
warnings (the so-called "bespeaks caution" doctrine, see, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Sec.
Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9 th Cir. 1994), in the PSLRA Congress also attempted to encourage
the quality and quantity of forward-looking information disseminated to investors by including a
"safe harbor" from liability for certain "forward-looking statements." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5.
Congress enacted the safe harbor provision "in order to loosen the 'muzzling effect' of potential
liability for forward-looking statements, which often kept investors in the dark about what
management foresaw for the company." Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 806 (11th Cir.
1999) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-369, at 42 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S. Code Congo &
Admin. News 730, 741)).
Under the PSLRA, the court must determine, at the pleading stage, whether a "forwardlooking" statement falls within the "safe harbor." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(e); see Karacand, 53 F.
Supp. 2d at 1243; MobileMedia, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 930 n.18 ("Before deciding whether the safe
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harbor is available, it must first be determined whether there is a 'forward looking statement,' as
defined in the [PSLRA]."). Because the statute "closes the universe of supposedly false
statements under scrutiny to those 'specif[ied]' in the complaint," the legislative history "implies
piecemeal examination of the statements found in a company communication." Harris, 182 F.3d
at 804 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(I)).
Whether under the statutory definitions or otherwise, to qualify for the protection offered
a statement, either oral or written, must first be deemed to be "forward-looking." See In re
Secure Computing Corp. Sec. Litig., 120 F. SUpPa 2d 810,818 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (notwithstanding
statutory definitions, court may take more simplistic approach and look to see whether statement
is a prediction as to future events as opposed to a statement of current business conditions). If a
statement qualifies as "forward-looking," it will fall within the safe harbor if it is "accompanied
by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results
to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(I)(A)(i).
Oral statements, such as those made to securities analysts or the press, may also fall within the
statutory protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b)(2).
Even if the "forward-looking" statement has no accompanying cautionary language, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant made the statement with "actual knowledge" that it was
"false or misleading."
15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(I)(B). These statutory provisions operate
independently, see Harris, 182 F.3d at 803; Fellman v. Electro Optical Sys. Corp., 2000 WL
489713, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2000), by which Congress intended to immunize statements
with meaningful warnings regardless of allegation of actual knowledge possessed by the speaker.
See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 201 (1 st Cir. 1999) ("The safe harbor has two
alternative inlets: the first shelters forward-looking statements that are accompanied by
meaningful cautionary statements."); see also In re 2TheMart.com Sec. Litig., 114 F. SUppa 2d
955,961 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("statements of expectation and belief are, however, actionable if '(1)
the statement is not actually believed (2) there is no reasonable basis for the belief or (3) the
speaker is aware of undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the statement's accuracy. "')
(citation omitted).
Under the PSLRA, a "forward-looking" statement includes (a) statements containing
projections of revenues, income, earnings per share, or other financial items; (b) statements of
the plans and objectives of management for future operations; and (c) statements of future
economic performance. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(i) (Securities Act definition of "forward-looking
statement"); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(I)(A) (Exchange Act definition). Courts have recognized that
predictions are often founded upon current facts or interlace present understanding with a belief
of possible outcomes. In Harris, 182 F.3d at 803-07, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that such
mixed presentations should be viewed "as a whole" and "be either forward-looking or not
forward-looking in its entirety"; thus, it held that a statement in a drug company's press release
that challenges unique to period in its history were not behind it, when considered in context of
anticipated improvements in business, qualified as "forward-looking" statements). See also
Advanta, 180 F.3d at 536 (statements predicting that company "will experience a large increase
in revenues" as a result of actions to be taken in future "clearly qualifies" as projection and
constituted "forward-looking" statements). Other courts have held that it is the overall nature of
an assertion that governs whether a statement will qualify, and not whether the statement is
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predicated on current facts even if it is alleged that current facts have been omitted. See, e.g.,
Eizenga v. Stewart Enters., Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 967,978-79 (E.D. La. 2000) (projections were
forward-looking despite allegation that they failed to disclose then-existing decline in demand
for product); Fitzer v. Security Dymanics Tech., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 12, 31 (D. Mass. 2000)
(predictions as to release date of "complex technical product" are "forward-looking"); Bryant v.
Avado Brands, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1378 (M.D. Ga. 2000) (earnings estimates, plans for
expansion and expected contribution of development project were "clearly" forward-looking
statements), rev'd, 252 F.3d 1161 (11 th Cir. 2001); In re Ciena Corp. Sec. Litig., 99 F. Supp. 2d
650, 661 (D. Md. 2000) (prediction of earnings and future performance were forward-looking
statements despite allegation that they were based upon historical purchasing patterns of
consumers); Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1114 (statements regarding hotel-casino's marketing
plans were forward-looking).
If a statement qualifies as forward-looking, the next task for the court is to determine
whether (1) the statement is accompanied by "meaningful cautionary statements," or (2) if it is
not, whether plaintiff has alleged that the speaker had "actual knowledge" of the falsity of the
statement. As to the first test, the PSLRA requires that cautionary statements must warn
investors of "important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in
the forward-looking statement." 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i). While courts uniformly hold
that mere "boilerplate" warnings are insufficient to invoke the protections of the safe harbor, see
In re World Access, Inc. Sec. Litig., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (neither the
statutory safe harbor nor the bespeaks caution doctrine applies where a warning "contain[s] only
minimal boilerplate language"), the courts differ on how precise warnings must be and to what
extent they must foreshadow the ultimate problem encountered. In Harris, 182 F.3d at 807,
where the Eleventh Circuit posed the question as "must the cautionary language explicitly
mention the factor that ultimately belies a forward-looking statement?," ide (emphasis in
original), the court held that "when an investor has been warned of risks of a significance similar
to that actually realized, she is sufficiently on notice of the danger of the investment to make an
intelligent decision about it according to her own preferences for risk and reward." Id. (emphasis
added). In Ehlert v. Singer, 245 F.3d 1313 (11 th Cir. 2001), the same court held that a warning
that cautioned that "[t]here can be no assurance that the Company will successfully complete the
development of the market for practice management systems" was sufficient to put an investor
on notice that important company software would not be upgraded to Year 2000 compliance.
Articulating the test as one of "similar significance," the court held that "the warnings actually
given were not only of a similar significance to the risks actually realized but were also closely
related to the specific warning which Plaintiffs assert should have been given."
Applying the standard elucidated by the Eleventh Circuit (or similar standards) other
courts have held that various warnings were adequate. See, e.g., In re Republic Sere Inc. Sec.
Litig., 2001 WL 253244, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2001) (difficulties in assimilation of
acquisitions were sufficiently forewarned by statement observing that the company faced
"significant challenges" in that regard); Carney v. Cambridge Tee. Partners, Inc., 2001 WL
322759, at *9 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2001) (corporate officer who publicly disagreed with
pessimistic analyst reviews held protected by safe harbor: "[T]he idea that reasonable investors
would ignore the advice and cautions of independent securities analysts based solely on the
optimistic opinions of ... the company's president, is at odds with common sense. In their
consideration of whether broad, optimistic statements about a company's future can be a
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predicate for liability under the securities laws, courts have recognized that corporate executives
often make vague, optimistic statements about their firms' outlook. Thus courts generally have
declined to impose liability for such statements. ").

B.

When Forward-Looking Statements Are Not Protected

A prediction may be actionable as a false statement of fact if (1) the speaker did not
genuinely believe the statement was true; (2) there was no reasonable basis for the speaker to
believe the statement; and (3) the speaker was aware of an undisclosed fact tending to undermine
the accuracy of the statement. Berti v. VideoLan Tech., Civil Action No. 3:97-CV-296-H, 1998
u.s. Dist. LEXIS 18066, at *13-14 (W.D. Ky. June 10, 1998); see also In re Reliance Sec. Litig.,
2001 WL 326870, at *21 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2001) (holding no safe harbor because statement of
belief of adequacy of loss reserve was one of "then-present state" of company's financial
condition, not future event); In re Splash Tech. Holdings, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2000 WL 1727377, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2000) (statement regarding "planned investment" was a statement of past
fact of planning rather than forward-looking statement); Karacand, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 ("The
Safe Harbor does not apply to the extent a statement was made by a person or entity having
actual knowledge that it was false or misleading.") (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(I)(B)).
Thus, in Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1111-12, the plaintiff shareholders alleged that the
company's officers and directors knew that their predications that a hotel-casino construction
project would be on budget were false because the insiders had received construction estimates
showing that the project would have cost overruns. On a motion to dismiss, Judge Pro held that
those allegations were sufficient to withstand dismissal under the PSLRA's "actual knowledge"
scienter standard for forward-looking statements. Following discovery, the court reached the
same conclusion once a complete factual record had been presented. See In re Stratosphere
Corp. Sec. Litig., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1191-93 (D. Nev. 1999) (material issues of fact regarding
defendants' knowledge of cost overruns on hotel-casino construction project and company's
generation of change orders and extra work orders without apparent regard for budgetary
constraints precluded summary judgment on defendants' claim that prospectus statements
regarding financial condition were not made with required scienter). Other courts have reached
similar conclusions. See, e.g., Weiss v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. CV-97-1376-ST, 1999 u.s.
Dist. LEXIS 17026, at *45-46 (D. Or. Oct. 6, 1999) (interpreting "actual knowledge" standard to
require that defendants knew -- not should have known -- of facts which seriously undermined
their prediction or knew -- not should have known -- there was no reasonable basis for their
prediction"); Geffon v. Micrion Corp., No. 96-11596-REK, 1998 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 15773, at
*10-11, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 190,307 (D. Mass. Sept. 24, 1998) (denying summary
judgment on claims that defendants had misrepresented to market that they had firm
commitments and an order backlog, when purchaser retained right to cancel significant portion
of order; held that comments were not protected by safe harbor because such statements were
clearly not forward-looking and because cautionary language did not clearly express nature of
cancellation right). See generally Edward Brodsky, Making the Safe Harbor Safer: Giving
Meaning to "Meaningful Cautionary Statements," 7 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr. 7 (Apr.
1999).
A "forward-looking" statement is insulated from liability unless the defendant fails to
make accompanying cautionary statements or the plaintiff proves the defendant actually knew
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the statements were false when made. See Schaffer, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (defendants knew
truth about future business based on company's financial statements which revealed downturn in
new business); Kensington Capital, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 385, at *10-11 (plaintiffs pled facts
sufficient to create strong inference of defendants' knowledge of falsity of statements regarding
introduction of new sunglass line).
The PSLRA's safe harbor explicitly excludes from protection forward-looking statements
included· in financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP; statements contained in
registration statements; or statements made in connection with a tender offer or initial public
offering. See Queen Uno, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (particular and detailed representations
regarding expected production levels of specific facilities may be actionable).
C.

The "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine: When Cautionary
Language Protects Misleading Statements

"Proving that Defendant has provided enough cautionary language as a matter of law is a
high standard." Lister, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 384, at *9; see also Kensington Capital, 1999
u.s. Dist. LEXIS 385, at *8. "The 'bespeaks caution' doctrine is applied narrowly because an
overbroad interpretation would encourage management to conceal deliberate misrepresentations
beneath the mantle of broad cautionary language." Boeing, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14803, at
*24. Whether a statement is misleading may be determined as a matter of law only when
reasonable minds could not disagree as to whether the mix of information is misleading.
Powers, 977 F. Supp. at 1043; Grand Casinos, 988 F. Supp. at 1279; Boeing, 1998 u.s. Dist.
LEXIS 14803, at *24-25 (reasonable minds could differ as to whether cautionary language was
sufficient).
Under the judicially created "bespeaks caution" doctrine, misstated "'forecasts, opinions,
or projections' do not amount to 'material misrepresentations' if 'meaningful cautionary
statements' accompany the forward-looking statements." Valujet, 984 F. Supp. at 1479 (alleged
misrepresentation was not based on forward-looking statements but existing facts) (citation
omitted).
A claim can only be dismissed under the "bespeaks caution" doctrine if defendants'
forward looking statements are accompanied by enough cautionary language or risk disclosure
that "'reasonable minds' could not disagree that the challenged statements were not misleading."
Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *17 (citation omitted); Olympic Fin., 1998
u.s. Dist. LEXIS 14789, at *12; Boeing, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14803, at *17, *24; Kensington
Capital, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 385, at *8.
The "bespeaks caution" doctrine provides a mechanism by which a court can rule as a
matter of law that defendants' forward looking statements contained enough cautionary language
or risk disclosure to protect the defendant against securities fraud. Hoffman v. Avant! Corp., No.
C97-20698(RMW), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21823, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1997) (citation
omitted). The doctrine reflects nothing more than the unremarkable proposition that statements
must be analyzed in context. See Powers, 977 F. Supp. at 1043. Dismissing a securities action
under the bespeaks caution doctrine represents a conclusion that, as a matter of law, a securities
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prospectus as a whole is not misleading due to the risks disclosed and the nature and extent of the
other cautionary language employed. Hoffman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21823, at *5.
D.

Cases In Which Cautionary Disclosures Were Insufficient
To Bespeak Caution

In a variety of cases, courts have held that defendants' cautionary disclosures were
insufficient to "bespeak" caution. See Bryant, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1382 (no defense when

cautionary statements regarding forward-looking information are separate statements or
documents from those listed in complaint); Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at
*17-18 (warnings appeared in documents that did not accompany allegedly misleading oral
representations, thus diminishing their cautionary effect); Powers, 977 F. Supp. at 1043-44
(information does not clearly preclude reasonable minds from differing); Fugman, 961 F. Supp.
at 1199-98 (statements concerning marketability of medical diagnostic test); Voit, 977 F. Supp. at
371 (cautionary warning itself was actionable as material misstatement); Hoffman, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21823, at *5 (representations regarding merits of defendants' legal position may be
misleading and substantially minimize impact of company's risk disclosures); Olympic Finan.,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14789, at *13 (documents containing some cautionary language did not
specifically address heart of plaintiffs' claim); Schaffer, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (misleading
quarterly earnings are present factual conditions); Kensington Capital, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
385, at *8 (same; statements concerning introduction of new sunglass line).
E.

Boilerplate Warnings Are Insufficient To Bespeak Caution

To determine whether the doctrine immunizes defendants from liability, the court must
analyze whether the cautionary statements are "precise" and directly addressed to the future risk
at issue. Hoffman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21823, at *5; Olympic Fin., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14789, at *12. "To immunize the type of conduct alleg.ed here would be to give companies a
license to issue groundless appraisals to investors so long as they include a modest footnote or
appendix with a kernel of truth that might enable an analyst or accountant to spot the
inconsistencies." Marksman Partners, 927 F. Supp. at 1307.
To be meaningful, cautionary statements must identify important facts that could cause
actual results to differ materially from the forward looking statement. Boeing, 40 F. Supp. 2d at
1169-71 (warnings did not speak to factors that could adversely affect company's development of
systems to improve efficiency).
If a party is aware of an actual danger or cause for concern, the party may not rely on a
generic disclaimer in order to avoid liability under the bespeaks caution doctrine. See In re
Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 97 Civ. 4760, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16560, at
*21, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 90,306 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1998) (blanket disclaimer that
defendant/ market maker "may from time to time have long or short positions" not enough to
protect defendants); Feiner v. SS&C Tech., 11 F. Supp. 2d 204, 209 (D. Conn. 1998)
("[W]arning is not so precise and obvious that it renders plaintiffs' allegations unactionable as a
matter of law."); Warman, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2009, at *15 (rejecting defendants' bespeaks
caution defense because cautionary statements did not directly address defendants' projections
and "even if the statements were forward looking, the language used by the defendants appears
to be merely a boilerplate disclaimer"); Cherednichenko, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23107, at *17
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(rejecting bespeaks caution defense because "many of the disclosures appear to be merely
boilerplate disclaimers") (citation omitted); Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 (plaintiffs
alleged that because defendants knew of existing, specific construction cost overruns and
construction delays which would necessarily affect operating revenues once hotel-casino opened,
they cannot insulate these statements with general language in securities disclosures concerning
risks inherent in every construction enterprise).
F.

The "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine Is Not Applicable When
Misrepresentations Or omissions Concern Historical Hard
Or Current Facts

Predictive statements contain the factual assertions that the speaker genuinely believes
the statement is accurate, that there is a reasonable basis for that belief, and that the speaker is
unaware of any undisclosed facts that would tend to seriously undermine the accuracy of the
statement. It follows that statements of opinion are actionable if they are made in bad faith or are
not reasonably supported by evidence available to the person that issues the statements. See
Credit Suisse, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16560, at *14. See also Grand Casinos, 988 F. Supp. at
1279-1280 (forward-looking cautionary language does not render immaterial presently known
facts regarding cost overruns and other construction difficulties); Friedberg v. Discreet Logic,
Inc., 959 F. Supp. 42, 47 (D. Mass. 1997) (while defendants disclosed "risk" that existing
products may become obsolete by introduction of new products by partners, defendants' failure
to disclose that such new product had already been created, was about to be introduced to
market, and would render company's "current product line obsolete within the industry and, thus,
materially lower [the company's] revenues and earnings for the second quarter of fiscal year
1996" held actionable); Page v. Derrickson, Case No. 96-842-CIV-T-17C, 1997 V'.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3673, at *33-34, 10 Fla. Law W. Fed. D 586 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 1997) ("bespeaks
caution" doctrine inapplicable when plaintiffs allege misstatements of existing facts); Powers,
977 F. Supp. at 1043 (rejected defendants' bespeaks caution defense because cautionary language
"does not directly address the delays that Plaintiffs claim Proxima was then experiencing with its
laser-projector development"); Valujet, 984 F. Supp. at 1479 (plaintiffs alleged that defendants
misrepresented and failed to disclose poor safety record and fact that FAA approval was required
before expansion could be consummated); Voit v. Wonderware Corp., 977 F. Supp. 363, 372
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (allegations that defendants made omissions of present fact regarding CEO
departure and that stock plummeted following announcement contradicted defendants' contention
that omission was soft information); Fugman, 961 F. Supp. at 1197 n.9 (cautionary statements
cannot render immaterial company's factual representations regarding the adequacy of one
component in a medical diagnostic testing system).

x.

LIABILITY OF SECURITIES ISSUERS AND THEIR OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS FOR SECURITIES ANALYSTS' STATEMENTS
A.

The Fraud-On-The-Market Doctrine

Federal regulation of securities began with the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities
Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). The goal of both statutes
can best be understood as the promotion of a more efficient securities market. See House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., Report of the Advisory Committee
on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission 560 (1977) ("1977
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Report"). To achieve this goal, the legislation mandates company disclosure of material
information and establishes liability for false and misleading statements. Id. at 564-65.
Market efficiency has two components: informational efficiency and allocational
efficiency. James D. Cox, et ai., Securities Regulation, 36-38 (Aspen 2d ed. 1997). "On close
inspection, there are really two distinct aspects of market efficiency: informational efficiency
and allocational efficiency. Informational efficiency describes the speed with which market
prices adjust to new information. Allocational efficiency concerns the allocation of resources to
their best or highest use." Id. at 38. "Prices in an efficient market more closely reflect
underlying value than in an inefficient market, and scarce resources are therefore allocated more
efficiently." Id. at 36. By mandating company disclosures, with the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act Congress sought to increase informational efficiency and thus increase
allocational efficiency." 1977 Report, at 562. "The Securities Act was founded on the theory
that informed investors seeking to maximize their own investment needs and objectives resulted
in the most efficient allocation of capital among innumerable alternative investment
opportunities." Id. at 563.

In open market securities cases brought by defrauded investors under Section 1O(b) of
the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs often employ the "fraud-on-the-market" theory
endorsed by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988): "[M]ost
publicly available information is reflected in market price, [and therefore] an investor's reliance
on any public material misrepresentations ... may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5
action."
As the Basic Court recognized, the fraud-on-the-market theory presupposes that the
securities market '''transmits information to the investor in the processed form of a market
price.... The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that given all the
information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price. '" Id. at 244 (quoting
In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980»; see also Semerenko, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14046, at *31-34 (offering an extensive discussion of the "fraud-on-the-market" theory).
See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059 (1990).
B.

The Important Role Played By Securities Analysts

In explaining how the securities market translates company-specific information into a
stock price, the Basic Court emphasized the importance of "market professionals":
We need not determine by adjudication what economists and social scientists
have debated through the use of sophisticated statistical analysis and the
application of economic theory. For purposes of accepting the presumption of
reliance in this case, we need only believe that market professionals generally
consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby
affecting stock market prices.
485 U.S. at 247 n.24 (emphasis added). Prominent among these "market professionals" are
securities analysts; indeed, district courts have frequently stated that the number of such analysts
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reporting on a particular security is one of the factors to be examined in determining whether the
fraud-on-the-market theory is to be applied in a particular case. See, e.g., In re MDC Holdings
Sec. Litig., 754 F. Supp. 785, 804-05 (S.D. Cal. 1990); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264,
1286 (D.N.J. 1989). See also Brad M. Barber, et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the
Indicators of Common Stocks' Efficiency, 19 J. Corp. L. 285, 305 (1994) (number of analysts
following stock and trading volume are only factors having independent statistical significance in
determining market efficiency); Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of
Insider Trading, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1023, 1024 (1990) (academic commentary supports the
proposition that "[i]nvestment analysts are crucial players in the mechanisms of marketplace
efficiency that lead to optimal allocations of capital resources").
Courts have recognized that earnings forecasts disseminated by securities analysts are of
particular importance because such analysts are theoretically independent of the companies they
follow and, as a result, they can be expected to provide more objective projections than the
companies themselves:
[T]he corporation's own officers are not likely to be the most reliable source of
projections of future corporate performance. Officers and internal analysts may
be biased by their personal goals in evaluating the corporation's prospects for
short- and long-term success. [So] long as the corporation provides accurate hard
data to the market, professional analysts and investors are in at least as good and
probably a better position to make the predictions about a corporation's future
which are relevant to the valuation of corporate securities.
This is true for a number of reasons. First, the professional analyst has
more interest in making the most accurate prediction possible, because the
analyst's reputation and livelihood depend solely on· the analyst's ability to be
correct. The corporate officer's success does not depend primarily or even
significantly on an ability to predict stock prices. Second, the analyst has the
benefit of objectivity because the analyst is removed from the daily operations of
the corporation, whereas the corporate officer is in the thick of these
developments. Finally, and most importantly, the analyst is skilled in combining
the specific data disclosed by the corporation with general knowledge about the
industry and the national and international economies in which the corporation
competes. Corporations calion their officers for other skills.
In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1481-82 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 11 F.3d 865 (9th
Cir. 1993) (footnote omitted). See also In re Compaq Sec. Litig., 848 F. Supp. 1307,1315 (S.D.
Tex. 1993) ("market makers often use analysts' opinions rather than management's to form the
basis for their decisions about the appropriate market price for a company's stock") (footnote
omitted); William O. Fisher, The Analyst-Added Premium as a Defense in Open Market
Securities Fraud Cases, 53 Bus. Law. 35, 38-43 (Nov. 1997) (recognizing influence that
securities analysts have upon stock prices).
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c.

Liability Of Securities Issuers For Statements And
Projections Disseminated By Securities Analysts

1. Introduction
Several legal theories impose liability upon securItIes issuers and their officers and
directors for statements or projections made by securities analysts, as Judge Legge has cogently
explained:
If defendants made misleading statements to securities analysts regarding
expected licensing revenues, they may be liable for securities fraud, even if the
company did not adopt the analysts' subsequent reports. If a company chooses to
speak to the market on a subject, through an analyst or otherwise, it must make a
full and fair disclosure to ensure that its statements are not materially misleading.
A company may be liable under Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations to analysts that
reach the market.
Although a company is not generally responsible for the accuracy of
statements made by securities analysts, a company may adopt or endorse an
analyst's report, causing the report to be attributed to the company. A defendant
may become sufficiently entangled by reviewing the analysts' reports and making
representations that the information is true or in accordance with the company's
views, or by exercising some measure of control over the content of the reports.
For liability to attach, plaintiffs must demonstrate: 1) that a corporate insider
adopted the analysts' forecasts; and 2) that the insider knew the analysts' forecasts
were unreasonable when made, yet failed to disclose their unreasonableness to
investors. Generally, a company is liable for analysts' forecasts that it fostered
and reviewed but failed to correct if the company expressly or impliedly
represented that the information in the forecasts was accurate or coincided with
the company's views.
In re DSP Group Sec. Litig., No. C 95-4025-CAL, 1997 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 11942, at *19-21,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 99,525 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 1997) (citations omitted). See generally
Shirli Fabbri Weiss, Securities Analysts in Securities Class Actions: Theories of Liability and
Defense After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 8 Securities Reform Act Litig. Rptr.
667 (Feb. 2000) ("Weiss, Securities Analysts"); Peter L. Cholakis, Comment, Company
Disclosures of Earnings Projections: Should Individual Investors Be Allowed Into the "Ball
Park"?, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. 819, 836 n.147 (1999) ("Cholakis, Company Disclosures")
("Corporations may also be subject to [Rule] 10b-5 liability stemming from relations with
analysts where they: (1) provide an analyst with false information, (2) entangle themselves with
an analyst's report, or (3) disseminate an analyst's report. ") (citations omitted).

2. PressTek
On December 22, 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") issued an
Enforcement Release defining the circumstances under which a securities issuer may be held
liable for statements, including earnings forecasts, contained in a securities analyst's report. See
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In the Matter of Presstek, Inc., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-9515, 1997 SEC LEXIS
2645 (Dec. 22, 1997). In an accompanying civil action brought against Presstek's chairman,

Robert Howard, and president, Robert Verrando, the SEC alleged that Howard and Verrando
caused Presstek to disseminate, through its own statements and its distribution of analysts'
statement, materially misleading information concerning its sales and business prospects. SEC v.
Robert Howard, No. 97 Civ. 9378 (SWK), Litigation Release No. 15599, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2623
(Dec. 22, 1997). In 1994 and 1995, Howard directed Presstek to distribute several thousand
copies of several editions of the Cabot Market Letter, a financial newsletter that aggressively
touted Presstek and which contained excessive earnings projections for the company. Howard
knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that those earnings projections far exceeded Presstek's
contemporaneous internal projections. Presstek adopted those unrealistic projections by
distributing the Cabot Market Letters without disclaimer, and during a time when Presstek
elected not to make public its own projections because management did not view them as
reliable.
In November 1995, Howard reviewed and edited the draft of a research analyst's report
on Presstek and had Presstek distribute the report, which in final form substantially overstated
Presstek's sales and earnings expectations. For example, the report projected 1996 sales of a
Presstek laser imaging product of $26 million, when Presstek internally projected only $10
million. It also projected 1996 sales of consumable printing plates of $33.2 million, contrasted
with Presstek's internal projection of $8.7 million. It projected 1997 earnings of $2.42 per share,
80% more than Presstek's internal projection of $1.34 per share. Howard did not correct those
errors, and Presstek distributed the erroneous report for more than six months to investors
without disclaimer. Verrando was aware that projections in the analyst's report were
significantly greater than Presstek's contemporaneous projections, but failed to halt its
distribution.
In its release, the SEC recognized "entanglement" liability (see discussion below), stating

that "[a]n issuer is liable for inaccuracies in a research report published by someone else" if it
"'sufficiently entangled itself with such information to render them attributable to the issuer."
Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *29 (citation omitted). The SEC also recognized "adoption"
liability (see discussion below), stating that "[a]n issuer may also be liable for false statements
contained in a third-party report if it adopts, expressly or impliedly, the statements after they are
published, even if management had no role in preparing the reports." Id. at *31. Analyzing the
facts of the case, the SEC held that Presstek was liable under both theories. Id. at *34-39.
D.

The "Entanglement" Theory

As a general rule, securities issuers are not liable for statements or forecasts disseminated
by securities analysts; however, reference to reported cases demonstrates numerous exceptions
which nearly swallow this rule. Thus, issuers can be held liable under § 1O(b)/Rule 10b-5 if they
have "sufficiently entangled [themselves] with the analysts' forecasts [so as] to render those
predictions 'attributable to [the issuers].'" Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d
eire 1980). In that case, the Second Circuit explained the rationale for its holding:
We have no doubt that a company may so involve itself in the preparation of
reports and projections by outsiders as to assume a duty to correct material errors
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in those projections. This may occur when officials of the company have, by their
activity, made an implied representation that the information they have reviewed
is true or at least in accordance with the company's views.
Id.; accord Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *29-30 (explicating "entanglement" theory and
collecting cases). In order for the securities issuer to be held liable for the securities analysts'
statements or projections under the so-called "entanglement" theory, the issuer must have placed
its "imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on the analysts' projections." Elkind, 635 F.2d at 163;
see also Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *30; Helwig, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 7341, at *22
(Sixth Circuit: "[A] corporation cannot be held responsible for analysts' statements about the
corporation's financial health unless the corporation takes more affirmative action than simply
providing information to the analysts") (citation omitted); In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d
1399~ 1410 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Nokia Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 96 Civ. 3752 (DC), 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4100, at *31, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) CJ[ 90,195 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998);
Verifone, 784 F. SUppa at 1486; Alfus V. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. SUppa 598,603 (N.D. Cal.
1991). See also In re Polaroid Corp. Sec. Litig., 134 F. SUPPa 2d 176 (D. Mass. 2001) (company
had no duty to correct inaccurate analysts' reports circulating in market).

At least one district court has observed that there are "sound reasons ... to construe the
entanglement requirement strictly." In re Caere Corp. Sec. Litig., 837 F. SUppa 1054, 1059 (N.D.
Cal. 1993). As Judge Williams explained:
In today's complex and highly competitive financial markets, countless analysts ...
issue earnings and revenue forecasts on virtually every publicly-traded
corporation. Forecasts may vary a great deal. If corporate insiders are held liable
under Rule 10b-5 every time one of these forecasts proves to be incorrect, they
would likely spend more time in court than running their companies.
Also, if a loose and capricious entanglement standard is allowed to
develop, it will be very difficult for corporate insiders to know how to regulate
their behavior in such a way as to adopt only with those forecasts which they have
carefully examined and have determined to be reasonably accurate. Corporate
insiders should not be exposed to Rule 10b-5 liability for an analyst's forecast
unless it is clear, based on the insider's conduct, that he could have reasonably
foreseen that he would be held liable if the forecast turned out to be unreasonable
when made and materially misleading to the investing public.
Id.; see also In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Caere
court's "strict construction" language with approval). Relying upon Caere, 837 F. SUppa at 1059,
Judge Lasker recently posited the standard for liability under the "entanglement" theory in the
following terms:

Courts concluding that an issuer may be liable under the statute for failure
to correct an analyst statement have generally required that the plaintiff allege
that: (1) the issuer "entangled" itself in the making of a statement by the analyst;
(2) the issuer knew that the statement (commonly a prediction) was false or
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lacked a reasonable factual basis when made; and (3) the issuer failed to disclose
the falsity or the unreasonableness to investors. The element of entanglement
may be satisfied by the issuer having either "fostered," "induced," or otherwise
caused the statement to be made in the first place, or having adopted, ratified, or
otherwise "endorsed" the statement after it was made. In either instance, the
issuer must have "sufficiently entangled itself with the analysts' [statements] to
render [them] attributable to it."
In re Boston Tech. Sec. Litig., 8 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55 (D. Mass. 1998) (citations omitted); accord
Peritus Software, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 230; In re Number Nine Visual Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 51 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 30 (D. Mass. 1999). See also In re Crown Am. Realty Trust Sec. Litig., No. 95-202J,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14609, at *54 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 1997) (to plead "imputation" theory
with sufficient particularity to avoid dismissal under Rule 9(b), plaintiffs "'must (1) identify
specific analyst opinions and name the insider who adopted them; (2) point to specific
interactions between the insider and the analyst which gave rise to the entanglement; and (3)
state the dates on which the acts which allegedly gave rise to the entanglement occurred"')
(citation omitted).

Under this line of authority, courts typically hold that·a so-called "one-way flow of
information, from [issuer] representatives to analysts and from the analysts to their customers" is
not sufficient "entanglement" to render the issuer liable for the analysts' statements or
projections. Syntex, 95 F.3d at 934. Those courts which strictly construe the requirements of the
"entanglement" theory require plaintiffs to allege with particularity the time, place, content, and
speaker of the issuer's communications with the securities analysts, and explain why the
communications were fraudulent. See Suna v. Bailey Corp., 107 F.3d 64, 73-74 (1st Cir. 1997)
(declining to reach ultimate issue of whether action against issuer could lie on basis of analyst
statements, but dismissing case on grounds of plaintiffs' failure to plead issuer's "entanglement"
sufficiently, indicating that if squarely faced with issue, it might well permit findings of liability
for analyst statements); accord Peritus Software, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 230; Number Nine Visual, 51
F. Supp. 2d at 30-31. See also In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 97 Civ. 1865 (HB),
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8061, at *15 n.2, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) C)[ 90,235 (S.D.N.Y. May 27,
1998) ("The complaint alleges that a report published by the firm of Robinson-Humphrey Co. is
attributable to defendants because it was written by a former CFO of HMS and because the
information is of sufficient detail that it could only have come from defendants. I find that these
allegations do not sufficiently plead with particularity that defendants so thoroughly 'entangled'
themselves with such report as to render them liable for such reports."); DSP Group, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11942, at *27 ("Plaintiffs have not alleged [with particularity] which securities
analysts provided draft reports to DSP corporate insiders, when they provided those reports, or
which corporate insiders reviewed and approved the draft reports. "); Colby v. Hologic, Inc., 817
F. Supp. 204, 215 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that plaintiff failed to adequately plead
"entanglement" or misstatements of facts to analysts). But see Harvey M. Jasper Retirement
Trust v. Ivax Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1260, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 1995) ("At the pleading stage, all
plaintiffs need allege is that defendants provided the information to the securities analyst, upon
which the reports were based. ").
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Not surprisingly, with a liability standard phrased as "entanglement" or "imprimatur," the
courts have experienced difficulty in determining when an issuer may be held liable for a
securities analyst's statement or projection. Some cases addressing the question have held that an
issuer who simply provides background information to a securities analyst will not be liable for
statements in the analyst's subsequent report. As Judge Patel explained in Padnes v. Scios Nova
Inc., No. C95-1693 MHP, 1996 WL 539711 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 1996):
Here, plaintiffs have pled only that the analysts' reports were based on
information provided by the defendants. This, without more, in [sic] insufficient
under the great weight of authority in this district to attribute third-party
statements to a defendant company. Mere provision of information cannot
amount to entanglement sufficient to sustain liability under Elkind.
Id. at *10 (citations omitted). See also In re Rasterops Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-9320349RPA(EAI), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18245, at *9, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 98,231 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 31, 1994) (" [I]t is not enough to simply allege that the reports were based on
information provided by the company and that the company received and reviewed a draft of the
report."); O'Sullivan v. Trident Microsystems, No. C 93-20621 RMW (EAI), 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17065, at *46, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 98,116 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 1994) ("While the
company may have provided the information on which the reports were based, this does not
mean the company is liable for the contents of the reports. ").

On the other hand, in Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, the SEC held that the following
facts constituted "entanglement":
Presstek's management directly participated in preparing a report that it knew, or
was reckless in not knowing, included forecasts that were far more optimistic than
Presstek's contemporaneous internal projections. For example, the PMG Report
quoted management's projection of "a few 100" Pearlsetter sales for 1996.
However, Howard and Verrando knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that
Presstek's internal forecasts projected only half as many Pearlsetter sales for 1996
as were forecast in the PMG Report. Moreover, in an effort to give added weight
to the inaccurate Pearlsetter forecast, Howard falsely attributed it to "industry
experts." Howard also failed to lower the PMG Reports 1996 or 1997 revenue
forecasts to conform them to Presstek's contemporaneous internal projections.
Although Howard edited the PMG Report's 1996 EPS projection, he did not
correct its 1997 EPS projection ($2.42), which far exceeded Presstek's internal
projection ($1.34). By revising certain forecasts concerning Presstek's revenues
and earnings, Howard impliedly represented to PMG that those he did not revise
were accurate.
Id. at *34-35. "Such involvement by management in the preparation, review, and editing of the
PMG Report establishes Presstek's liability for the report's forecasts." Id. at *35-36.
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E.

The "Conduit" Theory

The "entanglement" analysis applies where the securities analyst's statement forecast is
the product of his own work on which the issuer has placed its imprimatur by entangling
conduct. When plaintiffs allege that the issuer consciously ,planted false information with an
analyst, so that the analyst acted as a conduit for introducing the false information into the
market, the company may be liable whether or not it entangled itself by review of draft reports.
See, e.g., In re Sunbeam -Sec. Litig., No. 98-8258-CN-MIDDLEBROOKS, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) CJ[ 90,735 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1999) (refusing to dismiss claim that "Defendants used
private securities analysts to mislead the public about the financial condition of Sunbeam and its
operations" where plaintiffs alleged that it was "Sunbeam's practice to have officers
communicate with analysts frequently, in conference calls, meetings and analyst briefs, in order
to falsely present the operations and allegedly successful prospects of Sunbeam to the
marketplace and inflate artificially the price of Sunbeam common stock"). In the words of one
recent commentary:
If an issuer intentionally or recklessly misleads securities analysts, then
the analyst reports are relevant to determine securities fraud liability. Adoption or
entanglement is not required in such circumstances and an issuer cannot avoid
liability just because the fraud is perpetrated through third parties.
Robert Norman Sobol, The Tangled Web of Issuer Liability for Analyst Statements: In re Cirrus
Logic Securities Litigation, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. 1051, 1057-58 (1997) ("Sobol, Tangled Web")
(footnotes omitted). (It should be noted that in Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, the SEC did
not address the "conduit" theory of liability.)
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act prohibits the use of "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance," whether practiced "directly or indirectly." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section
20(b) of the Exchange Act specifies that it is unlawful for a person "to do any act or thing which
it would be unlawful for such person to do ... through or by means of any other person." 15
U.S.C. § 78t(b). As a result,
[m]anipulation of the prices of securItIes by the dissemination of false and
misleading information through analysts is exactly the type of conduct section
10(b) prohibits. When an issuer communicates such misleading information to
investment analysts there is an expectation that the false information will reach
the marketplace and influence prices.
Sobol, Tangled Web, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. at 1058 (footnote omitted). See also Kirby v. Cullinet
Software, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 303, 307 (D. Mass. 1987) (stating that reliance on the market also
includes reliance on third party statements that just relayed the misstated information from
securities issuers).
In Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996), the Ninth Circuit reversed
dismissal of a securities fraud complaint which alleged that the securities issuer intentionally
used securities analysts and the press to disseminate false information to the investing public:
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[I]f defendants intentionally misled securities analysts and the press in order to
stave offaXoma stock sell off, then these third-party reports would be relevant to
determine Xoma's securities fraud liability. The Complaint asserts that Xoma
intentionally used these third parties to disseminate false information to the
investing public. If this is true, Xoma cannot escape liability simply because it
carried out its alleged fraud through the public statements of third parties. The
Complaint should not have been dismissed under 12(b)(6), without a contextual,
"delicate assessment" of the facts presented by including the statements of thirdparty analysts.
Id. at ·959 (citing Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 1995)). Accord DSP
Group, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11942, at *25 ("If defendants provided inflated or otherwise
misleading licensing revenue projections to the analysts, that could qualify as misleading the
analysts.").

In another case, In re Cirrus Logic Sec. Litig., 946 F. Supp. 1446 (N.D. Cal. 1996), the
district court observed:
Defendants also argue that they cannot be held liable for allegedly
misleading statements made to analysts, unless plaintiffs can prove Cirrus's
entanglement with, or adoption of, the analysts' reports. This is not the law....
The Court finds that a company may be liable under Rule 10b-5 for its own
intentional or reckless misrepresentations to analysts that reach the market,
whether or not the company adopts the resulting analysts' reports.
Id. at 1466-67. Similarly, in Simon v. American Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416
(D.R.I. 1996), the court denied a motion to dismiss that part of the complaint alleging liability for
statements made by analysts because

[t]here are sufficient facts to support a finding that any misstatements in the
analysts' reports were caused by APC's management. The reports reference
numerous conversations with APC management on the question of APC's buildup of inventories, during which APC gave its explanation for the increase in
inventories. From that, it would be reasonable for the fact-finder to infer that any
misrepresentations in the reports were based on or caused by false or misleading
information obtained directly from APC. Such causation, if proven, is sufficient
to support APC's liability through the attribution of the statements.
Id. at 429-30 (footnote omitted).

In Schaffer v. Timberland Co., 924 F. Supp. 1298 (D.N.H. 1996), the court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss because
[s]ignificantly, the plaintiffs have identified specific analyst statements and the
insider information, sometimes directly quoted, upon which they allege the
statements were based.... Jeffrey Swartz is alleged to have made direct statements,
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excerpted verbatim, statements of approval of erroneous projections of outside
analysts, and statements concerning the size and nature of Timberland's inventory
and the demand for its product. The plaintiffs next allege, again in detail, that the
following day Merrill Lynch directly relied on and incorporated Swartz's remarks
into its report.
Id. at 1312.

I

r

It is not unusual for plaintiffs to allege several alternative theories of issuer liability for
analyst statements. See Gross, 977 F. Supp. at 1474 ("Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that the
[analysts'] reports were based on misleading information provided by Defendants. Finally,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants, without any reasonable basis, endorsed and adopted each of the
analysts' reports by, among other things, expressing comfort with the third and fourth quarter
earnings estimates contained in one of the reports. ") (citations omitted); In re Wall Data Sec.
Litig., No. C95-0528Z, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14052, at *14, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 99,292
(W.D. Wash. June 25, 1996) (granting motion to dismiss as to entanglement theory, but not as to
conduit theory; "Plaintiffs' allegations that the Company made false and misleading statements to
analysts, however, are relevant to plaintiffs' claim under § 10(b) that the Company made false
and misleading statements about acceptance of Wall Data products and the Company's potential
for growth. "). Judge Smith has agreed that
[i]t is also possible for liability to attach if a corporate officer or employee
makes false and misleading statements to an analyst, who then in good faith
incorporates them into his or her report. Because a company official spoke ... this
is a form of direct liability and does not involve the imputation of the analyst's
statements back to the company. Under such a theory, the plaintiff must "plead
with the requisite specificity precisely what misstatements were made by which
defendants to which analysts, and precisely how that specific misinformation
reached the market through a specific analyst report. "
Crown Am. Realty, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14609, at *54 n.2 (citations omitted) (quoting Rubin
v. Trimble, No. C-95-4353 MMC, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14011, at *55-57 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28,
1997».

The Ninth Circuit has held that the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank, which
abolished aiding and abetting liability, does not foreclose such a theory, at least where the
securities analysts act wittingly. In Cooper, 137 F.3d 616, where the court reversed dismissal of
securities fraud claims, the securities issuer argued that "it is not responsible for the
recommendations of securities analysts, even if it provided information on which the analysts'
assessments were based." Id. at 623-24. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that it
had held in Warshaw, 74 F.3d at 959, that "corporate defendants may be directly liable under
[Rule] 10b-5 for providing false or misleading information to third-party securities analysts."
Cooper, 137 F.3d at 624. Further rejecting the issuer's argument that "Central Bank precludes
holding it liable for the analysts' statements," id., Judge Fletcher stated:
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Merisel is alleged to have made misleading statements to the analysts with the
intent that the analysts communicate those statements to the market. This is not
aiding and abetting or secondary liability; the complaint alleges that Merisel is
[responsible] for its own false statements to the analysts.
Id. Judge Fletcher concluded her analysis of this issue by stating that

[p]laintiffs' claims ... are not barred by Central Bank in that they are asserting that
Merisel, through false statements to analysts, and those analysts, by issuing
reports based on statements they knew were false, together engaged in a scheme
to defraud the shareholders.
Cooper, 137 F.3d at 625. See also Weiss, Securities Analysts, 8 Securities Reform Act Litig.
Rptr. at 669 (discussing Cooper).

F.

Securities Issuer's Review, Correction And/Or
Dissemination Of Securities Analysts' Reports

In Elkind, following a jury trial the Second Circuit affirmed that the securities issuer,
Liggett & Myers, was not liable for securities analysts' projections. 635 F.2d at 163. In so
holding, it noted that Liggett had hired a public relations firm in order to specifically encourage
"closer contact between analysts and company management" because management "concluded
that the company's stock was underpriced, due in part to lack of appreciation in the financial
community for the breadth of its market activity." Id. at 159. While the Second Circuit noted
that Liggett's officers had received drafts of analysts' reports and corrected them, the court
stressed that the company's review and correction did not extend to forecasts:

[W]e find no reason to reverse as clearly erroneous the district court's finding that
Liggett did not place its imprimatur, expressly or impliedly, on the analysts'
projections. The company did examine and comment on a number of reports, but
its policy was to refrain from comment on earnings forecasts. Testimony at trial
indicated that the analysts knew the were not being made privy to the company's
internal projections. While the evidence leaves little doubt that Liggett made
suggestions as to factual and descriptive matters in a number of the reports it
reviewed, the record does not compel the conclusion that this conduct carried a
suggestion that the analysts' projections were consistent with Liggett's internal
estimates.... Thus, Liggett assumed no duty to disclose its own forecasts or to
warn the analysts (and the public) that their optimistic view was not shared by the
company.
Id. at 163 (footnotes omitted).

Subsequent decisions have reached varying results on the precise question of whether
review and correction of draft securities analysts' reports by an officer or employer of the
securities issuer constitutes sufficient "entanglement" to attribute the analysts' statements to the
issuer. In SEC v. Wellshire Sec., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 569,572 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court denied a
permanent injunction as to two individual defendants and dissolved an injunction against a
corporate defendant, finding that statements in a broker's market letter were not attributable to
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those defendants. The district court so held even though the brokers sent a draft of a market
letter to the defendants, the defendants corrected the draft and sent it back to the broker, and the
broker then incorporated that corrected draft into its market letters. Contrasting the facts of that
case with Elkind, the court wrote:
The facts of the case at bar indicate less entanglement that in Elkind,
where the court was not inclined to find entanglement because the company's
general policy was not to involve itself with forecasting. No evidence has been
presented as to any meetings between the ... defendants and [the broker] in
preparing the drafts at bar or [the] Market Letters.
Id. at 573.

On the other hand, there are a number of decisions holding on their particular facts that
review and correction of analysts' draft reports by a securities issuer's officer or employee is
sufficient to constitute entanglement. For example, in In re ICNlViratek Sec. Litig., No. 87 Civ.
4296, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4407, at *10, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) <j[ 99,213 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4,
1996), where the court denied defendants' summary judgment motion, Judge Wood noted that
plaintiffs had "submitted evidence indicating not only that defendants reviewed the PaineWebber
report, but also that defendants did fail to correct factual statements in the report that they knew
were erroneous B while at the same time making other corrections and additions to the report."
(Emphasis in original.) The district court contrasted the facts before the Second Circuit in
Elkind, where the corporation reviewed and commented on an early draft of an analyst's report
but "did not review the actual text of the final report just prior to issuance," and noted that in the
case at bar, defendants' "review and amendment of the final draft of the report just before its
issuance" made a difference. Id. at *16, *18 (emphasis in original). Accord Presstek, 1997 SEC
LEXIS 2645, at *35-36 (citing ICNlViratek with approval).
In Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995), the court denied a motion to
dismiss, noting that plaintiffs alleged "that the analyst who wrote each of these reports sent
copies to three Quickturn insiders (Lobo, D'Amour and Ostby), and that all three of these
insiders reviewed and approved of the report during the week prior to the report's publication."
Id. at 1372. See also In re Gupta Corp. Sec. Litig., 900 F. Supp. 1217, 1237 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(denying motion to dismiss because plaintiffs made "detailed allegations that Gupta insiders
provided information and guidance to analysts to assist the analysts in creating forecasts for the
company" and alleged, although generally, "that defendants reviewed and approved analysts'
reports before publication").

G.

"No Comment" Policies

Cases that follow Elkind and find defendants not liable for analysts' forecasts frequently
emphasize that the issuer had a policy of refraining from comment on such forecasts, or point to
statements by the issuer's management distancing the company from the forecasts. See, e.g.,
Syntex, 95 F.3d at 934 (affirming dismissal of securities fraud claims; "when Defendant Freiman
(Syntex's CEO) was asked about the analysts' predictions related to future earnings per share,
Mr. Freiman stated, 'We don't forecast earnings,' and emphasized that such estimates should not
be attributed to Syntex"). See also In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 1369,
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1377 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (granting summary judgment for defendants as to all statements in
analysts' reports; "Rodgers and Allen both testified that Cypress does not give its forecasts to
analysts and has a policy of not commenting on analysts' forecasts. Plaintiffs have failed to
present any credible evidence that Cypress ever deviated from this policy during the class
period.") affd sub nom. Eisenstadt v. Allen, No. 95-16255, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9587 (9th
Cir. Apr. 28, 1997); In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., No. C-89-2493(A)-VRW, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2052, at *13-14, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) CJ[ 98,530 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 1995) (granting
summary judgment for defendants because Seagate's president "testified that throughout fiscal
1988, the company had a strict policy not to comment upon analysts' financial projections.
Analysts themselves confirm Seagate's adherence to this policy. Plaintiffs fail to present
evidence that defendants departed from their policy of not commenting on analysts' forecasts. "),
affd, 98 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1996). As the district court noted in Caere:
The only specific statements alleged in the Amended Complaint which suggest an
entanglement are Caere's Chief Financial Officer's March 15, 1993, comments
regarding analysts' forecasts, indicating that Caere did not have "sufficient
information" upon which to base a comment, that "the first quarter is typically
slower, reflecting seasonality in Caere's business," and that "as a result, results for
the [first] quarter are always difficult to predict." It strains the intellect to imagine
how this statement could constitute an entanglement. Caere's Chief Financial
Officer was not embracing the analysts' forecasts when she made this statement.
To the contrary, she was suggesting that the analysts' forecasts might be overly
optimistic.
837 F. Supp. at 1060; see also Cirrus Logic, 946 F. Supp. at 1466 (granting summary judgment
for company defendants for liability on opinions contained in 32 analyst reports; company
personnel who were authorized by internal policy to talk with analysts stated that "they never
commented on analysts' financial projections, and never provided to analysts internal earnings or
revenue forecasts or other specific financial guidance").
As a result of plaintiffs' claims of issuer liability for statements or projections contained
in securities analysts' reports, some issuers have reassessed their policies regarding corporate
communications with analysts. See Dale E. Barnes, Jr. & Constance E. Bagley, Great
Expectations: Risk Management Through Risk Disclosures, 1 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 155, 182
(1994) (citing to various articles indicating that companies such as Exabyte Corp., Software
Toolworks and Oracle Systems Corp. now have stringent guidelines on the content and manner
of such communications as a result of securities litigation involving those companies).
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H.

"Adoption"

Or

"Ratification" Of Analysts' Reports

While in Elkind the Second Circuit addressed pre-publication "entanglement," several
cases hold that an issuer can be held liable for post-publication adoption or ratification of a
securities analyst's statement or projection. See Sobol, Tangled Web, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. at 1065
(distinguishing "[p]republication entanglement" from post-publication "adoption" of analysts'
statements or projections); Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *29-33 (same); In re Burlington
Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429 (3dCir. 1997) (holding that use of word
"comfortable" by corporate officer in regard to his views of certain analysts' estimates clearly
evidenced adoption).
For example, a securItIes issuer might ratify, endorse, or adopt an analyst's report
(including presumably any forecasts contained therein) by distributing copies of the report to
shareholders or potential investors:
The act of circulating the reports amounts to an implied representation that the
information contained in the reports is accurate or reflects the company's views ....
By passing out the favorable analyst reports, Rasterops was clearly implying that
the company agreed with the forecasts contained in the reports.

Rasterops, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18245, at *10, *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 31,1994) (denying motion
to dismiss and noting that plaintiff alleged that "the company provided false information to the
[securities] analysts and approved drafts of the reports"). See also Strassman v. Fresh Choice,
Inc., No. C-95-20017 RPA, 1995 u.S. Dist. LEXIS 19343, at *31 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1995)
(stating that "[i]n addition to pre-publication entanglement ... this Court has held that a company
may also be liable if it ratifies an analysts' report after the report has been published," but
granting motion to dismiss because plaintiffs failed to alleged which reports were circulated by
defendants, which defendant circulated reports and to whom reports were circulated). As the
SEC recently concurred:
In the Commission's view, under certain circumstances an issuer that
disseminates false third party reports may adopt the contents of those reports and
be fully liable for the misstatements contained in them, even if it had no role
whatsoever in the preparation of the report. If an issuer knows, or is· reckless in
not knowing, that the information it distributes is false or misleading, it cannot be
insulated from liability because management was not actively involved in the
preparation of that information.

Presstek, 1997 SEC LEXIS 2645, at *33-34; see also Id. at *38 (citing Rasterops opinion with
approval).
In Stratosphere, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1115, Judge Pro granted defendants' motions to dismiss
plaintiffs' claims based upon the "entanglement" theory, finding that the complaint "fail[s] to
allege specific interactions between the insider and the analyst giving rise to the entanglement, or
allege when these interactions occurred." Id. However, the court reached a different conclusion
as to other allegations:
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Plaintiffs also point to two facsimile cover sheets from an analyst to
[Stratosphere chief financial officer] Lettero for the proposition that Lettero
endorsed or approved the reports, and allege that certain analysts testified in
depositions that Lettero was sent drafts of letters and sent drafts of reports prior to
issuance by the analysts. Plaintiffs also contend that Stratosphere and the
Individual Defendants distributed copies of analysts' reports and/or provided a list
of analysts' coverage of Stratosphere in the packages that the company sent to
potential investors. These allegations are sufficient to meet the pleading
requirements for liability, and this Court does not dismiss liability based on these
claims.
Id. at 1115-16.

In Stack v. Lobo, No. 95-20049SW, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19966, at *24 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 19, 1995), Judge Williams observed that "[b]y reproducing and including these [securities
analysts'] reports in their own stockholder informational materials, Quickturn may have
impliedly represented that the information contained in those reports was accurate or reflected
the company'[s] own views"; however, the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss because
plaintiffs did "not identify the particular 'investor relations package' or provide the date on which
it was sent out." In a later opinion in the same case, however, the district court seemed to
reconsider its earlier ruling and found plaintiffs' allegations to be sufficient, thereby denying
defendants' motion to dismiss as to securities analysts' reports that had been included in investor
relations packets:
Plaintiffs here have pled sufficient facts with regard to the investor relations
package to satisfy Rule 9(b). Plaintiffs allege that specific Quickturn insiders
approved the inclusion of specific analysts' reports and brochures in the package.
Requiring Plaintiffs to identify each package that was sent out and the date on
which it was sent would be unduly burdensome and unrealistic.
I. Public Company Practices In Dealing With Securities
Analysts
Given the perils inherent in public companies' "entanglement" with securities analysts, it
is surprising to see the frequency with which their officers (and directors) review drafts of
analysts' reports, selectively disclose material information to analysts, and engage in similar
practices. See Cholakis, Company Disclosures, 39 Santa Clara L. Rev. at 845-47. A study
published in May 1998 revealed the following practices employed by public companies in
dealing with securities analysts:

Does any officer ofyour company review drafts of
securities analysts' reports on a regular basis?
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Yes

86% (78% in 1995)

No

14%

Does any officer ofyour company check analysts'
earnings projections or models before they are
published?

Yes

79% (69% in 1995)

No

21%

Yes

77% (same in 1995)

No

23%

Yes

71 % (same in 1995)

No

29%

Yes

46%

No

54%

Yes

45% (34% in 1995)

No

55%

If guidance has been given to analysts during the
quarter but results are expected to be well below
expectations, would your company issue a press
release to correct misperceptions?

Yes

70% (47% in 1995)

No

30%

Would an officer ofyour company follow up with
investment professionals, either individually or by
conference call?

Yes

70% (47% in 1995)

No

30%

Would an officer ofyour company inform analysts
that results are expected to be well below
expectations without first issuing a press release?

Yes

26% (40% in 1995)

No

74%

Does your company set aside a period ofdays in
advance ofan earnings announcement during
which corporate representatives do not provide
analysts with earnings guidance?

Yes

77% (56% in 1995)

No

23%

Does any officer ofyour cO'mpany challenge
analysts' assumptions if they appear "out ofline "?

Does any officer ofyour company express a general
level ofcomfort with analysts' earnings estimates?

Does your company provide analysts with guidance
and/or financial data relating to future trends?

Does your company limit its comments on analysts'
reports to correcting errors ofhistoricalfact?
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Does your company have a written disclosure policy
for dealing with analysts?

Yes

40% (50% in 1995)

No

60%

See National Investor Relations Institute, A Study of Corporate Disclosure Practices (May

1998).
The following "rules of the road" have been recommended for companies when dealing
with securities analysts:

Don't distribute analyst reports
Don't link to analyst reports on your Web site
Don't incorporate analyst projections into Web pages
Don't review or comment on reports
Don't express "comfort" with or comment on projections
Steven E. Bochner & Ignacio E. Salceda, Over the Wall: Handling Analysts' Conference Calls,
Earnings Forecasts, and Reports Effectively, 2 wallstreetlawyer.com 1,7 (Apr. 1999).

E-76

UPDATE ON PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
& ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY LIABILITY ISSUES

Defense Views:
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACTFocus ON SECONDARY LIABILITY ISSUES

Daniel S. Floyd
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Los Angeles, California

Copyright 2002, Daniel S. Floyd

SECTION F

UPDATE ON PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
& ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY LIABILITY ISSUES

Defense Views:
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACTFocus ON SECONDARY LIABILITY ISSUES

Table of Contents
I.

INTRODUCTION

F-l

II.

SECONDARY LIABILITY ISSUES UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS, INCLUDING THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995

F-3

A.

The Supreme Court's Decision in Cel1,tral Bank ••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• F-3

B.

Independent Conspiracy Liability Has Effectively Been Eliminated
By Central BalIk •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• F-3

C.

The Courts Have Split on When Secondary Actors Can Be Subject to
Primary Liability

F-4

1.

The "Bright Line" Test

F-4

2.

The"Substantial Participation" Test

F-5

D.
E.
III.

The General Standards for Pleading Scienter Under the PSLRA Vary
Among the Circuits, Although Some Consensus Is Emerging
Application of the Scienter Standards to Claims Against Secondary Actors

F-7
F-11

OTHER IMPORTANT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

F-13

A.

Lead Plaintiff Issues -- In re Cendant Securities Litigation

F-13

B.

Injunctions Against State Court Actions Based on the PSLRA or SLUSA

F-16

C.

Class Representative Must be Knowledgeable, and Control the
Litigation To Be Adequate, According to the Fifth Circuit

F-17

The Seventh Circuit Rejects Duty to Update Unless Positive Law
Creates a Duty to Disclose

F-18

Insurance Developments

F-19

D.
E.

SECTIONF

UPDATE ON PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
& ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY LIABILITY ISSUES

Defense Views:
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACTFocus ON SECONDARY LIABILITY ISSUES

Daniel S. Floyd1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Recent high profile securities class action cases, including the so-called "IPO laddering"
cases and the multiple cases filed as part of the fallout from the Enron bankruptcy, have placed
renewed scrutiny on the possible liability of professionals in connection with securities fraud.
While the issue of whether securities class action litigation in fact benefits investors continues to
be hotly debated (even on the internet investor chat boards of companies being sued)2 the reality
is that securities litigation is alive and well, albeit different in important ways than prior the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the "PSRLA" or the "Reform Act"). The five years
since passage of the Reform Act have proven that the Reform Act was neither the death knell for
investor protection predicted by the plaintiffs bar, nor was it the protection from lawsuits hoped

Partner, Los Angeles, California office of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP; Co-chair of the
Litigation Department, Los Angeles; BA., Economics, magna cum laude, University of
California at Los Angeles; J.D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall), Order of
the Coif and Managing Editor of the Industrial Relations Law Journal. Mr. Floyd
concentrates his practice on corporate securities litigation, antitrust litigation and the defense
of professionals in negligence actions.
2 It is not unusual to find heated debates among anonymous participants on the Yahoo chat
boards of companies who have announced significant restatements or other problems, with
groups actively soliciting plaintiffs for litigation, and others engaging in "lawyer bashing"
and suggesting that shareholder class action is conducted for the benefit of lawyers, not
shareholders.
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for by companies and professionals. Securities litigation filings continue, at a significant pace,
with professionals becoming increasing targets once again. 3
For example, over the past year, the law firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach
LLP, among others, has filed more than 180 class actions against Wall Street investment banking
houses. Included as defendants are virtually all the leading firms, including Credit Suisse First
Boston, Goldman, Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Salomon Smith Barney, and
numerous internet technology companies and their officers and directors. The claims include
allegations that underwriters demanded that some investors pay secret, "excessive" commissions
to receive allocations of shares of IPO's of internet companies, and that underwriters entered into
"laddering" arrangements with investors in which investors agreed to purchase additional shares
at inflated prices in the aftermarket in the days after the offering. The "IPO laddering" cases,
which are not traditional Section lOeb) cases in that they involve claims of "manipulation," are
scheduled for motions to dismiss in early 2002. 4 As a result of these IPO laddering cases, the
total number of securities cases filed jumped from 216 in 2000 (a rate roughly equivalent to preReform Act levels) to 487 in 2001.
While the Enron debacle is the most prominent accounting fraud case pending,
accounting fraud and accounting restatement cases have been on the rise ever since passage of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. This may be because such fraud is on the rise, it
may be because accountants are struggling to define revenue in the internet age, or it may be
because accounting restatements, i.e., a concession of a material misstatement of fact, provides a
major leg up in satisfying the difficult pleading requirements under the PSLRA so the plaintiffs
bar is focusing on those types of cases. According to the Stanford Law School's Securities
Action Clearinghouse, in the year 2000 60% of the cases filed involved accounting fraud,
compared to approximately 35% prior to the PSLRA. The most frequent form of accounting
allegation is improper revenue recognition, with high technology still the most commonly sued
industry. Insider trading allegations were present in 56% of the cases filed in 2000.
Despite concerns that the PLSRA would seriously restrict securities litigation, after a
brief decline, the number of class actions has increased from pre-Act levels, and both the average
settlement, and high end of settlements has increased, with three post-Act settlements over $200
million. However, two effects of the Reform Act are an increase in dismissals, particularly in the
Ninth Circuit, and delays in litigating the actions, because of the lead plaintiff process and the
discovery stay in place pending completion of motion to dismiss process.

3 In addition, in an application of the law of unintended consequences, plaintiffs class action
firms that focused primarily on securities litigation have branched out into new areas,
including consumer protection, antitrust and anti-discrimination.
4 It was recently announced that Credit Suisse had settled with the SEC for $100 million on the
excessive commissions claim, without admitting or denying liability.
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This paper will focus on primarily on securities liability of so-called secondary actors,
including what actions potentially subject a professional to the private securities laws, and the
scienter requirements. In addition, the paper will discuss some of the more important appellate
decisions this past year, 2001, on various procedural issues in securities class action litigation.

II.

SECONDARY LIABILITY ISSUES UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS, INCLUDING THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM
ACT OF 1995
A.

The Supreme Court's Decision in Central Bank

The Supreme Court dramatically altered the scope of liability for "secondary" actors in
the securities world (i.e., accountants, investment bankers, attorneys) in 1994 in Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), where the court held
that, despite many years of lower court decisions to the contrary, aiding and abetting cannot be a
basis for liability under Section IO(b). Under Central Bt;t,nk's holding, unless a defendant
"commit[ted] a manipulative or deceptive act within the meaning of Section IO(b)," the
defendant has not violated the federal securities laws. Id. at 191.

Central Bank's clear rejection of aiding and abetting liability, however, has not led to
consistent standards being applied by the Federal courts. The inconsistency in the approaches of
the courts to the scope of liability for secondary actors is due in significant part to the fact that
Central Bank did not involve the most common secondary actors in securities matters underwriters, accountants, and lawyers - who are involved in preparing disclosures and offering
materials. Instead, Central Bank involved a securities claim against a bank acting as an
indenture trust with no participation in drafting statements. Thus, the legal principles articulated
in Central Bank were not applied in the factual contexts most frequently encountered by courts
in this area. Thus, it has been left to the lower federal courts to grapple with the difficult issues
surrounding the "primary" liability of secondary actors. Pre-Central Bank cases are of limited
utility because previously there was no need to distinguish aiding and abetting from primary
liability.

B.

Independent Conspiracy Liability Has Effectively Been Eliminated By
Central Bank

One area where there has been general agreement is conspiracy liability. The courts that
have considered the issue have, with one exception, concluded that the reasoning of Central
Bank extends to prohibit liability under the Section IO(b) and Rule 10b-5 premised on
conspiracy. Compare Dinsmore v. Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, 135 F.3d
837, 841 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that "every court to have addressed the viability of a
conspiracy cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the wake of Central Bank has agreed
that Central Bank precludes such a cause of action" (citing cases)) and Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.
3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1998), with Wenneman v. Brown, 49 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1290 n.3 (D. Utah
1999) ("the Court reads nothing in Central Bank as a wholesale adoption of the notion that one
who willingly conspires with others to disseminate fraudulent information in connection with a
purchase or sale of a security is immune from liability ... because that person is intelligent or
lucky enough to avoid being the one who actually drafts the fraudulent documents or who deals
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directly with. the victims.
abetting.")

Conspiracy

IS

a separate and distinct concept from aiding and

However, even under Dinsmore and Cooper, allegations of a conspiracy are not improper
per se, and may indeed be valuable in pleading scienter against each defendant, as coordinated
action more likely raises a "strong inference" of fraud. Thus, a "scheme" to defraud can be
alleged, but to be sufficient each member of the scheme must have committed a deceptive or
manipulative act subjecting him or her to primary liability. Wenneman appears to be the only
case where the primary liability has been extended to someone who agrees with another to have
the other disseminate a fraudulent misstatement, and there is little reason to believe its reasoning
will be accepted by other courts.

C.

The Courts Have Split on When Secondary Actors Can Be Subject to
Primary Liability

The fact that secondary liability was eliminated by Central Bank has not eliminated
liability for secondary actors. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that "the absence of ...
aiding and abetting liability does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are
always free from liability." Id. at 191. Indeed, the Supreme Court noted that there are likely to
be multiple violators in any complex securities fraud, and thus, a secondary actor, "including a
lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material
misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a
primary violator under 10b-5," so long as all the requirements for primary liability are
established. Id.

1.

The "Bright Line" Test

The Courts have taken two basic approaches to evaluating whether a secondary actor's
involvement in an alleged securities violation is sufficient to potentially subject that person to
primary liability. The clear majority view, termed by the Second Circuit as the "bright line" test,
"requires that 'a defendant must actually make a false or misleading statement in order to be held
liable under Section 10(b).'" Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999) (citing Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717,720 (2d Cir. 1997)).
While under this standard the primary violator does not have to communicate the
misrepresentations directly, "a secondary actor cannot incur primary liability under [Section
10(b)] for a statement not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemination." Id. This
requirement in tum is based on the requirement of reliance as an element of liability. Thus, to
satisfy the "bright-line" test the "misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor at the
time of public dissemination, that is, in advance of the investment decision." Id. This is referred
to as the "bright line" test because the degree of a person's participation in the drafting of the
statement is irrelevant, absent public attribution.5

5 However, the Second Circuit rejected an attempt to extend Howard's holding to a claim by a
corporate defendant that imposition of primary liability of a principal for the statements of an
[Footnote continued on next page]
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The "bright line" test of the Second Circuit has been expressly adopted by the 11th
Circuit in Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Following the
Second Circuit, we conclude that, in light of Central Bank, in order for the defendant to be
primarily liable under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, the alleged misstatement or omission upon which
a plaintiff relied must have been publicly attributable to the defendant at the time that the
plaintiffs investment decision was made. n), as well as by several district courts. See, e.g., Roger
Copland v. Grumet, 88 F. Supp. 2d 326, 332 (D.N.J. 1999); Great Neck Capital Appreciation
Investment Partnership, LLP v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP, 137 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Wis.
2001). Several decisions prior to Wright adopted the requirement that to be subject to primary
liability a defendant must make a false and misleading statement that he or she knew or should
have known would reach investors (as opposed to mere participation, without specifically
addressing whether the false statement must be expressly attributed to the defendant. See, e.g.,
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226-1227 (10th Cir. 1996); In re Kendall
Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass 1994) (rejecting argument that
accountant's review and approval of financial statements could give rise to a 10b-5 violation).

2.

The "Substantial Participation" Test

The second standard for when secondary actors are subject to Section 1O(b) liability has
been termed the "substantial participation" test. The Ninth Circuit has described that "substantial
participation or intricate involvement in the preparation of fraudulent statements is grounds for
primary liability even though that participation might not lead to the actor's actual making of the
statements." Howard v. Everex Sys., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000), relying upon In re
Software Toolworks Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615,628-29 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1995).
In Software Toolworks the Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment granted in favor of
Deloitte & Touche in connection with two allegedly fraudulent letters sent to the SEC, which
allegedly falsely stated that the company did not have preliminary financial data available for the
June 1990 quarter and misleadingly described the nature of Toolworks' contracts with original
equipment manufacturers. 50 F.3d at 628. The Court found evidence that (1) one letter was
"prepared after extensive review and discussions with ... Deloitte," and referred the DEC to two
Deloitte partners for more information, and (2) Deloitte "played a significant role in drafting and
editing" the second letter, as "sufficient to sustain a primary cause of action under section lOeb),
and, as a result, Central Bank does not absolve Deloitte on these issues." Id. at 628. This
approach has not been accepted by any other circuit court, but it, or at least a similar approach,
has been adopted by a few District Courts. See Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, 27
F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 1998) ("This Court ... concludes that a secondary actor can
be primarily liable when it, acting alone or with others, creates a misrepresentation even if the
misrepresentation is not publicly attributed to it."); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960,

[Footnote continued from previous page]
agent was barred by Central Bank, particularly given that a corporation can only act through
its employees and agents. See Suez Equity In,vestors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dolnil1ion Bank, 250
F.3d 87, 100-101 (2d Cir. 2001).
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970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (an accounting firm that was "intricately involved" in the creation of false
documents subject to primary liability).
The practical difference between the "bright line" test and the ;'substantial participation"
test can be significant, particularly for attorneys and financial advisers, who, unlike aUditors, are
often not required to make statements on their own behalf to properly perform their services. For
example, to use the Enron case as an example, if the bright-line test is applied, it is unlikely that
Enron's counsel could properly be sued under the Federal Securities laws, even crediting
allegations that the firm offered a legal opinion supporting Enron's conduct. See, e.g., Ziemba,
256 F.3d at 1205-06 (no securities claim against the lawyers because they made no statements
and had no duty to disclose). The "bright-line" test in effect exempts various participants in the
drafting process for statements that later are the basis for a securities action.
However, the lines between "substantial participation" and the "bright line" test are not
always so clear, particularly for underwriters or other participants in an offering of securities.
For example, in Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Fin., Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
the court held that the listing of the two defendant financial institutions (initial purchasers of the
debt securities of a company being offered to the plaintiff investors) on the offering materials, as
well as the defendants' use of the materials as part of the sales pitch, satisfied the "bright line"
test. The court further held that it was not necessary to attribute specific representations in the
Offering Memorandum to particular defendants because of the involvement of the financial
institutions in drafting of the Offering Memorandum and participation in the sale of the
securities. Id. at 502-503. The court distinguished the role of these defendants from the typical
role of an attorney and accountant in an offering, who generally merely advise on the contents of
the offering materials, but do not participate in the sale. Id. at 503.
The complexities of this issue are further illustrated by In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec.
Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19688 (174 F. Supp. 2d 144) (S.D.N.Y. 2001). In that case the
court held that to impose liability on a securities dealer in connection with a notes offering,
merely soliciting or serving as a "substantial factor" in connection with a particular securities
transaction is insufficient; rather, the plaintiff must show either that the plaintiff purchased
securities directly from the securities dealer or that "whatever injury they suffered was caused by
the material misstatement that induced Notes sales to them and was communicated by [the
investment bank] rather than by [the company] or some other securities dealer." Id. at *14-15.
Thus, where an investment bank sells stock in an offering on its own behalf, or communicates
directly with investors, it can be subject to primary liability, even under the "bright line" test.
While a secondary player in an purported fraud can escape liability by not making a
statement, it does not appear that a defendant who signs a document on behalf of a corporation
can escape liability by arguing that he or she neither drafted, nor participated in the drafting, of a
statement, Howard, 228 F.3d at 1061-1062; Suez Equity Investors, 250 F.3d at 101 ("A
corporation can only act through its employees and agents [citation omitted], and an allegation
that a particular agent may have doctored or conveyed the report will not immunize the
principals from liability for a knowing deception. If).

F-6

D.

The General Standards for Pleading Scienter Under the PSLRA Vary
Among the Circuits, Although Some Consensus Is Emerging

Under the PSLRA, Congress enacted two specific pleading requirements for securities
actions. The first is that a complaint must specify each false statement or omission and explain
why the statement or omission was false and misleading. 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(1). The second
is that a complaint must state "with particularity" facts giving rise to a "strong inference" that the
defendant acted with scienter. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2). However, "[b]ecause falsity and
scienter in private securities fraud cases are generally strongly inferred from the same set of
facts," courts have often incorporated the two pleading requirements into a "single inquiry."
Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 429 (9th Cir. 2001).
While application of the pleading requirement for scienter has not been uniform among
the circuits, there appears to be a consensus that the Reform Act did not change the substantive
standard for scienter, which includes actual knowledge and so-called "severe" recklessness. See,
e.g., Fla. State Bd. ofAdmin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 654 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing
cases); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir. 2001); City of Philadelphia V.
Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001) (defining scienter by reference to prePSLRA cases); Howard v. Everex, 228 F.3d at 1064 (,'Because the PSLRA did not alter the
substantive requirements for scienter under § 10(b), however, the standard on summary judgment
or JMOL remains unaltered by In re Silicon Graphics"). This type of recklessness is derived
from the standard set forth in Sundstrand Corp. V. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th
eir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977), and is generally defined as involving '''not merely
simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care, and that present a danger of misleading buyers or sellers which is either known to the
defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it. '" Fla. State Bd., 270
F.3d at 654 (citation omitted). This is generally viewed as a lesser version of intentional
conduct, as opposed to a heightened form of negligence.
Despite substantial agreement on the substantive standard for scienter, the application of
the pleading requirements is not the same, although the differences in pleading standards in some
instances are more formalistic than real. On the whole, the effect of the heightened pleading
requirements has led to a higher rate of dismissals (now reported as approximately 25-30%). In
addition, the effect on so-called secondary actors appears to be even greater, as the claims
against secondary parties have been dismissed at a higher rate.
It is generally recognized that the highest standard for pleading scienter is in the Ninth
Circuit, as established in the case of In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.
1999). Under Silicon Graphics, plaintiffs must plead "at a minimum, particular facts giving rise
to a strong inference of deliberate or conscious recklessness." 183 F.3d at 979. A "mere
showing of motfve and opportunity" is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Howard, 228
F.3d at 1064. In addition, the Ninth Circuit concluded in Silicon Graphics that "a plaintiff must
provide, in great detail, all the relevant facts forming the basis of her belief" that the facts
supporting the claim are true. 183 F.3d at 985. It is perhaps this requirement of very specific
and detailed pleading of the basis for the belief in the truth of the allegations, more than the
substantive scienter standard itself, that has raised the pleading bar in the Ninth Circuit, because
the absence of specific, detailed facts supporting a strong inference of intentional or deliberately
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reckless behavior leads to dismissal. This pleading requirement also includes the names of any
confidentia~ sources. Id. at 984-85; see also In re Green Tree Financial Corp. Stock Litig., 61 F.
Supp. 2d 860, 872 (D. Minn. 1999) (source of statement attributed to unnamed money manager
was "a central fact (if not the central fact) on which plaintiffs' belief is formed. ")
Nevertheless, even the Silicon Graphics standard has not been interpreted as rigidly as its
language might support. While "motive and opportunity" pleading has been rejected, the
existence of "unusual" or "suspicious" stock sales, "dramatically out of line with prior trading
practices at times calculated to maximize the personal benefit from undisclosed inside
information," is circumstantial evidence that a statement was false when made and the defendant
"knew it." Ronconi, 253 F.3d at 434-435. However, if plaintiffs seek to "rely on insider trading
as circumstantial evidence of falsity, they must allege sufficient context of insider trading" for
the Court to determine whether the level of trading provides such circumstantial evidence. Id. at
436-437. Thus, while simple "motive and opportunity" allegations are insufficient, highly
unusual or suspicious "motive and opportunity" pled in detail, is at least an important factor that
must be considered in evaluating scienter.
The standard adopted by the Second Circuit is generally viewed as the most lenient
standard. The Second Circuit has most recently held that a plaintiff may be plead the requisite
"strong inference" of scienter by pleading that defendants: "(1) benefited in a concrete and
personal way from the purported fraud"; (2) "engaged in deliberately illegal behavior;" (3) "knew
facts or had access to information suggesting that their public statements were not accurate;" or
(4) "failed to check information they had a duty to monitor." Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300,
311 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1012 (2000). However, to the extent that a claim is based
on an omission, scienter cannot be established in the absence of a "clear duty to disclose." Kalnit
v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 144 (2d. Cir. 2001). The Second Circuit indicated courts should "not
be wedded" to motive and opportunity concepts, but that the motive and opportunity cases
provide meaningful guidance. Novak, 216 F.3d at 310-311.
The motive prong of scienter set forth in (1) above is "generally met when corporate
insiders were alleged to have misrepresented to the public material facts about the corporation's
performance or prospects in order to keep the stock price artificially high while they sold their
own shares at a profit." Id. at 308; Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir.
1999) (allegation that officers sold off large portions of stockholding during period of alleged
misrepresentations "supports the i~ference that [defendant] withheld disclosures that would
depress his stock until he profitably sold his shares").6 While there are some cases that suggest
that the insider trades must be "unusual" to qualify as supporting a "strong inference" of scienter,

6 The Second Circuit expressly rejected such motives as "(1) the desire to maintain a high
corporate credit rating or otherwise sustain 'the appearance of corporate profitability, or of
the success of an investment'" or "(2) the desire to maintain a high stock price in order to
increase executive compensation or prolong the benefits of holding corporate office," as
being important motives for fraud. (citation omitted) Novak, 216 F.3d at 307; accord Kalnit
v. Eicher, 264 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2001).
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see, e.g., Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2000), the inquiry is less rigorous than the
Ninth Circuit's standard of trading patterns "dramatically out of line" with the past. See, e.g., In
re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding gross proceeds of $1.25
of one officer in class period sufficient to allege motive, stating that there is no "per se rule that
the sale by one officer of corporate stock for a relatively small sum can never amount to unusual
trading").
Furthermore, the Second Circuit has also expressly rejected Silicon Graphics requirement
that a plaintiff must provide in great detail all facts upon which the allegations are based.
Plaintiffs need not plead with "particularity every single fact upon which their beliefs concerning
false and misleading statements are based," but rather plaintiffs "need only plead with
particularity sufficient facts to support those beliefs." 216 F.3d at 313-314. Thus, unlike in the
Ninth Circuit, plaintiffs in the Second Circuit are not required to identify confidential personal
sources unless necessary to support "a reasonable belief as to the misleading nature of the
statement or omission." Id. at 314 n.l. Requiring disclosure of a confidential source "serves no
legitimate pleading purpose while it could deter informants from providing critical information
to investigators in meritorious cases or invite retaliation against them. Id. at 314. The Third
Circuit has essentially adopted the Second Circuit pleading standard. In re Advanta Corp. Sec.
Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999). Indeed, the Third Circuit recently ordered a district court to
allow amendment of a pleading after judgment was entered to allege facts from Board meeting
minutes obtained by the plaintiffs after the case was dismissed, and raised by the plaintiffs in
their reply brief on appeal. Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 297, (3d Cir. 2001) ("[P]laintiffs
were precluded from engaging in discovery in the District Court ...We will not add to the strict
discovery restrictions in the [PSLRA] by narrowly construing Rule 15 in this case").
The remaining circuits have adopted a middle road between the positions of the Second
and Ninth Circuit. The most influential of these decisions appears to be the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Hoffman v. Comshare, 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999), as further clarified by Helwig v.
Vencor, 251 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2001)(en bane). The Sixth Circuit held that plaintiffs must plead
facts "that give rise to a strong inference of reckless behavior," but not by alleging facts that
illustrate nothing more than a defendant's motive and opportunity to commit fraud. Comshare,
183 F.3d at 551. However, facts of motive and opportunity are "relevant to pleading
circumstances from which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred, and may, on
occasion, rise to the level of creating a strong inference of reckless of knowing conduct ..." Id.
As further explicated by Helwig, motive and opportunity cannot be equated with scienter, but
"can be catalysts to fraud and so serve as external markers to the required state of mind."
Helwig, 251 F.3d at 550. "[R]ecklessness in securities fraud is an untidy, case-by-case concept,"
and thus while "facts presenting motive and opportunity may be ·of enough weight to state a
claim under the PSLRA," pleading "conclusory labels of motive and opportunity will not
suffice." Id. at 551. Thus, the Sixth Circuit has left the issue to a case by case analysis, with the
express recognition that specific of motive and opportunity is potentially an important
component of pleading securities fraud.
The Eleventh Circuit, Fifth Circuit and Tenth Circuit have expressly stated they have
adopted the Sixth Circuit's approach, although the Eleventh Circuit has held that "motive and
opportunity" allegations, without more, are insufficient to plead scienter. See Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 410 (5th
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Cir. 2001) ("The most sensible approach appears to us to be the one first generally articulated by
the Sixth Circuit in Comshare"); City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261
(10th Cir. 2001) ("We agree with the middle ground chosen by the First and Sixth Circuits ...
allegations of motive and opportunity may be important ... but are typically not sufficient in
themselves to establish a 'strong inference' of scienter,,).7 The First Circuit view is "close to that
articulated Sixth Circuit," neither rejecting nor accepting motive and opportunity pleading, but
"without adopting any pleading litany of motive and opportunity," the First Circuit has held that
"merely pleading motive and opportunity, regardless of the strength of the inferences to be drawn
of scienter, is not enough," although "allegations of unusual insider trading by a defendant with
access to material non-public information can support a strong inference of scienter." Greebel v.
FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197-198 (1st Cir. 1999).
The Eighth Circuit most recently adopted a similar approach to the Sixth Circuit's in Fla.
State Bd. ofAdmin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 660 (8th Cir. 2001). In that case the
Eighth Circuit had the following to say about "motive and opportunity" allegations:
First, motive and opportunity are generally relevant to a fraud case, and a
showing of unusual or heightened motive will often form an important part of a
complaint that meets the Reform Act standard. Second, in some cases the same
circumstantial allegations that establish motive and opportunity also give
additional reason to believe the defendant's misrepresentation was knowing or
reckless. For instance, in insider trading cases, the timing of trades shows motive
and opportunity, but it may also provide additional circumstantial evidence that
the defendant knew of an advantage. Such allegations may meet the Reform Act
standard, but if so it is because they give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not
merely because they establish motive and opportunity. Third, when the complaint
does not show motive and opportunity of any sort - either the unusual, heightened
motive highlighted in the Second Circuit cases, or even an everyday motive such
as keeping one's job - then other allegations tending to show scienter would have
to be particularly strong in order to meet the Reform Act standard.
Id. at 660. Thus, the Eighth Circuit views the "motive and opportunity" facts as very important,
though generally not dispositive, of the scienter pleading.

The teaching of the various court of appeal decisions is that the ultimate determination of
the sufficiency of pleading will be very fact specific. The challenge for defendants in any circuit
is to bring to the court's attention facts that tend to undermine the circumstantial tie between the
timing and amount of any stock sales and knowledge of undisclosed material bad news. These
may include consistent past selling practices, adherence to corporate trading policies, specific
needs to sell stock, purchases or lack of sales by similarly situated persons, retention of

7 In reaching this result, the Fifth Circuit disavowed "mere passing dicta" in Williams v. WMX
Technologies, Inc., 112 F.3d 175,177-178 (5th Cir. 1997) that appeared to adopt the Second
Circuit standard.
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significant percentage of stock or large sales explained by a prior inability to sell. See, e.g.,
Ronconi, 253 F.3d at 435. Once such a reasonable explanation is proffered, the focus in the
pleading can be on whether the plaintiff has specific, contemporaneous information to support a
strong inference that the defendant acted with knowledge or deliberate recklessness. Those facts
are much harder to come by than allegations that senior executives sold stock.

E.

Application of' the Scienter Standards to Claims Against Secondary
Actors

The difficulties presented to plaintiffs lawyers in pleading a securItIes fraud claim
against a corporation and its officers and directors, who through often large stock sales, have a
readily available "motive and opportunity" to commit securities fraud, are magnified in claims
against secondary actors. While the standard for scienter is the same, the practical ability to
assemble the necessary facts is more difficult in connection with secondary actors, because it
will not necessarily be presumed that the secondary actor had access to the contrary information
upon which the fraud is premised. Instead, the claims are typically grounded more in a failure to
discover, or investigate, which are closer in type to negligence or even ordinary recklessness, as
opposed to the "deliberate" recklessness (a lesser version of intent) required under the securities
laws.
As one district court put it "[w]here the allegations of recklessness pertain to third-party
advisers, such as underwriters or accountants, plaintiffs' allegations must be commensurately
stronger, 'approximating an actual intent to aid in the fraud being perpetrated by the company.'"
In re Indep. Energy Holdings PLC Sec. Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 741, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Thus,
"[a]llegations of conduct that demonstrate 'merely simple,or even inexcusable negligence' are
not sufficient to state a claim under the securities laws." Id. In addition, allegations of motive
and opportunity, even when available, are more difficult with secondary actors, who typically do
not have the large stock sales of corporate insiders. Obtaining ordinary and typical fees for
services, whether auditing fees or underwriting fees, are not viewed as a sufficient motive to
participate in fraud. Id. at 765-766 (citing cases); In re Complete Management Inc. Sec. Litig.,
153 F. Supp. 2d 314, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("'[M]any federal courts have held that the fact that
the professional services firms like [defendant] receive fees for their services is insufficient to
supply the motive essential to the motive-and-opportunity theory under Rule 9(b)"'). However,
the desire of a investment banking firm to sell stock on its own behalf, if the quantities are
sufficiently large, has been viewed as satisfying a "motive" standard. 154 F. Supp. 2d at 766; /11
re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19688 at *21. ("Rather than
generally reflecting the profit motive of any securities dealer, the concrete benefit derived by
erne from Livent's fraud alleged here was uniquely personal to erne in several ways"). In
addition, substantial fees for contemporaneous the consulting services obtained by an auditor has
also been viewed as potentially satisfying the motive and opportunity standard. Complete
Management, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
Notwithstanding the high standards applied to allegations of scienter involving secondary
actors, plaintiffs have, in several recent instances, successfully alleged claims against auditors for
certification of financial statements that allegedly violated Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAp") or Generally Accepted Auditing Standards" ("GAAS"), particularly where
formal restatements were involved. See, e.g., Complete Management, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 335;
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Great Neck Capital Appreciation, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1124; In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
115 F. Supp. 2d 620, 634-640 (E.D. Va. 2000); Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche,
L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1339-1341 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
All the courts that have the considered the issue of accountant securities law liability
agree that a violation of GAAP, or even a restatement of financials, is not, on its own, sufficient
to give rise to a "strong inference" of scienter. See, e.g., Microstrategy, 115 F. Supp. 2d 634-635
n. 28. Instead, violations of GAAP or GAAS provide evidence of scienter only when
accompanied by additional facts and circumstances that raise an inference of fraudulent intent.
Novak, 216 F.3d at 309. The circumstances vary by case, but "the magnitude of a restatement,"
the "pervasiveness and repetitiveness" of the violations, "the simplicity of the accounting
principles" involved, and the importance of the revenue involved, are all important factors in
pleading scienter. Microstrategy, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 636. The pleading of facts setting forth
"red flags" known to, but ignored by, the accounting firm, have also been found critical to
pleading scienter. In re Ikon Office Solutions Inc. Sec. Litig., 66 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629 (E.D. Pa.
1999). The scope of the auditors involvement with the company is also important. Carley
Capital, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 (holding that where defendant auditor also provided extensive
consulting services, and had "unrestricted access to its financial records and data," and thus
suggesting that "Defendant knew that its client was understating expenses and improperly
recognizing revenue").
It is not surprising that the highest standard articulated for auditor liability is in the Ninth
Circuit, based on the application of Silicon Graphics. Reiger v. Price Waterhouse Coopers LLP,
117 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (S.D. Cal. 2000) ("In sum, the lack of a rational economic incentive
for an independent accountant to participate in fraud, the client's central role in providing
information to the accountant, and the complex professional judgment required to perform an
audit, make it exceedingly difficult for a securities plaintiff to plead facts suggesting that an
independent accountant acted with the deliberate state of mind now required to withstand a
motion to dismiss").
The Reiger court addressed the types of factors adopted by various courts as sufficing to
establish scienter, and, consistent with Silicon Graph~cs, required a higher level of specific fact
pleading than required in other courts. Indeed, the court specifically concluded, contrary to other
district courts, that "to avoid undermining the policies of the Reform Act through reliance on
hindsight and speculation, a court should not infer an independent accountant's scienter based
solely on the magnitude of its client's fraud." Id. at 1013. Instead, consistent with Silicon
Graphics' requirement of highly specific pleading, the plaintiff must plead "specific and detailed
facts showing that the magnitude [of the alleged fraud] either enhanced the suspiciousness of
specifically identified transactions, or made the overall fraud glaringly conspicuous." Id.; accord
In re SCB Computer Technology, Inc. Sec. Litig., 149 F. Supp. 2d 334,357 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)
(finding the analysis in Reiger "persuasive").
In addition, in Reiger the court addressed several allegations of "red flags," that plaintiff
alleged supported a strong inference of scienter. However, the court rejected the view that
merely alleging that the accountants had access to specific documentation revealing the GAAP
violations was insufficient. The court concluded that in order to find a strong inference of
scienter based. on such allegations of access to information, the court would need to engage in
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prohibited speculation that (1) the auditor closely reviewed the documents, (2) discovered the
violations and (3) deliberately chose to ignore them. 117 F. SUppa 2d at 1011-1012; see also In
re Raytheon Sec. Litig., 157 F. SUppa 2d 131, 155 (D. Mass. 2001) ("The magnitude of the
misstatement, combined with the internal documents . . . at most supports a garden-variety
inference of recklessness or a strong inference of negligence - but that is not enough"); but see
Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand, C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356,362 n.7 (6th Cir. 2001) (suggesting in dicta
that allegations of "Coopers' recklessness in its failure to examine the risks of material
misstatements in MAW's accounting estimates," "may" support an inference of recklessness
under Section 10(b)).
Drawing. the line between negligence, even gross negligence, and deliberate recklessness
is often difficult, and thus the cases in this area are very fact specific, and not always
reconcilable. The primary difference between the approaches of Reiger and cases finding
scienter allegations against accountants sufficient is the requirement of Reiger that the red flags
either be true "smoking guns" on their face, or there be other specific facts that establish that the
auditor was actually aware of the accounting violations or had sufficient actual knowledge to
satisfy a deliberate recklessness standard. The Reiger standard, as opposed to one premised on
availability of information, appears to more closely follow the standard that the conduct of the
auditor must "approximate an actual intent to aid in the fraud being perpetrated by the audited
company." Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81,98 (2d Cir. 2000). Given the rash of restatements
and cases premised on accounting fraud, how this debate within the lower courts is resolved will
be critical in determining the scope of securities liability of accountants.

III.

OTHER IMPORTANT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Lead Plaintiff Issues -- liz re Celzdalzt Securities Litigation

One significant change with the PSLRA from prior practice. in securities class action
litigation is the process for the appointment of lead plaintiff and lead counsel. Section 21D of
the Exchange Act provides a rebuttable presumption that the "most adequate plaintiff" is the one
with "the largest financial interest in relief sought by the class" and "otherwise satisfies the
requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." This "lead plaintiff' standard
has led to ongoing solicitation of potential clients by plaintiffs firms, as the firms attempt to
represent either the individual, institution or "group" with the largest financial interest, where
before the rush was often to be the first case filed. The courts have taken very different
approaches to the role of the Court in selecting lead plaintiff and lead counsel.
One view, set forth most notably by Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of
California, contemplates an active role by the District Court in determining the appropriate
plaintiff and counsel. Under this view, "[t]he PSLRA's rebuttable presumption in favor of the
class member having the largest claimed loss may only be invoked by a plaintiff who satisfies
the requirements of Rule 23." In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 148 F. SUppa 2d 967, 970 (N.D. Cal.
2001). In Judge Walker's view "[a]t the outset of litigation, 'a proposed lead plaintiff can best
demonstrate the willingness and ability to discharge the fiduciary duties of the lead plaintiff by
demonstrating the willingness and ability to take charge of the litigation and negotiate a
reasonable representation arrangement with class counsel.'" Armour v. Network Assocs., 171 F.
SUPPa 2d 1044, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The failure of a plaintiff to "select appropriate class
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counsel" is a basis for the court to reject the lead plaintiff. Under this interpretation of the lead
plaintiff provisions, the court is to take an activist approach to insuring that the class receives, in
the court's judgment, the most cost effective representation. This, in turn, has led in many
instances, particularly involving individual lead plaintiffs, to a competitive bidding process
overseen by the court. Id. at 1049-1050; see also Wenderhold v. Cylink Corp. 191 F"R.D. 600
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (appointing lead counsel through in PSLRA action pursuant to auction).
However, the Ninth Circuit is hearing oral arguments on February 15, 2002, on a petition
for mandamus filed by Milberg Weiss after Judge Walker rejected their lead plaintiff (otherwise
presumed the most adequate plaintiff), and them as class counsel, based on the court's conclusion
that the fee arrangement negotiated by the other plaintiff vying for lead plaintiff was significantly
less expensive than that proposed by Milberg Weiss, and the record showed no qualitative
factors favoring Milberg. See In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 148 F. Supp. 2d at 987. The resolution
of this case is being closely watched, as it will likely provide significant appellate guidance on a
number of issues surrounding the lead plaintiff.
The Ninth Circuit will not be the first appellate court making law in this area. The Third
Circuit, in its recent opinion in In re Cendant Corporation Sec. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir.
2001), affirming the $3.2 billion settlement of a securities class action against Cendant and its
auditors, addressed multiple issues related to the appointment of lead counsel, clearly rejecting
the approach of Judge Walker. The court specifically held that the practice of several District
Judges of holding an "auction" to appoint lead counsel (264 F.3d at 258 n. 35 (identifying eleven
cases where an auction was held to select class counsel)), and to set the fees, is not generally
permitted under the PSLRA.
While the Court recognized various advantages (reduced cost) and disadvantages
(including difficulty in performing the "cost/quality" analysis usually performed by clients) of a
court-supervised competition for class counsel, ide at 258-260, the basis of the ruling was that the
intent of Congress was to permit the lead plaintiff to choose counsel and negotiate the fee,
subject to court supervision. The only possible exception is when the trial court does not believe
that there is a sophisticated investor with sufficient losses to be "counted on to serve the interests
of the class in an aggressive manner." Id. at 273-277. In those limited circumstances, the trial
court could assume a direct role in selecting counsel and hold a bidding process for counsel. Id.
at 277.
The Third Circuit in Cendant also set forth in some detail its interpretation of the lead
plaintiff provisions. While it specifically held that defendant has no role in the court proceedings
leading to the selection of lead plaintiff and counsel, the court's tying of the decision in
appointing the lead plaintiff to the formal class certification requirements provides guidance to
the defendant on the standards to be addressed in the class certification procedure. Unlike some
courts, which have indicated that a court may "sua sponte" consider the arguments of a defendant
on lead plaintiff, see, e.g., Takeda v. Turbodyne Techs., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (C.D.
Cal. 1999), the Cendant court held that a "court should not permit or consider any arguments by
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defendants or non-class members. ,,8 Id. at 268. The issue is limited to whether the lead plaintiff
is adequate, not whether another plaintiff could do "a better job of protecting the interests of the
class." Id.
Specifically, the Cendant court held that the burden of the lead plaintiff is to make a
prima facie showing of both typicality a'nd adequacy of representation, applying the common
standards on both issues. Id. at 264. For the issue of typicality, the question is "whether the
circumstances of the movant 'are markedly different or the legal theory upon which the claims
[of that movant] are based differ[] from that upon which the claims of other class members will
perforce be based.'" Id. at 265 (citation omitted). As to the adequacy requirement, the court
stated that the trial court should consider whether the proposed lead plaintiff "'has the ability and
incentive to represent the claims of the class vigorously, [whether it] has obtained adequate
counsel, and [whether] there is [a] conflict between [the movant's] claims and those asserted on
behalf of the class. Id. (alterations in original).
The Cendant court identified two additional factors to be considered in evaluating
whether the prima facie showing of adequacy has been made. The first is "whether the movant
has demonstrated a willingness and ability to select competent class counsel and to negotiate a
reasonable retainer agreement." Id. at 265. This is not an approval process by the trial court of
counselor the fee, but a threshold inquiry into the movant's legal experience or sophistication,
and whether the counsel selection and fee agreement were plainly unreasonable. Id. at 266.
The second adequacy issue is whether the movant is a group versus an individual person
or entity. Id. at 266. The court rejected any hard and fast rules for evaluating a group, but
suggested that a "kind of 'rule of reason prevails.'" Id. at 267. The court further rejected the idea
that an unrelated group was always improper, but suggested that an unrelated group assembled
by lawyers seeking to become lead counsel "could not be counted on to monitor counsel in a
sufficient manner." Id. The size of the group is also important, with the Third Circuit effectively
accepting the SEC's view that groups greater than five are too large. Id. at 267. The court did
not purport to limit the factors that could be considered by the trial court, and held that "the court
should explain its reasoning on the record" for rejecting the presumptive lead plaintiff. Id. If the
presumptive lead plaintiff is rejected, the trial court should undertake the process for the plaintiff
or group with the next highest financial interest. Id. at 267-68.
One factor that the court considered, but ultimately rejected, in determining whether the
lead plaintiff group in the Cendant litigation (the CalPERs group) was proper was whether the

8 However, it is clear that the preliminary showing on the class certification standards is
without prejudice to the defendants' ability to relitigate the issues fully on the class
certification motion. See, e.g., In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 369,
373 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (on motion for class certification, "proposed class and Class
Representatives are to be reviewed according to the standards of Rule 23, without any
deference to the earlier determinations made in the appointment of Lead Plaintiffs. "); In re
Nice Sys. Ltd. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206,218 n.11 (D.N.J. 1999).
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lawyers had obtained the status as lead counsel by virtue of political contributions, known as
"pay-to-play," on the basis that actual proof was lacking. The Court made no mistake, however,
that such allegations were serious: "Lest we be misunderstood, we observe that actual proof of
pay-to-play would constitute strong (and, quite probably, dispositive) evidence that the
presumption had been rebutted." Id. at 269. What is interesting, however, is that it is common
practice to provide "bonuses" to lead plaintiffs upon the settlement of securities class actions.
While not directly analogous, the practice of paying bonuses may come under greater scrutiny
based on the lead plaintiff provisions of the PSLRA.

B.

Injunctions Against State Court Actions Based on the PSLRA or
SLUSA

One of the early responses to the PSLRA was the filing of simultaneous federal and state
court class actions. Plaintiffs could avoid the heightened pleading requirements and obtain
discovery prohibited the PSLRA. In some instances, federal cases were dismissed, while state
cases went to trial. To address this issue, in 1998, Congress passed the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(f). SLUSA preempts· state court
class litigation involving "covered securities," mainly securities trading on national securities
markets. 9 SLUSA also empowers federal courts, "upon a proper showing," to "stay discovery
proceedings in any private action in a State court, as necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments, in an action subject to the stay of discovery." Securities Act
§ 27(b)(4); Exchange Act § 27D(b)(4)(D).
Even after SLUSA, in many cases, particularly those involving accounting restatements,
companion state court derivative lawsuits are filed, seeking damages from directors for the costs
to the company from the ongoing investigations and class action litigation. This raises the
specter of an end-run around the discovery stay imposed by the PSLRA, and appear on their
face, to be vulnerable to a stay based on. SLUSA. However, the first case interpreting the scope
of SLUSA, In re Transcrypt International Sec. Litig., 57 F. Supp. 2d 836, 847 (D. Neb. 1999),
held that SLUSA does not authorize the federal courts to stay non-class state court actions. The
holding in Transcrypt has already been the subject of criticism, but if its reasoning prevails,
companion derivative suits to class actions will likely become more common.
The Eighth Circuit, in In re BankAmerica Corporation Sec. Litig., 263 F.3d 795, 2001
U.S. App. LEXIS 19035 (8th Cir. August 24, 2001), issued an opinion upholding an injunction
issued against a California securities class action brought prior to the November 3, 1998
effective date of SLUSA. While the case appears to be of limited direct effect, because it
addressed a state court litigation filed prior to SLUSA, it could possibly have a wider impact as it

9 The Second Circuit recently held that a "variable annuity" is a covered security under
SLUSA because it is (1) a security and (2) most be sold by companies registered under the

Investment Company Act of 1940, and thus any state court class action alleging fraud in the
sale of annuities is preempted under SLUSA. Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co.,
251 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001).
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appears to reject the reasoning of Transcrypt, while not expressly ruling on the point. Id. at 802
("SLUSA's limited injunction power is instead aimed at plaintiffs who would use state-court
actions to circumvent the automatic discovery stay that applies in federal actions upon the filing
of a motion to dismiss").
The specific issue in BankAmerica was whether the injunction fit within the exception
provided in Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 for injunctions expressly provided for in a
federal statute. The district court answered the question in the affirmative, and the Eighth
Circuit, in a 2-1 opinion, affirmed. The Eighth Circuit's opinion concludes that "the leadplaintiff provisions of the PSLRA create significant federal rights that previously did not exist,"
and that permitting a parallel state court action would improperly interfere with those rights. 263
F.3d at 801. The Court recognized that if SLUSA applied, the action would have been
preempted altogether, but did not directly respond to the argument that the decision not to give
SLUSA retroactive effect itself indicated the intent of Congress to permit previously filed
parallel state suits to proceed, instead using the policies of SLUSAas support for its ruling. Id.
at 802-03.
BankAmerica is certainly direct authority to seek to stay any existing parallel state court
actions. It may also be used to support an argument under SLUSA that the federal court should
stay any state court action filed that circumvents the automatic discovery stay that applies upon
the filing of a motion to dismiss (15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(b)(I», whether it is a class or individual
action. Id. at 802 (discussing, without deciding, SLUSA's limited injunction power against
plaintiffs who use state court action to circumvent the PSLRA's automatic discovery stay).

C.

Class Representative Must be Knowledgeable, and Control the
Litigation To Be Adequate, According to the Fifth Circuit

One practical issue that was created by the lead plaintiff provisions of the Reform Act
was whether the procedures involved effectively eliminated any reasonable possibility of
challenging the class representative. In fact, some plaintiffs counsel took the position that
discovery of the class representative, including a deposition, was unnecessary and protective
orders should be routinely granted. This approach has been rejected by the Fifth Circuit in
Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp. , 257 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2001). In Berger the circuit court
granted an interlocutory appeal and reversed the certification of a securities class action on two
grounds: (1) the trial court improperly shifted the burden of proof away from the plaintiff on the
issue of adequacy of representation; and (2) the court applied a lax standard of adequacy that
ignored that the class representatives, and not class counsel, "must direct and control the
litigation." Id. at 481. As the Fifth Circuit stated, "[c]lass action lawsuits are intended to serve
as a vehicle for capable, committed advocates to pursue the goals of the class members through
counsel, not for capable, committed counsel to pursue their own goals through those class
members." 257 F.3d at 484.
Although the Fifth Circuit specifically addressed the standards under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), its opinion makes clear that the adequacy standard
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being articulated should be generally applied. 10 While it is expected that experienced class
counsel will assume a larger role in managing and directing a class action as opposed to one with
a single client, the Berger court specifically rejected the argument that adequate counsel is
sufficient to satisfy the adequacy of representation requirement. Instead a class representative
must "possess a sufficient level of knowledge and understanding to be capable of 'controlling' or
'prosecuting' the litigation." 257 F.3d at 482-483. The exact parameters of the necessary
knowledge and understanding are not defined, but trial courts have not typically imposed a high
standard. See, e.g, Williams Corp. v. Kaiser Sand & Gravel Co., 146 F.R.D. 185, 187-188 (N.D.
Cal. 1992).
Given that it is undisputed that a defendant's full rights to challenge a class certification
motion are unaffected by the PSLRA, see In re Nice Sys. Sec. Litig., 188 F.R.D. 206,218 n.ll
(D.N.J. 1999), the tactical issues for defense counsel to consider is whether waiting until class
certification to raise issues concerning the plaintiff is too late, or whether attempting to prompt a
court to sua sponte address objections in the lead plaintiff stage will effectively foreclose a
challenge at the class certification stage, when the defendant should be able to obtain discovery
to rebut the adequacy of the class representative. Any argument that the lead plaintiff should not
be subject to discovery based on the lead plaintiff based on the "sworn certification" filed
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(2)(A) and 78u-4(a)(2)(A) has been effectively rejected by the
Fifth Circuit opinion in Berger which, if anything, supports the view that the scrutiny of a lead
plaintiff is heightened under the PSLRA. If the Berger opinion is generally accepted, that will
counsel in favor of waiting until the class certification process, and after some discovery, before
raising any objections to the class representative.

D.

The Seventh Circuit Rejects Duty to Update Unless Positive Law
Creates a Duty to Disclose

The Seventh Circuit has not spoken yet on many of the important issues under the
Reform Act, including the pleading requirements for scienter. However, in Gallagher v. Abbott
Laboratories, 269 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2001), the court, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook,
rejected a general duty on the part of companies to update information, holding that "firms are
entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news) unless positive law creates a duty

10 The Fifth Circuit recently denied rehearing of Berger, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 579 (5th Cir.
January 14, 2002) (per curiam), specifically rejecting the argument of plaintiff that the court
had "created an additional, independent requirement for the adequacy standard for class
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by reading the provisions of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") into rule 23(a)(4)". Id. at *1.
The court stated "[w]e have not, however, created an additional requirement under rule
23(a)(4) that, after completing the process of selecting the lead plaintiff and lead counsel, a
court may grant class certification only if the putative class representative possesses a certain
level of experience, expertise, wealth or intellect, or a level of knowledge and understanding
of the issues, beyond that required by our long-established standards for rule 23 adequacy of
class representatives." Id. at *1.

F-18

to disclose." Id. at 808. In Gallagher, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a dismissal of a complaint
under Section 10(b) claiming .that Abbot's decision to defer public disclosure of ongoing
settlement talks with the FDA that led to a $168 million write-down constituted a fraud on the
shareholders. Id. at 807.
While the court acknowledged that the periodic reports required under the Securities Act
of 1933 and Section 13 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m, including the implementing
regulations, affirmatively required disclosure of corporate information, the court characterized
those reports as "snapshots of the corporation's status on or near the filing date, with updates due
not when something 'material' happens, but on the next prescribed filing date." 269 F.3d at 809.
Accordingly, "a corporation does not commit fraud by standing on its rights under a periodicdisclosure system." Id. at 809-10. Finally, statements need only be "corrected" if they were
"incorrect when made," and not rendered incorrect by subsequent developments. Id. at 810. 11

E.

Insurance Developments

The most important development, not captured in the published case law, is the
increasing attempt by Directors and Officers Insurance carriers to rescind policies based on
material misrepresentations in the policy application, particularly in accounting restatement
cases. The approach works as follows: the company is required to attach its most recent SEC
filings to its policy application, verify that the financial statements are correct, and acknowledge
in the application that the attachments are material to the insurance company's decision to issue
coverage. Thus, if the company and its officers and directors are later sued based on a
restatement of the financial statements, the insurer can seek rescission based on a material
misrepresentation in the policy application, which under state law often does not require intent.
This is a serious issue because on some level it renders the coverage illusory.
The Sixth Circuit addressed two other D & 0 insurance issues in Owens Corning v.
National Union Fire Ins., 257 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2001). The first was whether or not allocation
between covered and uncovered claims was required when a joint settlement was entered into
including both covered directors and an uncovered corporation. (With entity coverage widely
available this scenario is less common). The court affirmed a summary judgment on behalf of
the corporation, holding that, under Ohio law, an allocation provision that required the parties to
cooperate in good faith to allocate a settlement payment between covered and uncovered claims
was ambiguous, and should be interpreted to only require allocation to the extent that the
uninsured claims actually increased the insurer's liability. Id. at 492, 493.
The second issue considered by the court was whether the underlying indemnification
obligation by the company of the directors for the settlement was proper under Delaware law.

11 The primary exception to this rule is that "[a] registration statement and prospectus for a new
issue of securities must be accurate when it is used to sell stock, and not just when it is filed."
Id. at 811 (citing Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) and Regulation S-K,
Item 512(a».
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257 F.3d at 494. Under Section 145 of Delaware General Corporations Law there are two types
of indemnification, mandatory and permissive. "Mandatory indemnification for defense
expenses occurs when the director is 'successful on the merits or otherwise' in defense of the
action," Section 145(c), while U[p]ermissive indemnification may occur ... for the costs imposed
on directors who have been determined to have acted in good faith" (Section 145(a) and (b)). Id.
Owens Corning took the position that (1) its by-laws provided an alternative basis for
permissive indemnification that did not require "good faith," and (2) a settlement of
approximately $10 million should be viewed as success on the merits, mandating
indemnification. Id. National Union argued that Owens Corning admitted failure to follow the
procedures contained in Section 145(d) for determining the good faith of its directors barred
permissive indemnification. Id.
The Sixth Circuit rejected all of the arguments made by the parties, but nevertheless
found in favor of Owens Corning. The court first rejected the argument that the by-laws could
override the requirements of Delaware law, stating that "the ability [of the company] to provide
indemnification is constrained by its corporate form as governed by the law of Delaware." 257
F.3d at 494-495. The court also found it to be "extremely dubious that a payout of almost ten
million dollars would be deemed 'success' by the courts of Delaware," expressed "no opinion on
whether a payment in any amount must be considered a failure." Id. at 495 n.6. The court
recognized that a blanket rule against a settlement being considered a success would· "compel
litigants to seek a Pyrrhic victory in court," but a rule not tied to a specific factual showing would
allow any pre-trial settlement to be viewed as a success. Id. The court concluded, however, that
"[ilt is not impermissible for a Delaware corporation to accord a director seeking indemnification
a rebuttable presumption of good faith." 257 F.3d at 495. The failure of National Union to rebut
the presumption led to affirmance of summary judgment. Id.
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I.

II.

Introduction
A.

Recent Experience

B.

The Standards Setting Function and Civil Liability

The Securities Lawyer's Standards of Care
Example:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

H.
I.
J.

The Securities Lawyer's Due Diligence Standard

Conduct a preliminary review to determine client's quality and integrity
and any potential conflicts.
Form, direct and oversee a competent working group for the disclosure
process.
Establish a due diligence atmosphere making certain every participant
knows of liability risks.
Conduct meetings with key personnel to determine the terms of the
offering and its purpose and the nature of the issuer's business.
Prepare a due diligence checklist covering every material aspect of
issuer's business.
Distribute questionnaires to directors, officers and principal shareholders
covering their background, experience and conflicts of interest.
Prepare a working draft of disclosure document, after review of sample
documents used by other issuers in similar business and after consultation
with working group.
Conduct and control an extensive "due diligence" investigation for the
purpose of obtaining and verifying all information necessary for inclusion
in the disclosure document.
Compare all information from different sources in order to determine "red
flags" and inconsistencies.
Write, edit, review and revise various drafts of the disclosure document in
consultation with entire working group - and reach a consensus that the
final draft fully and completely discloses all facts material to the issuer
and its offering of securities.
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III.

The Sources of the Securities Lawyer's Standard of Care
A.

Federal Securities Laws
1.

The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) has two main
purposes:
(a)

to provide investors with material financial and other
information concerning securities offerings in the primary
market; and

(b)

to prohibit misrepresentation, deceit and other fraudulent
acts and practices in the distributions of securities generally
(whether or not required to be registered).

§11 of the 1933 Act:
(a)

in case any part of the registration statement ... contained
an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted . . . a
material fact . . . , any person acquiring such security . . .
may sue - (1) every person who signed the registration
statement ... , (2) every director ... , (3) every person
named in the registration statement as being or about to
become director ... , (4) every accountant engineer, or
appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority
to a statement made by him, who has been named ... , (5)
every underwriter ... [but]

(b)

... no person, other than the issuer, shall be liable ... who
shall sustain the burden of proof - (3) that (a) as regards any
part of the registration statement not purporting to be made
on the authority of an expert . . . he had, after reasonable
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe
... that the statements ... were true and that there was no
omission to state a material fact.

§ 12 of the 1933 Act:

(a)

any person who - (2) offers or sells a security (whether or
not exempted . . .) by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a
material fact or omits to state a material fact . . . and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the
person purchasing the security ....
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2.

The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) primarily
concerns the regulation of secondary or trading markets. The Act,
for example, contains antifraud provisions such as Rule IOb-5,
extensive periodic and continual reporting, as well as other
requirements, for certain issuers of securities, oversight of brokerdealers and national securities exchanges, and regulations focusing
on proxy solicitation, tender offers and going private transactions.
Rule IOb~5 of the 1934 Act
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,

B.

(a)

to employ any device scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b)

to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or

(c)

to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.

The Common Law of Torts
American Law Institute (ALl) Restatement (Second) of Torts.

Section 526
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker (a) knows or
believes the matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not have the
confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he states or implies,
or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he
states or implies.

SectjOlt 529
A representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the
maker knows or believes to be materially misleading because of his failure
to state additional or qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation.
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Section 552(1)
One who, in the course of his business, profession.or employment,
or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies
false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions,
is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
C.

Rules of Professional Conduct
1.

The ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility

Duty of Competence
Model Rule 1.1
A lawyer must provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
To handle securities transactions, the lawyer must be a prudent expert or
must associate special counsel.

Duty to Consult
Model Rule 1.2(a)
A lawyer must corlsu[t with the client, which means
communication of information reasonably sufficient to apprise the client
of the significance of the transaction. See also Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers, §20.

No Assistance to Fraudulent Conduct
Model Rule I.2(d)
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows or should know is fraudulent. See also
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, §94. A lawyer who assists a
client in conduct that violates the rights of a third person is subject to
liability to both the third person and the client.

Duty to Communicate
Model Rule 1.4
A lawyer is required to explain the consequences of the transaction
and assure that the client fully understands the substantive and legal
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effects of the transactions to which the lawyer's work relates.
Duty to Withdraw

Model Rule 1.16
A lawyer must not represent a client if the representation would
result in any violation of the law or the rules of professional conduct.
Advisory Duties

Model Rule 2.1
A lawyer must exercise independent professional judgment and
provide candid advice, even if that advice involves unpleasant facts and
alternatives the client would rather not confront.

Model Rule 2.3
A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter effecting a
client for the use of someone other than the client if:
(a)

the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation
is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer's
relationship with the client; and

(b)

the client consents after consultation.

See also Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, §95. In
providing the results of the lawyer's investigation and analysis of facts or
professional evaluation, the lawyer must exercise care to the nonclient and
must not make false statements.
Duty of Truthfulness

Model Rule 4.1
In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a)

make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person; or

(b)

fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client.

See also Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, §98,
Statements to a Nonclient, infra.
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Note the Rule 1.6 exception to the lawyer's duty of confidentiality.
A lawyer's disclosure of information is impliedly authorized where
necessary to carry out the representation, e.g., federally-mandated
disclosure requirements in the client's securities offerings. See also
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, §67. Moreover, neither the
attorney-client privilege nor work product immunity applies when a client
uses the lawyer's services to engage in or assist a fraud. Id. at §§82, 93.

Supervisory Duty
Model Rule 5.1
Partners are required to ensure that the firm has measures in effect
to assure that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Model Rules,
including the duty of competence, among others. Moreover, a lawyer
having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer must make
reasonable efforts to ensure the subordinate lawyer conforms to the Model
Rules. See also Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 11.

Duty of Subordinates
Model Rule 5.2
A lawyer is bound by the Model Rules even when acting at the
direction of another person. See also Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers, § 12.

Professional Misconduct
Model Rule 8.4
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a)

violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional
conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do
so through the acts of another;

(b)

commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects;
engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation; and

(c)

(d)

engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the adnlinistration
of justice.
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2.

ABA Formal Ethics Opinions
The American Bar Association has issued Formal Ethics
opinions specifically advising lawyers to perform independent
disclosure and not blindly rely on clients' statements (Formal Ope
335 (1974)), to withdraw if disclosures made in offerings do not
satisfy the lawyer's ethical responsibility (Formal Ope 346 (1982)),
and to withdraw and disavow his work product if the client is using
the lawyer's work product to commit fraud, and failure to
repudiate constitutes assistance to the unlawful conduct (Formal
Ope 92-366 (1992)).

D.

ALl Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers

Section 51. Duty of Care to Certain Nonclients
For purpose of liability under §48 [professional negligence], a
lawyer owes a duty to use care within the meaning of §52 [standard of
care] in each of the following circumstances:
1.

to a prospective client, as stated in §15 [duties to prospective
clients];

2.

to a nonclient when and to the extent that:

3.

4.

(a)

the lawyer or (with the lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's
client invites the nonclient to rely on the lawyer's opinion
or provision of other legal services, and the nonclient so
relies, and

(b)

the nonclient is not, under applicable tort law, too remote
from the lawyer to be entitled to protection;

to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a)

the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the primary
objectives of the representation that the lawyer's services
benefit the nonclient;

(b)

such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer's
performance of obligations to the client; and

(c)

the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of
those obligations to the client unlikely; and

to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a)

the lawyer's client is a trustee, guardian, executor, or
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fiduciary acting primarily to perform similar functions for
the nonclient;
(b)

the lawyer knows that appropriate action by the lawyer is
necessary with respect to a matter within the scope of the
representation to prevent or rectify the breach of a fiduciary
duty owed by the client to the nonclient, where:
(i)

the breach is a crime or fraud, or

(ii)

the lawyer has assisted or is assisting the breach;

(c)

the nonclient is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and

(d)

such a duty would not significantly impair the performance
of the lawyer's obligations to the client.

Section 52. Standard of Care
1.

For purposes of liability under §§48 [professional negligence] and
49 [breach of fiduciary duty], a lawyer who owes a duty of care
must exercise the competence and diligence normally exercised by
lawyers in similar circumstances.

2.

Proof of a violation of a rule or statute regulating the conduct of
lawyers:
(a)

does not as such give rise to an implied cause of action for
professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty;

(b)

does not preclude other proof concerning the duty of care in
Subsection (1) or the fiduciary duty; and

(c)

may be considered by a trier of fact as an aid itl
understal1ding and applyb1g the standard of Subsection (1)
or §49 to the extent that:
(i)

the rule or statute was designed for the protection of
persons in the position of the claimant, and

(ii)

proof of the content and construction of such a rule
or statute is relevant to the claimant's claim.

Section 98. Statements to a Nonclient
A lawyer communicating on behalf of a client with a nonclient
may not:
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1.

knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to the
nonclient,

2.

make other statements prohibited by law; or

3.

fail to make a disclosure of information required by law.

See also Model Rules ofEvidence 702-703
E.

F.

G.

SEC Opinions:

*

In re Keating, Muethirlg & Klekamp (1979)

*

Irt re Fields (1973)

*

III re Carter (1981)

*

III re Ferguson (1974)

Basic Case Law:

*

u.s. v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964)

*

SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968)

*

Escott v. BarC/zris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)

*

SEC v. National Student Marketil1g Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682
(D.D.C. 1978)

*

Greycas v. Proud, 826 F. 2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1987)

Exemplary Cases:
1.

Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972). Relying on SEC
v. Frank, supra, the court held that an attorney with primary
responsibility for drafting disclosure documents was primarily
liable to investors under Rule IOb-5 as a result of nlisleading
financial information "which he should have investigated."

2.

Felts v. National Accourlt Systems Association, IllC., 469 F. Supp.
54 (1978). The court held an attorney, who had no experience in
securities law, liable to purchasers of promissory notes. The court
stated "the duty of the lawyer includes the obligation to exercise
due diligence, including a reasonable inquiry, in connection with
responsibilities he has voluntarily undertaken." The attorney, as a
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lawyer for the issuer, secured an exemption for the securities sold
to investor solely based on promotional material furnished by the
issuer without making a reasonable inquiry to ascertain the truth or
falsity of the representation that could have been easily verified.

3.

Flight Transportation Corporation Securities Litigation v. Reavis
& McGrath, 593 F. Supp. 612 (1984). Purchasers of securities
brought an action against law firm which represented underwriter
in connection with a public offering. The court, in holding the
Plaintiff s complaint stated a cause of action, stated that "the
defendant waS not some stranger in the market. Rather, according
to the allegations, it undertook the preparation of allegedly
fraudulent and misleading prospectus. The duty has been fairly
asserted by the complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss.

4.

Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt and Heuer, 713 F. Supp. 1019
(1989). Investors brought securities fraud action against attorneys
who prepared offering circulars. The court held that "A person
undertaking to furnish information which contains a material
misstatement or omission is a primary participant, so long as he or
she is not so far removed from the transmission of the misleading
information that liability would necessarily become vicarious. The
attorneys' approval or assistance in the preparation of misleading
disclosure documents is "conduct that certainly qualifies as
'furnishing' or supplying' information to potential investors in a
sufficiently direct manner to impose IOb-5 primary liability."

5.

Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Limited, 941 F.2d 142 (2nd Cir.
1991). Investors brought state and federal securities actions against
attorneys for a limited partnership. The investors alleged that
attorneys preparing the offering memorandum had omitted and
misstated over twenty-two material facts, including issuer's
conviction of mail fraud in connection with a previous fraudulent
limited partnership scheme. The court held that lawyers who
recklessly prepare misleading disclosure documents may be
primary violators of Rule IOb-5.

6.

Molecular Technology Corporation, v. Valentine, 925 F.2d 910
(6th Cir. 1991). The purchasers of convertible debentures brought
action against issuer and its attorneys to recover for securities fraud
and negligent misrepresentation. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that attorneys could be liable for
misrepresentations made in an offering circular for a private
placement of convertible debentures if they should reasonably
foresee third parties' reliance. In this case, corporate counsel fOf
the issuer drafted a private placement memorandum and fOfwarded
it to outside counsel for review. The court held that outside counsel
knew or should have known that the disclosure document he edited
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failed to disclose materials facts concerning the issuer. As a
primary participant in the disclosure process, counsel could be held
liable as a primary violator of Rule IOb-5.
7.

O'Melveny & Myers v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
969 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1992). The FDIC, a receiver for a failed
savings and loan, sued former counsel for S&L for legal
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty regarding counsel's
advice and services in connection with public offering. O'Melveny
& Myers argued that a lawyer owes no duty to uncover a client's
fraud or to advise the client and the world of that fraud. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that there are two problems
with O'Melveny's approach. The first is the implication that if a
client happens to be committing a fraud, of which the attorney may
or may not be aware, the presence of the fraud cancels the
attorney's duty to use due care. The second problem with
O'Melveny's approach is its sharp differentiation between a "duty
to investors," which it concedes, and a "duty to the client," which
it denies. Given the broad duty to protect the client, this distinction
is a false one. Part and parcel of effectively protecting a client, and
thus discharging the attorney's duty of care, is to protect the client
from the liability which may flow from promulgating a false or
misleading offering to investors. An important duty of securities
counsel is to make a "reasonable, independent investigation to
detect and correct false or misleading materials."

8.

Florida Bar v. Calvo, 630 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1994). The court
disbarred an attorney for violations of Disciplinary Rules 1102(A)(I) and 1-102(A)(6) and assessed $7,252 in costs in
connection with preparing a fraudulent securities offering. The
court rejected attorney's arguments that his client was the crook
and thus was bound by the code of ethics to keep his mouth shut.
The court reminded him that the "rule of attorney-client
confidentiality comes to an end when an attorney knows that the
client is engaging in a crime or fraud."

9.

Walco Investments, Irlc. v. Thenan, 881 F. SUppa 1576 (S.D.
Fla. 1995). Investors brought suit against law firms which had
prepared private placement memorandums on behalf of limited
partperships. The court, in denying the law firms' motions to
dismiss, held that the law firms were aware that investors would be
relying upon and induced to purchase securities based upon the
information contained in the private placement memorandum. This
knowledge may be sufficient to create a relationship between the
law firm and plaintiff-investors.

10.

Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler & Garret, 871
F. SUppa 381 (S.D. Calif. 1994). The court allowed an insurance
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company to sue for contribution against a law firm who drafted an
entire prospectus which contained misrepresentations and
omissions. The court held that "such allegations are not to be
characterized as failure to disclose but as affirmative
misrepresentations or omissions described under IOb-5." The court
held that plaintiffs need not show a duty to disclose where counsel
has participated in the preparation of disclosure documents
containing material omissions.

IV.

Conclusion
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PANEL DISCUSSION HYPOTHETICAL
Joe N. Vence founded The New New Thing, Inc. in February, 1999. Mr. Vence
serves as its CEO, owns 55% of the outstanding shares of New New Thing, but through
a special class of common stock held by him carrying 10 votes per share, holds
approximately 92% of the voting power of New New Thing. Vence took $200,000 out of
his retirement plan at his former employer of 15 years to start New New Thing. Through
loans and private placements of shares to friends, family and several "angel investors,"
New New Thing raised almost $1,500,000 over the last three years to keep the company
alive. During this time, New New Thing developed and patented a wrapping foil for
hotdogs and similar type sandwiches that keeps the dog, brat or sausage ')ust off the grill
hot" for up to one hour while allowing the bun to keep its natural fresh texture and not get
soggy. New New Thing had been working on a foil that could be used for hamburgers,
which because of their circular shape present a special R&D challenge that Vence and his
one R&D employee are confident they can overcome. However, a shortage of funds has
stopped this R&D work.
At a recent trade show, a sales rep for the national firm that holds concession
rights to most of the Major League Baseball ballparks discovered New New Thing's
wrapping foil for hotdogs and came away favorably impressed, promising to get back
with Mr. Vence. The problem is, New New Thing is out of money and behind on its
office rent, Vence hasn't taken salary for two months, his savings are depleted and Mrs.
Vence wants her husband to get a "real job," the R&D employee has not been paid in
four weeks and is threatening to quit, the sales and marketing person Vence wanted to
hire couldn't wait any longer and took another job, and his investor friends and family are
tapped out.
Vence wants to follow up with the concession firm for those Major League
Baseball ballparks but literally has no money on which to travel. And if this concession
firm gets the slightest whiff of that, he'll have no negotiating leverage and get taken to
the cleaners. Vence believes that if New New Thing only had the funding to keep the
doors open, hire a top notch sales and marketing person, and look more like a viable
business, that it could also get in the near future some significant sales from concession
firms serving the National Football League stadiums, the National Hockey League and
NBA arenas like Madison Square Garden, and the NCAA Division I universities. And
that doesn't even include the wholesalers that sell to the hotdog street vendors!
If only
he had the financial and other resources to get New New Thing's foot in the door with
even one of these behemoths. Vence also remains convinced New New Thing can
develop a wrapping foil for hamburgers with funding for further research and
development.
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One angel investor, weary of putting money in and now on to something else,
knows I. M. Rich, the founder and managing partner of Friendly Capital Group LLC. In
one last effort to help New New Thing before he writes off his investment, he contacts
Mr. Rich and requests that he meet with Vence. Friendly Capital has investments in a
portfolio of companies, including several in the food services business. Even though
I. M. is Ivy League Old School with a preference for premium-priced vodka and Vence a
college dropout with a preference for Miller Genuine Draft®, the two hit it off quite well
at their first meeting. That meeting ends with I. M. Rich wholeheartedly agreeing with
Vence that there is nothing worse than pealing back a concession vendor's wrapper at the
game and biting into a lukewarm hotdog in a soggy bun. After further meetings, a
thorough review of New New Thing's business plan and some due diligence, Friendly
Capital offers to invest $1.2 million in New New Thing on the terms set forth in the
following cap table and term sheet.
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THE NEW NEW THING, INC.
Summary of Principal Terms of
Series A Preferred Stock Offering

This term sheet summarizes the principal terms with respect to a potential private placement of
equity securities of The New New Thing, Inc. (the "Company") by Friendly Capital Group, LLC, or its
designees (the "Purchaser").

Type of Security:

Shares of the Company's Series A Convertible
Redeemable Participating Preferred Stock
("Series A Preferred") representing
approximately 33% of the outstanding equity of
the Company on a post-closing fully diluted
basis.

Amount of Investment:

$1,200,000

Pre-Money Valuation of the Company:

$2,400,000

Price Per Share:

$0.38, subject to adjustment based on the actual
shares issued (the "Issue Price").

Capitalization of the Company:

The pre-investment and post-investment
capitalization of the Company shall be as set
forth on Exhibit A.

Use of Proceeds:

The proceeds from the sale of the Series A
Preferred shall be used by the Company for
working capital.

Dividends:

Cumulative dividends at the rate per annum of
8% of the Issue Price, compounded annually,
will accrue on the Series A Preferred. If the
Company declares a dividend on the Common
Stock, the Series A Preferred shall also be
entitled to participate pro rata on an as-if
converted basis.

Liquidation Preference:

In the event of any liquidation, dissolution or
winding up of the Company, the holders of
Series A Preferred will be entitled to receive in
preference to the holders of all other equity
securities an amount equal to (i) the Issue Price
per share of Series A Preferred, plus (ii) all
accrued but unpaid dividends, plus (iii) an
amount which, after receipt, the holders of
Series A Preferred shall have received an
internal rate of return on the Issue Price equal to
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25%, calculated through the event of liquidation
and after payment of all dividends on the Series
A Preferred, plus (iv) the aggregate amount that
would be distributed in respect of the aggregate
number of shares of the Company's Common
Stock issuable upon conversion of all shares of
Series A Preferred. At the option of the holders
of Series A Preferred, the consummation of a
transaction or series of transactions in which
more than 50% of the voting power of the
Company is disposed of or the consolidation or
merger of the Company with or into any other
corporation or corporations or the sale of all or
substantially all of the assets of the Company
shall be deemed to be a liquidation, dissolution
or winding up for purpose of the liquidation
preference.
Optional Conversion:

A holder of Series A Preferred will have the
right to convert the Series A Preferred, at any
time, into shares of Common Stock. The total
number of shares of Common Stock into which
a share of Series A Preferred may be converted
initially will be determined by dividing the Issue
Price by the conversion price. The initial
conversion price will be the Issue Price.

Anti-Dilution Adjustments:

The conversion price will be subject to
adjustment in the event of any stock dividend,
stock split, recapitalization or the like. If the
Company issues additional shares at a purchase
price per share less than the applicable
conversion price (other than in connection with
the conversion of the Series A Preferred, the
issuance and sale of, or the grant of options to
purchase, shares of Common Stock pursuant to a
Company stock option or employee purchase
plan approved by the Board of Directors), the
conversion price will be adjusted to such lower
price to prevent dilution.

Automatic Conversion:

The Series A Preferred will be automatically
converted into Common Stock, at the then
applicable conversion price, upon the closing of
a sale of the Company's shares of Common
Stock pursuant to a firm commitment
underwritten public offering by the Company
with aggregate net proceeds to the Company
(after deducting underwriters' commissions and
discounts) of at least $10,000,000 and at a public
offering price per share of at least $3.00, as
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adjusted for stock splits, stock dividends,
recapitalizations and the like occurring after the
date hereof (a "Qualified Public Offering").
Redemption:

The Company shall, at the option of a holder of
Series A Preferred, at any time and from time to
time after five years from the Closing and upon
not less than 90 days prior notice to the
Company, redeem such holder's shares of Series
A Preferred for a price per share equal to the
greater of (i) the Issue Price per share of Series
A Preferred, plus all accrued and unpaid
dividends, or (ii) the fair market value per share
of Series A Preferred, as determined by a
qualified, independent appraiser acceptable to
both the Company and the holder. If unable to
agree on an appraiser, the Company and the
Purchaser shall each designate an appraiser and
the average of the fair market value as
determined by each appraiser shall be deemed
the fair market value per share. The costs of any
appraiser shall be paid for by the Company.

Voting:

Except with respect to the election of directors,
each share of Series A Preferred will have the
right to that number of votes equal to the number
of shares of Common Stock issuable upon
conversion of such share of Series A Preferred.

Protective Provisions:

The Company shall not, without the consent of
the holders of at least a majority of the
outstanding Series A Preferred: (i) amend any
provision of the Company's certificate of
incorporation or bylaws; (ii) create any new
series or class of shares having rights,
preferences or privileges senior to or on parity
with the Series A Preferred or issue any class or
series of equity securities or additional shares of
existing classes or series; (iii) effect any
transaction resulting in a change in control; (iv)
liquidate, dissolve or change the nature of the
Company's business; (v) effect a merger or
consolidation of the Company or sale of all or
substantially all of its assets; (vi) enter into any
transaction with affiliates; (vii) incur any
obligations for borrowed money of more than
$100,000 in the aggregate in any 12 month
period; (viii) repurchase or redeem any equity
securities of the Company except as
contemplated herein or make any distribution on
the Common Stock or any shares ranking junior
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to the Series A Preferred; (ix) increase the size
of the Board of Directors; (x) acquire an interest
in any entity; or (xi) take any action that would
materially adversely affect the Series A
Preferred.
Registration Rights:

If, at any time after 180 days following the
Company's initial public offering, the Purchaser
requests that the Company file a registration
statement for at least 25% of the Common Stock
issued or issuable upon conversion of the Series
A Preferred, the Company will use its
reasonably diligent efforts to cause such shares
to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933
and applicable state securities laws. The
Company will not be obligated to effect more
than two registrations (other than on Form S-3
as described below) under these demand
registration right provisions. The Purchaser will
have full piggyback rights to register its shares
in any registration of the shares of the Company
by the Company or its shareholders (other than
an offering related solely to an employee benefit
plan or a Rule 145 transaction), subject to the
right of the Company and its underwriters, in
view of market conditions, to reduce or
eliminate the number of shares of the Purchaser
proposed to be registered. The Purchaser shall
have unlimited Form S-3 registration rights,
provided that the Company shall not be
obligated to effect more than two S-3
registrations in any 12 month period. All
registration expenses (exclusive of underwriting
discounts and commissions and special counsel
fees of a selling shareholder) shall be borne by
the Company. Subsequent purchasers of the
Company's securities may not be granted
registration rights on parity with or superior to
the registration rights of the Purchaser without
the consent of the holders of at least a majority
of the Series A Preferred. Any underwriter shall
be selected by the Purchaser and shall be
reasonably acceptable to the Company.

Option Pool:

The Company will reserve up to 10% of the premoney equity in the Company for issuance upon
the exercise of outstanding options granted to
employees, officers and consultants of the
Company pursuant to an employee stock option
or purchase plan approved by the Board of
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Directors. The option plan will provide for four
year vesting.
Information Rights:

The Company will provide standard financial
reports to the Purchaser, including monthly and
year to date income, balance sheet and cash flow
statements as compared to budget, and shall
provide a written one or two page summary of
operations each month. Not later than 30 days
before the end of each fiscal year, the Company
shall provide a business plan and projections for
the next fiscal year. An annual audit of the
Company's financial statements shall be
performed by a "big five" or other accounting
firm acceptable to the Purchaser.

Board of Directors:

The number of directors of the Company shall
be fixed at five members. The Series A
Preferred voting as a class shall elect two
directors and the Common Stock voting as a
class shall elect two directors. One director shall
be elected by the holders of the Series A
Preferred and the Common Stock voting
together as one class. The Purchaser shall also
have the right to have one observer attend all
meetings of the Board. The representatives of
the Series A Preferred shall be entitled to
customary indemnification from the Company
and reimbursement of the reasonable costs of
attending meetings of the Board and its
committees.

Compensation Committee:

The Board shall establish a compensation
committee composed of non-management
directors, which shall administer the Company's
stock option plan and make decisions with
respect to executive compensation.

Preemptive Rights:

In the event that the Company offers equity
securities (other than upon conversion of
outstanding shares of Series A Preferred or upon
exercise of outstanding options under a Board
approved employee stock option or purchase
plan), the Purchaser shall have a right of first
refusal to purchase a pro rata percentage of
shares in the new offering, based on the
Purchaser's percentage ownership interest in the
Company on a fully diluted basis. The right will
terminate upon the Company's initial public
offering.
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The Founder shall execute a Right of First
Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement with the
Company and the Purchaser which contains,
with respect to the Founder's shares, customary
buy-sell covenants and restrictions in favor of
the Purchaser. In addition, if the Founder
proposes to sell shares of the Company, the
Purchaser will be entitled to participate in such
sale by selling the same percentage of its Series
A Preferred as the Founder is selling. The
Founder shall participate in any sale of the
Company by the holders of a majority of the
Company's outstanding securities.

Right of First Refusal and Co-Sale Agreement:

Confidentiality and Proprietary Information
Agreements:

Each officer, employee and consultant of the
Company shall have entered into an agreement
containing provisions satisfactory to the
Purchaser with respect to confidentiality,
corporate ownership of inventions, and noncompetition and non-solicitation of employees
and customers during and after employment.

Stock Restriction Agreement:

The Company and the Founder will execute a
Stock Restriction Agreement with the Company
pursuant to which the Company will have a
repurchase option to buy back at cost a portion
of the shares of Common Stock held by the
Founder in the event that the Founder's
employment with the Company is terminated
prior to the expiration of 48 months from the
date of the closing. 1/48th of the shares will be
released from the repurchase option at the end of
each month based upon continued employment
by the Company. The restriction will terminate
upon any sale of substantially all the assets or
stock of the Company.

Key Person Life Insurance:

The Company shall obtain and maintain a key
person life insurance policy of $2,000,000 on the
Founder, with proceeds payable to the
Company.

Purchase Agreement:

The purchase of the Series A Preferred will be
made pursuant to a Series A Preferred Stock
Purchase Agreement to be drafted by
Purchaser's counsel which shall contain among
other things, appropriate representations and
warranties of the Company and the Founder,
indemnities for breach, covenants of the
Company and the Founder reflecting the
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provisions set forth herein and other typical
covenants and appropriate conditions of closing,
including, among other things, an amendment to
the Company's certificate of incorporation to
authorize the Series A Preferred and delivery of
an opinion of the Company's counsel. Until
each of the Company, the Founder and the
Purchaser execute the Purchase Agreement there
shall not exist any binding obligation on the part
of any party to consummate this transaction.
Due Diligence:

The Closing of this transaction is subject to the
Purchaser's due diligence investigation of the
Company (which must be satisfactory to the
Purchaser in its sole discretion).

Expenses:

The Company will pay all reasonable legal, outof-pocket and due diligence expenses incurred
by the Purchaser in connection with this
transaction, whether or not the transaction
closes.

Closing:

Closing of the purchase of the Series A
Preferred (the "Closing") shall occur on or
before
, 2002 or as soon
thereafter as reasonably practicable.

Exclusivity:

Upon execution of this Term Sheet and until
_ _ _ _ _, 2002 or such earlier date on
which the Purchaser informs the Company that it
is no longer interested in financing the
Company, the Company and the Founder shall
deal exclusively with the Purchaser and neither
the Company nor the Founder will initiate,
respond to, or participate in any way, in any
discussions regarding, or accept any proposal
for, any equity financing or sale of the
Company.

Confidentiality:

The existence and terms of this term sheet, and
the fact that negotiations may be ongoing with
the Purchaser, are strictly confidential and may
not be disclosed to anyone except the
Company's directors, senior executive officers,
and legal counsel.

H-9

This term sheet is intended solely as a basis for further discussion and is not intended to be and
does not constitute a legally binding obligation of any party except as provided under "Confidentiality",
"Exclusivity" and "Expenses" above. No other legally binding obligation will be created, implied or
inferred until a definitive purchase agreement is executed and delivered by all parties.

THE NEW NEW THING, INC.

FRIENDLY CAPITAL GROUP, INC.

By:

_

By:

Title:

_

Title:

JOEN. VENCE

H-IO

_

_

New New Thing Capitalization
Shareholder
Joe N. Vence(3)
G. Monet Banks
Forestt Gump
Alice Wunderlin
D. N. Ventor
U.R. Friendly
Buddy Lee
Lois Price
Wright Price
Kathleen Price-Vence

Investment(1 )(2)
199,404
550,000
550,000
59,373
33,000
17,600
16,500
13,750
13,750
11,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Class A
Common
265,872
1,000,000
1,000,000
107,950
60,000
32,000
30,000
25,000
25,000
20,000

.",n2:'565"~82-2n-

Hope Springs (4)
Patience Wells (4)

$
$

200,000
100,000

379,886
189,943

Option Pool

$

-

633,409
3,769,060

Class B
Common
2,565,027

Series A
Preferred

Ownership
Outstanding
55.170/0
19.490/0
19.490/0
2.100/0
1.170/0
0.620/0
0.58%
0.49%
0.490/0
0.39%

Ownership
fully diluted
44.69%
15.790/0
15.79°k
1.70%
0.95%
0.51%
0.470/0
0.390/0
0.390/0
0.320/0

Pro Forma
Ownership
29.80%
10.53°k
10.530/0
1.140/0
0.63%
0.340/0
0.320/0
0.260/0
0.260/0
0.21%

Voting
Control(SK6)
91.850/0
3.540/0
3.540/0
0.380/0
0.210/0
0.110/0
0.11°k
0.09%
0.09°k
0.07%

Pro Forma
Voting
Control
42.420/0
1.640/0
1.640/0
0.180/0
0.100/0
0.05%
0.05%
0.04%
0.04%
0.030/0

2,565,027
6.000/0
3.00%

4.000/0
2.000/0

0.620/0
0.31%

10.000/0

6.670/0

1.040/0

33.330/0

51.84%

2,565,027

::t:
I
......

......

Friendly Capital Group, LLC

$

1,200,000

3,167,044
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SECTION I(a)

SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE AND INSIDER TRADING:
REGULATION FD AND RULES IOBS-I AND IOBS-2

On August 10,2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") adopted new
issuer disclosure rules, Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), to address the issue of selective
disclosure of materialn'onpublic information to securities analysts and other market insiders. At
the same meeting, the Commission adopted two new insider trading rules, Rules 10b5-1 and
I
IOb5-2. The first of these two rules clarifies when liability arises from a trader's "use" or
"knowing possession" of material nonpublic information. The second clarifies how the
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability applies to family and other non-business
relationships. Each of these rules is summarized below.

I.

REGULATION FD

A.

Introduction

The new selective disclosure rules were proposed for public comment on December 20, 1999. 2
The Commission's rulemaking initiative was a response to what it perceived to be a systemic
problem within the U.S. securities markets; that is, the practice of issuers selectively disclosing
material nonpublic information to securities analysts and institutional investors before
disseminating that same information publicly. This creates opportunities for market insiders
(and their clients) to profit from that information by trading ahead of its public announcement, at
the expense of public investors. In the Commission's view, "the current practice of selective
disclosure poses a serious threat to investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the
securities markets.,,3
The Commission received nearly 6,000 comment letters on proposed Regulation FD. Individual
investors universally supported the Commission's effort to "level the playing field" for access to
significant corporate information. Issuers, securities industry participants, the securities bar and
other professional trade organizations criticized the breadth of the proposed rule and expressed
concerns about the potential chilling effect on issuer disclosure practices from a mandatory
selective disclosure rule. The final rule was modified in several important respects to address
these issues. First, the coverage of the rule was narrowed to focus on those communications
which are most likely to lead to insider trading abuses. In so doing, the Commission intended to
avoid interfering with exchanges of otherwise legitimate and valuable corporate information
such as ordinary course business communications with an issuer's customers or suppliers or
communications with the news media. Second, the liability provisions were revised to protect
issuers against the possibility of private litigation under the antifraud provisions of the federal
1 See Release No. 34-43154 (Aug. 15,2000) (the "Adopting Release"). The Adopting Release is available on the
Commission's website at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm.
2 See Release No. 34-42259 (Dec. 28, 1999) (the "Proposing Release"). The Proposing Release is available on the
Commission's website at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-42259.htm.
3 Adopting Release at 4. See also Speech of then-Chairman Arthur Levitt, "A Question of Integrity: Promoting
Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading," to the SEC Speaks Conference, Washington, D.C., Feb. 27, 1998.
"Our markets are strong because investors are confident of their basic fairness. Trading on inside
information - and giving early tips to other potential traders - damages the entire structure of our markets,
because it deeply shakes this vital investor confidence. It can especially demoralize individual investors."
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securItIes laws for failure to disclose material nonpublic information under Regulation FD.
Third, exclusions were added for foreign private issuers and information disclosed in connection
with most registered public offerings.
The purpose of Regulation FD is to deter selective disclosure of material nonpublic information
to securities analysts, institutional investors and other market insiders in advance of general
public announcement. As adopted, the rule requires that all domestic public issuers make
simultaneous (or prompt) public disclosure of all material nonpublic information that it, or
persons acting on its behalf, communicates to its security holders and securities market
professionals. The rule became effective on October 23,2000.

B.

Reasons For Regulation FD

In its release accompanying the new rule, the Commission cited two fundamental problems
caused by the practice of selective disclosure. First, selective disclosure undermines the integrity
of the securities markets and reduces investor confidence in the fairness of those markets.
Second, selective disclosure may also create conflicts of interest for securities analysts, who may
have an incentive to avoid making negative statements about an issuer for fear of losing their
4
access to nonpublic information.
Several commenters on proposed Regulation FD, citing concerns over the breadth of the rule and
the associated risks of unintended consequences, urged the Commission to address the issue of
selective disclosure through the issuance of additional interpretative guidance and, where
appropriate, enforcement actions rather than a mandatory disclosure rule. 5 As discussed in the
Proposing Release,6 the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v. SEC? raises doubts over the extent
In his opening statement at the August 10, 2000 Commission meeting at which Regulation FD was adopted, thenChairman Arthur Levitt stated:
High quality and timely information is the lifeblood of strong, vibrant markets. It is at the very core of
investor confidence.

4

But when that information travels only to a privileged few, when that information is used to profit at the
expense of the investing public, when that information comes by way of favored access rather than by
acumen, insight, or diligence, we must ask, "Whose interest is really being served?" If investors see a
stock's price change dramatically - but are given access to critical market-moving information only much
later - we risk nothing less than the public's faith and confidence in America's capital markets.

Today, as Wall Street analysts play an increasingly visible role in recommending stocks, some in corporate
management treat material information as a commodity - a way to gain and maintain favor with particular
analysts. What's more, as analysts become more and more dependent on the "inside word," the pressure to
report favorably on a company has grown even greater, as analysts seek to protect and guarantee future
access to selectively disclosed information.
s See, ~, Comment Letters of the American Bar Association (May 8, 2000) and the Securities Industry Association
(April 6, 2000). These comment letters are available online at the Commission's website, http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s73199.shtml.
6 Proposing Release, Part II.A.
7 463 U.S. 646 (1983). In Dirks, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of liability under the federal securities laws
when a corporate insider "improperly" discloses material nonpublic information to a securities analyst. It stated that
courts must first look to "whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider. This requires courts to focus on
objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a
pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings." Id. at 663.
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to which selective disclosures by issuers to securities analysts who then trade on the basis of the
nonpublic information (or advise their clients to trade) constitute violations of the insider trading
laws. In the end, the Commission chose to adopt a "more measured approach" to the issue of
selective disclosure through rulemaking rather than a more aggressive enforcement program.

c.

The Elements of Regulation FD

Rule 100 of Regulation FD sets forth the basic rule regarding selective disclosure. It provides
that whenever:
•
•
•

•
•

An issuer, or person acting on its behalf,
Discloses material nonpublic information,
To certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals or holders of
the issuer's securities who may reasonably be expected to trade on the basis of the
information),
The issuer must make public disclosure of that same information,
Either simultaneously (in the case of intentional disclosures), or promptly (in the case of
non-intentional disclosures).

1. Issuer and Persons Acting on its Behalf
Rule 101 (b) of Regulation FD defines "issuer" to include any domestic issuer with a class of
securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or one that is
8
required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act. Foreign governments and
9
foreign private issuers are specifically excluded from the rule.
The rule also covers communications by certain persons acting on behalf of the issuer. These
include any senior official of the issuer or any other officer, employee or agent of an issuer who
regularly communicates with securities market professionals and the issuer's security holders. 10
"Senior official" is defined to mean any director, executive officer, investor relations or public
ll
relations officer, or other person with similar functions. Any person who discloses material
nonpublic information in breach of a duty of confidence owed to the issuer is not considered to
be acting on behalf of the issuer. Issuers will therefore not be held responsible for material
12
information improperly tipped by insiders.

Disclosures made in connection with initial public offerings are therefore not covered by Regulation FD.
Rule 405 under the Securities Act of 1933 excludes from the definition of "foreign private issuer" any foreign
issuer which maintains its principal office in the United States, or whose management or assets are principally
located in this country, if a majority of its outstanding voting securities are owned by United States residents.
Consequently, these foreign issuers would be subject to Regulation FD.
10 Rule 101(c).
11 Rule 101(f).
12 An issuer may limit its liability for unauthorized disclosure by adopting a written disclosure policy which
identifies the senior officials who are authorized to communicate with securities market professionals and investors.
Selective disclosures by persons not authorized to speak under the policy would be made in violation of a duty of
trust to the issuer and would, therefore, not be subject to Regulation FD. See U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Division of Corporation Finance: Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, Fourth
Supp. (rev. July 18, 2001) (the "Telephone Interpretations Manual"), Question No. 14. The Telephone
8

9
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As proposed, Regulation FD would have applied to statements made by virtually any person
acting within the scope of his or her corporate authority.13 In response to public comments, the
final rule was narrowed to limit its application to senior management, investor relations
personnel and others who regularly communicate with securities market professionals and
security holders. In the Adopting Release, the Commission notes, however, that neither an issuer
nor a covered person may escape liability under the rule by directing a non-covered person to
make a selective disclosure. In that case, the covered person would still be held responsible for
the selective disclosure. 14

2. Material Nonpublic Information
(a) Materiality
The Commission chose not to expressly define the term "material" in Regulation FD. Instead,
the rule relies on existing judicial interpretations of materiality. Under existing case law,
information is considered material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important" in making an investment decision and it "would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available." 15 The Adopting Release contains a non-exclusive list of
information and events that, in the Commission's judgment, should be "reviewed carefully" to
determine whether or not they are material. These include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Earnings information;
Mergers, acquisitions and tender offers;
New products or discoveries, or developments regarding customers or suppliers;
Changes in control or management;
Change in auditors;
Dividends, stock splits and defaults on senior securities;
Issuance of additional securities; and
Bankruptcy.
(1) Earnings Guidance and Analyst Reports

Perhaps the most difficult issue confronting issuers since the adoption of Regulation FD is the
subject of earnings guidance and what issuers can say to analysts about earnings models and
previously published earnings expectations without communicating the same information
publicly. In a strongly worded message to issuers, the Commission warned in the Adopting
Release that issuer officials who engage in private discussions with analysts seeking guidance on
earnings estimates assume "a high degree of risk under Regulation FD. If the issuer official
communicates selectively to the analyst nonpublic information that the company's anticipated
Interpretations Manual is available on the Commission's website at http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone/
phonesupplement4.htm.
13 See Proposing Release, Part ILB .1.
14 Adopting Release at 8.
15 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). In the case of contingent or speculative
information, the Supreme Court has held that materiality will depend upon a balancing of both the indicated
probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company
activity. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988).
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earnings will be higher than, lower than, or even the same as what analysts have been
forecasting, the issuer likely will have violated Regulation FD. This is true whether the
information about earnings is communicated expressly or through indirect 'guidance,' the
meaning of which is apparent though implied.,,16
At the same time, the Commission confirmed that issuers may continue to selectively disclose
non-material information· to analysts on the basis of the "mosaic theory"l? without violating
Regulation FD. In the Commission's view, "[t]he focus of Regulation FD is on whether the
issuer discloses material nonpublic information, not on whether an analyst, through some
combination of persistence, knowledge, and insight, regards as material information whose
significance is not apparent to the reasonable investor.,,18
Issuers continue to struggle with the question of how and when they may properly confirm
previously issued earnings forecasts. The Commission staff has stated that an issuer should
consider whether the confirmation of its own forecast itself conveys new material information.
In assessing that question, issuers should consider the amount of time that has elapsed between
the original forecast and the confirmation. Confirmations of prior earnings estimates made late
in a quarter are more likely to contain material information than ones made within a few days or
weeks of the original statement. Companies should be cautious in referring to previously issued
forecasts. In the staff's view, statements by an issuer that a forecast hasn't changed or that it is
"still comfortable" with the prior guidance are no different than an express confirmation.19
Regulation FD has prompted many issuers to rethink the practice of reviewing and commenting
20
on draft analyst reports. Issuers which limit their review to historical facts and reminders of
previously published earnings information should not trigger the rule's public disclosure
requirements. 21 On the other hand, nonpublic information which is shared privately with an
analyst whose own earnings estimate seems outdated or varies from the company's projections
22
would likely be considered material and necessitate public disclosure.

Adopting Release at 10.
The "mosaic theory" was first articulated by the Second Circuit in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156,
165 (2d Cir. 1980), where the court observed that a "skilled analyst with knowledge of the company and the industry
may piece seemingly inconsequential data together with public information into a mosaic which reveals material
non-public information." See also SEC v.Bausch & Lomb. Inc., 420 F.Supp. 1226,1231 (S.D. N.Y. 1976)
(corporate officers and analysts may engage in a "general discussion out of which a skilled analyst could extract
pieces of a jigsaw puzzle which would not be significant to the ordinary investor but which the analyst could add to
his own fund of knowledge and use toward constructing his ultimate judgment.").
18 Adopting Release at 1o.
19 See Telephone Interpretations Manual, Question No.1.
20 Only 50 % of the companies surveyed by NIRI in August 2001 continue to review analysts' earnings models,
down from 87 % prior to Regulation FD.
21 See Telephone Interpretations Manual, Question No.7.
22 The Commission staff has made it clear that the practice of managing quarterly earnings expectations through
private discussion with analysts would be prohibited by Regulation FD. "In short, walking the Street up or down is
almost certainly prohibited and can no longer be done privately. I'm hard-pressed to think of a scenario where the
reasonable investor would not be interested in knowing whether an analyst's forecast is too high or low, if even by a
penny, under current market dynamics." Remarks of Richard H. Walker, former Director, Division of Enforcement,
to the Compliance and Legal Division of the Securities Industry Association, "Regulation FD - An Enforcement
Perspective," New York, N.Y., Nov. 1,2000 (the "Walker Speech").
16

17
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(2) Staff Accounting Bulletin 99
A footnote reference in the Adopting Release to Staff Accounting Bulletin 99 has prompted
concern over the materiality threshold which the Commission staff may apply in possible
enforcement actions. 23 SAB 99 requires that both quantitative and qualitative factors must be
considered in evaluating materiality for financial reporting purposes. Items that may be
quantitatively immaterial may nevertheless be considered qualitatively material if, among other
things, they have the potential for causing a significant movement in the issuer's stock price. 24
By drawing a connection between SAB 99 and Regulation FD and potentially defining
materiality in terms of market-moving information, issuers and securities attorneys are concerned
that the Commission has lowered the materiality threshold and effectively eliminated the concept
of the mosaic theory.

(b) Nonpublic Information
Information is nonpublic if it has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to
investors generally. In addition to the manner of dissemination, issuers must also consider
whether a reasonable time has passed for the information to reach the market. What constitutes a
25
reasonable time depends on the circumstances of dissemination.

3. Disclosures to Enumerated Persons
Regulation FD was created to address the problem of selective disclosure to persons who would
reasonably be expected to trade securities on the basis of the information or provide others with
advice about securities trading. The rule is therefore limited to communications with the
following securities market professionals and institutional investors:
•
•

any broker-dealer, investment adviser or institutional investment manager, or their
associated persons; and
any investment company or hedge fund or their affiliated persons.

The rule also covers holders of the issuer's securities under circumstances where it is reasonably
foreseeable that such holders would trade on the basis of the information.26 The rule excludes
communications with the following persons:
•
•

Any person who owes the issuer a duty of trust or confidence;
Any person who expressly agrees to maintain the information in confidence;27

Adopting Release, fn. 38.
Other considerations cited in SAB 99 that may render material a quantitatively small amount in a financial
statement are: (1) does the item disguise a change in earnings or other trends; (2) does the item hide a failure to
meet analysts' consensus expectations; (3) does the item change a loss into income or vice versa; and (4) does the
item concern a segment or other portion of the issuer's business that is significant to the issuer's profitability or
operations.
25 Adopting Release, fn. 40.
26 Rule 1OO(b).
27 An express agreement to maintain the information in confidence is sufficient. The issuer is not required to obtain
an additional agreement from the recipient that the recipient will not trade on the information. See Telephone
Interpretations Manual, Question No. 10. Also, there is no requirement that the agreement be in writing or that it be
23

24
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•
•

Credit rating agencies; and
28
Any communication made in connection with most registered public offerings.

The exclusion for statements made in connection with a registered public offering was added in
the final rule to address potential conflicts between Regulation FD and Section 5 of the
Securities Act. Commenters feared that a public disclosure mandated by Regulation FD could
constitute an illegal offer for purposes of Section 5(c) ("gun-jumping") or a non-conforming
prospectus pursuant to Section 5(b)(1). Because of their continuous nature, certain registered
shelf offerings under Rule 415 of the Securities Act (such as secondary offerings, DRIPs,
employee benefit plans and stock options) are not excluded from Regulation FD.
Communications made in connection with private offerings remain subject to the rule. 29 Issuers
engaged in private unregistered offerings of their securities will therefore be required to either
obtain confidentiality agreements for any nonpublic information which they propose to provide
to prospective investors in the course of the offering or disclose the information publicly (and
thereby risk the availability of an exemption from registration under the Securities Act. )30
The Commission's initial proposal would have extended the coverage of Regulation FD to any
disclosure of material nonpublic information made by an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, to
31
any person or persons outside the issuer. In response to public comments, the Commission
modified the final rule to restrict its coverage to those persons who are most likely to trade
securities on the basis of information selectively provided by issuers or advise others about
securities trading. Ordinary-course business communications with an issuer's customers,
suppliers, strategic partners and employees and communications with the news media, credit
rating agencies and government agencies are excluded from the rule.
4. Public Disclosure
Rule 101(e) defines the types of "public disclosure" that will satisfy the requirements of
Regulation FD. The Commission intentionally created a definition which affords issuers
significant flexibility in selecting the most appropriate medium of public disclosure under the
rule. Issuers may satisfy their public disclosure obligations under Regulation FD in several
ways. Issuers may choose to either file or furnish a report on Form 8-K with the required
disclosures. Alternatively, issuers may select another method (or combination of methods) of

obtained prior to disclosure, so long as the recipient provides the confidentiality agreement before the recipient
discloses, or trades on the basis of, the disclosed information. Adopting Release, fn. 28.
2R Rule 101 (g) defines the relevant offering period for purposes of Regulation FD. Ordinary course communications
such as a regular quarterly conference call, even though made at a time when the issuer is in registration, would
remain subject to the rule.
29 Thus, for example, road show materials distributed to prospective investors in connection with an unregistered
offering must be disclosed publicly under Regulation FD, in the absence of an exemption from disclosure under the
rule. Similarly, information disclosed by an issuer during a road show while the issuer is not in registration and
otherwise not engaged in a registered securities offering is subject to Regulation FD. See Telephone Interpretations
Manual, Question No. 12.
30 The risk to an unregistered offering such as a traditional private placement or a Rule 144A offering is that a public
disclosure mandated by Regulation FD could be construed as a form of general solicitation, invalidating the relevant
private offering exemption. Information used in connection with the offering, as well as the fact of the offering
itself, may be material and, if not previously disclosed, required to be made public under Regulation FD.
31 See Proposing Release, Part II.B.3.
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disclosure that is reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the
information to the public. 32

(a) Form 8-K
Issuers may choose to either "file" a report under Item 5 of Form 8-K with the required
disclosures or to "furnish" a report under new Item 9 of Form 8-K that is not deemed "filed." If
an issuer elects to file the information on Form 8-K, the report will be subject to liability
pursuant to Section 18 of the Exchange Act and Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 if the information is automatically incorporated by reference in a Securities Act registration
statement. Reports furnished to the Commission pursuant to Item 9 will not be subject to Section
18 liability unless it takes steps to include the information in a filed document such as a periodic
report, proxy statement or Securities Act registration statement. Neither filing nor furnishing
information on Form 8-K will, by itself, constitute an admission that the information is material.

(b) Other Disclosure Methods
As an alternative to a Form 8-K filing, issuers are permitted to meet their Regulation FD
disclosure obligations through any other method (or combination of methods) that is "reasonably
designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public." The
Commission states in the Adopting Release that "acceptable methods of public disclosure for
purposes of Regulation FD will include press releases distributed through a widely circulated
news or wire service, or announcements made through press conferences or conference calls that
interested members of the public may attend or listen to either in person, by telephonic
transmission, or by other electronic transmission (including use of the Internet). The public must
be given adequate notice of the conference or call and the means for accessing it.,,33 The rule
doesn't mandate use of a specific disclosure method for all issuers; rather, it provides a flexible
standard that allows issuers to select the method (or combination of methods) that are best suited
to their specific circumstances. However, the rule places responsibility on the issuer to assure
that the methodes) chosen are, in fact, "reasonably designed" to effect a broad and nonexclusionary distribution of information to the public. Small issuers should heed the
Commission's warning in the Adopting Release that press releases alone may not be sufficient if
the issuer knows that its press releases are not routinely carried by the major wire services (such
as Dow Jones, Bloomberg, Reuters, Business Wire or PR Newswire). In those cases, the issuer
must utilize other or supplemental methods to assure that the information is broadly circulated to
the public. For some small issuers, a Form 8-K filing may be the only effective means of
complying.
Another source of disclosure regulation for public companies are the listing rules of the self-regulatory
organizations ("SROs"). The New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange and Nasdaq require all listed
companies to make prompt disclosure of material information by means of a press release. These requirements have
been cited by commentators as factors which limit the flexibility otherwise available to issuers under Regulation FD.
In particular, the SRO rules create impediments to the expanded use of alternative electronic disclosure methods
(such as the internet).
33 In the staff's view, an adequate advance notice must include the date, time and call-in information for the
conference call. Additionally, public notice should be provided a reasonable period· of time in advance of the call.
For regular quarterly earnings announcements, several days prior notice would be considered reasonable. The staff
also suggests that, if a transcript or replay of the conference call will be made available, issuers indicate in the notice
where, and for how long, the transcript or replay will be available to the public. See Telephone Interpretations
Manual, Question No.3.
32
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The Commission goes on to suggest the following disclosure model for making the required
public disclosure under the rule.
•
•

•

First, issue a press release, distributed through regular channels, containing the required
information.
Second, provide adequate notice, by a press release and/or website posting, of a
scheduled conference call to discuss the announced results, giving investors both the
time and date of the conference call, and instructions on how to access the call.
Third, hold the conference call in an open manner, permitting investors to listen in34
either by telephonic means or through Internet webcasting. 35

The posting of information on an issuer's website will not, by itself, be considered adequate
public disclosure under the rule. Additionally, issuers utilizing webcasts or conference calls as a
means of public disclosure should archive the webcast or call for some reasonable period of time
to allow persons who missed the original broadcast to access its contents at a later date.
Issuers are not required to wait some minimum period of time after filing or furnishing an
Exchange Act report before making disclosure of the same information to a private audience.
The issuer need only confirm that the Exchange Act report has received a filing date that is no
36
later than the date of the selective disclosure.

5. Intentional and Non-Intentional Disclosures
The timing of the required disclosures under Regulation FD is dependent upon whether the issuer
has made an intentional or non-intentional selective disclosure of the information. If the
selective disclosure is intentional, public disclosure must be made simultaneously. If the
selective disclosure is non-intentional, the issuer must make public disclosure of the same
information promptly. "Promptly" is defined in Rule tOted) to mean as soon as reasonably
practicable (but in no event after the later of 24 hours or the commencement of the next day's
trading on the New York Stock Exchange) after a senior official of the issuer learns that there
has been a non-intentional disclosure by the issuer or a person acting on behalf of the issuer of
information that the senior official knows, or is reckless in not knowing, is both material and
nonpublic.
A selective disclosure of material nonpublic information is "intentional" when the person making
the disclosure either knows, or is reckless in not knowing, that the information he or she is
communicating is both material and nonpublic. Whether or not a particular statement is made
"intentionally" may depend upon the circumstances in which it is made. In accordance with
prevailing judicial interpretations of recklessness, liability should only arise for mistaken
judgments for materiality if no reasonable person under the circumstances would have reached
The Adopting Release confirms that conference calls need not be open to questions from all listeners. Public
participants and members of the media could, for example, access the call in a listen-only mode.
35 This procedure would enable the issuer to discuss the earnings release in detail on the conference call without fear
of engaging in improper selective disclosure if additional material information relating to the original earnings
release is discussed with analysts in the subsequent call. Because no further guidance is provided in the Adopting
Release regarding the meaning of "relating to" in this context, however, it is unclear to what extent an issuer may
safely discuss information in the conference call which is arguably unrelated to the subject matter of the earlier press
release even though proper public notice of the conference call was given.
36 See Telephone Interpretations Manual, Question No.6.
34
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the same conclusion. The Commission acknowledges, for example, that the level of mistaken
judgment necessary to show recklessness in the context of a prepared written statement would be
different than that necessary to establish liability in the case of a spontaneous answer to an
unanticipated question. 37

D.

Liability Issues

Regulation FD is strictly an issuer disclosure rule. As the Commission emphasized in both the
Proposing Release and the Adopting Release, the rule is designed solely to create disclosure
obligations under Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Exchange Act and not to subject issuers to
additional liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. To address
concerns raised by commenters, the rule was expanded to expressly provide that no failure to
make a public disclosure required solely by Regulation FD will be deemed to be a violation of
Rule 10b-5 under the Exchange Act. This eliminates the possibility that private plaintiffs may
sue for securities fraud on the basis of violations of Regulation FD. An issuer's selective
disclosure may still provide the basis for liability under Rule 10b-5 on other theories, such as
38
liability for tipping and illegal insider trading.
Failure to comply with the disclosure
requirements of Regulation FD could still subject the issuer to an enforcement action by the
Commission for violations of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act. 39 To date, no
enforcement actions alleging violations of Regulation FD have been filed by the Commission,
although several investigations of possible disclosure violations have been reported in the press. 40

Adopting Release at 11.
See SEC v. Phillip J. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12813 (Mar. 19, 1991). In Stevens, the Commission
initiated an enforcement action against a corporate executive who allegedly disclosed nonpublic information to
securities analysts ahead of its release to the public. The executive's calls to the analysts were allegedly motivated
by a desire to enhance his reputation among the analysts who covered his company. The Commission argued that
this motive was sufficient to meet the "personal benefit test" set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in Dirks v.
SEC. See supra note 7.
39 In a speech to the Compliance and Legal Division of the Securities Industry Association on November 1, 2000,
Robert H. Walker, then-Director of the Commission's Enforcement Division, stated that the staff would be focused
initially on two types of violations: egregious cases involving the intentional or reckless disclosure of information
that is "unquestionably" material (such as selective disclosure of significant corporate events like mergers or
acquisitions and earnings information), and instances of persons who "deliberately attempt to game the system either
by speaking in code, or stepping over the line again and again, thus diminishing the credibility of a claim that their
disclosures were non-intentiona1." He further stated:
37

38

the express language of the rule says that in order to violate Regulation FD, an issuer must have acted
recklessly or intentionally in making a selective disclosure. What this means is that we're not going to
second-guess close calls regarding the materiality of a potential disclosure. An issuer's incorrect
determination that information is not material must represent an "extreme departure" from standards of
reasonable care in order for us to allege a violation of FD.
Walker Speech, supra note 22.
40 In one situation, senior executives of Raytheon Co. reportedly provided additional "color" regarding its earnings
forecast to analysts following the company's annual investor conference, which was broadcast over the internet.
After the conference, analysts reduced their quarterly earnings estimates for Raytheon, with several analysts
explaining in written reports that the change followed conversations with Raytheon management. In a second
situation, analysts reduced their earnings and revenue estimates for Motorola Inc. after company representatives
reportedly made a series of calls to analysts whose estimates were out-of-line with the company's previous earnings
guidance. According to analysts contact by the company, no new information was exchanged on the calls, and the
Motorola representatives simply repeated the earlier guidance. See Michael Schroeder, Raytheon's Disclosure to
Analysts is Investigated, Wall St. J., Mar. 15,2001.
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Issuers should consider the advisability of adopting written disclosure policies as a potential
defense in the event of a possible Regulation FD violation. The rule doesn't expressly require
that issuers adopt a corporate disclosure policy. However, as stated in the Adopting Release, the
Commission expects that "most issuers will use appropriate disclosure policies as a safeguard
against selective disclosure. . .. The existence of an appropriate policy, and the issuer's general
adherence to it, may often be relevant to determining the issuer's intent with regard to a selective
disclosure.,,41

E.

Duty to Update

As public companies increase the frequency and detail of their public disclosures (in particular,
financial forecasts and other forward-looking statements), the question of whether an issuer has
an affirmative legal duty to continuously update prior disclosures which, when made, were
truthful and accurate becomes more critical. Aside from any legal duties which may exist, will
the financial markets expect companies to update prior forecasts as current results and
expectations indicate that the company is not likely to achieve projected targets? The number of
companies routinely issuing earnings warnings each quarter suggest the answer to this question
is yes.
Existing case law considering the subject of an issuer's duty to update prior disclosures which,
although correct at the time, have become inaccurate due to intervening events or the passage of
time, provides no clear precedent. 42 While some federal circuits have found a legal duty to
update under the federal securities laws,43 at least one circuit court has consistently refused to
impose such a duty.44 The Commission staff has confirmed that Regulation FD does not change
45
existing law with respect to any duty to update. Until this conflict is resolved, issuers remain at
risk under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws for missed earnings estimates
and other failed predictions of future results. This liability risk may ultimately affect the current
trend under Regulation FD toward more disclosure by issuers of forward-looking information,
46
particularly earnings guidance.

F.

Response to Regulation FD

The debate over Regulation FD has continued since its adoption. Not surprisingly, sharply
different perspectives have emerged regarding the practical impact of Regulation FD. Members
of the investor community have generally praised the rule for leveling the playing field and
"democratizing" access to corporate information. Issuers have expressed concerns about the lack
of meaningful guidance from the Commission on the subject of materiality and their potential
liability for being second-guessed on disclosure issues which often involve difficult matters of
Adopting Release, fn. 90.
The duty to update should not be confused with the duty to correct prior statements which are later discovered to
have been inaccurate or misleading when made. In the latter case, issuers have a clear duty to immediately correct
the prior misleading statement upon learning of its inaccuracy. See Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10,16-17
(1st Cir. 1990).
43 See Backman v. Polaroid Corp., supra note 42; Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310 (3rd Cir. 1997).
44 See Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738,746 (7th Cir. 1997); Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d
1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995).
45 See Telephone Interpretations Manual, Question No.2.
46 See Steven E. Bochner and Samir Bukhari, Revisiting the Duty to Update in Light of Regulation FD, Insights, Jan.
2002.
41

42
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judgment. Analysts (particularly sell-side analysts) have complained about reduced access to
issuer personnel and the quality of information being provided by issuers. Other market
observers have suggested that Regulation FD, by reducing the amount of meaningful information
being communicated to analysts, has resulted in greater stock price volatility,47 especially among
small and mid-cap companies. Some also fear that, as the flow of information to analysts
decreases and companies become less willing to talk outside of press releases and public
conference calls, the level of analyst coverage of small and mid-cap issuers will decline.
A number of organizations have conducted surveys to track the effect of Regulation FD on
corporate disclosure practices. The Commission has sponsored a roundtable discussion to solicit
views from issuers and market participants on ways to improve the effectiveness of the rule.
Various organizations have also provided the Commission with their own reform proposals. A
summary of some of these developments follows.

1. NIRI Survey
On February 26,2001, the National Investor Relations Institute ("NIRI") released the results of a
48
survey of public company disclosure practices following the adoption of Regulation FD. The
results suggest that Regulation FD has in some ways significantly influenced the manner and
scope of corporate disclosures. The survey indicated that 27 % of the 577 NIRI member
companies surveyed are providing more information to investors than before the effective date of
Regulation FD. Forty-eight percent of the respondents reported that they are providing about the
same amount of information, and 24% said they are providing less information. Other highlights
of the survey are:
•

•

•

•

Regulation FD seems to have prompted companies to make their corporate disclosures
more easily accessible by the general public. Prior to the adoption of the rule, 60% of
NIRI members were providing full public access to quarterly earnings conference calls.
49
Since that time, 89% reported doing so, mostly through webcasts. Only one percent of
the survey respondents stated that they restrict calls to analysts and major investors.
Eighty-four percent of member companies include notice of their upcoming conference
calls in their earnings releases, and 75% post a notice of the calIon their corporate
website.
Seventy-nine percent of member companies are providing some form of earnings
guidance. Fifty-six percent are updating their guidance in a news release if material
facts or circumstances change during the quarter. Thirty-five percent reported that they
do not update earnings guidance once it is issued.
Of those companies that choose to provide earnings guidance, 67% are including it in a
news release and 33% are filing it with the Commission. Most companies indicated that
the news release is also being posted on their website.

See Jonathan Fuerbringer, When Companies Talk, Who Gets to Listen?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2000 (citing as an
example the case of Intel Corporation, whose stock declined 22% in one day in September 2000 after the company
announced reduced revenue expectations for the quarter.)
48 A summary of the survey findings is available online at NIRI's website, http://www.niri.org.publications/alerts/
ea070201.cfm.
49 This number continues to increase. A September 2001 survey of NIRI members shows that nearly all companies
(92%) are webcasting their quarterly conference calls.
47
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•

•

•

Despite warnings from the Commission about the risks of providing earnings guidance
to analysts in one-on-one meetings, 74% of NIRI companies reported that they continue
to hold the same number of individual analyst meetings and five percent indicated that
they have increased the number of one-on-ones since Regulation FD went into effect.
Regulation FD seems to have had very little direct effect on the level of analyst coverage
and institutional market following. Only one percent of companies attributed a loss of
sell-side analyst coverage or the sale of company securities by institutional investors to
changes in the company's disclosure policies as a result of Regulation FD.
Forty-three percent of companies reported that they are still reviewing analysts' earnings
models. Seventy-nine percent said they reviewed earnings models prior to Regulation
FD. Fifty-seven percent are still reviewing analysts' draft reports when asked to do so,
down from the 79% who reported doing so before Regulation FD.

2. ABA Survey
In April 2001, the American Bar Association Task Force on Regulation FD surveyed members
of the securities bar regarding their clients' experiences under the rule. Highlights of the
responses include:
•

•

•

•

Forty-five percent of the respondents reported that their clients were providing more
information to analysts and investors since Regulation FD went into effect. Twenty-four
percent stated that clients were providing the same amount of information, and 25%
stated that clients were providing less information.
Thirty percent reported that the quality of the information being disclosed had improved
since the adoption of -Regulation FD. One-half said the quality had not changed, and
17% said the quality of information had declined.
An overwhelming majority of the respondents (almost 76%) said their clients' practices
with respect to disclosure of forward-looking information had changed as a result of
Regulation FD. Specific responses suggest that issuers are generally disclosing more
forward-looking information since the adoption of Regulation FD, particularly in press
releases and conference calls, and that information and earnings guidance previously
shared with analysts is now being publicly disseminated. Additionally, as the number of
companies publishing forecasts increases, greater attention is being given to the safe
harbor provisions of the PSLRA.
Seventy-seven percent of the respondents reported that, prior to Regulation FD, most of
their clients conducted one-on-one meetings with analysts, and only one percent said few
of their clients did so. After Regulation FD, the number of respondents who reported
that most of their clients held one-an-ones declined to 27%. Twenty-seven percent
reported that few clients held one-on-ones after Regulation FD.

3. SEC Special Study
On April 24, 2001, SEC Commissioner Laura Unger convened a roundtable discussion in New
York City to hear comments from issuers, securities analysts, investors, information
disseminators, attorneys, academics and members of the Commission staff on their initial
experiences under Regulation FD. In December 2001, Commissioner Unger published a report
summarizing the views expressed at the roundtable and making recommendations for improving
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50

the effectiveness of Regulation FD. The principal issues raised by the roundtable participants
concerned the need for greater clarity from the Commission regarding the definition of material
information and current regulatory impediments to the expanded use of technology to satisfy
Regulation FD disclosure requirements. Conflicting views were also expressed regarding the
impact of Regulation FD on the quantity and quality of corporate information flow.
Commissioner Unger's report, which was based on comments from the roundtable discussions
and on information generated from post-Regulation FD surveys, makes the following
recommendations:
•

•

•

The Commission should provide more guidance on materiality. Specifically, the
Commission should consider issuing an interpretative release to make its position on
materiality under Regulation FD clearer. Commission guidance on materiality should
focus particularly on clarifying the meaning of "earnings information" as used in the
Adopting Release.
The Commission should make it easier for issuers to use technology to satisfy their
Regulation FD disclosure obligations. The Commission should work with the SROs
(including the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities
Dealers) to explore ways for the SROs to amend tneir rules to permit listed companies to
meet their disclosure and information dissemination requirements through media other
than press releases. Additionally, the Commission should make it clear that options such
as adequately noticed website postings, fully accessible webcasts and electronic mail
alerts would satisfy Regulation FD.
The Commission should study both the amount and type of information being disclosed
by issuers in Form 8-K filings, press releases, webcasts and conference calls to assess
whether Regulation FD has, in fact, chilled the flow of corporate information to the
securities markets or had other negative, unintended consequences.

4. NIRI Compliance Guidelines
On September 10, 2001, NIRI published a compilation of interpretations and guidance to assist
issuers in understanding and complying with Regulation FD. The advisory also sets forth NIRI's
recommended best practices for communicating with analysts and investors after FD. The
advisory may be accessed at NIRI's website, www.niri.org.

Commissioner Laura S. Unger, Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited (Dec. 2001). The report is
available on the Commission's website at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm.

50
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G.

Corporate Disclosure and Investor Relations Practices After Regulation FD

Although relatively simple in its basic construction, Regulation FD presents issuers with a
number of practical and legal challenges as they adjust to a new disclosure regime. Public
companies must reevaluate the manner in which they communicate with securities analysts,
investors and the financial community generally. As companies modify their corporate
disclosure and investor relations practices to conform to the new selective disclosure rules, they
must also evaluate how much information (particularly forecasts and other forward-looking
information) they are willing to disseminate publicly.
Many companies have chosen to limit the exchange of information with securItIes market
professionals to avoid potential liability under the rule. Others have continued the practice of
communicating informally with analysts and institutional investors, albeit on a different basis
than before Regulation FD, while increasing the amount of information disclosed to the public.
At the same time, it appears that virtually all companies have opened up their conference calls,
news conferences and investor conferences to the public.
Set forth below is a list of common disclosure and investor relations practices which should be
considered and analyzed in light of the new selective disclosure rules and changing relationships
among issuers and members of the financial community.
1.

Does the company conduct regular conference calls to discuss financial results and
other significant developments. If so, do all listeners have an opportunity to ask
questions during the call.

2.

Does the company webcast and/or provide toll-free telephone dial-in access to its
earnings (and other) conference calls. If so, how much notice of the call does the
company provide.

3.

Does the company discuss material information in its quarterly conference calls that
is not contained in the previously-issued earnings release.

4.

Does the company issue a press release describing the subject matter of an upcoming
conference call and providing details of the material information to be discussed on
the call. Or, does the company only issue a public notice of the call with no
additional detail.

5.

Does the company archive its webcasts. If so, for how long.

6.

Does the company provide earnings guidance in its press releases.

7.

Does the company review draft analyst reports.

8.

Does the company routinely provide interim updates of previous earnings forecasts. If
so, how frequently are formal updates provided. Is this done through a press release
or open access conference call.
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II.

9.

Does the company have a written disclosure policy, If so, what level of detail is
appropriate or advisable. Does the policy identify specific corporate personnel that
are authorized to communicate with securities analysts, major investors, other market
professionals and the media.

10.

Does the company observe a black-out period at quarter end. If so, for how long.

11.

Does the company conduct one-on-one and small group meetings with analysts. If so,
does the company require that a member of the IR staff , legal department or other
company personnel responsible for corporate disclosures be present at all analyst
meetings and discussions.

12.

Does the company participate in investor and broker-sponsored conferences. If so,
does the company require as a condition of its participation that the event be webcast.

13.

Does the company fulfill its Regulation FD disclosure requirements by filing or
furnishing a report on Form 8-K or through use of other broadly disseminated
communications such as press releases.
INSIDER TRADING RULES

A.

Introduction

Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder prohibit insider trading, that is,
buying or selling securities on the basis of material nonpublic information. 51 An unsettled issue
within insider trading cases has been what, if any, causal connection must be shown between a
trader's possession of inside information and his or her trading activities. While some courts
have held that a trader may be liable for trading while in "knowing possession" of material

51

Section 1O(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange -

(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive d~vice or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. 78j (1994).
SEC Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (2001).
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nonpublic information,52 others instruct that the proper test for determining whether a violation of
the insider trading provisions has occurred is whether one in possession of material inside
information used the information in connection with the trades that formed the basis for the
alleged violations.53
New Rule IOb5-1 attempts to clarify the issue of when insider trading liability arises in
connection with a trader's "use" or "knowing possession" of material nonpublic information.
Rule IOb5-I(a) states:
The "manipulative and deceptive devices" prohibited by Section lOeb) of the
Exchange Act and Rule-IOb-5 thereunder include, among other things, the
purchase or sale of a security of any issuer on the basis of material nonpublic
information about that security or issuer in breach of a duty of trust or confidence
that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the
shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the
material nonpublic information.
Rule IOb5-1 (b) further states that "a purchase or sale of a security of an issuer is "on the basis of
material nonpublic information about that security or issuer if the person making the purchase or
sale was aware of the material nonpublic information when the person made the purchase or
sale." Generally, under the rule, a trade is made on the basis of material nonpublic information if
the trader was aware of the information at the time of the purchase or sale. In the Adopting
Release, the Commission states that while the SEC staff believes the knowing possession
standard best accomplishes the goal of protecting investors and the integrity of securities
markets, it recognizes that the standard could be overbroad in some respects.54 "The new rule
attempts to balance these considerations by means of a general rule based on "awareness" of the
material nonpublic information, with several carefully enumerated affirmative defenses.,,55
Responses to the rule expressed concerns that the awareness standard for insider trading might
56
eliminate the scienter element from insider trading cases. The Preliminary Note to Rule IOb51, however, provides that the rule does not modify the scope of insider trading law in any respect
other than to define when a purchase or sale constitutes trading "on the basis" of material
57
nonpublic information.
Rule IOb5-I(c) contains an affirmative defense to alleged violations. It provides that a person's
purchase or sale is not "on the basis of' material nonpublic information if the person making the
purchase or sale demonstrates that before becoming aware of the information, the person had:
•
•
•

entered into a binding contract to purchase or sell the security,
instructed another person to purchase or sell the security for the instructing person's
account, or
adopted a written plan for trading securities.

See United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1993).
See SEC v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998).
54 Adopting Release at 19.
55 d.
I
56 Id.
57 Id.
52

53
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In order to qualify for the defense provided by this section, the contract, instruction or plan must
have either:
specified the amount of securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the
date on which the securities were to be purchased or sold;
included a written formula or algorithm, or computer program, for determining the
amount of the securities to be purchased or sold and the price at which and the date on
which the securities were to be purchased or sold; or
prohibited the person from exercising any subsequent influence over how, when, or
whether to effect purchases or sales; provided, in addition, that any other person who,
pursuant to the contract, instruction, or plan, did exercise such influence must have been
aware of the material nonpublic information when doing so; and

•
•

•

the purchase or sale that occurred was pursuant to the contract, instruction, or plan. 58
Of course, the defense will be available only if the contract, instruction or plan was entered into
in good faith and not as part of a scheme to evade the prohibitions of the rule. 59
As outlined above, Rule lOb5-1 not only resolves the possession-use dichotomy by establishing
the standard for the causal connection that is required to be shown between a trader's possession
of inside information and the related trading activity, but it also provides an affirmative defense
for properly structured transactions.

B.

Analysis

The SEC anticipates that Rule lOb5-1 will produce two significant benefits. First, the rule
should increase investor confidence in the integrity and fairness of the market by clarifying and
strengthening existing insider trading law. 60 Second, the SEC hopes to benefit corporate insiders
by providing greater clarity and certainty on how they can plan and structure securities
transactions. 61 These benefits should come at little cost, the SEC contends, as the rule does not
require any particular documentation or recordkeeping by insiders, although it would, in some
cases, require a person to document a particular plan, contract or instruction for trading if he or
she wished to demonstrate an exclusion from the rule.
lOb5-1 trading plans will in most instances be far easier to administer than the traditional
window period approach. 62 A plan can be entered into in good faith at any time, provided you do
not possess material inside information. For example, an issuer operating a repurchase program
will not need to specify with precision the amounts, prices and dates on which it will repurchase
its securities. Rather, the issuer could adopt a plan at a time when it is not aware of material
nonpublic information, that uses a written formula to derive amounts, prices and dates; or simply

Rule IOb5-I(c).
Id.
60 See Adopting Release at 29.
61Id.
62 See Rule lOb5-1: The Need to Gear Up Now, The Corporate Counsel, Vol. XXV, No.5 (Sept.-Oct. 2000).
5X

59
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delegate all the discretion to determine such variables to another person who is not aware of the
63
information.
Similarly, an employee wishing to adopt a plan for exercising stock options and selling the
underlying shares could adopt a plan while unaware of inside information that contained a
formula for determining the specified percentage of the employee's vested options to be
64
exercised and/or sold at or above a specific price. For instance, the formula could provide that
the employee will exercise options and sell the shares one month before each date on which her
65
son's college tuition is due, and link the amount of the trade to the cost of the tuition.
The Rule could also be applied to an employee's payroll deductions under a Section 401 (k)
plan. 66 The transaction price could be computed as a percentage of market price, and the
transaction amount could be based on a percentage of salary to be deducted under the plan, with
the transaction date determined pursuant to a formula set forth in the plan. Alternatively, the
date of a transaction could be controlled by the plan's administrator or investment manager,
assuming that he is not aware of the material, nonpublic information at the time of executing the
transaction, and the employee does not exercise influence over the timing of the transaction. 67
The defense provided by Rule 10b5-l is designed to cover situations in which a person can
68
demonstrate that the material nonpublic information was not a factor in the trading decision.
This should provide flexibility to those who would like to plan securities transactions in advance
at a time when they are not aware of material nonpublic information, and then carry out those
pre-planned transactions at a later time, even if they later become aware of material nonpublic
information.
The defense is also available to entities. An entity will not be liable if it demonstrates that the
individual making the investment decision on behalf of the entity was not aware of the
information and that the entity had implemented reasonable policies and procedures to prevent
69
insider trading. Policies of this nature are likely already in place with those entities to whom
the defense would be relevant-broker-dealers and investment advisers-and the Rule should
70
therefore provide additional protection at little or no cost.
As of the beginning of 2002, the Commission has provided little guidance beyond that included
in the Final Release. The staff has, however, issued a series of telephone interpretations
addressing Rule 10b5-l concerns, the most noteworthy of which include the following:
•
•

A plan may have hybrid instructions, part of which are fixed and part of which delegate
71
discretion.
The adoption of a written plan for selling securities that satisfies the affirmative defense
72
conditions of Rule 10bS-l(c) will not change the due date for the filing of a Form 144.

Id.
Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
6& Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 See Telephone Interpretations Manual, Question No. 12.
63

64
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•

•

•

•

A person may make an additional sale (if a "same way", but not a hedging or offsetting
transaction) outside a trading plan without it being deemed an alteration or deviation
73
from the plan.
The exercise of a put or call option held by an insider is a separate investment decision
from the original purchase of the option and must be exercised when the insider does not
possess inside information. IOb5-I would be available, however, if before becoming
aware of inside information, the insider specifies the amount, price and date of exercise
or delegates all discretion to a third party who is not in possession of inside information
74
at the time of exercise.
A foreclosure sale of stock pledged as collateral for a loan does not satisfy IOb5-I,
because the seller may have discretion to payoff the loan or substitute or provide
additional collatera1. 75
Termination of a plan, even when the person is aware of insider information does not
result in liability under lOb5-I. However, termination or cancellation of an order could
result in the loss of the lOb5-1 defense for prior transactions as an issue would arise as
to whether the plan was "entered into in good faith and not as part of a plan or scheme to
evade." Following the termination of a plan, the IOb5-1 defense would be available for
transactions under a new or modified plan only if that plan satisfies IOb5-I. 76

By enacting Rule IOb5-I, Congress has expressed strong support for the Commission's insider
trading enforcement program. Rule IOb5-I should prove to be a step towards maintaining the
fairness, health and integrity of our markets.

See id.,
See id.,
74 See id.,
75 See id.,
76 See id.,
72

73

Question No.1 (Rule 10b5-1 Interps., Oct. 2000).
Question No. 13.
Question No.5.
Question No.8.
Question No. 15.
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GUIDANCE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATION FD
Reg. FD has been in effect almost a ,year, and it is time to examine how companies and the investment
community have adjusted to the new rule. There have been numerous forums examining how to
comply with Reg. FD and forums examining the consequences of the rule. The SEC conducted a oneday roundtable in April. NIRI held a symposium on May 8 at the National Press Club in Washington.
Meanwhile, the SEC has provided some guidance through its Manual of Publicly Available Telephone
Interpretations (fourth supplement) available on the SEC Web site.
(www.sec.gov/interps/telephone/phonesupplement4.htm).
This advisory will attempt to digest the guidance and interpretations regarding various aspects of the
rule.
The goal of Reg. FD is to ensure that all market participants have equal access to market moving,
material news. The goal of achieving fairness in today's securities markets has been embraced
throughout NIRI's 31-year history, first in our Code of Ethics and later in our Standards of Practice for
Corporate Disclosure published in 1996.
Reg. FD requires that:
• When a public company has material, nonpublic information to discuss in a selective forum, it
must disclose that information publicly prior to or simultaneously with the disclosure in a nonpublic forum. Normally, this would be through a news release, filed under Item 5 or furnished
under Item 9 in a Form 8-K or in a fully accessible conference call.
• Should there be unintentional disclosure of material, nonpublic information, once the person
covered by Reg. FD realizes that has occurred, the company has 24 hours to issue a news
release or file an 8-K. If the inadvertent disclosure occurs over a weekend or holiday, the
company must publicly disclose the information before the opening of the next trading day.

Regulation FD Coverage
The rule covers material communications between issuer officials (Le., officers, directors, investor
relations officers, public relations/corporate communications officers) and analysts, professional
investors or any other holder of the company's securities who might be expected to trade on that
information. It is important that companies designate those who, under normal circumstances, are
authorized to speak for the company. Normally, this is done in a written disclosure policy - a subject
that will be addressed later.
Since Reg. FD allows analysts to use information gleaned from employees not covered by the rule,
one may assume analysts will pursue such sources with vigor to obtain information they would not get
from those covered by the rule. This means that a company should carefully educate employees
participating in trade shows, technical conferences, and facilities/headquarters tours conducted for
analysts.

Conference Calls
A September 2001 survey of NIRI members shows that 920/0 are webcasting their quarterly conference
calls. The other 80/0 are not conducting conference calls since most do not have analyst coverage.
Millions of investors are listening to the live calls and more than three times that number are listening to
the archived call. About 800/0 of companies leave their calls up for at least one to two weeks. One out
of four leave them up for the remainder of the quarter.
Reg. FD requires companies to provide investors "adequate notice" when scheduled conference calls
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are to occur. About 80% of companies provide such notice about a week in advance in a news release
and on the company's Web site.
In situations where a conference call will occur after an unscheduled announcement (e.g., a merger or
acquisition), the notice of the conference call should be in the news release announcing the event and
then posted on the company's Web site.
NIRI issued an Executive Alert on August 17, "Handling Disseminated information in the Internet
Environment," which provides guidance when posting conference calls on Web sites and how to deal
with forward-looking information once it is disseminated in cyberspace and is beyond the company's
control.

Earnings Guidance
Most companies have adopted a process for disclosing their earnings guidance. About 800/0 of
companies are providing guidance. Harvard Business School Professor Amy Hutton examined the
consequences of guidance vs. no guidance policies based on NIRI survey data and found:
• Companies that provide guidance build a greater earnings consensus than those that do not.
• Companies that provide guidance generally beat analyst's forecasts. Those providing no
guidance tend not to.
• Companies that provide guidance experience a more positive impact from good news than
those that provide no guidance.
• Those that provide no guidance experience a more negative impact to bad news than
companies that provide guidance.
Following NIRl's best practices and the listed company requirements of the New York Stock Exchange,
the Nasdaq Stock Market and the American Stock Exchange, most companies put their earnings
guidance in the news release before discussing it in their fully webcast conference call.
The best practice is for a company to put as much guidance in the quarterly news release as it is
comfortable in providing. About 100/0 of companies publish their financial model in the release. More
than 60% publish the major factors that drive earnings. The more information a company has publicly
released, the more it can comment on when analysts are seeking additional guidance. For example,
NIRI believes that a company can explain to an analyst how the company arrived at a material
component (e.g., a revenue estimate) in its financial model, assuming that component is fully disclosed
and assuming the explanation does not get into material, nonpublic inform·ation.
One should steer clear of commenting on material assumptions in an analyst's model. In reviewing
analysts' models, one can only correct errors of historical fact that are in the public domain or errors in
assumptions that are clearly non-material. Prior to Reg. FD, 87% of our members reviewed draft
earnings models. That has dropped to just over 50%.
The SEC, in its Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, says, ''An issuer also would not
be conveying such (material, nonpublic) information if it shared seemingly inconsequential data which,
pieced together with public information by a skilled analyst with knowledge of the issuer and the
industry, helps form a mosaic that reveals material nonpublic information. It would not violate
Regulation FD to reveal this type of data even i~ when added to the analyst's own fund of knowledge, it
is used to construct his or her ultimate judgment about the issuer. An issuer may not, however, use the
discussion of an analyst's model asa vehicle for selectively communicating either expressly or in code
- material, nonpublic information. "

What should you do if you see an analyst's earnings estimate that has obviously not been
updated? You can call that analyst and suggest that he/she look at the guidance the company issued
in its quarterly release but provide no additional comment. If one were to call an analyst whose
earnings estimate is significantly different from the company's and provide material, nonpublic
information in an attempt to get the analyst to change his/her estimate, that would most likely be a
violation of Reg. FO.
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One area that continues to concern companies is how far into the quarter can one confirm
guidance published early in the quarter in response to an individual analyst's question before
triggering the rule's public reporting requirements? The issuer must consider whether that
confirmation conveys any material nonpublic information beyond what was stated in the original
forecast. In other words, has there been any material change in the facts and/or circumstances
associated with that guidance?
If one does not want to confirm or deny an earlier forecast, the issuer official can say, "We are not
commenting on previously published guidance."
Various SEC officials have said, in their view, most companies have enough information on how the
quarter is going by mid-quarter that such a confirmation may. need to be made in a news release, fully
accessible conference call or·in an 8-K. Their rationale is that the forecast made in the quarterly
release was purely a forecast and now you have additional historical information about the quarter.
Therefore, that additional information, even though·it may not change the earlier guidance, is
considered material. NIRI has pointed out that companies may have a sense about how the quarter is
going by mid-quarter but has insufficient information to issue a substantive news release without
raising questions for which there are inadequate answers.
This is why we have seen a significant increase in the number of pre-announcements issued by midquarter or after.

Does Reg. FD Create a Duty to Update?
The SEC says in its Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations that Reg. FD does not
change eXisting law with respect to any duty to update. There is an ongoing legal debate over the duty
to update in which case law is not as clear as in those cases pertaining to the duty to correct. (A duty
to correct would arise if a company stated a piece of historical news in a release and later discovered
that the statement was incorrect).
There is an argument that when companies issue guidance or other forward-looking information and
later discover that the guidance has changed materially, that may give rise to liability under a "duty to
correct or "duty to update" in certain circumstances. While a violation of Reg. FD itself does not create
a liability under Rule 1Db-5, there could still be a liability under 10b-5 if investors believed they were
defrauded by the failure of the company to update guidance that changes materially. ("Earnings
Guidance Best Practices: SEC Regulation FD and the Duty to Update," Thomas J. Dougherty,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, March 2001)
The courts are increasingly suggesting there are two types of forward-looking earnings guidance: (1)
soft or qualitative guidance,. and (2) "hard" or quantitative guidance such as, "We expect revenue
range for the quarter of_." Generally, the courts recognize that a company has no duty to update
soft guidance. However, federal appellate decisions are cited, including by the SEC, as imposing a
duty to update those forecasts. Regardless of the merits of the various legal points of view on a duty to
update, NIRl's Standards of Practice for Investor Relations states thatit is both good business and
good investor relations to update material changes in publicly released information.

Materiality
Materiality raises some of the most difficult and debated issues. Materiality decisions are the lynchpin
for enforcing Reg. FO. The rule clearly points out that selective disclosure occurs when an issuer
official, covered by the rule, intentionally communicates material, nonpublic information to an analyst,
professional investor or anyone else who might trade on the information.
SEC officials have repeatedly said they are not about to "second guess" materiality decisions when
made on the spur of the moment in such settings as conference calls or other meetings with analysts
or professional investors. And, as discussed before, should an inadvertent disclosure of material,
nonpublic information occur in a closed forum, the company must release that information within 24
hours or before the next trading day.
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There are five key elements that the Commission must prove in a Reg. FD enforcement action: (1)
Was the person who selectively disclosed the information covered by the rule? (2) Was the information
clearly material? (3) Did the·issuer official know it was material or was reckless in not knowing? (4) Did
the issuer official intentionally disclose the information, and (5) Was the information disclosed in a
no~public setting such as a phone call, one-on-one meeting or a group meeting that was not made
fully accessible to the public.
The U.S. Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. found that a fact is material if
"there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder should consider it important" in making
an investment decision, or if the fact would have "significantly altered the 'total mix' of information
made available." So, what is a reasonable investor? Reg. FD, draws a distinction between the
"reasonable investor" and the "sophisticated" analyst or professional investor who, using the mosaic,
collects information from various sources and through detailed knowledge of the. industry and the
company and through his/her insight draws a material conclusion from the mosaic.
Specifically, Reg. FD says, "Similarly, since materiality is an objective test keyed to the reasonable
investor, Regulation FD will not be implicated where an issuer discloses immaterial information whose
significance is discerned by the analyst. "
The 1976 Bausch & Lomb, Inc. decision, 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y.) states that corporate officers
and analysts may engage in a "general discussion out of which a skilled analyst could extract pieces of
a jigsaw puzzle (the mosaic) which would not be significant to the ordinary investor but which the
analyst could add to his own fund of knowledge and use toward constructing his ultimate judgment."
The Reg. FD implementing release says that the "mosaic theory" is alive under the rule.
Therefore, an issuer official may selectively communicate public or nonpublic, immaterial information
to an analyst that helps that analyst in his/her effort to complete a mosaic and come to a material
conclusion. The rule says, ".. .an issuer official is not prohibited from disclosing a non-material piece of
information to an analyst, even if unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst complete a
'mosaic' of information that, taken together, is material. "
Complicating the determination of what information is material is the linkage of Reg. FD, through a
footnote reference, to the SEC's August 1999 Staff Accounting Bulletin 99. SAB 99 further defines
material information as that which is "qualitative" and that which may move the market in one's stock.
The latter, theoretically gives the SEC the ability, with 20/20 hindsight, to say that certain information
was material because it moved the market.
SAB 99 was originally designed to address materiality in filed financial statements. By linking it to Reg.
FD, the Commission extends the SAB 99 materiality definitions to all corporate communications. Trying
to anticipate, for example, whether the response to an analyst's question may move the market in
one's stock and, therefore, may be judged material in hindsight, may be stifling some of the
communication between companies and analysts/professional investors.
In the Reg. FD implementing release, the SEC provides a list of material factors that, in most
circumstances, would be material. At the top of the list is "earnings guidance." Yet, earnings guidance
can include both material and nonmaterial information.

One-on-One Discussions with Analysts and Investors
NIRI believes that one-on-one discussions, whether by phone or face-to-face, continue to be an
important component of a company's investor relations program. Company officials, directors and
spokespersons covered by Reg. FD must be careful to avoid disclosing material, nonpublic information
in these discussions. Should it happen unintentionally, the company is obligated to promptly issue a
news release or to provide that information in some other form that constitutes full disclosure.
To that end, we believe it is advisable to have an IRO present or on the phone with any company
official, engaged in a one-on-one discussion, who is not intimately familiar with the company's
disclosure record. If that official gets a question that could elicit a material response, the IRO could
interrupt and advise the official not to respond. If an unintentional disclosure of material, nonpublic
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information should occur, the IRO is there to discern that and promptly issue a news release after
consultation with legal counsel, if that is possible.
IROs or CFOs may engage inane-an-one discussions without someone else present, so long as they
are fully knowledgeable of the company's disclosure record.
The NIRI survey indicates that most companies are maintaining the same number of one-on-ones that
they did prior to Reg. FO. Some have even increased their one-on-one meetings with analysts and
investors.

One-on-One Meetings
It is most important that companies recognize that there is much that they can talk about in one-on-one
meetings besides earnings. Information such as long-term strategy, the company's history, its mission
and goals, management's philosophy, competitive advantages and disadvantages are valuable to
analysts and investors in making investment decisions.
The most recent NIRI trends survey shows that four out of the top seven factors that IROs say drive
share value are non-financial. Quality of management and strategy execution were rated slightly higher
than earnings growth and cash flow respectively. The company's long-term strategy and specific
industry conditions were rated about the same as sales/revenue growth.
Studies by Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers demonstrate that the institutional investors
place significant importance on non-financial measures and intangible assets. Moreover, it would be
difficult to determine materiality of such factors as quality of management, strategy execution,
customer relationship management, development of human capital, etc.

Confidentiality Ag reements
Reg. FO provides for confidentiality agreements between issuers and analysts/investors whereby a
company may provide material nonpublic information to the recipient, providing the recipient agrees in
writing or orally not to use the information or trade on it until the company releases it publicly. These
agreements are generally not being accepted by analysts/investors, primarily because they do not
want their hands tied for trading should information they agreed to hold confidentially. be leaked or be
revealed through other means, thus allowing others to have a trading advantage.
Under Reg. FO, absent a confidentiality agreement, if the official knows a response to a question is
material, he/she cannot respond without violating the rule. Should an analyst/investor verbally agree to
hold material nonpublic information confidentially, the company should make a memorandum for
record of such agreement.

Investor and Broker Sponsored Conferences
NIRI urges continued participation in investor and broker-sponsored conferences. Companies should
consider webcasting their presentations. Increasingly, sponsors of such meetings are providing
webcasting services. It is still incumbent on the company to provide adequate notice to investors of
such webcasts,even though the sponsor is providing the webcasting services. By making the
presentation fully accessible through a webcast, the company official can then engage in the Q&A
without concern over intentionally or unintentionally disclosing new material information.
A substantial number of companies are also "furnishing" their presentations under Item 9 of the Form
8-K and are also placing them on the company Web sites. While the SEC does not consider a Web
posting to constitute full disclosure, furnishing the presentation under Item 9 does make it fully public.

Headquarters and/or Facilities Visits
There is no reason under Reg. FO that companies should curtail headquarters and/or tours of its
facilities for analysts and investors. Being able to "kick the tires," so to speak, is part of the information
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gathering process for the mosaic. Issuer officials must be careful not to provide those attending these
sessions material, nonpublic information through statements or comments.
Analysts and investors may also ask questions of employees who are not covered by Reg. FO.
Therefore, companies may want to advise those employees on what they should or should not
comment on.

Quiet Periods
Most companies represented by NIRI's membership observe a "quiet period" prior to normal quarterly
earnings announcements. Our survey shows that the average quiet period is 25 days, slightly longer
than before Reg. FO. Companies use the quiet period to avoid discussing earnings information as the
results for the quarter become more evident. However, some say that Reg. FO has rendered the quiet
period irrelevant, particularly if a company undertakes a duty to update material changes in its earnings
guidance. Results could materially depart from earlier guidance, particularly toward the end of the
quarter, triggering the need to update those changes publicly, regardless of whether the company is in
the quiet period.

Written Disclosure Policy
NIRI recommends in our Standards of Practice for Investor Relations that companies have a written
disclosure policy. Moreover, footnote #90 of Reg. FO states, "The existence of an appropriate policy,
and the issuer's general adherence to it, may often be relevant to determining the issuer's intent with
regard to selective disclosure. "
Our survey of members in March 2001 showed that 65°1'<> had a written policy with another 25% saying
one was being developed. The NIRI board believes there is no "one-size, fits-all" disclosure policy
under Reg. FO. For NIRI to publish a sample policy might imply there is one. Companies have
numerous options under Reg. FD in how they handle disclosure. Therefore, each company should
tailor its policy to fit its preferred approach to disclosure. However, this guidance paper addresses
most of the areas that a company would want to consider in preparing a written policy.

Regulation FD and the Media
Reg. FD does not cover communications between companies and the media. The SEC provided a
"media carve-out" based on First Amendment concerns and the fact that the media are part of the
information dissemination process as opposed to being in a trading role.
However, the SEC has said in its Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations that merely
having a reporter at a meeting or conference with analysts and/or investors does not render that forum
public for purposes of Reg. FO. One cannot assume that a journalist will report a material statement by
an issuer official. Moreover, a single publication - other than a wire service - would be insufficient for
full disclosure even if it were reported.

Market Implications of Regulation FD
There were initial concerns that Reg. FD would result in a wider dispersion of earnings estimates,
greater stock price volatility and would produce a major chill on the flow of information from companies
to the investment community. The media hail Reg. FO for significantly increasing the amount of
corporate information being made available through fUlly .accessible conference calls and in their news
releases, in particular. Individual investors are experiencing an information bonanza.
Some analysts, on the other hand, complain they now have to live from conference call to conference
call to get earnings guidance. Some institutional investors have said the "quality" of information has
deteriorated. They say companies are still meeting with them, but are saying less. NIRldoes not have
survey information to dispute or support either contention. We do have data that says more than three
quarters of our members say they are disseminating the same or a greater amount of information than
before Reg. FO. And, clearly, earnings guidance is far more transparent than before.
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In summary,NIRI believes that companies are adjusting to the Reg. FD environment by, generally,
providing more information than before. Earnings guidance is more transparent and more broadly
disseminated than before. Virtually all companies are webcasting their conference calls, and the
audience of individual investors listening to the live and archived calls is growing substantially. And,
finally, companies are increasingly recognizing the value of communicating information about nonfinancial performance measures and intangible assets in their meetings with the investment
community.
As SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt said in his confirmation hearings, the underlying premise of Reg. FD
is unassailable. Providing a level playing field through equal access to material corporate information
and developments for all market participants is essential for maintaining a credible marketplace.
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BACKGROUND
Investor relations is defined as a strategic corporate marketing activity
combining the disciplines of communications and finance that provides
present and potential investors with an accurate portrayal ofa company's
performance and prospects. Conducted effectively, investor relations can
have a positive effect on a company's total value relative to that of the
overall market and to the company's cost of capital.
The process ofmarketing a company's stock involves identification of
the target audiences (institutional, individual and employee investors and
analysts) who might have an interest in investing in or analyzing the
company's securities and presenting historical and prospective information about the company to enable them to make an informed investnlent
decision or recommendation. This is done through the careful development of corporate documentation; response to queries from analysts, investors and the media; and group and face-to-face meetings with analysts, investors and the media (including conference calls, Webcasts and
management visits). Marketing in this context does not mean "selling" a
company's securities to investors, but rather a process of identifying target audiences and educating them about the present and potential value
of those securities.
Critical to the marketing process is the provision of accurate and complete information about the company, along with a duty to update that
information when material changes occur. Although a more complete
definition of "materiality" will be addressed in Appendix A, it basically
means information that, taken togetl1er with the total mix of information,
would cause a reasonable investor to make an investment decision.
National Investor Relations Institute
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The Securities and Exchange Commission implemented Regulation
Fair Disclosure on October 23, 2000, which was designed to address the
Commission's concern that selective disclosure of material nonpublic
information was affecting the integrity of the financial markets, and out
of fairness, all investors should have equal access to market-moving information. The methods for achieving equal access as stipulated in Regulation FD were based on dissemination means spelled out in NIRI's Standards and Guidance for Disclosure (Appendix A). While Regulation FD
has numerous implications for the investor relations practice, perhaps
the most important is that it elevates the role of the investor relations
officer as a key participant in senior nlanagement.

National Investor Relations Institute
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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CORPORATE
INVESTOR RELATIONS OFFICER
Integral Participant in the Evolution of Corporate Strategy
To be effective, the investor relations officer (IRO) has a "need to know"
and, therefore, must have full access to senior management and, preferably, be a part of senior management. In this way, he or she can speak
authoritatively and credibly about the company's strategic direction and
prospects for performance. If an IRO is restricted by a company's top
officers from providing strategic and other forward-looking information
to the investment community, there will often be greater demands for
access to the CEO and CFO from analysts and investors to obtain this
information.
Full knowledge about the company's strategy, budgets, forecasts and
various developments under consideration (e.g., mergers, acquisitions,
spin-offs, etc.) does not mean that a spokesperson will discuss these subjects with the investment community at will. Rather, he or she will do-so
only upon authorization by the company's CEO or other senior officer
with responsibility in this area and in line with the company's disclosure
policy.
Anyone in a spokesperson role must be completely familiar with the
company's record of disclosure in order to guard against unauthorized
disclosures of material, nonpublic information. Moreover, in SEC v.
Carnation, Inc., the court decided that ignorance ofa spokesperson who
misspoke and unknowingly provided misleading information in response
to a question is not excused. (Carnation's treasurer, who was unaware
the company was engaged in premerger discussions with Nestle, denied
rumors to that effect.) Moreover, under Regulation FD, to detect inadvertent disclosure of material, nonpublic information orto avoid potentially intentional disclosure of such information, the IRO should accompany senior officials in meetings with analysts and investors. If there
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should be an inadvertent disclosure of such information, the company
must promptly issue a news release (within 24 hours ofwhen the official
became aware ofsuch disclosure or before the market opens next, whichever is later).
Credibility comes not only from knowledge of the company and provision of accurate, complete and timely information, but also from a
demonstrated willingness to correct or update changes in information on
a timely basis. F.ailure to do so may .cause long-term or irreparable damage to the company management's and to the spokesperson's credibility.
The IRO is also responsible for assuring a level playing field for investors by providing information on a fair and impartial basis. However,
under the concept of "differential disclosure," analysts and portfolio
managers may rec.eive more detailed information regarding a company's
performance and prospects than is required by most individual investors
or financial reporters, so long as that information is not material, nonpublic
information and is not withheld from the noninstitutional investor, if requested. Differential disclosure may become a form of selective disclosure, which can be detrimental to the financial markets, when a company
goes into greater supporting detail in its discussions with analysts and
institutional investors yet refuses to provide the same information to reporters or the general public when requested.

Providing Market Intelligence to Senior Management and
the Board of Directors
IROs should also playa key role by providing nlarket intelligence to
senior management and the board of directors for use in strategic decision making. This might include analyst and investor comments about
the company, both in published reports as well as in questions gleaned
from daily discussions. This market intelligence may also include information about competitors and market research on the industry that may

National Investor Relations Institute
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be valuable in developing corporate strategy. Monitoring the company's
mix of shareholders (institutional, individual, employees, officers and
directors, etc.) and their investment styles is essential to determining the
company's desired shareholder mix.

Keeping Senior Management Apprised of What Corporate
Information Has Been Publicly Disclosed
Keeping senior management apprised of the company's disclosure
record is a very important function for the investor relations officer, particularly following the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure. Knowing what one should not say is just as important as knowing what to say.
Avoiding inadvertent disclosure of nonpublic, material information in
selective forums is essential if one wants to avoid allegations of selective disclosure. The IRQ should keep a record ofall public disclosures of
material information. Training or briefing senior managers who serve as
spokespersons at analyst meetings, on conference calls, etc., on matters
that have been publicly released, is one way to avoid selective or inadvertent disclosure.
It is critical that all management spokespersons are communicating
the same message and that they understand the extent to which corporate
matters will be discussed with analysts and investors. Moreover, it is
important that they discuss these matters with one voice.
Controlling access to inside information also helps avoid inadvertent
disclosure. A policy of restricting access to material inside information
should be part of a company's written disclosure policy.

National Investor Relations Institute
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CORPORATE IMPLICATIONS
OF INVESTOR RELATIONS
Representing the Company Credibly and Objectively
Credibility is an essential component of an effective investor relations
program and a cornerstone of good business. Credibility is built by reporting company information truthfully, accurately and completely
throughout the continuous disclosure process.

Duty to Correct in a Timely Manner
Avoiding investor surprises in the process of continuous disclosure is
important, but even more important is a willingness to disclose information beyond what the investment community is expecting in a timely,
complete and accurate manner using a news release, a fully accessible,
nonexclusionary Webcast conference call or presentation, or an SEC filing. Excessive delays in disclosing negative information can erode a
company's long-term credibility. As a matter of law, companies have a
duty to correct material information that they believed was correct when
first disclosed but that later determined to be incorrect. In Ross v. A. H.
Robins, the company had reported in its annual reports and other publicly disclosed documents on the safety and efficacy ofthe Dalcon shield.
Once it was discovered that there were some safety problems with the
product, it did not prolnptly correct its previous public statements and
was found liable in this regard.

Duty to Update in a Timely Manner
A duty to update occurs in situations in which information was correct
at the time of public disclosure but results in a material change. Though
the case law supporting a duty to update is not as strong as in a duty to
correct, it is nevertheless a matter ofgood investor relations practice and
National Investor Relations Institute
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good business to update material changes, positive or negative, in public
information in a timely manner.

Corporate Disclosure Policy
A complete disclosure policy represents a public company's commitment to full, fair and consistent disclosure and to maintain realistic investor expectations as best it can. It is also a commitment to tell the truth
in a timely manner, even when it may be tempting to downplay bad news.
Having a corporate disclosure policy, and following it, can bring structure and discipline to the disclosure process. It provides clear policies to
all parties who have a direct or indirect role in disclosing corporate information, with respect to the various issues companies face on a daily
basis. In addition, having a written disclosure policy, along with a written insider-trading policy, may result in a lower cost of directors and
officers' liability insurance. In footnote 90 of Regulation FD, the SEC
recommends that companies express their disclosure policies in writing
and goes on to say, "The existence ofan appropriate policy, and the issuer's
general adherence to it, n1ay often be relevant to determining the issuer's
intent with regard to a selective disclosure."
A disclosure policy should be a policy document, not a how-to or
operational statement. Being too specific in how you deal with various
disclosure issues, should you vary from the written procedures in the
course of handling a disclosure matter, may be later cited in shareholder litigation.
When a company begins developing a disclosure policy, the most obvious and important question is how much corporate information, beyond
that which is required by the SEC, should be volunteered to the investment
community. A most important consideration under Regulation FD is how
much publicly released earnings guidance a company believes it can provide, in what publicly available forms earnings guidance will be presented
and how that guidance is updated during the quarter.

National Investor Relations Institute
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A 1996 study by professors Russell Lundholm, University of Michigan, and Mark Lang, University of North Carolina,· found that companies with a more open disclosure policy have a tighter consensus in earnings estimates; less dispersion in earnings forecasts; lower stock price
volatility and a larger analyst following than peer companies disclosing
less information. Imputed in this research is the notion that these factors
can result in a lower cost of equity capital, depending on the company,
the industry in which the company operates and the number of shares
outstanding.
Also at issue is how much prospective or forward-looking information
the company should disclose voluntarily. Companies that have gone public
relatively recently often feel the need to provide more forward-looking
information than established companies with long track records of performance. Yet concerns over failure to meet such forecasts or to fulfill
market expectations still prevail, in spite ofthe 1995 passage ofthe Shareholder Litigation Reform Act that contains the Safe Harbor for ForwardLooking Information provision.
A company should appoint a disclosure policy committee and a disclosure officer from that committee. The committee, at a minimum, should
consist ofthe senior investor relations officer, the chieffinancial officer or
treasurer, the general counsel and the chief corporate communications officer (if the latter is separate from the IR function). The committee should
be kept small so it can react quickly to developments requiring, e.g., a
decision on whether new infomlation is material and the timing of its disclosure or how the company should respond to a significant market rumor.
It is important that the role of the disclosure policy committee is not construed as conducting investor relations activities by committee.

I Russell Lundholm and Mark Lang, 4'The Benefits of More Forthcoming Disclosure Practices," University of Michigan School of Business Adtninistration, Ann Arbor, MI, 1994.
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Using the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Information
When the U.S. Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), a cornerstone of the legislation was the
Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Information. The Safe Harbor was
designed to provide protection from securities litigation for companies
that make forward-looking statements, so long as investors are warned
that there are risks that those projections might turn out to be wrong in
a material way.
In passing the PSLRA, Congress recognized that companies need to
discuss their prospects for performance with the investment community.
One of the objectives of the act is to level the playing field between
professional and individual investors by encouraging companies to provide equal access to forward-looking information, using the Safe Harbor
as protection against shareholder litigation. It is particularly important in
the Regulation FD era of disclosure that companies publicly providing
forward-looking information with respect to earnings guidance, as well
as other forms of forecasting, develop and disclose risk factors specific
to those forecasts and not rely on "boilerplate," generalized statements
of risk.
A 1998 University of Michigan survey2 of 547 firms in three industry
areas (computers, software and pharmaceutical) found an increase in the
frequency ofsales and earnings forecasts along with the mean number of
forecasts following enactment of the reform act. The researchers also
found an increase in short horizon, bad-news forecasts that they attribute
to the reputational costs of disappointing security analysts. The net benefit ofproviding guidance was higher during the post-reform-act period.
Two other findings were that the net benefit of providing guidance to
analysts was higher in the post-reform-act period, and that managers
have become less hesitant to disclose forecasts specifying a more precise estimate of future earnings or sales.
2 Marilyn Johnson, Ron Kasznik and Karen Nelsoll "'Impact of Securities Litigatioll Retoml
of the Disclosure of Forward-Looking lnfomlation by High Technology Fimls," University of
Michigan School of Business Adlninistration, Ann Arbor, MI, 1998.
1
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In a 1997 4th U.S. District Court decision, Racheedi v. Cree Research,
Judge Richard Erwin dismissed a suit against Cree Research. In his decision he noted that Cree, in its public statements, used the Safe Harbor,
and even though the factor that caused Cree's actual results to differ
materially was not mentioned among the cautionary factors, the judge
believed that in the total mix of information, investors were warned that
there was risk involved in the forward-looking statements. The judge
specifically referred to the Private Securities Litigation RefonnAct "Statement ofManagers" (the House-Senate Co.nference Committee report that
interprets the Act) to support his decision.
The statement says that not all potential risk factors need to be listed
among the cautionary factors, and even if the risk factor that eventually
causes the statement to change materially is not listed, so long as in the
"total mix of information" investors are warned that there is a risk involved, the Safe Harbor has been accomplished. In written documents,
the forward-looking statements must be accompanied in the same written document.
In oral statements (e.g., conference calls with analysts and investors,
analyst conferences or meetings), one may refer to other readily available written documents (public releases or documents filed with the SEC)
for the risk factors. To be safe, companies should consider archiving
these teleconferences or other Webcast events or transcripts of the same
on its Web site to provide other investors and the media an opportunity
to listen to or view these sessions. Once this information becomes dated
(i.e. changes in a material way), it should be taken offthe site or moved
to a historical section on the site that is clearly labeled as historical, dated
infomlation that should not be relied on in making investment decisions.
There is no value in using the Safe Harbor "warning" in documents
that do not contain any forward-looking statements. In fact, using the
Safe Harbor in this situation might deceive investors by causing them to
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look for prospective information when there is none. However, companies that make written or oral forward-looking statements and fail to use
the Safe Harbor may well subject themselves to unnecessary risk.

What Is Not Covered by th'e Safe Harbor
The Safe Harbor does not cover forward-looking statements made in
conjunction with an initial public offering (IPO), tender offer, Section
13(d) disclosure or a going-private or roll-up transaction. Additionally,
financial statements are not covered.

What Is Considered a Forward-Looking Statement
The following are considered forward-looking statements:
• Projections of revenues, income, earnings per share (EPS), capital
expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other financial items
• Management's plans or objectives for future operations
• Plans or objectives for the company's products or services
• Statements relating to future economic performance
• Information in the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A)
in FomlS IO-K and IO-Q.
• Any statement of the assumptions underlying the above
• Any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by the company
that assesses forward-looking statements made by the company
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Discussion of Nonfinancial Performance Factors
There is growing evidence that discussion of a company's nonfinancial performance factors is an important component of an investment
decision. In a 1997 Ernst & Young study,3 Professor Sarah Mavrinac
found that, on average, 35 percent of the investment decisions by 275
portfolio managers were based on nonfinancial factors. Quality of management, overall, was at the head ofthe list, followed by quality ofproducts and services, strength ofmarket position, effectiveness ofnew-product development, effectiveness of compensation policies, quality of investor communications, level of customer satisfaction and strength of
corporate culture. .
The relative importance of these factors varied by industry groups of
the companies involved in the study. A 1997 Conference Board study
group on reporting nonfinancial performance measures recommended
in its final report that there be no specific disclosure regime for reporting
on these factors, but said that there is value in discussing these factors
with analysts and investors. 4 Obviously, most of these nleasures cannot
be quantified or audited for reporting purposes, but are nonetheless significant considerations in an investment decision.
The importance of the "quality of management" factor suggests that
companies expose their senior managers to the investment community
on a periodic basis so analysts and investors have an opportunity to evaluate who is running the company and determine if they can articulate a
vision of where the company is going and whether they have the resources to accomplish this vision.

3 Sarah Mavrinac, "Measures That Matter," Richard Ivey School of Business, University of
Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada, 1996.
4 "Communicating Corporate Perfomlance: A Delicate Balance," Conference Board Special
Report 97-1, New York, NY, 1997.
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ISSUES ADDRESSING CORPORATE PRACTICE
Dissemination of Information
Beyond disseminating information required under "structured" disclosure-Le., information filed with the SEC in the Form lO-K annual report, IO-Q quarterly report and Form 8-K current report-is information
disseminated within the realm of "unstructured" disclosure: the annual
and quarterly reports, earnings and other news releases, management
speeches, the Internet Website, conference calls, face-to-face meetings
and phone calls with analysts and investors. How this information is
disseminated and under what conditions are covered in Appendix A,
"Standards and Guidance for Disclosure." The accepted means for accomplishing full public dissemination of information are contained in
the disclosure sections of the listed company manuals published by the
self-regulatory organizatiolls (New York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Stock
Market and American Stock Exchange).

COMMUNICATING INFORMATION INTERNALLY
To Management and the Board of Directors
Certain senior managers and the board of directors will normally be
considered insiders under Section 16 ofthe Securities and Exchange Act.
When they buy or sell stock in the company or exercise their stock options, they must file with the SEC. When in possession of material,
nonpublic information, an insider may not trade in the company's stock.
Full disclosure ofthe material information must be accomplished before
an insider may trade (SEC lJ. Texas GulfSulfur). Normally, when companies establish trading windows, the windows are not opened until several days after the information has been fully disclosed through a news
release to the public. This is to allow sufficient time for the information
to be fully disseminated to the marketplace.
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Here is one area where the roles of the IRO and the corporate counsel
are critical in keeping a record of what material information has been
fully disclosed and what has not to avoid insider trading. Most companies (93°~ of companies surveyed by NIRI in 1998) have established
written insider trading policies. These policies generally cover what kind
of material inside information is provided to the various levels of corporate managers as well as the board of directors. Some companies are
relatively open in terms of communicating inside information to corporate management; others tend to compartmentalize information so relatively few have the full picture or are aware of all material developments. These policies also establish trading windows and when officials
are allowed to trade their shares or options.
Increasingly, companies in their insider trading policies are requiring
that all trades by corporate managers and, in some cases, all employees,
be cleared by the general counsel, who should know which parties have
access to each area of inside information. Moreover, the total value of
shares traded at anyone time should be limited to an insignificant level
in order to avoid the issue of heavy insider trading associated with possession of material nonpublic information.
An important role for the IRO is to bring information and intelligence from the investment community to management and the board
of directors.

To Nonmanagement Employees

One question that often arises is, Should .the company treat its employee shareholders who are not corporate insiders under Section 16 any
differently than nonemployee investors when it comes to providing them
with infonnation about the company? Some companies adopt the position that they will not provide any information to employee shareholders
that they '''ould not provide to nonemployee shareholders. A more prevalent practice is to provide employee shareholders information about the
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company that is fully public, (if nonpublic, it should be nonmaterial information) along with a digest ofanalyst reports on the company. (Some
provide all, others a representative sample.)
NOTE: The practice of disseminating analyst reports to nonemployee investors is
strongly discouraged since the courts contend that such dissemination implies that the
company endorses the report or reports. From a legal viewpoint, the company has entangled itself with the report. This issue is sometimes raised in shareholder lawsuits
when a company has provided to brokers or investors analyst reports that say the
cOlnpanY'5 prospects for perfonnance will likely be better than the results that actually
occur. Many companies provide, on their Web sites or in investor packets, a cOlnplete
listing of analysts that follow the company.

When employees are briefed on corporate plans or developments or
provided nonpublic forecasts, corporate management must advise them
that they are insiders and must not trade on that information.
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MONETARY FACTORS IN COMPANY DEALINGS
WITH ANALYSTS AND INVESTORS
Company-Sponsored Trips for Analysts and Investors
Companies may sponsor trips for analysts and investors to see the
company's operations in various locations. Some companies conduct their
annual analyst meetings at company facilities to better demonstrate the
company's lines of business. Most analysts are restricted by their finn's
rules on what they may accept with respect to these trips.
Analysts and investors are expected to pay their ordinary expenses
(transportation to and from the trip site). It is appropriate for the companies to provide group transportation, meals and overnight accommodations at the site. However, many firms have a policy that their analysts
pay for their overnight accommodations at the site.

Company Gifts for Analysts and Investors
Analysts and professional investors are often restricted by the chartered financial analyst designation on what they may accept in the form
of gifts from companies they cover or in which they invest. Companies
that manufacture low-cost consumer products will often provide a gift
bag of these products at a site visit, other group or individual presentations or at Christmas. Ifa company produces products that are not appropriate as a gift, alternative gifts are appropriate that do not exceed $50 in
value.
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THE ROLE OF THE
INVESTOR RELATIONS COUNSELOR
Investor relations counselors are expected to practice their profession
in a way that provides the highest levels of professionalism, knowledge,
expertise and value-added services in support of their clients' goals and
objectives. In so doing, they will serve the public interest, honor the
public trust, adhere to society's laws and maintain the integrity of the
capital markets.
Counselors have an overriding obligation to judiciously balance public interests with those of their clients and to place both those interests
above their own. Counselors should exercise careful professional and
ethical judgments in assisting their clients in carrying out their responsibilities, as detailed in the corporate section ofthis docunlent. Counselors
should act with integrity, objectivity and due care, guided by the precept
that when investor relations consultants fulfill their responsibilities to
the public, they best serve the interests of their clients and employers.
Counselors are expected to provide quality services, enter into fee arrangements and offer a range of services--all in a manner that demonstrates a level of professionalism consistent with NIRI's Standards of
Practicefor Investor Relations. In return for the faith the public reposes
in investor relations counselors, they should continually seek to demonstrate their dedication to professional excellence.
Counselors should diligently discharge responsibilities to clients, employers and the public; render services promptly, carefully and thoroughly;
and comply with all applicable technical, legal and ethical standards. A
counselor's competence represents the ability to impart a level of understanding and knowledge that enables the investor relations professional
to render services with competence and sound judgment. If a professional engagement begins to exceed the competence of a counselor or
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his or her firm, the counselor should recommend a consultant specializing in that particular area to provide the greater professional experience,
education and judgment required for the specific client engagement.
A counselor should also maintain objectivity and be free of conflicts
of interest in discharging his or her professional responsibilities. Integrity requires a counselor to be, among other things, honest and candid
within the constraints of client confidentiality. Integrity can accommodate the inadvertent error and the honest difference of opinion; it cannot accommodate deceit or subordination of principles for personal
gain or advantage.
Counselors must not work for more than one client or employer whose
goals may be in conflict without the express consent ofthose concerned,
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Additionally, counselors must
be particularly sensitive and alleviate situations where a conflict of interest or even a perception of such a conflict could originate. In no
instances will counselors use or share inside information, which is not
otherwise available to the general public, for any manner of personal
gain as n1ight be realized, for example, through trading in the stock of a
client company. Further, counselors are expected to respect the confidentially of information pertaining to present, former and prospective
clients, and avoid future associations wherein inside information is used
that would give a desired advantage over the respective counselor's
previous clients.
It should be noted that there a few firms operating in the U.S. markets
that call themselves "investor relations firms," when their primary function is to promote the status of their clients' stocks. These firms often
work in conjunction with so-called boiler-room brokerage firms that promote micro- and small-cap stocks traded on the aTe bulletin board but
do not file periodic financial reports with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. This practice of stock promotion, in the name of "investor
relations," is in no way condoned as a proper practice.
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The following is an alphabetical list of typical services offered by investor relations counseling firms. The range of services provided may
vary based on a finn's expertise in certain areas.

Arranging Analyst and Investor Meetings. Arrange company presentations to brokerage-sponsored or corporate-hosted analyst and portfolio manager conferences or meetings. Assist with effective targeting
of investors and the conduct of one-on-one or group meetings with selected analysts and institutional investors.

Counsel. Provide strategic counsel, policy guidance and program execution leading to sound investor relations performance and consistent,
credible communications programs with the domestic and international
investment communities.

Crisis Communications. Structure and implement effective crisis communications programs in anticipation ofor in response to litigation, rating/
regulatory agency actions, restructuring announcements, product recalls,
plant closures, market withdrawals, a significant earnings shortfall, competitive rumors, loss of a key manager, takeover or merger speculation,
stock volume and price volatility, natural catastrophes, theft, fire and other
crises.
Disclosure. Guide the management team with respect to public disclosure requirements, issues and practices surrounding financial reporting,
managing investor expectations and fast-breaking corporate events that
impact the price of a company's debt and equity issues. Assist management in developing a corporate disclosure policy if it does not have one.
Financial Communications. Develop customized, cost-effective, highquality, high-impact and fully integrated financial communications programs and platforms, including annual reports, financial fact books, corporate profiles, capabilities brochures, analyst meetings or presentations,
investor fact sheets and information kits, quarterly earnings releases,
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analyst conference calls, executive financial presentations, retail brokerage meetings and other individually tailored activities designed to support corporate objectives.

IR Spokesperson Training. Train company executives and investor
relations contacts to be effective and consistent presenters in analyst and
investor conferences, before the media and in day-to-day interaction with
the investment community.

Media Relations. Leverage proactive investor relations programs with
fully integrated national and regional financial and trade media placements to provide all-important third-party testimonials for growing investor awareness of the company's unfolding investment story.
Messages. Develop investor relations messages that will most
proactively leverage senior management's strategic vision, operational
and financial performance and ongoing business expertise to deliver the
optimum PIE multiple and lower the company's cost of capital.
Positioning. Highlight the company's management team to effectively
personify the who and how behind the strategy and objectives so Wall
Street can "quantify the critical qualitative" aspects of potential buy decisions.

Research. Research and track current and prospective securities analysts and institutional and individual shareholders, their perceptions and
attitudes. Benchmark these measureables against realization of program
objectives.
Strategy Development. Assist management with the development ofhighimpact strategic approaches to the equity and debt markets that will deliver
enhanced shareholder value and lower the company's cost of capital.
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Targeting. Target the most suitable buy- and sell-side analysts and
portfolio managers whose investment style and interests best fit the
company's characteristics. Identify the most suitable and cost-effective
individual investor forums. Assist management in determining the ideal
shareholder mix to support the company's investment objectives.

Compensation of Counseling Firms
In general, counseling firms receive cash compensation for work performed for their clients. Occasionally, clients or prospective clients will
offer compensation in the form of stock, stock options or warrants (or a
combination of these) in addition to or in lieu of cash. Typically, these
offers are made by start-up companies that have limited cash flow to pay
for consulting services on the part of attorneys, accountants, investor
relations consultants or public relations consultants.
In April 1999, the SEC amended its Form S-8 stock distribution regulation and specifically stated that investor relations and shareholder communications consultants could not receive stock or stock options distributed through a Form 8-8 filing for their services. In a letter to NIRI dated
June 1.4, 2000, the 8EC stated, "The amendments and release addressed
only the availability of Form S-8 to register compensatory transactions,
not the availability of equity compensation generally. The release stated
that Form 8-8 will not be available to register equity compensation to
consultants who provide investor relations or shareholder communications services. These consultants may continue to receive equity compensation, provided that is registered on another available registration
form or issued in a bona fide private placement, consistent with the federal securities laws."
This essentially means that stock or options registered in a Form 8-1 or
8-3 filing may be used to compensate IR consultants for their services.
The Form S-1 is available for any publicly traded company. The S-3 is
only available for those publicly traded companies that have filed at least
one Form 10-K annual report with the SEC and have a market float of at
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least $74 million. The reason stock registered tllrough these forms may
be used to compensate IR consultants is that these forms are reviewed by
the SEC staff, whereas the Form S-8 is not.
Should an employee of a counseling firm already hold securities in a
newly acquired corporate client, at a minimum, that person should inform the client company that he or she holds shares in the company and
should be considered an insider. As an insider, the employee should clear
transactions with the client company before executing any trades of the
company's securities to ensure that the company is not in possession of
material, inside information of which the employee may not be aware.
As outlined· in the NIRI Code of Ethics (Appendix C), investor relations services performed by consultants must not have even the appearance of being promotional in nature. And a consultant must consider
llerself or himself an insider in relation to the company and observe the
company's insider-trading policies, as well as the federal securities laws,
with respect to insider trading.

Speaking for the Client Company
A counselor should exercise caution when speaking on behalf of a
client company and should refrain from addressing matters related to
future company performance. Consultants who speak for a client company, in this regard, are potentially liable for the veracity of the information provided by the company that they might, in tum, communicate to
analysts or investors.
It is, however, appropriate for consultants to describe the nature of a
company's business and discuss historical company information when
arranging meetings between company officials and analysts and/or investors who may not be fanliliar with the company. It is also appropriate
for consultants to interview the participants following company presentations as a third-party means of evaluating the presentations and providing feedback to the company's management.
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APPENDIXA
STANDARDS AND GUIDANCE FOR DISCLOSURE
INTRODUCTION
The integrity ofthe capital markets is based on full and fair disclosure
of information. Although the securities laws in the United States encourage the disclosure of material information to the marketplace, the laws
do not impose a general disclosure obligation upon participants in the
securities markets beyond the specific disclosure requirements mandated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In fact, the mere possession of material, nonpublic information does not give rise to a legal duty
to disclose that information.
Of course, as numerous insider-trading prosecutions have shown, corporate insiders who wish to trade their stock must disclose any material,
nonpublic information in their possession or abstain from trading on the
basis of that information. Absent such trading, corporations have no obligation to inform the market of facts that may influence investment decisions.
Similarly, the "selective disclosure" of information by corporations,
whether to institutional investors, securities analysts or others, raises
concerns about the fairness of the dissemination of information to the
securities markets as well as the specter of liability.
In May 1995, NIRI completed a survey of corporate practices in the
area of investor communications. The survey revealed a strong need for
standards and guidance with respect to corporate disclosure and communications practices. In response, the NIRI Board ofDirectors commissioned a NIRI task force to examine the disclosure issues confronting
corporate investor relations professionals and, with input from representatives from the Association for Investment Management and Research,
developed the following Standards and Guidance for Disclosure.
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These standards and guidance have been revised to conform with relevant provisions of the SEC's Regulation FD, which went into effect on
October 23, 2000. It should be noted that the NIRI "Standards and Guidance for Disclosure" served as a model for the basic disclosure requirements in Regulation FD.
Comment: Since the.following standards and guidance are intended.for corporations and those acting in an investor relations role, and are thus beyond
.the scope o.fAIMR s mission, AIMR cannot endorse these standards and guidelines as statements ofAIMR policy. NIRI nlembers are urged to read AIMR s
Standards of Practice Handbook in order to better understand the role and
practices of analysts and por!folio nlanagers. NIRI grate;fully acknowledges
the participation o.fAIMR in the preparation o.f these standards and thanks
AIMR s nlembers for their insight concerning the role o.ffinancial analysts in
the disclosure process.
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DISCLOSURE CONTENT GUIDELINES
Materiality of Information
Corporations must continually identify the infonnation they are required to release to the public and detennine how and when to release
that information. The first step in making these determinations is deciding whether the information at issue is "material." Materiality should be
viewed from the perspective of anyone making an investment recon1n1endation or decision, not merely a decision to trade securities. For example, an analyst will consider such information in the context ofmaking an investment recommendation, which mayor may not result in a
trade.
In determining whether facts are material, a company may apply the
legal definition of materiality adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. as the standard of materiality for
actions under SEC Rule IOb-5 (antifraud provisions), which has been
stated as follows:
There must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of an
omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the "total" mix of information made
available.

A more clearly stated definition of materiality that enlarges upon the
Supreme Court's statements has been developed by AIMR:
Information is material if its disclosure would be likely to have an
impact on the price of a security or if reasonable investors would
want to know the information before making an investment decision. In other words, information is material if it would significantly alter the total mix ofinformation currently available regarding the security.·

* AIMR Standards ofPractice Handbook, Association for Investment Managenlent and
Research, Charlottesville, VA, 7th edition, 1996.
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There are obviously no "bright lines" from a legal standpoint to assist
in determining what information is material and what is not. The SEC in
Regulation FD provides a list oftypes ofinfonnation or events that should
be carefully reviewed to detennine whether they are material. The SEC
cautions that the list is not "exhaustive" and includes the following: "( I)
earnings information; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures or changes in assets; (3) new products or discoveries, or developments regarding customers or suppliers (e.g., the acquisition or loss of a
contract); (4) changes in control or in management; (5) change in auditors or auditor's notification that the issuer may no longer rely on an
auditor's audit report; (6) events regarding the issuer's securities--e.g.,
defaults on senior securities, calls of securities for redemption, repurchase plans, stock splits or changes in dividends, changes to the rights of
security holders, public or private sales of additional securities; and (7)
bankruptcies or receiverships.
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, issued in August 1999, also discusses issues related to materiality and says, an10ng other things, that
movement in a company's stock price may be evidence of materiality
and that quantitative information, in addition to qualitative information,
may also be material.
The process ofdetermining the materiality of inforn1ation is made even
more difficult by the fact that company officials often have little time for
deliberation. For example, a company official may disclose information
that analysts believe is material given in response to questions during a
meeting with analysts or investors. The company must then determine
whether it has made an inadvertent disclosure of material, nonpublic
information so it can release it promptly as described under Regulation
FD. At that point, analysts are then free to use that information.
Determining the materiality of information is clearly an area where
judgment and experience are of great value. In addition to examining
information in the context ofthe legal definition ofmateriality, one should
use good judgment, and if it is a borderline decision, the information
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should probably be considered material and released using broad means
of dissemination. Similarly, if several company officials have to deliberate extensively over whether information is material, they should err on
the side of materiality and release it publicly.

Timing of Disclosure of Material Information
Once a decision is made that information is material, the timing of its
release becomes an issue. Regulation FD says that once an official becomes aware that shelhe made an inadvertent disclosure of material,
nonpublic infonnation in a selective forum, the company has 24 hours or
before the market opens next (which ever is later) to issue a news release
and/or make an 8-K filing. Under the rules of the self-regulatory organizations (SROs), including the exchanges and The Nasdaq Stock Market,
in nonnal circumstances, once a determination is made that facts are
material and that there is a duty to disclose those facts, the information at
issue must be disclosed immediately and broadly disseminated to the
investment community. "Broad dissemination" normally requires that
the information be released in the form of a press release and disseminated over one or more of the major wire services.
Regulation FD gives an issuer considerable flexibility in choosing appropriate methods ofpublic disclosure, but it also places a responsibility
on the issuer to choose methods that are, in fact, "reasonably designed"
to effect a broad and nonexclusionary distribution of information to the
public. In some circumstances, according to the Regulation, an issuer
may be able to demonstrate that disclosure made on its Website could be
part of a combination of methods that are "reasonably designed" to provide broad, nonexclusionary distribution of information to the public.
Decisions to promptly disclose material information that has not been
selectively disclosed may be qualified by "confidentiality." Company
officials may withhold material information for legitimate business purposes, such as the benefit of the company or its shareholders, as long as
no insider trades on that information. For example, information about
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pending acquisition discussions or premerger negotiations, information
that might damage a company's competitive position or information about
a new product in development that the company is not yet prepared to
release may appropriately be withheld from immediate disclosure.
Note: I1l:forn1ation regarding pending acquisition discussions and premerger
negotiations presents a particularly sensitive timing issue. COlnpanies often
withhold such inforn1ation until an lIagreement in principle" is reached by the
respective parties. However, if there is a high probability that an agreen1ent in
principle will be reached and there are strong market rumors to that e;ffect, the
company may be required to disclose such i1l:formation prior to reaching an
agreement in principle. In all o.fthese instances, controlling the knowledge o.f
this i1l:formation by insiders is critical, so that it is not inadvertently disclosed.

This does not mean that a company can withhold "bad news" indefinitely because such information may not be beneficial to the company or
its shareholders owing to its effect on share price. The SEC has stated
that a company must disclose information having a significant effect on
its profits or losses in the Management's Discussion and Analysis
(MD&A) section of the company's next periodic report. Circumstances
may arise where that information may be required to be publicly released before the next lO-Q is filed.

Discussing Public Information
Material or nonmaterial information that the company has publicly released or that is already in the public domain may be discussed on an
individual or selective basis. Nonmaterial, nonpublic information may
also be provided on an individual or selective basis. However, should a
company give such information to one individual or group of persons
and not to another, and should someone else request it, that company
may be practicing selective disclosure. For example, if a company has
provided certain nonmaterial, nonpublic information to analysts or portfolio managers, it should also provide that information to a reporter or
individual investor upon request.
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Specifically, companies must not disclose material projections or
forward-looking information orally or in handouts to analysts before
disseminating that information through a news release, during a fully
accessible, nonexclusionary conference call or in an 8-K filing (see
"Methods of Dissemination," p. 45).
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act provides a Safe Harbor
for Forward-Looking Statements. In general, the Safe Harbor provides
protection from litigation to companies making public projections and
providing other forward-looking information so long as the information
is identified as such, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements contained in readily available documents. A "meaningful" cautionary statement must relate to the risk that the forward-looking information disclosed can change materially.

Differential Disclosure

The concept of "differential disclosure" is based on the notion that,
ordinarily, analysts and portfolio managers use more detailed information to make their analyses and assessments regarding a company's performance and prospects than individual investors or financial reporters
might require. It is entirely appropriate to provide detailed nonmaterial
information to those who request it. This practice, however, can be a
form of selective disclosure that can be detrimental to the financial filarkets when a company goes into greater detail in its discussions with analysts and portfolio managers, yet refuses to provide the same level of
information to the media or the general public upon request.

Use of Mosaic Information

The "mosaic" theory is based on the concept that analysts may put
together pieces of public information and nonmaterial, nonpublic information to create a mosaic from which a material, nonpublic conclusion
may be drawn. An analyst may not use material, nonpublic information
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obtained from a company in this process. The information used in creating the mosaic may be gathered from all of the sources at the analyst's
disposal, including the company itself, and sources outside of the company, such as suppliers, customers and competitors. An analyst may use
conclusions reached under the mosaic theory as the basis for investment
recommendations without the need for the company to release the information through broad, public means. A company is under no obligation
to confirm or deny conclusions reached under the mosaic theory.
The mosaic theory recognizes that analysts provide a valued service in
culling and sifting available data, viewing it in light of their own knowledge ofa particular industry and ultimately furnishing a distilled product
in the form of reports. Regulation FD suggests that skilled analysts can
extract pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that would not be significant to the
ordinary investor but are useful in constructing the analyst's ultimate
judgment, and this remains a legitimate practice. The rule goes on to say,
"[A]n issuer is not prohibited from disclosing a nonmaterial piece of
information to an analyst, even if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece
helps the analyst complete a 'mosaic' ofinformation that, taken together,
is material." The SEC says that Regulation FD is not intended to discourage discussions between companies and analysts on the basis of
nonmaterial information or information that is material but fully public.

Distributing or Referring to Analysts Reports
Companies should exercise caution before distributing or referring to
analysts reports. The practice-particularly on the part ofcompanies with
minimal analyst coverage-of distributing analysts reports to brokers,
fund managers or individual investors is fraught with potential legal problems. First, analysts reports are proprietary and should not be distributed without the approval of the analyst or analyst's firm. In addition,
distributing an analyst's report, even with permission, may expose the
company to the appearance of "entanglement" with the report. By distributing the report, the company runs the risk of appearing to embrace
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or endorse the report's contents and conclusions. • Further, the distribution of analysts
reports, particularly those that are more optimistic about a company's prospects for perfonnance than may be warranted, Inay be cited as evidence in shareholder suits of a
"conspiracy" between the company, the analyst and perhaps the analyst's firm to defraud
investors.
If a company decides, however, to distribute an analyst's report with pennission of
the analyst's firm, at a minimum the company should include a statement that its distribution of the report does not imply the company's endorsement.
Companies, using fact sheets and/or the IR section on their Web site, can list those
analysts and their firms that are covering them but should refrain from including analysts
reports. Whatever the mode ofcommunication, a company's risk in distributing reports is
the same. Individuals who request analysts reports froln companies should be referred to
the analyst's firm, which may provide reports if it is the finn's policy to do so.
A cOlnpany that distributes or refers to an analyst's "buy" recolnlnendation Inust ask
itself if it would be willing to make the saine distribution should that analyst change his
or her recommendation to a "sell."
Companies should avoid the practice ofcommissioning (paying for) and distributing
research reports that have the appearance of being an independent opinion of a brokerage or buy-side firm. However, sOlne cOlnpanies that have little or no sell-side research
coverage may decide to commission or pay for research on the company as an entree to
the buy-side or to local or regional brokerage fions. Such reports should contain factual research conducted by a qualified analyst and should avoid the expression of opinions about the cOlnpany's prospects and must not contain a recomlnendation that one
should acquire the stock.
Moreover, it is essential that it be fully disclosed in the research report itself that the
company commissioned or paid for the research directly or indirectly. Failure to Inake
such a disclosure could be a violation of federal securities laws.
Companies should also be aware that there are stock prolnotion firms that operate
under the auspices of"investor relations" consultants that will write research coverage
on a client company as one of its services and disseminate that coverage over the Internet or distribute it through other means. Some of these firms, or individuals within the
firms, have been cited by the SEC for stock promotion activities in violation ·of federal
securities laws, in particular for failure to fully disclose that the client company had
paid for the research. Before engaging a finn that offers to write research reports on a
·See Rasterops Corp. securities litigation, U.S. District Court of the Northern District Court of
California.
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clientcompany, one should check the SEC's Web site (www.sec.gov) to
ensure that the firm offering such services is not among those that have
been sanctioned for stock promotion.
Dealing with Rumors or Leaks
The self-regulatory organization (i.e., an exchange or Nasdaq) listed
company manuals address the obligations of companies to respond to
market rumors. Companies are generally required by their SRO to respond publicly to market rumors if they are likely to have a material
effect on their securities.
Under the federal securities law, however, where a company is not the
source of a rumor, it may choose a no comment response to market rumors. A more palatable way of saying no comment is to say, "We do not
respond to market rumors." To maintain a consistent no comment policy,
a company should not comment even if no significant corporate developments are taking place or ifthe company knows of no reason for stock
activity. For example, it is an inconsistent (and likely ineffective) use of
a no comment policy ifa company were to say, "There are no significant
corporate developments at this time," when such is the case, but respond,
"No comment," when M&A developments are under consideration. Using a no comment policy in this fashion may act as a signal to the market
and defeats the purpose of the policy.
A written disclosure policy, which identifies authorized spokespersons
for the company and underscores how unauthorized leaks of information can place it in a very vulnerable position, can aid a company in this
area. A company's disclosure policy should also define how it responds
to market rumors under various contingencies. All authorized company
spokespersons must be fully apprised ofcorporate developments so they
do not fall into the trap of denying significant activity when, in fact,
there are developments occurring. The SEC has sanctioned both a corporation and its spokesperson for making fraudulent state,ments where
the spokesperson denied the existence ofmerger talks when, in fact, talks
were taking place without his knowledge (SEC,,~ Carnation Inc.).
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A company should, at a minimum, inform all employees who the authorized company's spokespersons are and of those elements of the disclosure policy that are applicable to employees and/or those considered
insiders (those covered by insider-trading rules). Policies should be updated to address employees' use of technology with regard to disclosure
issues, including participation in Internet chat rooms and use of e-mail
(see NIRI Executive Alert, "Electronic and Telephonic Communications
System Policy," July 1, 1999).

Responding to Rumors or Inquiries
Regarding a Possible Earnings Decline
Companies are often called upon to respond to rumors or inquiries
regarding possible earnings shortfalls below the current Street estimates.
Under Regulation FD, companies may no longer comment on or express
comfort with the Street's earnings consensus unless they do so in a fully
public forum or in a news release.
Should a company simply state the current range of Street eanlings
estimates and go no further than this, it has not triggered a disclosure
obligation.

Quiet Period
Many companies voluntarily impose a quiet period before announcing
earnings, during which time they will not provide any additional earnings guidance. A quiet period shields a company that normally provides
earnings guidance or commentary on business from providing that information once it has much better idea of what the final earnings are likely
to be. In light ofRegulation FD's language regarding earnings guidance,
companies may want to consider lengthening their quiet period. Regardless ofhow long the company decides its quiet period should be, it should
be consistent from quarter to quarter and should be observed by all company officials.
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Nondisclosure Briefings
Companies within certain industries occasionally conduct nondisclosure briefings for selected financial analysts and the trade press to provide background on information, usually on products in R&D or in the
conceptual stage. It is very important that the participants agree to maintain the information on a confidential basis and not use it for any purposes that may lead to illegal trading activity. Regulation FD allows for
the use of oral or written confidentiality agreements between companies
and analysts or investors in which the recipients ofconfidential, nonpublic
information agree not to use it until it is publicly released. The SEC
recommends that companies maintain a list of those individuals who
orally agree to keep information confidential.
Regulation FD creates a new situation with respect to the involvement
of the trade press in these nondisclosure briefings in that communications between a company and the media are excluded from the rule. Therefore, while the rule does not prevent the media from using material,
nonpublic information from a company, reporters may agree to embargo
the information until the company releases it. Moreover, while Regulation FD does not provide any sanctions against analysts who may use
material, nonpublic information from a company, most firms have rules
that prevent them from doing so.
A company still runs the risk ofselective disclosure liability anytime it
holds such a briefing, particularly if any unusual trading activity should
occur that can be traced to the briefing. Therefore, the use of such briefings to disseminate infonnation should be very carefully considered. NIRI
recommends that companies avoid this practice.
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Providing Material Information to
Reporters on an Exclusive Basis

Companies should refrain from providing information on upcoming
material events or announcements to a specific publication on an exclusive basis. Some companies, in anticipation of a major development,
offer to give a specific publication details of the event providing that it
embargoes or holds the story, until the day that the company makes the
full public announcement. Although the practice does not violate rules
regarding selective disclosure, it is always conceivable that the story
could break prior to the company's announcement. Newspapers often
publish news items on their Internet page in the early-morning hours
before the printed version is circulated and before a company issues its
news release.
NIRI believes that out of fairness, the media should receive material
information at the same time as everyone else when a full public announcement is made. Providing exclusive news of a major event to one
publication and not others may well create a media relations problem.

Duty to Correct/Duty to Update
Material Changes in Information

If a company discovers that a statement it made was, in fact, materially
incorrect at the time it was disclosed, the company is obliged to publicly
issue a correction of the prior misstatement as soon as the error is discovered. Such a duty to correct arises when new facts are developed that
render a previous disclosure false or misleading.
In contrast, there is no clear legal duty to update material changes in
information that do not fall under a duty to correct. The Safe Harbor for
Forward-Looking Information explicitly states that it does not impose
on any person a duty to update forward-looking statements. Nevertheless, it is often prudent for a company to update its forward-looking statements. Publicly held companies would be well advised, as anlatter of
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good business and credible investor relations, to consider updating forward-looking statements to reflect material changes in information, to
the extent possible.
Comment: It has consistently been AIMR s position that a company has a
business obligation to update nlaterial changes in in.(ornlation in a written.(orn1.

Virtually all companies represented by NIRI's membership have IR
sections on their Web sites. Although the Internet provides a tremendous
opportunity to disseminate information to a wide audience on a timely
basis, it also requires that a company be vigilant in keeping its information current, particularly with regard to material changes.
NIRI recommends that companies put dated information in an archive
section on its Web site where there is an explicit warning that one is
entering an area where information is being provided for historical purposes but which may be dated and should not be relied on for making
investment decisions.
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GUIDELINES FOR THE DISSEMINATION
OF INFORMATION
After the company decides that information is material and should be
disclosed to the public, the process of dissemination begins. One of the
defining functions of investor relations professionals is the dissemination of information to investors, analysts and the general public. There
are many different issues to consider and many different ways of properly disseminating information. Each company has its own unique position in its industry and in the general marketplace, and circumstances
surrounding each disclosure may vary. There is no one correct way of
disseminating information in every circumstance. There are, however,
general guidelines regarding the dissemination of information that reflect the best practices within the industry and compliance with Regulation FD and that all are urged to follow.

Nonselective Flow of Information
Companies should disseminate information equitably and respond in a
timely manner to all legitimate requests for information. Companies
should never discriminate among types or manner of legitimate requests
for information that may be legally disclosed. For example, companies
should respond to requests from individual or small investors in the same
manner that they would respond to a request for information from a large
investor, an analyst or the media. An analyst from a small investment
finn should receive the same attention and level of service that an analyst from a large investment firm would receive, and there should be no
distinction between buy-side and sell-side analysts.
That companies should respond in the same manner to all legitimate
requests for information does not mean that con1panies are required to
respond to all requests for information. Any request for lnaterial,
nonpublic information should be denied. If a company does give material, nonpublic information to one person, then it absolutely must underNational Investor Relations Institute
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take an immediate effort to disseminate the information as broadly as
possible, usually through the issuance of a news release. Even if such
measures are taken, the damage may already be done, and the company
may be exposed to liability.

Blackballing of Analysts or Others
Under no circumstances should a corporation blackball an analyst or
investor, thereby denying one access to information. Nor should a company pressure an analyst to change a recommendation by threatening to
withhold information from that analyst in the future. The free flow of
information to the marketplace should never be impeded by mere differences of opinion, issues that involve the relationship of a company to an
analyst or reporter. Companies must not discrinlinate among recipients
of information.
Ifa company has a legitimate, serious and objective difference ofopinion with a particular analyst, then the company should contact the analyst's
employer, explain its position and possibly request that another analyst
be assigned to cover the company.
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METHODS OF DISSEMINATION
Use of Technology
Information should be released in a manner designed to reach the widest public audience possible, including the individual investor. Companies should encourage the use of multiple technologies to disseminate
information. There are many different ways to reach investors and the
public; some of the most obvious technologies include the major wire
services, conference calls, broadcast fax and fax-on-demand services,
e-mail, video conferences, Internet Web sites and electronic EDGAR
filings.
Although new technologies are important and useful ways to disseminate information, they are not substitutes for a broadly disseminated news
release. The use oftechnology to disseminate timely or up-to-the minute
information should be used to supplement consistent and regular communications with investors, analysts and the public through regular mailings ofthe company's annual and quarterly reports, proxy mailings, SEC
filings, fact sheets and fact books to legitimate interested parties. Certainly, electronic dissemination can be substituted for paper mailing if
requested. Companies should strive to disseminate all corporate sources
of information. For example, a company should provide in its annual
report items such as its telephone and fax numbers and e-mail and Internet addresses.

Mailing of Quarterly Reports and Other Materials
Many companies are moving toward alternative means of delivering
quarterly reports to investors, replacing the traditional glossy quarterly
report. The most widely used alternative has been the quarterly news
release, sometimes accompanied by a chairman's message. Other alternative means include 800 numbers that· investors can call to hear recorded information directly or to request that the information be sent to
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them. Some companies provide the information via fax-on-demand. If,
however, a company does publish a quarterly report, it should mail the
report to every party that asks to receive it.
While companies may experience some cost savings using alternative
means, the real issue for most companies is that the alternative means
provide information in a more timely manner. Investors typically wait at
least six weeks from the end ofthe quarter to receive the traditional glossy
report. By using alternative means, a corporation can make information
available almost immediately upon its release. However, for some companies the value of a quarterly report as a lnarketing tool should be considered, in addition to the value of ongoing quarterly communication
with the investment community.
The National Investor Relations Institute and the American Society of
Corporate Secretaries adopted similar position statements in 1994 with
respect to fairness in the distribution of quarterly report information.
The SEC urged both organizations to adopt a position in which companies would be encouraged to make quarterly information available to all
investors on an equal basis, as opposed to mailing it to registered shareholders but not to shareholders who held their accounts in Street name.

Internet
The Internet has become a primary means for disseminating information about a company. There are still segments of the public that do not
have access to the Internet, so companies must continue to use more
traditional sources of dissemination. It is just as important to update
and correct information that is contained on a company's Internet Web
site as it is to update and correct information made in oral or written
statements.
Companies should note that there can be a great deal of information on
the Internet about the company that is not found in the IR section of its
Web site, and that there are many sources of infonnation about a comNational Investor Relations Institute
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pany on the Internet that the company cannot control. Companies·should
also monitor other sites on the Internet for information about the company but should not respond to market rumors or participate in chat rooms
about the company. Such responses may, under certain circumstances,
be considered a form of selective disclosure. The fact that a company
responds to one rumor and not others may leave the impression that the
others are true.

Conference Calls
Following news releases to the wire services, conference calls are
the most widely used means for disseminating corporate information
to the investment community_ They are often used as a forum in which
the company disseminates detailed information expanding on the news
release that has been issued prior to the call.
The information from conference calls should be made available to all
interested parties, including investors, analysts and members of the media. Regulation FD considers a fully accessible, nonexclusionary Webcast
or telephonic conference call as a means for real-time, full and fair disclosure. The rule calls for adequate notification ofinterested investors of
upcoming Webcasts or teleconferences. While the SEC recognizes that
there are circumstances where a conference call may be held on short
notice, it believes interested investors should be given several days notice when a company has scheduled a call that far in advance. Proper
notification means issuing a news release with the date, time and means
for accessing the call. The use ofpush technology and the posting on the
company's Web site are additional methods of providing notification.
The last two alone do not constitute adequate notification.
The SEC recommends that companies archive the conference call on
their Web sites for at least several days. Asnlentioned before, once it
becomes dated, it should be taken offthe Web site or moved to an archive
section that is clearly labeled as historical information. Another method
of distributing conference call information is to make transcripts availNational Investor Relations Institute
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able upon request or to place transcripts on the company's Internet home
page. The latter methods do not constitute full and fair disclosure as the
live, fully accessible call does.
A company may want to use several means for achieving full disclosure.
NIRI recommends a conference call should be preceded by a news release
containing all new material, nonpublic disclosures that are intended to be
discussed. If, however, infonnation discussed in a conference call modifies or expands upon information included in the preceding news release,
a fully accessible call serves as a means for full public disclosure.
The advantage of issuing a news release before the conference call is
that analysts and institutional investors have a chance to review its contents and are better prepared to ask questions during the call. Moreover,
if the company wishes to provide earnings guidance or other forwardlooking information for the next quarter or more, having that information in the news release, with the accompanying risk factors, fulfills the
Safe Harbor requirements. Companies that do not want to archive their
conference calls on their Web sites for more than a few days will have
the news release as a reference when analysts and investors request guidance during the quarter.
A company may promote order and efficiency by using its best judgment as to audience comn1ent and participation in a conference call. It is
not necessary that everyone be allowed to ask questions or to make comments. It is recognized that there will be some participants on the conference call who may ask irrelevant or misleading questions, who may not
ask questions in good faith or who may not want to ask a question at all
but who simply may want to make a statement.
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One-an-One Meetings
One-on-one meetings with individuals or groups are a common and
indispensable way to disseminate information about a company and to
answer legitimate requests for a discussion of long-term strategies as
well as for detailed information about it. One-on-one meetings help to
build goodwill and make a company more approachable in the eyes of
the investment community. Companies should continue the practice of
face-to-face meetings; however, companies should note that, as in all
other types of meetings, there is the possibility that information may be
selectively disclosed. Companies should conscientiously avoid discussing material, nonpublic information in face-to-face meetings and discuss only legally disclosable information. Moreover, the company should
treat investors fairly and without discrimination by providing equal access to information.
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GUIDANCE OF ANALYSTS
One of the most important functions of the investor relations professional is providing analysts with information about the company. Providing information to analysts helps the free flow of information to the
marketplace and assists the public in determining accurately the value of
the company's stock and its business. Investment analysts playa critical
role in the free flow ofinformation in the marketplace. They add value to
publicly available information, ideally through diligent, thorough research
and skilled, independent analysis. When the analyst cannot perform fully
the role of bringing such value-added information to the marketplace,
the investing community is hindered in its efforts to make fully infonned
decisions, and the efficiency of the capital markets is compromised.
Companies should take caution to refrain from overstepping legal
boundaries in providing an analyst with selective guidance and absolutely refrain from disclosing material, nonpublic infonnation on a selective basis. Ifmaterial, nonpublic infonnation is inadvertently disclosed,
the company must take action immediately to achieve broad public dissemination ofthe information and to avoid anyone from taking action on
selective infonnation.
Not all information, however, exposes the conlpany to liability under
Regulation FD. Mosaic infonnation gathered by analysts that is material, public or nonmaterial, nonpublic information and is used in combination with perceptive analysis to arrive at investment conclusions can
provide a valuable service to the marketplace. However, companies should
not give infonnation to one person or group that they would not give to
another person or group.
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Review of Draft Analyst Reports
Companies and investor relations professionals should take special
precautions ifthey are invited to review draft analyst reports or earnings
models, because review or comment on draft analyst reports may expose
the company to liability under Regulation FD or may be viewed, in a
class-action law suit, as an endorsement of the report.
Companies that review analyst reports or models should review them
only for historical, factual information that is in the public domain. Regulation FD would appear to make it most difficult to comment on an
analyst's underlying assumptions, unless the company considered each
to be nonmaterial or it has discussed them publicly. They should take
special care not to become "entangled" in an analyst's report. Corporations can minimize the threat ofclaims ofentanglement by limiting comment or review to discussion or correction of historical fact. One best
practice is to refer analysts to the company's full public guidance information and have the analysts pursue their further research under the
"mosaic" theory.
Should a company decide to comment on an analyst's underlying assumptions in an earnings model, it should document those comments so
that it can later prove that its comments were made in good faith that
they were not material and had a reasonable basis in fact at the time they
were made.
Investor relations officers should take special caution when commenting on drafts ofreports that make significant changes in earnings projections, investment ratings or any other information that could materially
affect the market in the company's stock. Investor relations officers should
treat such reports as they would nonpublic, inside information.
Ifa company provides specific earnings guidance in fully public documents or forums, then it may have a duty to update or correct that information. Material updates or corrections should be made in a news
release before it is provided to one or more analysts.
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Forward-Looking Information
The Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Information contained in the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides corporations
an opportunity to more openly discuss prospects and projections, given
the appropriate caveats, both orally and in writing, with analysts and
investors without an overriding fear of litigation. Forward-looking
statements must be accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those projected in the statement. In making oral forward-looking statements, company spokespersons may refer to readily
available written information that contains the factors that could cause
the results to differ materially.
While companies with established investor relations programs have,
for the most part, discussed forward-looking information with analysts
and professional investors in the past, companies should take advantage
of this new Safe Harbor to communicate appropriate forward-looking
information in writing to the broader investment community (see p. 15).

Duties of an Analyst Who Receives
Material, Nonpublic Information
Financial analysts who receive material, nonpublic information in their
dealings with investor relations personnel are subject to liability as tippees
under federal securities laws if they use that information as a basis for
investment decisions. The appropriate course for the analyst who receives
such information is to encourage the public dissemination of the information. Unless and until the information is disseminated publicly, the
analyst may not legally trade in the company's securities or change his
or her recommendations with respect to those securities.
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The AIMR Standards of Professional Conduct recognize two divergent sets of circumstances in which an analyst may receive material,
nonpublic information. The analyst's duties vary with these circumstances.
First, analysts may receive information as a result of their confidential
relationships with securities issuers. For example, an analyst may receive information when acting as a financial consultant or as the representative of a rating agency, lender or underwriter to an issuer. When
acting in these roles, analysts are likely to be considered "temporary
insiders" of the issuer. In these situations, analysts can use the infonnation they receive for its intended purpose without encouraging further
disclosure of the information. They cannot, however, use the information for any other purpose or share the information with other members
of their firms. Selective disclosure is not normally a concern in these
circumstances. Note that analysts do not become temporary insiders by
attending nondisclosure briefings but may incur tippee liability by basing investment decisions on infomlation learned in such briefings. For
this reason, and because ofthe potential breaches ofduty discussed above,
AIMR recommends that analysts should avoid such briefings (see p. 40,
"Nondisclosure Briefings").
Next, an analyst may receive information from an issuer, although there
is no confidential relationship between them. The conduct of analysts
who receive information through selective disclosure by investor relations personnel or other company executives is governed by this section
of the AIMR standard. In this situation, the AIMR standard requires analysts to evaluate the materiality of the information they receive and
consider whether the source of the information is violating a duty by
disclosing it. The analyst should make these decisions in consultation
with a compliance officer or supervisor. If the information is deemed
material, the analyst should make reasonable efforts to achieve public
dissemination of the information. This usually means encouraging
the company to issue a news release, or otherwise make the information public. Until the information is publicly disseminated, the analyst
should not take any investment action on the basis ofthe information. To
be fully protected from liability, the analyst should refrain from taking
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any action at all with respect to the company's securities, even if that
action can be justified on other grounds. An arialyst is subject to insidertrading liability for investment decisions made while he or she is in possession of material, nonpublic information, even if those decisions are
made for independent reasons. Last, the analyst should not communicate the information to anyone other than designated supervisory and
compliance personnel within his or her firm unless and until the information becomes public.
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APPENDIX B
GUIDANCE FOR COMPLIANCE WITH
REGULATION FAIR DISCLOSURE
Many companies are developing or revising their existing disclosure
policies to comply with the requirements in the SEC's Regulation Fair
Disclosure. The following is some guidance to help those engaged in
that process. This guidance is based on a compilation ofvarious law finn
advisories on Regulation FD and an extensive discussion of the issues
related to the new rule at the October 6- 7, 2000, NIRI Board of Directors meeting. The NIRI board is charged in the organization's bylaws
with the responsibility for policy development.
The board recognizes there is no one-size-fits-all policy to conlply with
Regulation FD. Each company will have to look at its own situation and
circumstances in determining which of the following guidelines are relevant. As a general proposition, we believe Regulation FD offers an
expanded role for investor relations and greater opportunities for companies to communicate information more broadly to the investment
community.
When the rule was published the week following its approval, companies, analysts and securities lawyers were most surprised to read the language regarding earnings guidance in the commentary leading to the
actual rule. That paragraph reads as follows:
When an issuer official engages in a private discussion with an analyst who is seeking guidance about earnings estimates, he or she
takes on a high degree of risk under Regulation FD. If the issuer
official communicates selectively to the analyst nonpublic information that the company's anticipated earnings will be higher than,
lower than or even the same as what analysts have been forecasting, the issuer will likely have violated Regulation FD. This is true
whether the information about earnings is communicated expressly
or through indirect 'guidance,' the meaning of which is apparent
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though implied. Similarly, an issuer cannot render material information immaterial simply by breaking it into ostensibly nonmaterial pieces.

This paragraph will clearly change the way most companies provide
earnings guidance under Regulation FD. Absent further clarification or
guidance from the SEC, we believe companies should observe the following procedures if they intend to continue to provide earnings guidance.
1. Guidance may only be based on:
a. information the company has publicly issued,
b. nonmaterial infonnation, whether in the public domain
and/or
c. industry related information.
2. To accomplish this, a company may consider publishing an outlook
section in its quarterly earnings release that forecasts its expectations with respect to those factors that drive the company's earnings
(generally those factors that analysts use in their earnings model assumptions). These may be expressed as a range or using specific
numbers. Some companies may want to publish their own earnings
estimate or range of estimates. As the quarter progresses, the company may express comfort with its own projections as opposed to
commenting on or expressing comfort with the assumptions in an
analyst's earnings model, a consensus number or an individual
analyst's estimate. The latter practice would appear to be no longer
possible under Regulation FD without issuing a nel'VS release. If facts
and circumstances should change during the quarter, thus altering
the earlier projections, the company should update that information.
Furthennore, as the quarter progresses, an expression ofcomfort with
projections made early in the quarter may be viewed as a material
disclosure as the results become more apparent. Under these circumstances, the company may be obligated to issue a news release.
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3. It is essential that any forward-looking information be accompaniedby safe harbor language containing risk factors specifically
related to the forecasts or projections.
4. A company should consider updating material changes in its projections as a matter of good business and good investor relations,
regardless ofwhether it believes there is a legal obligation to do so.
At the same time, it should not publicly comnlit to a duty to update
material changes in information.
5. We believe that reviewing or commenting on analysts earnings
models or draft reports must be limited to:
a. correcting errors of historical fact
b. pointing out infonnation that is in the public domain
c. providing infonnation the company believes is clearly nonmaterial
NOTE: SOlne companies are eliminating this practice all together. Many of the law
finn advisories are recommending that companies no longer review analysts draft
reports or earnings models. Securities lawyers have never been comfortable with this
practice in that, from the standpoint of legal liability, it could appear that the COlnpany embraced or endorsed the report as a result of the review process.

6. Companies that choose to forecast as a means of providing earnings guidance will want to consider:
a. their ability to provide such information early in the quarter,
b. the risks in doing so and
c. the risk factors that need to be communicated in a readily
available written document (news release or SEC filing)
related to their projections.
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Conference Calls
Regulation FD does not require companies to conduct conference calls.
However, ifone does, NIRI urges the company to conduct them on a fully
accessible, nonexclusionary basis through a Webcast or by telephonic
means, giving interested investors and the media adequate notice of the
call. A company may still conduct a call with limited access but must recognize this exposes management to much greater risk under Regulation
FD. The SEC has not specified what constitutes adequate notice since circumstances may require a call be held on short notice. However, as a general proposition, the more notice you can give, the more likely the call
would be considered adequate for full disclosure purposes.
These calls should be preceded with a news release containing any
new material information you plan to discuss in the call. While the fully
accessible, nonexclusionary call alone may legally be a means for full
and fair disclosure, companies should use additional means, such as a
news release or an 8-K filing, particularly if they intend to provide earnings guidance during the call. By having that information in a readily
available written document containing the relevant Safe Harbor risk factors, the issuer may use that document as a basis for future reference
when analysts ask for earnings guidance.

One-on-One Discussions with Analysts and Investors
NIRI believes one-on-one discussions, whether by phone or face-toface, will continue to be an important component of a company's investor relations program. Clearly, company officials, directors and spokespersons covered by Regulation FD must be very careful to avoid disclosing material, nonpublic information in these discussions. Should it happen unintentionally, the company is obligated to promptly issue a news
release or provide that information in some other form for full disclosure. To that end, NIRI believes it is most advisable to have an IRO
present or on the phone with any company official engaged in a one-onone discussion with an analyst or investor.
National Investor Relations Institute
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The IRO must be the most knowledgeable person in the company with
respect to its disclosure record. If an official is asked a question that
could elicit a material, nonpublic answer, the IRO may need to interrupt
and advise him or her not to respond to the question. If an unintentional
disclosure of material, nonpublic information should occur, the IRO is
there to discern that and promptly issue a news release, if possible, after
consultation with legal counsel.
IROs themselves may continue to engage inone-on-one discussions
with analysts and investors without someone else present, so long as
they are fully knowledgeable of the company's disclosure record. For
IROs to do their job in this respect, they must know all of the company's
material corporate developments, whether public or not. Companies cannot afford to keep company spokespersons in the dark on nonpublic corporate developments in the new Regulation FD environment.
One-on-one meetings will continue to be an important venue for discussing information such as a company's
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

long-term strategy
history
mission
goals
management philosophy
strength and depth of management
competitive advantages and disadvantages
previously disclosed material and nonmaterial information
earnings guidance based on previously released information

These meetings are also useful forums for discussing industry trends
and issues.
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Investor- and Broker-Sponsored Conferences
NIRI urges continued participation in these meetings. At the same time,
we believe companies may want to consider Webcasting their presentations and the Q&A live as a condition of participation. We understand
some sponsors of these conferences are already planning to offer
Webcasting services or opportunities for those who want to use them.
NOTE: If a company wants its live Webcast to serve as a Ineans for real-tilne, full and
fair disclosure, it must take the initiative to inform interested investors and the Inedia
through a news release and a posting on its Web site stating the date, tilne ofthe Webcast
and how to access it. The conlpany must do this, even ifthe conference sponsor or SOlne
other entity provides the Webcast service. Companies that do not choose to Webcast
their presentations and the Q&A may want to consider putting the presentation script
and slides (if applicable) on the company's Web site and/or furnish them under item 9
of an 8-K. We believe the more in/orl11ation a conlpany has in the public donzain, the
greater the basis,for re.ference when analysts are seeking guidance.

Breakout sessions at these conferences should be conducted in the same
way as one-on-one discussions, and officials should take all of the appropriate precautions with what they say. Remember, analysts like to say
in their First Call notes, for example, "In discussions with management
today, we learned ..." Such representations sometimes suggest the analysts got exclusive infonnation, when in fact they did not.

Headquarters and/or Facilities Visits
Companies may want to continue conducting visits to their headquarters and/or tours of their facilities for a limited number of analysts or
investors. In doing so, companies should be mindful that visitors n1ight
be exposed to employees who are not covered by Regulation FD. Under
the rule, analysts can use information gleaned fron1- these employees.
(See "Regulation FD Coverage" regarding designated spokespersons, p.
55.) Therefore, companies will want to control these visits so analysts
may gain additional insight into the company's business and operations
while avoiding opportunities where they might gain material, nonpublic
infonnation in the process.
Natiol1allnvestor Relations Institute
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Regulation FD Coverage
This rule covers material communications between company officers,
directors, IROs, public relations officers and other authorized spokespersons, and analysts, professional investors or any other holder of the
company's securities who the company could expect might trade on that
information. Therefore, in its written disclosure policy, the company
should designate those who, under normal circumstances, are authorized to speakfor the company. Conversely, it should warn employees
who are not authorized spokespersons that they are not to speak to analysts or investors unless authorized to do so under special circumstances.
Moreover, a company may choose to implement a policy whereby such
unauthorized discussions may result in company-imposed disciplinary
actions.
Since Regulation FD allows analysts to use information gleaned from
employees not covered by the rule, one may assume analysts will pursue
such sources with vigor to obtain information they may no longer get
from those covered by the rule. This implies that a company should carefully guide employees participating in trade shows, teclmical conferences,
etc. on what they can say when approached by analysts.

Regulation FD and the Media
The SEC, under pressure from several media companies, exempted
the media from Regulation FD. This means that any company communications with the media are exempt from SEC enforcement actions. The
basis for the media's concerns was based on 1st Amendment issues. In
spite ofNIRI's objection to the media carve-out, it was approved as part
of the rule.
Our objection was based largely on the premise that the financial media, particularly the televised financial programs, are often in competition with the analysts in terms of who can get the best information and
National Investor Relations Institute
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analysis to investors the fastest. With the restrictions Regulation FD places
on communications between companies and analysts but not on those
between companies and the media, we believe the SEC has created a
competitive imbalance with this rule.
NIRI recommends, as it has in its Standards ofPractice for Investor
Relations, that companies treat their communications with analysts, professional investors and the media equally. We recommend that companies should. not provide ".exclusives" to selective media of material,
nonpublic news even though the recipient may agree to embargo that
information until the company releases it. Even when a story is planned
to appear in the printed version of a publication the same day as the
company issues its news release, the publication's online component may
well publish that news in advance ofthe company's release. In that event,
material, nonpublic news has appeared in a medium not recognized as a
means for full and fair disclosure under the self-regulatory organizations' listed company rules (NYSE, Nasdaq or AMEX).
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APPENDIX C
NIRI CODE OF ETHICS
I.

An investor relations practitioner should assist in maintaining the
integrity and competency of investor relations.

II.

An investor relations practitioner should assist in preventing the
unethical or improper practice of investor relations.

III.

An investor relations practitioner should preserve the properly
confidential infonnation of an elnployer or client.

IV

An investor relations practitioner should exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of an employer or client.

V.

An investor relations practitioner will keep himself/herself abreast of
the affairs of his/her company or client and the laws and regulations
affecting him/her and the practice of investor relations. so that he/she
will discharge his/her responsibilities competently.

VI.

An investor relations practitioner should recognize his/her obligation
to continually assist in maintaining and improving the free access of
individuals to a healthy securities nlarket.

VII. An investor relations practitioner should avoid even the
appearance of professional ilnpropriety.
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SAFE HARBOR
I attribute any forward-looking statements today to a
childhood void of the Internet where fictional settings
and imaginary play friends were strongly encouraged.
I no longer believe in the Easter Bunny or Santa Claus,
but I have read three of the four Harry Potter novels.
I expressly disclaim, however, any responsibility to offer
a rational explanation why clients may act irrationally in
disclosing material, non-public information.
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IN WITH THE NEW
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A TRAIL OF TEARS
Sell-Side Research Coverage
(U .S. Corporations)
6,000

5,600

4,600

3,900

1998

1999

2000

2001

Corporate Communications

Source: IIBIEIS

SELL SIDE CONTRACTION
Big Dough News
I:J Aerospace and defense analyst David Ainsworth
left Merrill Lynch.

I:l Herbert Maher left H.C. Wainright & Co. His coverage
is in transition.
£)

Thomas Postek, CFA retired from William Blair.
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ON THE ROPES
Companies With No Sell-Side Coverage
Companies

Market Capitalization

o

$ 5.0 Billion +

$ 500 Million - $ 5.0 Billion

132

$ 250 MiI·li,on - $ 500 Million

174

$ 100 Million - $ 250 Million

312

< $ 100 Million

2,539
Corporate Communications

Source: IIBIEIS

"HAVE'S" AND "HAVE-NOT'S"
Published Brokerage Estimates
3,900 Companies
~1 0

Estimates
1-3 Estimates

4-9 Estimates

122% = 1 Estimate
Source: IIBIEIS

I
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KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER
Institutional Needs

Industry
Knowledge*

Earnings Estimates
Stock Selection
Written Reports
Visits/Conferences

• Institutional Investor (10/00)
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HOT POTATO
£guity Fund Redemption Rate
47% (2000)
8%

15%

25%

19608

19708

19808

1990s
Corporate Communications

Source: The Vanguard Group
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AVERAGE FUND SHARE OWNERSHIP
12.5 years

2.0 years
Corporate Communications

Source: The Vanguard Group

THE MAKEOVER
IIJ Consistent profitability

II:) Increasing margins

1:1 Efficient facilities

IIIJ Six Sigma initiative

£J Sound growth strategy

IEl Experienced management
IElCommitment to shareholders

lID Specific growth targets I
II:) Incentivized team
II:) Low relative valuation
Corporate Communications
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Do YOUREMEMBERl .
20 Years.A9.Q...· ."
. ... _"Chrysler needs $400 million,
.. and I'm supposed to invest in the market?"

Corporate Communications

Do YOU REMEMBER?·
10 Years A9Q.
"We're days away from a war with Iraq.
Could there be a worse time to invest?"
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Analyze This
AYS BEFORE YEAR-END. A YOUNG PAINEWEBBER

analyst broke into electronic print with a forecast
that Qualcomm (then S126, split-adjusted) would
double in price over 12 months. As a result, the
telecom stock surged 31% Dec. 29. Now, Qualcomm is a p~omising telecom company with a lock on a
technology.(called code division multiple access) that is becoming the standard for digital cell phones. But that's not
enough to justify such a projection. Lately the stock has
dropped back almost to its
previous level on signs of
slowing chip sales growth.
QuaJcomm's round trip
shows how the solid and necessary profession of security
analysis has become a farce. It
has moved investors' focus
from long term to instant
gratification-and done so
amid the noise level of a busy
craps table. Part of the problem th~ days is that too many
analysts thirst for the instant stardom that an outrageous
projection delivers.
Brokerage-house management encourages them to seek
high visibility because that's good for business. And the pro. liferation of1V investment shows-whose staccato bursts of
trivia are something out of Walter Wmchell. c. 194o-pro- .
vide the forom. Security analysis is now show business; with
analysts the circus dogs jumping through hoops of fire.
Tellingly, money managers who haven't the time or the
need to shill themselves are seldom the performers. You
don't see Robert Stansky, who manages $100 billion at Fidelity Magellan. as a CNBC regular.
WaIl Street firms view their celebrity analysts as calling
cards for underwriting assignments. These high-profile analysts lasso investment banking clients. then hawk the clients'
stocks 30 days after an initial public offering. And their sales
pitches-ahem. analysts' reports-frequently just condense
the legal verbiage ofa prospectus some even helped to write.
In that fashion Henry Blodget of Merrill Lynch is one who
offers direction and sometimes contributes a paragraph here
and there to a prospectus, blurring the line between security
analysis and investment banking, which is supposed to be
ethically separated by a Chinese \\'aJ)'
Small wonder that analysts are easily manipulated into
groupthink, guided by conference calls and investor relations people, rarely stepping out of the earnings consensus.
Investors aren't well served \,'hen an analyst shrinks fronl
188
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the bald truth. So a troubled stock isn't a sell; it's just of average attractiveness. Look at Coca-Cola at its peak, when
dozens ofanalysts were within a penny of one another. Too
bad they didn·t see the coming slowdown abroad that
trashed their projections in late 1998.
Whatanalysts do with numbers to justify their recommendations is ridiculous. especially for Internet and
biotechnology companies that have no discernible earnings power for years to come. Making a profit. of course,
is irrelevant. To overcome any
queasiness about seas of red
ink. analysts take refuge in
ten-year discounted cashflow models. That way they
can rationalize Amazon's
going to the moon and back
in one day. But can anyone
seriously predict what will
happen a year, let alone a
decade. from now?
TIle ·other buzzword we hear from analysts is "metrics,"
most often meaning revenue projections every bit as absu·rd as cash-flow models. Write a biotech or telecom business plan with enormous metrics, and analysts fall in love
with you.
Analysts didn't used to be such patsies. Back in the early
19605, the small firm of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette revolutionized what was then a sleepy corps of desk-bound statisticians. Led by its trio of young M.B.A. partners, DLJ studied businesses in the field, looking for the good and the bad
based on fundamentals. They unleashed a series of SO-page
papers that were godsends to investors. Today. there are few
pure research outfits like DLJ was then (it~ too. is into investment banking now). The real downfall for analysts came in
1995, when then-profitless Netseape Communications went
public, doubling in price the first day. That's \\'hen metrics
started creeping into their vocabulary.
Maybe the Nifty Twenty-Five now leading the market
will correct individually like Coca-Cola and Lucent. If they
all go down at the same tiqte, it'll make Black ~1onday look
like Thanksgiving. Either \vay, don't count on the analysts to
alert us to problems ahead.
Full disclosure: \Ve own Qualcomm, Cisco, ~1icrosoft,
Sun Microsystems and other tech highfliers. At least \\'e
bought them years ago, \vhen you could model companies
using only one metri~~_~ld-fashioned earning~.per share...!'~1artin Sosnoff ;$ (hi~f ;,,,'r5t,,,tPlt officrr lJf t\ttdd'lt.lISt l 91,lff Carit'll in
Nt:"'" l'ork an,1 (llltilor ofSill"nt In\"t:stor. Sill"nt I.oser.

By Joe Hassett and Bill Mahoney
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Can't get any research coverage from the
brokers? Don't despair. You can always buy it.
Encouraged by the bull market and the frustrations of
CFOs at small companies at not being able to gamer any
following by the sell-side brokerages, soeealled independent firms have sprouted up, offering research for a price.
Judging from the flow of fee-based research reports
flooding· cyberspace and filling fax machines, the practice
has taken off big-time.
Maybe to the surprise of some, the sliding economy
and stock market don't appear to be putting any brakes
on the momentum. In fact, the opposite is occurring.
Desires by micro, small, and even mid-size companies to
get more exposure in the face of a down market seem
only to be feeding the paid research frenzy.
The question for company executives is, How valuable
is this coverage? In fact, there are lots of questions. Are
investors paying any attention to it? After aU, the argument
goes, since companies are paying for it, it must: be positively
slanted. Is it aimed strictly at individuals, or are the institutional pros looking at any of it? Indeed, is it even legal?
And then there's perhaps the most practical question:
Accepting the n9tion that there is a legitimate role for
fee-based research, which providers are really adding
value to the investment process and which ones are ~ype
artists who are probably doing their company clients
more harm than good? The bottom line for CFOs and
IROs buying this research: Buyer beware!

Serving Ignored Companies
A sound premise supports the explosion of paid research:
Thousands of companies are being overlooked in the battle for investor attention. Facts prove the contention.
Richard J. Wayman, a chartered financial analyst (CFAe )
and founder of stockresearch.com, cites research from
Thomson FinanciallBaseline showing that 1,558 of 4,890
companies with mar~et caps under $500 million have no
analyst coverage. Further, those remaining 3,332 companies have fewer than two analysts, on average, covering
them. Read one, probably the investment banker.
Contrast those numbers with the 25 analysts, on average, following companies with market caps of over $200
billion, says Wayman.
Shareholder Value

\1.,·,

Wall Street easily rationalizes its focus on the big stocks.
That's where most of the investment money is going. Large
institutions provide the bulk ofstock transaction commissions,
and they need liquidity to buy and sell sizable positions without moving share prices. With volatility at aU-time highs, these
money managers are willing to pay a premium for liquidity.
That's just one reason. Razor-thin trading spreads,
caused by competition and regulation, exacerbate the
need for brokers to have liquidity to ensure some profit
m~f'gin on high-volumetransaetions.
Then, there's the competition for investment banking
deals. It has led to accusations oftainted research, namely positive coverage to help banks cuny favor with corporate CFOs
and CEOs. "With every investment banker vying for the same
deal, research coverage has become a lemmings market with
everybody following the same stocks,· says Wayman.
Still one more factor is the merging of regional brokerages into the major houses, significantly reducing
opportunities for small local companies to raise capital
and gain coverage. In raising money, companies often
worked their way up the chain of small and regional
investm~nt houses that provided support from infancy
through development.
Purveyors of paid research argue that all research costS
companies mone~ in one way or another. Small companies
aren't likely to be followed without an indication of investment banking business. "Our program gets the company
coverage without having to offer an investment banking
deal," argues Sherry Grisewood, CFA, who does research
for The Public Analysis and Research (PAR) program of
Investrend Research, one of the many flnns offering
research for a price.
Serious conflicts of interest exist at Wall Street finns, say
fee-based proponents in claiming their research can be just as
objective. "At least we're not trading in the stock," claims
Karen Snedeker, managing director of Bluerae Partners in
Minneapolis, an investor relations finn that also has registered
to be an investment advisor. BlueFire requires companies to
be an IR client before research is \\·ritten. But not all clients
qualify, says Snedeker. "Basically, it is a service for those that
deserve research and do enough \\'ith us to warrant it."
Wayman, who collects fees for research at stockresearch.com, questions the objectivity of Wall Street analysts.Their compensation packages, he argues, include a
base salary, percentage of hanking deals, and trading volunlc
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"Our program gets the company coverage without
having to offer an investment banking deal.

II

Sherry Grisewood, of The Public Analysis and
Research (PAR) program

from aftermarket transactions. With fee-based providers,
tcthe compensation is fixed and not dependent upon investment banking deals or stock trades," saysWayman~

Getting to Know Them

f.

.

~

Who are these folks and what are their credentials?
Clearly, they are opportunists, filling a void as they see it.
Many come from Wall Street and the buy side. Investor
and public relations people also have stepped into the
breach. Being an.analyst, with CFA stature, helps estabIish·a level of experience plus market/investing knowledge, but it doesn't guarantee legitimacy.
The "research" takes a number of forms, which serve
to differentiate providers' qualifications. Basic is the
investment profile, essentially offering just information
about companies. These are disseminated as companyspecific reports, typically faxed to a distribution list or
put on the provider's Web site for access by subscribers.
On-line newsletters also are popula~ frequently covering
more than one company in an issue.
At the next level are research reports akin to Wall
Street products. A professional report, says Wayman,
delivers "a balanced view by discussing a company's competitive advantages, provides an overview of the firm's
prospects/challenges facing the company and industry,
analyzes operating results against a relevant peer group,
and provides eaminis estimates based upon assumptions
that are clearly stated."
Legitimate research includes a solid discussion of the
risk factors. In addition to earnings and probably revenue
forecasts, most of these reports also include buylhold recommendations and target stock prices.

At the lowest level are pure hype reports. Unfortunately,
these abound in cyberspace, and some are unbelievably
bold. Some recent samples make the point. lHIS IS A
STOCK TO PURCHASE!"'Thaon Communications is a
very strong buy, with a target of 56! We think this is a stock
you should 0\\'11 right now." Or, in reference to another
company: "By far the best stock we have ever covered."
Wayman suggests checking the language for clues into
unadulterated hype. He admonishes companies and investors
to be cautious of reports full of promotional language while
tcsparse bn details" or using phrases like tcthe stock will rocket
to new highs" or the author "guarantees" a sizable return.

Key Factors in Picking a Provider
Quality of research, length of time coverage is provided,
costs, and audience impact are vital factors in deciding if a
fee-based approach to gain market coverage is a value-creating
proposition for a company. Costs can vary widely; \\'e have
seen fees from $7,500 to $50,000. And some providers take
stock, which should raise a red flag on the issue of objectivity.
The time frame for giving coverage is a factor. A onetime report should be viewed with suspicion. Investors
aren't likely to give it much weight; hype is ,vritten all
over a report that isn't part of an analyst's commitment
to follow the company. By comparison, Wall Street analysts add value by covering a company over time. A yearlong contract at least ensures some follovl-up reports.
Audiences also matter - in terms of size and quality.
The Internet market for fee-based research essentially is
individual investors. Some \Veb site providers claim an
institutional follo\\'ing. Quantity and quality of audience
don't necessarily go together. Paid subscriber and opt-in
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research

The Internet

e-mail audiences are likely to be more serious, upscale
investors, compared with purchased audience lists.
Investors and companies are wise to assess the quality of
the research on a provider-by-provider basis, covering both
the infonnation-only and forecast/recommendation groups.
Key considerations focus on the experience and qualifications of the research analysts. Does the provider truly
have a corps of credentialed research analysts? Is the
resource essentially an investor relations or public relations firm? Bottom line: Know what you are bUfi?g.

Some of the Players

I

r
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Knowledge is in the details, and in how various providers
look at their own service. Skip Nordstrom operates the
GrowthStock Newsletter (www.NICStock.com). published by the National Investors Council. He writes a 4page, glossy, one-time infonnation report for $7,500 per
report, plus expenses for a site visit to interview management. Longer-term contracts are encouraged. Client leads
typically come from PR and IR firms, and market makers.
A proprietary audience database consists of about 3,000
opt-in investors.
PAR (www.investrend.com) has a team of analysts,
mostly CFAs, says Grisewood, and the finn doesn't hold
stock in companjes it writes about. Fees are $19,700 a year
for an initial report, quarterly updates, and ahy further
reports warranted by events. Companies typically are in the
$50-$60 million market cap range, but can go as high as
$200 million. A 75,000 e-mail audience can expand to a
million viewers via several participating \\feb sites, adds
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Grisewood..
Alan Stone (www.WallStreetResearch.org) includes
recommendations and stacks his research team against
the Wall Street firms. He says his background includes
stints at Merrill Lynch as an analyst and as a portfolio
manager. Because the finn covers microcap companies,
fellow analyst Richard Goldman says that time boundaries need to be put on their recommendations. "Things
can change so fast, reports are only good for a definitive
period of time," according to Goldman.
OTe Growth Stock l*.zteh is small cap newslette~ profiling companies for an audience of about 300,000 subscribers who opt-in to the site. Companies qualify for inclusion based on certain criteria and don't pay a fee to be featured. OTe rmandal Research, the parent company, also
produces "glorified fact sheets" for a fee and conducts IR programs, says Geoff Eiten, president. The firm claims to not
make recommendations in its fact sheets, despite a statement
in one such proflle reading, 'We consider the stock to be
undervalued:'
Steve Reid, editor of the Moebius Free Financial
Newsletter, says that services like his are "no different from
a brokerage finn's. The brokers won't help you unless
you're a corporate flnance client." Reid specializes in e-mail
distribution and claims to have access to 200 million names
on a global scale. His research is mainly information-based,
poured into the market on a fee structure \,,'ith discounts
based on size of order. Costs to saturate the market can nUl
over $1 million. Reid also creates streaming videos for online distribution. Most of his clients are trying to rais~
money, he says. "Much of \\'hat \\'e do is create liquidityo"
SmaIlCapRe\'ie\\' (\\rv.,\\,.sn1allcaprc\,ie"o.(onl) clJinlS to
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have a large institutional follOWing, \,'ith subscribers opting
in. "We don't buy mailing lists or s\vap names," says Thomas
Englebert, editor. He says that the Web site focuses on small
companies with good gro\rth prospects. "We "'ant to build
subscriber loyalty and trust." Englebert \\'on't reveal his
site's number of subscribers. -We consider that proprietary,
but we are very pleased with our gro\\1:h rate," he says.
After serving seven years as an equity analyst, Rick
Wayman founded stockresearch.com in 1999 as an independent, fee-based research firm based in Columbus, OH..
He sees fee-based research as a "useful \vay to bridge the
gap between companies with investment potential and
investors looking for ne\\' ideas and undervalued stocks."

The Legality of the Matter
Is all this cyberspace traffic legal? The distinction comes in
whether the prOVider is a broker dealer or investment
adviser and thus subject to the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, or whether it is a publisher. According to the Act,
investment advisers provide advice, make recommendations,
issue reports, or furnish analysis on securities, either directly
or through publications. As such, they muSt register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. They can get into
trouble by providing materially false or misleading statements
about public companies.
Producers ofgeneral and regular circulation publications
are excluded from the definition of investment adviser as
long as they don't offer individualized advice tailored to
the investment needs of specific clients. The SEC has gotten
publishers to agree to consent decrees and pay penalties.
Brian Hamburge~ an attorney for the law firm of Stark
& Stark, suggests that criteria for judging the legality of
newsletter or Web site content seem to be determined by
the SEC on a case-by-case basis.

s.

Can't Quantify the Value
Our research fell short in finding companies or portfoliO
managers buoyant about the value of fee-based research.
Understandably, companies ponying up the funds aren't
anxious to talk about their experiences. Robert Benou,
president of Conolog, follo\ved the advice of Geoff Eiten

to put out a lot of ne\\'s. Benou believes it helped in keeping the price from taking a "nosedive" "·hen the market
fell in the spring of 2000, and to pick up \\,hen sonlC
recovery occurred.
Richard T\vardo\o\'ski, IR director at IVG Corp., can't
say that the heavy communications urged by t\1oebius
editor Ste\'e Reid has impacted stock price, but he says
that it did serve to boost trading volume. And Richard
Pierce, CEO at Laredo, said its source, Re\'ealer, "generated ~ fair number of calls, but it's hard to say \\,hat influence it has had on stock price."
On the investment side, Ken Sevinsky, Jr., senior portfolio
manager at Fifth Third Bancorp in Cincinnati, sees a place
for paid research among small cap companies. But he also
has his doubts. "I wonder ho\v you dra\\' the line of being
objective while the company you are covering is paying
you," comments Sevinsky.
Objectivity? Chuck Hill, director of research for
Thomson Financial/First Call, issues a \\'arning to
investors about fee research. "If there is no analyst's name
on the research, then buyer be\vare," says Hill. About the
opportunitY for companies to make the investment
screens of institutions requiring at least one analyst earnings
forecast, Hill has bad news. "We clearly would not use
somebody that does research and was paid for it," he says.
A final word comes from Robert 1. Flaherty, longtime
editor of Equities magazine, which specializes in understanding small companies. ImprovedJiquidity may be the
chief benefit of paid-for research, suggests Flaherty. Plus,
it's better than no research, he adds, as long as it's honest.
What he doesn't like is stuff like "'This is the next
General Motors.' They're trying to have the company
take on the attributes of the giants."
Flaherty says that companies and investors should
"'ant information in these reports about management and
about risk. "There's a lack of management background in
these pieces." Risk needs to be disclosed, especially about
competition, adequacy of financing, and other basic
financial conSiderations, he adds. "And, any projections
should be reasonable."

m

Joseph R Hassett is research editor of Sharehold~r \'ahh.'.

He has an exte1lSil1e career as a corporate iUl'l!stor reliltiolls
officer and consultant. Bill Mahoney is eXl'clitil't' editor of
Shareholder Value.
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SIA ENDORSES 'BEST PRACTICES' TO ENSURE
ONGOING INTEGRITY OF RESEARCH

Practices Emphasize Pre-Eminence Of Clients' Interests
New York, June 12 - The Securities Industry Association today endorsed a
compilation of "best practices" followed by brokerage firms to ensure the ongoing
integrity of securities research and analysis.
The best practices - which cover, among other things, analyst compensation and
stock ownership, relations with investment banking units, and disclosures-- were
compiled by an ad hoc committee of senior level research professionals from the
association's largest firms. The practices are the latest ina series SIA has published
to guide firms and educate industry employees.
"Our most important goal is to maintain the public's trust and confidence in capital
markets and our industry," said Mark Sutton, chairman of SIA's board of directors and
president of the private client group of UBS PaineWebber Inc. "SIA's endorsement of
best practices for research demonstrates our commitment to achieving the highest
levels of public trust and confidence in our industry. Behind every transaction or piece
of advice given to an investor is one simple but important principle: the client's
interests come first.·
The chief executives of the 14 largest underwriting firms all expressed support for the
best practices. These firms are: Bear Stearns; elBe World Markets Corp.; Credit
Suisse First Boston; Deutsche Bane Alex. Brown; Goldman Sachs Group Inc.; J.P.
Morgan Securities; Lehman Brothers, Inc.; Merrill Lynch; Morgan Stanley; Prudential
Securities Incorporated; Robertson Stephens, Inc.; Salomon Smith Barney; Thomas
Weisel Partners; and, UBS Warburg.
"These recommendations embody our industry's aspirations to strengthen ethical and
professional standards for securities analysts, unde~score broker-dealers'
commitment to the best interest of our clients. and buttress the overall integrity of the
securities markets," said the letter the CEOs signed.
SlAts best practices address all aspects of the research department's role within a
h1t P://\\'\\'\\, .sia.com/prcsslhtI111/pr

-
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.' Endorses Best Practices to Ensure Ongoing Integrity of Research

firm to ensure that research is objective, independent, and of the highest integrity.
The practices cover disclosure, recommendations, compensation, the relationship to
investment banking and other business units, the relationship with the companies
covered by analysts. the research process. and personal trading and investment.

Among the key recommendations:
• Research departments should not report to investment banking or any other
business units that might compromise their independence.
• Analysts should be encouraged to indicate both when a stock should be bought
and when it should be sold, and management should support the use of the full
ratings spectrum.
• Analysts should not trade against their recommendations and should disclose
their holdings in companies they cover.
• Analysts' pay should not be directly linked to investment banking transactions,
. sales, and trading revenues or asset management fees.
The full text of the best practices is available at
http://www.sia.com/publications/pdf/BestPractices F.pdf.
"Helping investors to identify appropriate i.nvestment opportunities and deyelop a
financial plan is a vital function securities firms perform for investors," said SIA
President Marc Lackritz. "Analysts playa very important role by providing thoughtful
and independent analysis for investors. These 'best practices' are part of many efforts
to ensure that our industry abides by the highest professional standards."
"SIA members hold their research staffs, like the rest of their employees, to the
highest level of integrity," said Sutton. 'he commitment of firms to these best
practices sends a strong message to the investing public that serving their interests is
our first priority."
.
The Securities Industry Association brings together the shared interests of nearly 700
securities firms to accomplish common goals. SIA member-firms (including
investment banks, broker-dealers, and mutual fund companies) are active in all U.S.
and foreign markets and in all phases of corporate and public finance. The U.S.
securities industry manages the accounts of nearly 80 million investors directly and
indirectly through corporate, thrift, and pension plans. In the year 2000, the industry
generated $314 billion of revenue directly in the U.S. economy and an additional $110
billion overseas. Securities firms employ approximately 770,000 individuals in the

U.S.
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INVESTOR RELATIONS RESOURCES
CONFERENCE CALL SERVICES: (continued)
ASSOCIATrONS:

ConferTech International, Inc.
12110 North Pecos Street
Westminster, CO 80234-2076
(800) 525-8244
davinci.csn.netlconfertech

American Association of Individual Investors (AAII)
625 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611-3110
(312). 280-0 170
www.aaii.com
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc.
521 Fifth Avenue, 32nd Floor
New York, NY 10175
(212) 681-2010
www.ascs.org

InterCall
Glenridge Highlands One
SS5 Glenridge Connector
Ste.495
Atlanta, GA 30342
(800) 374-2441
W\\w.intercall.com

Association for Investment Management
Research (AIMR)
Post Office Box 3668
Charlottesville, VA 22903
(804) 977-6600
www.aimr.org

Premiere Conferencing
109S5 Lowell Avenue, Suite 600
Overland·Park, KS 66210
(800) 234-2546
www.atsgroup.com
CORPORATE REPORTING SERVICES:

National Association of Investors Corporation (NAIC)
Post Office Box 220
Royal Oak, MI 48068
www.better-investing.org

Moody's Investor Services
99 Church Street
New York, NY 10009
www.moodys.com

National Association of Securities Dealers
1735 K Street, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 728·8000
www.nasd.com

Standard & Poor's Corporation
25 Broadway
New York, NY 10004
(800) 221-3122
www.standardpoors.com

National Investor Relations Institute
(Publishers of Annual IIR Resource Guide)
8045 Leesburg Pike
Suite 600
Vienna, VA 22182
(703) 506-3570
www.niri.org
CONFERENCE CALL SERVICES:

BestCalls.com
15951 Los Gatos Blvd.
Suite 16
Los Gatos, CA 95032
\vww.bestcalls.com

DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES:

American Society ofCorporate Secretaries, Inc.
521 Fifth Avenue, 32nd Floor
New York, NY 10175
www.ascs.org
Bowne Red Box Service
Bowne Publishing Division
345 Hudson Street
New York, NY 10014-4589
(212) 924-5500
www.bowne.com

C-Call.Com, Inc.
540 Howard Street, Third Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 284-7980
\\~w.c-cal1.com
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EARNINGS ESTIMATE SERVICES:

INTERNET SERVICES: (Continued)

FirstCalJ
11 Farnsworth Street
Boston, MA 02210
(617) 345-2100
www.firstcaJI.com

CCBN.com
133 Portland Street
Boston, MA 02114
(617) 531-2999
info@ccbn.com

Institutional Brokers Estimate System (lIBlEIS)
345 Hudson Street
New York, NY 10014
(212) 243-3335
www.ibes.com

Direct Report
12 Clock Tower Place
Maynard, MA 01754
(800) 990-6397
(978) 897-3739 (fax)
\V\vw.shareholder.com

Standard & Poor's Corporation
25 Broadway
New York, NY 10004
(800)221-3122
www.standardpoors.com

PRNewswire
New York Headquarters
810 Seventh Avenue, 32M Floor
New York, NY 10019
(800) 832-5522
(800) 793-9313 (fax)
\vww.pmews\vire.com

Zack's Investment Research
ISS North Wacker Drive
Chicago, IL 60606
(312) 630-9880
www.zacks.com

Investor Broadcast Network (Vcall)
833 Chestnut East
Ste.1300
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215)599-4800
(215)599-5007 (fax)
\\'\vw.vcall.com

FAX SERVICES:

Business Wire
40 East 52nd Street
New York, NY 10022
(212) 752-9600
\vww.businesswire.com

MAILING LIST SERVICES:

bigdough.com
6935 Wisconsin Avenue, 3rd Floor
Chevy Chase, MD 2081 S
(800) 254-1005
W\\'W.bigdough.com

PRNewswire
1SO East 58th Street, 31 st Floor
New York, NY 10166
(212) 832-9400
www.pmewswire.com

Thomson Investor Relations
75 Wall Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10005
(877) 498-4750
www.technimetrics.com

SureFax
Cable & Wireless Communications, Inc.
1919 Gallows Road
Vienna, VA 22182
(800) 229-7113
www.cwplc.com

Vickers Stock Research Corporation
226 New York Avenue
Huntington, NY 11743
(516) 423-7710
www.vickers.com

INTERNET SERVICES:

Business Wire
40 East S2nd Street, 19th Floor
New York, NY 10022
(800) 221-2462
(212) 752-9698 (fax) ·
www.businesswire.com

MEETINGS:

The Wall Street Forum
1369 Madison Ave., Ste. 254
New York, NY 10128
(802) 253-7596
www.wallstreetforum.com
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NEWS RELEASE CONTACTS:

NEWS RELEASE CONTACTS: (continued)

Associated Press
SO Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10020
www.ap.org

Dow Jones San Francisco
(415) 986-6886
(415) 989-7527 (fax)
Dow Jones Boston
(617) 423-4600
(617) 654-6711 (fax)

Bloomberg Business News
News Department
Post Office Box 888
Princeton, NJ 08542-0888
(609) 279-3000
(609) 497-6577 (fax)
www.bJoomberg.com

Dow Jones Washington, DC
(202) 862-9266
(202) 862-9200 (fax)
Dow Jones New York
(212) 416-3299 (fax)

Business Wire
Cathy Baron Tamraz, Eastern Division Manager
) 185 Avenue of the Americas, 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10036
(212) 575-8822
(212) 575-1854 (fax)
www.businesswire.com

Investment Data Corporation
7758 Wisconsin Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20814
(800) 254-1005
www.idc.com

Dow Jones Ticker (NYC)
200 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10281
(201) 938-5400
(201) 938-5600 (fax)
www.dowjones.com"
Dow Jones Atlanta
(404) 865-4360
(404) 865-0179 (fax)
Dow Jones Chicago
(312) 750-4000
(312) 750-4 I 53 (fax)
Dow Jones Dallas
(214) 951-7101
(214) 95 1-7111 (fax)
Dow Jones Detroit
(313) 963-7800
(313) 963-6527 (fax)
Dow Jones Houston
(713) 227-5440
(713) 547-9228 (fax)
Dow Jones Los Angeles
(323) 658-6464
(323) 658-3828 (fax)
Dow Jones Pittsburgh
(412) 553-6900
(412) 471-4769 (fax)

Investor's Business Daily
12655 Beatrice Street
Los Angeles, CA 90066

(310) 448-6711
(310) 577-7311 (fax)
www.investors.com
PRNewswire
Gary Kass, ChiefCopy Editor
150 East 58th Street, 31st Floor
New York, NY 10166
(212) 832-9400
(800) 793-9313 (fax)
www.pmewswire.com
Reuters News Service
Financial News Bureau
1700 Broadway, 31st Floor
New York, NY 10019
(212) 859-1700
(212) 859-1717 (fax)
www.reuters.com
PROXY SOLICITORS:

Corporate Communications, Inc.
523 Third Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37210
(615) 254-3376
www.corpcomminc.com
Corporate Investor Communications, Inc.
111 Commerce Road
Carlstadt, NJ 07072-2586
(20 I) 896-1900
www.cic.com
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PROXY SOLICITORS: (Continued)

PUBLICITY: (Continued)

Georgeson & Company, Inc.
Wall Street Plaza
New York, NY 10005
(212) 440-9979
www.georgeson.com

Forbes
60 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10011
www.forbes.com
Fortune
Time & Life Building
Rockefeller Center
New York, NY ·10020
VlWw.fortune.com

D.F. King" Co., Inc.
77 Water Street
New York, NY 10005
(212) 269-5550
www.dfking.com

Individual Investor
125 Broad Street, 14th Floor
New York,·NY 10004
212-742-2277
www.iionJine.com

Kissel-Blake Inc.
25 Broadway
New York, NY 10004
(212) 344-6733
www.kisselblake.com

Investor's Business Daily
126S5Beatrice Street
Los Angeles, CA 90066
www.investors.com

Morrow &, Co., Inc.
909 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 754-8000
www.morrow.com

Registered Representative
18818 Teller Avenue
Suite 280
Irvine, CA 92612-1680

PUBLICITY:
Barron~

(949) 851-2220

200 Liberty Street

(949) 851-1636 (fax)
\V\\'W.mnag.com

New York, NY 10281
www.barrons.com

STOCK WATCH SERVICES:

Betler Investing
Official Publication ofNational Association
of Investors Corporation
Post Office Box 220
Royal Oak, MI 48068
www.better-investing.com

The Carson Group
1790 Broadway
Suite 1501
New York, NY 10019
(212) 581-4000
www.carson.com

Business Week
1221 Avenue ofthe Americas
New York, NY 10020
www.businessweek.com

Georgeson & Company, Inc.
Wall Street Plaza
New York, NY 10005
(212) 440-9979

www.georgeson.com

Financial Communications Company
(Buyside, Research, Investor Direct)
2201 Third Street
San Francisco, CA 94107
(415) 621-0220
(415) 621-0735 (fax) ·
WW\v.buyside.com ·
w\vw.researchmagazine.com
\VVlw.streetnet.com

Kissel-Blake, Inc.
25 Broadway
New York, NY 10004
(212) 344-6733
www.kisselblake.com

I(b)-20

STOCK WATCH: (Continued)

Morrow &, Co., Inc.
909 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022
(212) 754-8000
www.morrow.com
TARGETING SERVICES:

The Carson Group
1790 Broadway
Suite 1501
New York, NY 10019
(212) 581-4000
www.carsongroup.com
Georgeson & Company, Inc.
Wall Street Plaza
New York, NY 10005
(212) 440-9979
www.georgesoD.com
Thomson Investor Relations
75 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005
(877) 498-4750

www.technimetrics.com
WRITING STYLE:

The Associated Press
Stylebook and Libel Manual
Perseus Books
Reading, MA 01867
W\vw.8w.comlgbl
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SECTION I(b)

Theory and Practice of SEC Regulation FO
By Janet Kelley and Patrick Daugherty •
11 th Biennial MidwestlMidsouth Securities Law Conference
February 15-16, 2002
Louisville, Kentucky
A. Refreshing Your Recollection: The Basics
1. Selective Disclosure Banned. A registrant must disclose publicly (i.e., by Form 8-K or
another method "reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution to the public")
any "material nonpublic information" disclosed by a person acting "on behalf of" the registrant to a
broker-dea1er or its employee (including a sell-side analyst), an institutional investor or its employee
(including a buy-side analyst) or another securityholder who is reasonably likely to buy or sell the
registrant's debt or equity securities while aware of the information (collectively, "the Street").
2. Exceptions. The only exceptions permit disclosures (1) to lawyers, accountants, investment
bankers or others who owe a duty of trust or confidence to the registrant, (2) to rating agencies
developing published credit ratings for the registrant, (3) to those persons who expressly agree to
maintain the information in confidence or (4) in connection with a registered securities offering· (other
than a "continuous" offering such as an employee benefit plan or a DRIP).
3. MMateriality" Defined. Information is "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would consider it important in making an investment decision. Put another way, a
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that it would be viewed by the reasonable investor as
significantly altering the "total mix" of information made available. For a contingent or speculativeevent, materiality depends on probability and magnitude. These are legal tests, with qualitative aspects;
as emphasized in SAB No. 99, quantitative rules of thumb can be useful but are not dispositive.
4. "Nonpublic" Defined. Information is "nonpublic" if it has not yet been disseminated in a
manner making it available to investors generally.

s. Covered Speakers. Persons deemed to be acting "on behalf of' the registrant are its "senior
officials" and others who regularly communicate with the Street or with the registrant's securityholders.
The registrant's "senior officials" are its directors, executive officers, investor relations and public
relations officers and other persons with similar fuQctions.
6. Public Dissemination. Methods "reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary
distribution to the public" include (1) distribution of a press release through a widely disseminated news
or wire service- and (2) announcement at a conference of which the pUblic had notice and to which the
public was granted access, either by personal attendance, by telephone or by other technology (such as
webcasting). A website posting, without more, is insufficient.

• Ms. Kelley is the General Counsel of Kmart Corporation, headquartered in Troy,. Michigan.
Mr. Daugherty is a partner of Foley & Lardner in Detroit.
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7. Timing of Reguired Disclosure. In the case of an "intentional" disclosure to the Street, the
required public disclosure must be made "simultaneously." In the case of a "non-intentional" disclosure
to the Street, the required public disclosure must be made "promptly" (within 24 hours after a senior
officer learns that there has been such a disclosure that the officer knows, or is reckless in not knowing,
is both material and Donpublic or, if later, by the next NYSE opening bell). A selective disclosure is
"intentional" when the speaker knows or recklessly disregards that the information is both material and
nonpublic.
B. Industry Reaction; Academic Study; Consensus Advice; Evolving Practices
1.. NIRI Survey. Highlights: 75% said "same amount, or more, information disclosed; 79%
said there are at least as many one-on-ones as before; 79% said earnings guidance is given in some
form; a significant number reported fewer requests to review analysts' reports; and 89% reported use
of open webcast calls for earnings discussions (other 11 % reported "no conference calls, period").
2. USC/Purdue Study. Sampling nearly 1,600 companies, the researchers examined stock price
volatility surrounding corporate earnings announcements and found that volatility, far from increasing,
bas actually decreased sligbtly now that Regulation FD is in effect. The researchers also found no
significant deterioration in various measures of analyst forecasting performance. For example, they
found no change in analyst forecast errors, or in the dispersion of analyst forecasts, after controlling for
extraneous factors. This evidence, like the price volatility evidence, is inconsistent with any claimed
deterioration in the information environment. The only significant effect of Regulation FD found by the
r~searchers was a near doubling of the number of voluntary public earnings announcements made by
managers. This implies that registrants now disclose publicly wbat they once gave the Street selectively
- precisely wbat the SEC bas been trying to achieve.
3. ABA Task Force Survey. An ABA Task Force on Regulation FD surveyed the federal
securities bar on a broad range of issues relating to public-company practices that have evolved since
the regulation became effective. The more notable conclusions include:
•

Are clients disclosing more, the same, or less information to analysts and investors?
More, 45%; same, 24%; less, 26% (one called it "Regulation Fewer Disclosures")

•

Are disclosures better, the same, or worse? Better, 30%; same, 50%; worse, 18%

•

How many clients conduct one-on~ones with analysts? Most or some, 61 %

•

Do clients have a black-out period? Yes, 87%

•

How long? No clear pattern (two to seven weeks)

•

What is a "reasonable" period of public notice of an analyst call where material
nonpublic information will be disclosed in connection with a routine earnings
· release? 24 bours or less, 25%; 48 hours or less, 50%

•

What is your e~perience with analysts' willingness to enter into confidentiality .
agreements? They won't do it, period, 40%; depends, 32%
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•

Do your clients "correct" analysts whose forecasts vary with the company's
forecasts? No, 57%; yes, 14%; no response, 29%

•

Do your clients confirm their announced forecasts to analysts? No, 50%; yes, 35 %;
DO response, 15%

•

How long after the original announcement? No clear pattern, but all specific
responses were four weeks or less

4. Law Finn Survey.·A survey of 22 national law firms revealed that the following advice is
most commonly given:
•

Determine/designate and limit who will be authorized.spokespersons (20/22).

•

Educate or inform spokespersons (13/22).

•

Review/reexamine written disclosure policies (13/22).

•

Create "disclosure" team; prepare for unintentional disclosures (11/22).

•

Require earnings calls to be open to public and give public notice of same (12/22).

•

Use "safe harbor" language in making forward-looking statements (11/22).

•

Script/prepare for analyst calls (10/22).

•

Develop system for keeping track of publicly disclosed information (10/22).

•

Monitor what the market knows about your company (7/22).

•

Hold debriefing sessions after an analyst conference (7/22).

•

Require more than one representative to be present during one-on-ones (6/22).

•

Put clear limits/ground rules on any private sessions with analysts (5/22).

•

If company decides to review analyst report, limit to factual inaccuracies (5/22).

c. Ten Nuances Worth Knowing
1. "Earnings Guidance": - don't do it, says the SEC in its adopting release; don't even say
"earnings are right on target"; what's banned is selective earnings guidance (e.g., don't give earnings
guidance in a one-on-one); public earnings guidance has become extremely common, but be sure to
invoke the safe harbor (and eliminate the boilerplate), and bear in mind that plaintiffs' lawyers are
known to be obtaining and using webcasts; mid-to-Iate-quarter conference calls are becoming more
common; one issuer (named "Progressive") has gone to monthly reporting
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2. A voiding Selective Updating of Earnings Guidance: reiterating guidance is an update (do not
say "as we said before" unless you intend to update); merely choosing to quote prior words is also an
update; how best to handle questions on guidance in one-on-ones: "I really can't comment on our prior
guidance"
3. The "Mosaic Theory": has been preserved, indeed celebrated; everyone does it (what you
gn do in a one-on-one is help the analyst "fiJI in" his or her mosaic); but it can't be used to circumvent
the rule (e.g., by deconstructing the company's earnings projection and feeding the assumptions to an
analyst one assumption at a time)
4. The "Road Show" Exception: applies to statements made "in connection with" a registered
offering; does not apply to every statement made in the course of a road show; for example, would not
apply to a regularly scheduled investment 'conferencethat happened to coincide with a road show; also,
does not apply to statements made in connection with a private offering, areal problem in Rule
144AlRegulation S (European) offerings

s. Chat Rooms and Personal-Finance Websites: "don't go there" to comment, ever; company
should have a policy banning employee participation
6. Investor Conferences: usually, and by design, these aren't "public" events; if making a
statement there, assume the Street is present, and try to convince the sponsor(s) to open it up - e.g., by
webcasting; but note that even that won't be good enough unless your company makes its own public
announcement and makes a webcast of your comments in real time from its own website; alternatively,
don't say anything material and nonpublic or, if you plan to say something material and nonpublic, then
issue a press release concurrently; plan what you are going to say and don't deviate; and remember that
it's safer to schedule these conferences earlier in your quarter than later
7. Form 8-K versus Press Release: the sense of the federal securities bar is that Form 8-K is
beloved by the SEC Staff, but in the real world a press release connotes "greater dignity"; also, the
major SROs require a press release for disclosure of material information (the NYSE rules stipulate that
the "normal method of publication of important corporate data is by means of a press release" while the
NASD rules mandate disclosure "through international wire services or similar disclosure media"); the
better practice is to use both; and the best practice is to use both plus a website posting; but remember
that a website posting alone is currently deemed insufficient because of the so-called "digital divide"
8.. Confidentiality Agreements: generally, analysts (especially sell-side analysts) won't sign
(their firms tell them to "just say no"); exception - an analyst might sign a confidentiality agreement
before initiating coverage, while coming up to speed; breach of a confidentiality agreement is not a
Regulation FD violation, is rather more serious than that (Rule lOb-S); it's not good enough to say "I
won't trade" or "I won't violate the law"; must actually agree to keep the information "confidential"
9. Shareholder Meetings: traditionally, these aren't "public" in the manner Regulation FD
demands for provision of material nonpublic information; therefore, say nothing material and nonpublic
unless there is a -press release and an 8-K; in my opinion, the innovation of electronic shareholder
meetings will eventually change this, but we're nowhere near that point yet
10. Restructurings: Restructuring talks with public debtholders require confidentiality
agreements under Regulation FD.· Debtholders who want to remain free to trade while the restructuring
proceeds will refuse to sign these agreements.

I(c)-4 .

D. Enforcement Activity
No actions have been brought (in the United States); "investigations" only; according to
outgoing DOE Director Richard Walker in May 2001, fewer than ten investigations were pending at
that time, and he thought this proved that it's no big deal; Walker's enforcement position was, and
Chairman Pitt's position is, not to sue companies that have made mistaken but reasonable and goodfaith attempts to comply with Regulation FD; what irks the SEC most is the kind of incident that led to
the adoption of Regulation FD in the first place (e.g., calling pet analysts and tipping them to bad news
ahead of a public announcement).
Situations suggested by Walker to be abusive:
•

Calling multiple analysts to review prior announcements, resulting in the analysts lowering
their earnings estimates

•

Calling analysts serially and talking them down from their earlier assumptions

•

Calling a single analyst late in the quarter to confirm guidance given pUblicly "months
earlier when market conditions were very different"

The conunon thread·ofalt these alleged abuses is - making a phone call. According to
Conunissioner Hunt at the ABA Annual Meeting in August, the hottest "hot button" for the SEC is any
situation where it's the issuer's management that places the call (and not vice-versa). The thinking is:
analysts are supposed to ferret out information, not be spoon-fed; if management feels a need to "reach
out," then it should issue a press release. (Note that this thinking is contra the conunon practice of
calling the out-of-contact rogue analyst whos~ estimates are skewing the averages. It's also contra
management's acceptance of a standing invitation to calion an analyst "while in town.")
Publicized investigations to date include: Raytheon (selectively disclosed "color" conunents);
Motorola (selective confirmation of earnings guidance). Regulation FD investigations are conunenced
quickly, move along quickly, so it looks doubtful that Raytheon or Motorola will be sanctioned.
There has been one enforcement action in Canada, under Canadian law (not under Regulation
FD, although clearly the result would have been the same), resolved by consent decree last sununer:
Air Canada's CFOand CIO conceded that they developed and used a script to call 13 analysts, serially,
to tell them that earnings would be lower than expected. A.press release was issued the next day, and
even then only because the Toronto Stock Exchange had inquired. The company was fined (Can.) $1
million for this misconduct, which has been illegal for years in Canada but was never before enforced.
E. Unger Report
1. Background. Bearing a date of December 2001, this report expresses the views only of
Commissioner Unger. The report draws upon evidence gathered from the SEC's Apri124, 2001
"roundtable" discussion of Regulation FD and from eight surveys pertaiaiBz to the new rules to identify
issues of conunon concern and to make reconunendations to the SEC for increasing the effectiveness of
Regulation FD. (See note 8 to the Unger Report for the website addresses of all eight surveys.)
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2. Recommendations. Commissioner Unger, who alone dissented from the adoption of
Regulation FD, characterizes her recommendations as "fme tuning." The recommendations include:
•

The SEC should consider issuing an interpretive release to make its position on
materiality under Regulation FD clearer. This would provide the SEC a
constructive opportunity to articulate its views on materialityt using real-world
factual scenarios.

•

If enforcement action is warranted, the SEC should consider issuing a Section 21(a)
report.

•

The SEC should explore with the SROs ways to amend·theirrules to expand the
range of tools - beyond the press release - that would satisfy both Regulation FD
and SRO information dissemination requirements.

•

As the digital divide continues to narrow, the SEC should continue to reevaluate .its
position on how the Internet can further the goals of Regulation FD. The SEC
should consider encouraging use of the Internet as a prime dissemination tool.

•

In particular the SEC should deem adequately-noticed website pastings. fullyaccessible webcasts (without an accompanying press release repeating the
substantiuve information) and electronic-mail alerts to satisfy Regulation FD.

•

If the SEC determines that Regulation FD has caused companies to cut back on
making future projections, then it·should consider using its authority under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act to expand the safe harbor to encourage
more forward-looking disclosure.

•

Regulation FDpurports to leave intact the mosaic theory so that analysts can use
pieces of nonmaterial information to build a material mosaic. Right now, though,
the pieces of the mosaic are hard to come by due to the confusion about materiality.
In providing guidance, it would be helpful for the SEC to provide concrete
examples of what information issuers could give analysts to build their mosaics
without running afoul of Regulation FD.

t

F. Resources

http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm (the adopting release)
http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone/phonesupplement4.htm (telephone interpretations)
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm (the Unger report)
http://www.shareholder.com (turnkey webcasting service found here)
http://www.fedex.comlus/investorrelations/financialinfo/disclosure.htm (a published policy)
http://~.thecorporatecounseI.net (state-of-the-art thinking and practice)
Erica H. Steinberger and John J. Huber. "The Effect of Regulation FD on Mergers,
Acquisitions and Proxy Solicitations and the Requirements of Regulation M-A," The M&A Lawyer,
Oct./Nov. 2000, at 1-11.
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Bruce Alan Mann, ·Want that new FD to be easier? Try a projection template," Business Law
Today, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 26-29.
John Jennings, "Regulation FD: SEC Reestablishes Enforcement Capabilities over Selective
Disclosure," 32 St. Mary's L. J. 543-609 (2001).
.
Clay Richards, "Selective Disclosure: A 'Fencing Match Conducted on a Tightrope' and
Regulation FD - The SEC's Latest-Attempt to 'Electrifytbe Tightrope,'tt 70 Miss. L. J. 417-440

(2001).
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Legg Mason Overview

o Founded in 1899, Legg Mason, Inc. is a NYSE-listed firm with an equity
market capitalization of approximately $3.3 billion.

o Legg Mason operates in three principal business segments:

securities

brokerage, asset management, and capital markets.
~

0 A summary of Legg Mason's performance during its last nine fiscal years

N

follows:
Revenues

Assets Under Management
($ Billions)

($ Millions)

--

"1

$1.5

Equity Capital
($ Millions)

$150

$1.2
$120
$0.9

Market Capitalization
($ Millions)
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Legg Mason Overview
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D 1,290 financial advisors in 138
offices.
D More than 1,000,000 accounts
hold $65 billion in assets.
D Superb brokerage force with
high quality client base.

D $170 billion of assets under
management in all major asset
classes, domestic and
international.

D Full service capital markets
division includes investment
banking, research and sales &
trading.

D Separate accounts and
proprietary mutual funds.

DOver 370 professionals.

D Commitment to Legg Mason
Research.

limit......
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D Focused on core industry sectors
teaming investment banking,
research and sales & trading.
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The Economic Outlook

o Little incentive for business expansion in fixed assets.

o Modest corporate profits and overcapacity further reduce the need for
capital expenditures.

o Consumer spending unlikely to remain at current levels due to higher
unemployment, mounting debt balances and poor equity performance.

'i""'
0\

o Interest rates are likely to increase as the Fed ends its easing cycle and the
government increases its debt issuance.

o Timing and magnitude of the economic recovery is uncertain.
Will demand accelerate enough to warrant an increase in
production and, in tum, encourage business development?
..
•
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New Environment

Cost of Capital

~
I

Capital Markets
Focus

I

.....,J

I

Nearly zero:

Nearly infinite:

raise as much as
you can

make the most of

Growth

Profits, cashflow and

credit quality - back

I

Capital Technology I
Budgets
Employee Strategy

...................... ItiV. estv.umt
·.1

•

....•..•

Banking

what you have

I

Loose

I
I

Recruit for growth

I

7

to basics

Tight
Motivate, screen, cut
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Public Equity Offerings - Number of Transactions

450 I
400
350
300
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200
150
100
50
0

~
I

\0
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6
IPO

ADR IPOs

Follow-On
Offerings

I • 2000

• 2001

Convertibles

I
Source: Equidesk
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Public Equity Offerings - Dollar Amounts
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IPOs - Number of Transactions - at Pricing

200
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~
I
~
~

85
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I

•
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• 2001
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Size Matters

o Despite 4x fewer IPOs in 2001 than 2000, the average deal size rose
approximately 134% to $419 million.

o 11% of the IPOs completed in 2001 raised over $1 billion versus 4% in
2002.
Co..!
I

~

tv

o 45% of the dollars raised from IPOs in 2001 came from 4 deals.
o Current backlog consists of 25 IPOs seeking to raise $2.9 billion for an
average deal size of $116 million.
/
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2001 IPO Market by Sector

~
I

.........

w

I
I

I

29

11.7%

17.2%

Technology

20

25.7%

41.1%

Oil & Gas

11

8.3%

Healthcare

I

-4.8%

Finance

I

6

10.7%

-3.1%

Insurance

I

5

8.1%

19.9%

Professional Services

I

5

2.9%

19.8%

1) Sectors withfive or more 2001 US Marketed [POs

o In 2001 50% of IPO companies were profitable vs. 24% for 2000.
Source: Equidesk
_...
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Public Equity Markets Summary

IPOs
Follow-on Offerings
~
I
~

~

Convertibles
PIPEs

'III
:. '.'. . . . ..:.
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Tight - market slowly coming back
Available to larger established companies
Available to larger established companies
Available
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PIPE Issuers - Typical Characteristics

o Low institutional ownership.
o "Fallen angel" -

reduced research coverage by Wall Street.

o Public capital market constraints.
~
I

......

0\

o Dramatic decrease in share price.
o Immediate need for cash infusion.

RIll
> •. nv.estment
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PIPEs - Structural Issues

o Common security with warrants.
~

Discount of 5% to 20%.

o Common security with resettable warrants.
~

Dependent on future stock performance.

~
I

~

o Common stock issued off of a shelf registration.

-.....J

~

Shortens time to market.

o Convertible security with warrants.

:.
•

~

5% to 25% conversion premium.

~

Coupon of 4% - 7%.

. ..... ....•.. .:. Inv. es.tl1.t.ent
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PIPE Transaction Volume

Completed Deals
($ in Millions)

$30,000

1,500
$24,491

$20,000

1,000

$10,000

500

~
I
~

00

$O~
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o
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-
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1999

2000

2001

-..... Dollar Amount

Number of Deals

Source: Placement Tracker
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Top 10 PIPE Investors

~
I
~

\0

I

I

1.

I Vulcan Ventures, Inc.

2.

I Forstmann Little & Company

6

$1,601,750,000

3.

I Janus Capital Corporation

11

$1,581,560,000

17

$1,795,653,452

4.

Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst, Inc.

6

$1,015,000,000

5.

E.M. Warburg, Pincus & Co., LLC

29

$884,233,073

6.

Rose Glen Capital Management, L.P.

86

$737,590,195

7.

I Microsoft Corporation (Nasdaq: MSFT)

8

$560,555,200

8.

I Citadel Investment Group, Inc.

82

$553,380,482

9.

I Angelo, Gordon & Co., L.P.

77

$508,707,011

31

$496,453,717

Q

10.

J Putnam Investment Management, Inc.

Note: 1995 through Q3 2001

Source: Placement Tracker

_
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Benefits to the Issuer

o Process increases exposure to sophisticated investors.
o Market is comprised of accredited investors, including: private equity
funds, crossover funds, and hedge funds.

o Offering process provides the Company with structuring flexibility and the
~

ability to deliver comprehensive presentations that explain the business
model.

o

o Highly creative and tailored structures.

Structuring flexibility allows for
offering to consist of common stock, convertible preferred stock, delayed
registration convertibles or debt.

o Return parameters depend upon the type of investor - financial or strategic and typically range from 15% to 40%.

nv.est.n. lent
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Disadvantages to the Issuer

o Investor will require a discount to market.
o Limited number of "blackout" periods for the issuer during effectiveness
period of resale registration statement.

~
I

N

o Can only be marketed to accredited investors.

..........

o Cannot sell more than 20% of issuer's outstanding stock without
receiving prior stockholder approval.

_
'" . '"
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Interneuron Pharmaceuticals, Inc. - PIPE Case Study

3,125,000 Shares

I

fh~!~~l~C~~~?n

~
I

tv
tv

Private Placement
of Common Stock

Legg Mason Wood Walker
Incorporated

_ :
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Private Equity Markets Summary
Deal Flow
Investment Pace

Quality

Prices

~
I

N

~

o No standout industry for new investment.
o Investment in existing portfolio projects and follow on financings.
o No liquidity (lack of an IPO market or attractive M&A exit multiple).
..
•
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Private Equity Markets Summary

o Deal flow has slowed dramatically.

o Investment pace down 53% YTD Q3 2001 over YTD Q3 2000.
o Quality improving slowly.
;G
U\

~

More experienced management teams with solid business plans.

~

Recreational entrepreneur has gone home.

o Prices on average are declining.
~

60+% declines on average deals; tracking the public market risk premium.

~

Two classes of deals: price elastic and price inelastic.

~

Pricing gets worse with low demand, low cash, high expenses.

n.~ent

•
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Private Equity Markets

$35

__ $30

=

l

1656

T

1553

~

t 1,500

11')00

~ $25

~~-r.l.

rIj
..-..
1,200 ~

'e

.....
~

Co.-4

~

I

tv

~

0\

Q

$20

~

=
=
S $10
$5
$0

900

717

:: $15

<

1,800

~ ~4.()
I

~

"a!

~~

I

I

~

I

~

~a!

,a!

_

d"£~

•••••••••

"'•

~

'Va!

I

~

"a!

I

~

~a!

I

I

~

I

~

,~

'V~

Amount Invested ($B)

~

,,~

~

600

_+300
I 0

I

~~

~

,~

~

'V~

~

,,~

..... Number of Deals
Source: Venture One

.:
•

::.IltVestl1.'l.e1tt

• ...•... Banking

26

~
~

..c

$10.6
$8.4
_

$:;;4

0

a
=
Z

Investments in Venture-Backed Companies by Industry
Amount Invested
3Q 2001 ($6.5 Billion)

Amount Invested
Year to Date 2001 ($25.5 Billion)

Biopharmaceuticals

ConfidentiaV
Undisclosed

Biopharmaceuticals
Confidentiall
6%
Undisclosed

9%

15%

Communications

Communications

15%

~
I

tv

'-J

Medical IS
Medical IS

ConsIBus Services

2%

10%

Information
Services
5 % Industrial

3%

-

Cons/Bus Services
14%

Medical Devices

...J

Healthcare Services

5%

0%

0%

Source: Standard & Poor's
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Investments in Venture-Backed Companies by Stage of Development

Dollars Invested Q3 2001 ($6.5 Billion)
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Commitments to Venture Capital Funds - "Money is Available"

$109 Billion
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Median Pre-money Valuation by Year
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Median Pre-money Valuation by Round Class
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Median Pre-money Valuations by Industry
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The Senior Bank Debt Market Summary

o Credit quality is the primary concern among senior lenders.
> Deteriorating credit quality in existing portfolios.
> External regulatory scrutiny.

o Pricing is at record levels in the leveraged market for both spreads and
~
I

upfront fees.

W

~

o Declining leverage multiples.
o Increased equity contributions to leveraged buyouts.
o Tightening of financial covenants and more aggressive amortization
schedules.
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The Senior Bank Debt Market

Average New Issues BB/BB- Spreads

Average Debt Multiples of Highly Leveraged Loans
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Alternatives to Traditional Senior Bank Debt
Asset Based Financing

o Non-bank institutions are filling the void.
o Loans are subject to advance rates against inventory, receivables and
plant, property and equipment.
~
I

W
0\

o Borrower receives more flexibility and lenders receive more security.
o Often deemed to be counter cyclical.
o "Lender of last resort" stigma is no longer relevant.

.
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Alternatives to Traditional Senior Bank Debt
Mezzanine / Subordinated Debt

o Tremendous capacity from a variety of players - banks, institutional
funds, hedge funds, insurance companies.

o Lenders seeking an all-in rate of return of 18% - 25%.
~
I

W
-.......l

o Flexibility in structure and type of security.
> All coupon.
> Warrants.

o Longer term and modest amortization requirements.
o Flexible covenant and security package.
.,.
•
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D

Implications for Private Companies
Short term, it's about survival
D Don't cut it too close.
D Don't run out of money, extend the runway.
~

D Don't count on a recovery anytime soon.
D Be realistic on valuation vs. capital availability.
D Plan on more modest amounts of financing.

•
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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, D.C.

The Securities and Exchange Commission disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement of any of its
employees. This outline was prepared by members of the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance and does not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the Commissioners or other members of the staff.
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CURRENT ISSUES AND RULEMAKING PROJECTS
DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE
QUARTERLY UPDATES
FOR MARCH 31, 2001, JUNE 30, 2001 AND SEPTEMBER 30, 2001 1

I.

DIVISION ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
The Division's organizational structure is as follows:
Division Director
- David B. H. Martin (202) 942-2800
Deputy Director
- Michael McAlevey (202) 942-2810
Senior Counsel to the Director
- Anita Klein (202) 942-2980
Operations
Principal Associate Director (Disclosure Operations)
- Shelley Parratt (202) 942-2830
Associate Director (Disclosure Operations)
- James Daly (202) 942-2881
Associate Director (Disclosure Operations)
-William L. Tolbert, Jr. (202) 942-2891
Senior Special Counsel (Regulatory Policy)
- James Budge (202) 942-2800
Office of EDGAR and Information Analysis
- Herbert Scholl, Chief (202) 942-2930
Disclosure Support
Associate Director (Legal)
- Martin P. Dunn (202) 942-2890

1 These are the 2001 quarterly updates to the Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporation
Finance's Current Issues and Rulemaking Projects outline. Issua!1ce of the first quarterly update dated March 31,
2001 reflected a new approach by the Division of Corporation Finance. Previously, the Division revised the entire
outline periodically by adding new material and deleting dated sections. The users of the outline expressed concern
regarding the increasing size of the outline, difficulties in focusing on new material and the loss of deleted sections
that continued to include useful, if no longer new, material. In response to these concerns, the Division will leave the
most recent version of the complete outline (November 14, 2000) on the Commission's web site and will publish
quarterly updates throughout the year. Those quarterly updates will then be combined with updates from the fourth
quarter to comprise an annual update to the outline.
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Office of Chief Counsel
- Paula Dubberly, Chief (202) 942-2900
Office of Rulemaking
-Elizabeth Murphy, Chief (202) 942-2910
Associate Director (Regulatory Policy)
- Mauri Osheroff (202) 942-2840
Senior Special Counsel (Regulatory Policy)
- Mark W. Green (202) 942-2840
Office of Mergers and Acquisitions
- Dennis O. Garris, Chief (202) 942-2920
Office of International Corporate Finance
- Paul Dudek, Chief (202) 942-2990
Office of Small Business Policy
- Richard Wulff, Chief (202) 942-2950
Associate Director (Chief Accountant)
- Robert Bayless (202) 942-2850
Assistant Directors
Health Care and Insurance
- Jeffrey P. Riedler (202) 942-1840
Consumer Products
- Christopher Owings (202) 942-1900
Computers and Office Equipment
- Barbara Jacobs (202) 942-1800
Natural Resources
- Roger Schwall (202) 942-1870
Structured Finance, Transportation and Leisure
- Max Webb (202) 942-1850
Manufacturing and Construction
- Steven Duvall (202) 942-1950
Financial Services
- Todd Schiffman (202) 942-1760
Real Estate and Business Services
- Karen Gamett (202) 942-1960
Small Business
- John Reynolds (202) 942-2950
Electronics and Machinery
- Peggy Fisher (202) 942-1880 .
Telecommunications
- Barry Summer (202) 942-1990
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Division Employment Opportunities for Accountants and Attorneys
Accountants
The Division has about 104 staff accountants with specialized expertise in the various
industry offices. The Division provides a fast-paced, challenging work environment for
accounting professionals. Our staff works on hot IPOs and current and emerging accounting
issues. We influence accounting standards and practices and interact with the top professionals in
the securities industry.
A staff accountant's responsibilities include examining financial statements in public
filings and finding solutions to the most difficult and controversial accounting issues. A
minimum of three years' experience in a public accounting firm or public company dealing with
SEC reporting is required. If you want to experience a unique learning opportunity and explore
the depth and breadth of accounting theory, principles, and practices, call (202) 942-2960 for
information on employment opportunities in the Division.
Attorneys
The Division has about 147 attorneys who process filings and draft and interpret
regulations. Every year, we recruit top law school graduates, and from time to time have
positions for lateral applicants with solid legal skills and experience. Applicants should
demonstrate an ability to accept major responsibilities. We prefer applicants who have had
experience in securities transactions involving public companies. It is also helpful" but not
necessary, if applicants have accounting and/or business training.
Responsibilities include analyzing and commenting on disclosure documents in public
offerings, including those relating to mergers and acquisitions. The positions involve working
directly with companies, their executives, underwriters and investment banking firms, outside
counsel and outside accountants. The work involves innovative financing and business
structures. Interested persons should send resumes to-Division of Corporation Finance, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549.
II.

MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

A.

Option Exchange Offers
1.

Introduction

On March 21, 2001, the Division of Corporation Finance, pursuant to delegated authority
from the Commission, issued an exemptive order (<<http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfinlrepricing.htm») under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) for
issuer exchange offers that are conducted for compensatory purposes. The order exempts
these exchange offers from Rules 13e-4(f)(8)(i) and (ii), the all holders and best price
rules, so long as the following conditions are met:
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2.

•

the issuer is eligible to use Form S-8, the options subject to the exchange offer
were issued under an employee benefit plan as defined in Rule 405 under the
Securities Act, and the securities offered in the exchange offer will be issued
under such an employee benefit plan;

•

the exchange offer is conducted for compensatory purposes;

•

the issuer discloses in the offer to purchase the essential features and significance
of the exchange offer, including risks that option holders should consider in
deciding whether to accept the offer; and

•

except as exempted in this order, the issuer complies with Rule 13e-4.

Background

The Division of Corporation Finance has become aware of issuers conducting exchange
offers to reprice their employees' stock options. The structure of these exchange offers
varies from issuer to issuer and is based upon their compensation policies and practices.
Frequently these exchange offers will require option holders to agree to revised vesting or
exercisability terms or to accept a reduced number of securities in exchange for receiving
a lower exercise price. The new options or other securities offered in exchange for
existing options may be registered under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), but
generally are offered in reliance on an exemption from registration, typically Section
3(a)(9) of the Securities Act.
These offers commonly involve securities issued through broad-based plans, are open to a
large number of employees, are not limited to executive or senior officers of the issuers,
are not privately negotiated compensation arrangements, have fixed terms, and are open
for a limited period of time. Unlike the situation where an issuer unilaterally reprices its
options, the option holders have individual decisions to make. Further, the decision
whether to accept the offer is an investment decision and not merely a compensation
decision. These exchange offers are subject to the issuer tender offer rule, Rule 13e-4
under the Exchange Act, if the issuer has a class of equity securities. registered under
Section 12 or is required to file reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.
The exemptive order eliminates the limitations that the all holders and best price rules
place on issuers' ability to structure exchange offers consistent with their compensation
policies and practices. This will reduce the bu.rdens and costs to issuers that otherwise
must seek individual exemptions from the Division. We believe that these exchange
offers do not present the same concerns caused by discriminatory treatment among
security holders that these rules were intended to address.
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3.

Disclosure and Processing

Issuers that are subject to Rule 13e-4 are reminded that the remaining provisions of Rule
13e-4, as well as Regulation 14E, apply to these exchange offers. A Schedule TO-I must
be filed at the time the exchange offer commences, and the disclosure required by the
schedule must be disseminated to option holders in accordance with Rule 13e-4. The
disclosure items of the Schedule TO-I must be complied with in the offer to purchase
only to the extent applicable. The items do not require a response in the offer to purchase
if they are not applicable to the offer. The disclosure should set forth clearly the essential
features and significance of the exchange offer, including risks that option holders should
consider in deciding whether to accept the offer. The disclosure also should include
financial information about the issuer, which generally is material to the option holders'
investment decisions. See Item 10 of Schedule TO. The financial information in the
disclosure may be in summary form if the issuer incorporates its financial statements by
reference into the schedule and offer to purchase. See Instruction 6 to Item 10 of Schedule
TO.
We understand that issuers contemplating option exchange offers are concerned that staff
review may cause issuers to incur additional costs to disseminate revised materials in
response to staff comments and also may cause offers to be extended. The Division
always balances the necessity of staff review with the best use of staff resources. These
types of exchange offers are conducted for compensatory purposes and are less likely to
raise the concerns that often are present in non-compensatory tender offers. In this regard,
the Division staffs decision to review these exchange offers will take into account the
presence of the disclosure discussed above. Issuers should note that they are responsible
for full compliance with Rule 13e-4 whether or not the staff reviews the filings. Issuers
also are reminded of their disclosure obligations under Item 402 of Regulations S-K and
S-B and under generally accepted accounting principles.
Issuers or their counsel should contact the Office of Mergers & Acquisitions at (202) 9422920 if they have questions about the exemptive order or compensatory option exchange
offers generally.

III.

ELECTRONIC FILING AND TECHNOLOGY

A.

Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
In 2000, Congress enacted the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce

Act ("E-SIGN") to promote the use of electronic records and signatures in interstate and
foreign commerce. Among other things, E-SIGN provides that, if a state or federal law
requires that information be retained, this requirement may be satisfied by retaining an
electronic record of the original document that accurately reflects the information set
forth on the original and remains accessible to all persons who are entitled to access, in a
format that is capable of being accurately reproduced for later reference.
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As prompted by E-SIGN, the Division undertook a review of the rules under the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Regulation S-T in order
to identify provisions where issuers are required to maintain records. Four significant
areas were identified:
• . the rules requiring five-year retention of manually-signed signature pages or other
documents ("authentication documents") that appear in typed form within
documents, such as prospectuses and periodic reports, which are filed with the
Commission via EDGAR or which are permitted to be filed in paper form;
•
•

•

the rule requiring five-year retention of documents comprising a Form S-8
prospectus;
the rule requiring five-year retention of each publicly distributed document, in the
format used, that contains graphic, image, audio or video material where such
material ~s not included in the electronic version filed with the Commission; and
the rule requiring two-year retention of written representations by persons subject
to the reporting requirements of Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act that they were
not required to file an annual statement of beneficial ownership of securities on
Form 5.

On June 14, 2001, the Commission issued an interpretive release providing guidance on
the application of E-SIGN to these recordkeeping requirements (Release No. 33-7985).
The release provides that E-SIGN is not applicable to authentication documents since
these records are generated principally for governmental purposes. It states that issuers
should continue to retain paper copies of these documents. The release also provides that
the other identified records may be retained in electronic form, as long as the method
selected for retention provides the same assurances of accuracy and accessibility as are
provided by paper retention.

B.

Mandated Electronic Filing for Foreign Issuers
(See Section V. "Internationalization of the Securities Markets" below)

IV.

SMALL BUSINESS ISSUES

A.

Small Business Initiatives
The 20th Annual Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation was
held in Washington D.C. on September 6-7,2001. This platform for small business is the
only governmental-sponsored national gathering for small business, which offers annually
the opportunity for small businesses to let government officials know how laws, rules and
regulations are affecting their ability to raise capital. The next Government-Business
Forum will be in September of 2002.
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v.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS

A.

Confidential Processing of Foreign Issuer Filings
Filings by public companies are generally available to the public, including filings of
amendments to remedy disclosure deficiencies identified by staff reviewers. The Division
of Corporation Finance staff recognizes that foreign private issuers and foreign
governments often face unique circumstances when accessing the US markets. This is
particularly true when a foreign registrant's securities trade publicly in its home market,
and the company will be making new and different disclosure as a result of its registration
with the SEC.
To address these concerns, the staff often reviews and screens draft submissions of
foreign registrants on a non-pUblic basis. The staff, however, is revising its practice in this
area. The staff generally will continue to accept on a draft basis registration statements in
connection with an issuer's initial registration with the SEC. Except in unusual
circumstances, however, once a foreign issuer has registered a transaction under the
Securities Act or a class of securities under the Exchange Act, the staff no longer will
accept from that issuer additional registration statements on a draft basis and will not
review or screen a registration statement until it is publicly filed.
The timing and scope of staff review of draft registration statem,ents is generally the same
as for publicly filed registration statements. Foreign issuers are reminded that, when draft
registration statements are submitted to the staff, the documents should be complete, as
described in "International Financial Reporting and Disclosure Issues," available on the
SEC's website. The Division's Office of International Corporate Finance should be
contacted in advance of any draft submission.

B.

International Disclosure Standards-Amendments to Forms 20-F, F-2 and F-3
On June 15, 2001, the Commission adopted technical amendments to Form 20-F, the
basic Exchange Act registration statement and annual report form used by foreign issuers,
and to Forms F-2 and F-3 under the Securities Act of 1933 (Release No. 33-7983). The
amendments clarify language in the forms that could create confusion as to the forms'
disclosure requirements.
The forms were last revised by the Commission on September 28, 1999 (Release No. 337745). As revised, Instruction I to Item 8.A.4-incorrectly implied that audited financial
information for a period of less than a full year would satisfy the requirement that audited
annual financial statements are no more than 15 months old at the time of the offering or
listing. The technical amendments clarify that a foreign private issuer cannot satisfy the
I5-month audited annual financial statement requirement by filing financial statements
that cover less than a full fiscal year, even if those statements are audited. Audited
fin~ncial statements for a period of less than a full year, however, will continue to satisfy
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the requirement that the audited financial statements in an initial public offering are no
more than 12 months old at the time of the filing.
The amendments also codify the long-standing practice of accepting two years audited
income statement and statement of cash flows information if the financial statements are
presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP, and conform Item 3.A (Selected Financial
Data) of Form 20-F by adding an instruction to include predecessor information as
already required in Instruction 1 to Item 8 (Financial Information).
Finally, the amendments correct various cross-references in Forms F-2 and F-3 under the
Securities Act. The amendments were necessary only to clarify language in the forms, and
do not alter the current disclosure requirements for companies filing on the forms.

c.

Mandated Electronic Filing for Foreign Issuers
On September 28, 2001, the Commission proposed for public comment rule and form
amendments that would require foreign private issuers and foreign governments to file
electronically their securities documents through the Commission's Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system (Release No. 33-8016). Currently,
the Commission's rules only permit" but do not require, foreign issuers to file their
securities documents on EDGAR. By mandating the electronic filing of foreign issuers'
securities documents on EDGAR, the Commission seeks to achieve the same investor
benefits and the same efficiencies in information transmission, dissemination, retrieval
and analysis realized since it mandated EDGAR filing for domestic issuers.
Mandated EDGAR filing benefits investors by making available to the public information
contained in Commission filings soon after the Commission has received them. Filers
benefit from electronic filing requirements since the electronic format facilitates research
and data analysis, thereby fostering increased market exposure for their securities. Filers
also benefit from the speedy and secure delivery afforded by EDGAR filing as well as
. from the efficiencies achieved in the Commission's review and processing of their filings.
The proposal in the release would amend Regulation S-T, the Commission's rules
governing electronic filing, to eliminate the foreign issuer exception from mandated
EDGAR filing for most Securities Act and Exchange Act documents. The proposed
amendments would require the electronic filing of
•

foreign private issuers' Securities Act registration statements and Exchange Act
registration statements and reports;

•

foreign governments' Securities Act registration statements and Exchange Act
registration statements and reports;

•

MultijurisdictionalDisclosure System forms filed by Canadian issuers;
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•

statements of beneficial owners.hip on Schedules 13D and 13G and tender offer
schedules that pertain to the securities of a foreign issuer, whether filed by a
foreign or domestic person;

•

Form CB, the form used for cross-border rights offers, exchange offers and
business combinations that are exempt from the tender offer rules .or Securities
Act registration, if the filer or the subject co~pany is an Exchange Act reporting
company; and

•

most Trust Indenture Act forms.
The proposed amendments would further

•

permit,but not require, a foreign issuer to file a Form 6-K electronically if the sole
purpose of the Form 6-K is to submit the foreign issuer's attached annual report to
.security holders;

•

permit, but not require, supranational entities, such as the World Bank, to file their
reports electronically;

•

continue to require documents submitted under Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(b) to
be in paper only;

•

eliminate the option that currently exists for paper filers to provide an English
language summary of a foreign language exhibit instead of a complete English
translation; and

•

provide a transition period of four months from the date of the adopting release
before the amendments would become effective.
Comments on the proposals should be submitted by December 3,2001.

VI.

OTHER PENDING RULEMAKING AND RECENT RULE ADOPTIONS

A.

Pending Rulemaking
1.

Proposed Equity Compensation Plan Disclosure

As the use of equity compensation, particular~y stock options, has increased in recent
years, so too have concerns about the impact of these programs. These concerns involve
(a) the absence of full disclosure to security holders about equity compensation plans, (b)
the potential dilutive effect of these plans and (c) the adoption of many plans without the
approval of security holders.
On January 26, 2001, the Commission proposed amendments to its rules and forms that
would require registrants to disclose, at least annually, information about the total number
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of securities that have been authorized for issuance under their equity compensation plans
in effect as of the end of the last completed fiscal year, whether or not the plans have been
approved by security holders (Release No. 33-7944). Specifically, the proposed
amendments would require disclosure in a registrant's proxy statement or annual report on
Form 10-K or 10-KSB of the following:
•

the number of securities authorized for issuance under each equity compensation
plan of the registrant in effect as of the end of the most recently completed fiscal
year;

•

the number of securities issued pursuant to equity awards made during the last
completed fiscal year, plus the num~er of securities to be issued upon the exercise
of options, warrants or rights granted during the last completed fiscal year, under
each plan;

•

the number of securities to be issued upon the exercise of outstanding options,
warrants or rights under each plan; and

•

other than securities to be issued upon the exercise of outstanding options,
warrants or rights, the number of securities remaining available for future issuance
under each plan.

This disclosure would be set forth in a tabular format in the registrant's proxy or
information statement whenever the registrant is seeking security holder action regarding
a compensation plan or in the registrant's annual report on Form 10-K or 10-KSB in years
when the registrant is not seeking security holder action regarding a compensation plan.
The time period for submitting comments on these proposals ended on April 2, 2001.

B.

Recent Rule Adoptions
1.

Integration Safe Harbors for Abandoned Offerings

On January 26, 2001, the Commission adopted new Securities Act Rule 155 (Release No.
33-7943). This rule provides safe harbors from integration for a registered offering
following an abandoned private offering, or a private offering following an abandoned
registered offering. For purposes of these safe harbors, Rule 155(a) defines a "private
offering" as an unregistered offering of securities that is exempt from registration under
Section 4(2) or 4(6) of the Securities Act or Rule 506 of Regulation D under the
Securities Act.
The conditions of the Rule 155(b) private-to-registered safe harbor are as follows:
•

No securities were sold in the private offering;

K-IO

•

The issuer and any person(s) acting on its behalf terminate all offering activity in
the private offering before the issuer files the registration statement;

•

Any prospectus filed as part of the registration statement discloses information
. about the abandoned private offering, including

•

the size and nature of the private offering,

•

the date on which the issuer terminated all offering activity in the private offering,

•

that any offers to buy or indications of interest in the private offering were
rejected or otherwise not accepted, and

•

that the prospectus delivered in the registered offering supersedes any selling
material used in the private offering; and

•

The issuer does not file the registration statement until at least 30 calendar days
after termination of all offering activity in the private offering unless the issuer
and any person acting on its behalf offered securities in the private offering only
to persons who were (or who the issuer reasonably believes were) accredited
investors or sophisticated.

The conditions of the Rule 155(c) registered-to-private safe harbor are as follows:
•

No securities were sold in the registered offering;

•

The issuer withdraws the registration statement;

•

The issuer and any person acting on its behalf do not commence the private
offering earlier than 30 calendar days after the effective date of withdrawal of the
registration statement;

•

The issuer notifies each offeree in the private offering that

•

the offering is not registered under the Securities Act,

•

the securities will be "restricted securities" as defined in Rule 144 and cannot be
resold without registration unless as an exemption is available,

•

purchasers do not have the protection of Section II of the Securities Act, and

•

a registration statement for the abandoned offering was filed and withdrawn,
specifying the effective date of the withdrawal; and

•

Any disclosure document used in the private offering discloses any changes in the
issuer's business or financial condition that occurred after the issuer filed the
registration statement that are material to the investment ·decision in the private
offering.
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To facilitate reliance on the registered-to-private safe harbor, Rule 477 was amended to
provide automatic effectiveness for an application to withdraw an entire registration
statement that has not yet become effective, unless the Commission objects within 15
days after the issuer files the application.
Rules 429 and 457 were amended to move the provisions addressing the offset of filing
fees from Rule 429 to Rule 457. Amended Rule 429 continues to address combined
prospectuses.
Amended Rule 457 provides that where all or a portion of the securities offered remain
unsold after a completion or termination of a registered offering, or withdrawal of the
registration statement, the aggregate total dollar amount of the filing fee associated with
those unsold securities may be offset against the total filing fee due for one or more
subsequent registration statements. The subsequent registration statement(s) must ,be filed
within five years of the initial filing date of the earlier registration statement, and must be
filed by the same registrant (including a successor within the meaning of Rule 405), a
majority-owned subsidiary of that registrant, or a parent that owns more than 50 percent
of the registrant's outstanding voting securities.
Amended Rule 457 also provides as follows:
•

If a filing fee is paid for the registration of an offering and the same registration
statement also covers the resale of the securities, no additional filing fee is
required to be paid for the resale;

•

Payment of a filing fee is not required for the registration of an indeterminate
amount of securities to be offered solely' for market-making purposes by an
affiliate of the issuer; and

•

A registration fee may be calculated on the basis of the maximum aggregate
offering price of the securities, without regard to whether the securities are offered
by the issuer or selling shareholders.

The effective date for the new rule and the amendments is March 7,2001.

VII.

STAFF LEGAL BULLETINS FOR DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE

A.

Addendum to Staff Legal Bulletin No.1 (CF) - Confidential Treatment Requests
On July 11, 2001, the Division republished Staff Legal Bulletin No.1, with an addendum.
The bulletin deals with processing of confidential treatment requests filed in connection
with filings under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. The addendum gives
guidance on two issues. First, it specifies that requests for confidential treatment of the
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application itself and supporting documentation must be made under Securities Act Rule
406 or Exchange -Act Rule 24b-2, whichever is appropriate for the underlying exhibit.
Second, the addendum describes the lengths of time we will consider granting extension
for confidential treatment of exhibits whose original grants are about to expire.

C.

Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 (CF) - Rule 14a-8
Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 relates to Rule 14a-8 under the Exchange Act. The Division
structured the legal bulletin with three overriding purposes in mind, namely, to explain
the Division's role in the Rule 14a-8 no-action process, to provide guidance on a variety
of Rule 14a-8 issues, and to suggest ways to facilitate the Division's review of Rule 14a-8
no-action requests. The legal bulletin addresses procedural matters that are common to
shareholders and companies alike and provides a consolidated restatement of many of the
Division's current practices.

VIII. CURRENT DISCLOSURE, LEGAL AND PROCESSING ISSUES
A.

Disclosure, Legal and Processing Issues
1.

Cover Page Gate/old/or Registered Public Offerings

In many registered public offerings, issuers choose to include text and/or artwork inside
the front and back cover pages. Graphics depicting a registrant's products or services, or
explaining how they are used, can be very helpful to investors - particularly when the
products or services relate to a complex process or technical industry. In order to avoid
significant reprinting costs, we will review proposed gatefold and other graphic
presentations as soon as they are available. Mos~ of our comments are based on the
following staff concerns:

•

The graphics don't accurately represent current business - for example, the
depiction of products that do not exist yet or are not the registrant's products, the
selective one-sided presentation of only the most favorable aspects of a registrant's
business, excessive hyping, the inclusion of testimonials or statistical data that are
taken out of context, or the identification of customers or other third parties upon
which the registrant is not substantially dependant;

•

The text in the graphics does not adhere to plain English principles - for example,
the use of technical industry jargon and terms that are unfamiliar to the average
investor or the inclusion of extensive narrative text which repeats information
already contained in the summary or business sections; and

•

The graphics detract from other prospectus disclosure because it is too confusing
or obscure.
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The gatefold for each registrant is unique, and we take into account all the information we
have' learned about the registrant and its industry when we review it. Sometimes the
gatefolds for two different registrants seem similar at first glance, but they may raise
significant staff concerns in one instance and ~ot in the other, based on the unique facts of
each registrant.
Registrants and underwriters can expedite staff review and reduce the number of staff
comments if they keep in mind our concerns when "they are preparing their gatefold and
other graphic presentations.
2.

Section 12 Registration ReliefInvolving Employee Stock Option Plans

Companies have granted stock options to broad based groups of employees under stock
option plans in anticipation of going public within a short time after the stock option
grants. These stock options are granted under stock option plans established for
compensatory purposes. Many companies are now finding that they have granted stock
options to 500 or more employees and their plans to go public have been delayed.
Under Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, an issuer with 500 holders of record of a class
of equity security and assets in excess of $10 million at the end of its most recently ended
fiscal year must register the class of equity security, unless it has an exemption from
registration. Stock options are a separate equity security under the Exchange Act.
Accordingly, an issuer with 500 or more option holders and more than $10 million in
assets is required to register that class under the Exchange Act, absent an exemption. The
exemption from registration under Section 12(g) contained in Rule 12h-l(a) for "[a]ny
interest or participation in an employee stock bonus, stock purchase, profit sharing,
pension, retirement, incentive, thrift, savings or similar plan which is not transferable by
the holder except in the event of death or mental incompetency, or any security issued
solely to fund such plans" does not apply to stock options.
Beginning in 1991, the Commission by order, and subsequently the staff by no action
letter, exempted or relieved issuers with 500 or more stock option holders from having to
register their stock options under the Exchange Act when specified conditions were
present. For the conditions necessary to receive relief under these letters and orders see,
for example, the no action letter to Mitchell International Holdings, Inc. (available
December 27,2000).
Due to current market conditions, which are delaying the plans of many companies to go
public, we are revising the conditions necessary to receive relief from registering their
employee stock options under Section 12(g). As in the past, any relief granted by the staff
would apply only to the stock options. Once a company has 500 holders of record of any
other class of equity securities (e.g., common stock outstanding as a result of stock
issuances, including option exercises), it would be required to register that class. The
modified conditions would need to be present only when the company is relying on the
relief.
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We will consider granting relief in situations where the conditions of our prior no action
letters noted above are met with the following modifications:
•

The options may be immediately exercisable.

•

Former employees may retain their vested options.

•

As with the current conditions, the options must remain non-transferable in most
cases. However, we will permit the options to transfer on death or disability of the
option holder. The stock received on exercise of the options may not be
transferable, except back to the company or in the event of death or disability.

•

Consultants may participate in the option plan if they would be able to participate
under Rule 701. We encourage you to review the adopting releases effecting the
recent changes to Rule 701 and Form S-8 to understand the categories of
consulting services that fall within this group. See Releases 33-7645 and 33-7646.

We will premise any changes in our current position on option holders receiving
essentially the same Exchange Act registration statement, annual report and quarterly
report information ·they would have received had the company registered the class of
securities under Section 12, including audited annual· financial statements and unaudited
quarterly financial information, each prepared in accordance with GAAP.
April 30, 2001 is the filing date for registration statements of issuers that met the Section
12(g) registration requirement as of December 31, 2000. We will consider extending that
filing date to July 30, 2001 for any issuer that has submitted a no-action request to us by
April 30, 2001. Any questions may be directed to Amy Starr in the Office of the Chief
Counsel, (202) 942-2900.

3.

Equity Line Financings
[Note: The following discussion of our views replaces Interpretation No. 4S in the
March 1999 Supplement to the Division's Manual of Publicly Available Telephone
Interpretations.]
a.

Description of "Equity Line" Financing Arrangements

In a typical "equity line" financing arrangement, an investor and the company enter into a
written agreement under which the company has the right to "put" its securities to the
investor. Under this "put," the company has the right to tell the investor when to buy
securities from the company over a set period of time and the investor has no right to
decline to purchase the securities. The dollar value of the equity line is set in the written
arrangement, but the number of shares that the company will actually issue is determined
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by a formula tied to the market price of the securities at the time the company exercises
its "put."

b.

Private Equity Lines with Registered Resales

In many equity line financings, the company will rely on the private placement exemption
from registration to sell the securities under the equity line and will then register the
"resale" of the securities sold in the equity line financing. In these types of equity line
financings,. the delayed nature of the "puts" and the lack of market risk resulting from the
formula price differentiate private equity line financings from financing PIPEs (private
investment, public equity). We, therefore, analyze private equity line financings as
indirect primary offerings.
While we analyze private equity line financings as indirect primary offerings, we
recognize that the "resale" form of registration is sought in these financings. As such, we
will permit the company to register the "resale" of the securities prior to its exercise of the
"put" if the transactions meet the following conditions:
•

The company must have "completed" the private transaction of all of the securities
it is registering for "resale" prior to the filing of the registration statement.

•

The "resale" registration statement must be on the form that the company is
eligible to use for a primary offering.

•

In the prospectus, the investor(s) must be identified as underwriter(s), as well as
selling shareholder(s).

We have been asked a number of interpretive questions regarding private equity line
financings.

Q.

For the private transaction to be "complete," the investor must be
irrevocably bound to purchase all the securities. How does this apply to the
"put"?

A.

Only the company may have the right to exercise the "put" and, except for
conditions outside the investor's control, the investor must be irrevocably
bound to purchase the securities once the company exercises the "put."

Q.

If the investor is permitted to transfer its obligations under the equity line,
will the transaction be "completed"?

A.

No.

Q.

If the investor has the ability to make investment decisions under the
equity line agreement after the filing of the "resale" registration statement,
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the investor will not be considered irrevocably bound. What are some
structures that we consider to continue to provide the investor with an
investment decision?
Examples that we have observed include:
•

agreements that give investors the right to acquire
additional securities (including the right to acquire
additional securities through the exercise of warrants) at the
same time or after the issuer exercises its "put";

•

agreements that permit the investor to decide when or at
what price to purchase the securities underlying the "put";
and

•

agreements with termination provisions that have the effect
of causing the investor to no longer be irrevocably bound to
purchase the securities underlying the "put."

Q.

Is a "due diligence out" a condition to closing within the investor's control
that would prevent us from considering the transaction completed?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Are conditions such as (a)"bring downs" of customary representations or
warranties and (b) customary clauses regarding no material adverse
changes affecting the company copditions to closing within the investor's
control that would prevent the private transaction from being completed?

A.

No.

Q.

If the company may "put" securities other than the shares of common stock
being registered for "resale," such as a derivative security convertible into
common stock (f.:,g., a convertible note or a convertible preferred security),
would the private transaction be considered completed?

A.

No. This is because the investor may have further investment decisions to
make regarding the purchase of securities underlying the derivative
security and will, therefore, not be irrevocably bound to purchase the
securities that are being registered for "resale."

Q.

If the above conditions are not met, can the company register the "resale"
of the securities?

A.

As a general matter, no. However, if the following conditions are met, the
company may register the "resale" transaction, as these conditions address
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our concerns regarding inappropriate use of shelf registration and liability
for potential violations of Securities Act Section 5.
•

The company is eligible to use Form 8-3 or Form F-3 for a primary
offering of securities.

•

The company complies with Rule 415(a)(4).

•

The company addresses, in the prospectus, issues relating to the
potential violation of Section 5 in connection with the private
transaction.

If the preceding three conditions are not met, the company must withdraw
the registration statement and complete the private transaction. After the
private transaction is completed, the ability to register the "resale" of the
securities underlying the "put" would be analyzed in accordance with the
views discussed in this section.
c.

Takedown Off an Issuer's ShelfRegistration Statement for Equity Line
Financings

Some companies desire to register, as a primary offering, the issuance of the "put"
securities under an equity line. We believe that an equity line financing done as a primary
offering in which the "put" price is based on or at a discount to the underlying stock's
market price at the time of the "put" exercise is an "at the market" offering under Rule
415(a)(4) and must comply with the requirements of that rule. In this regard, we have
been asked the following questions regarding the application of Rule 415(a)(4):

Q.

May the company and the investor enter into the equity line agreement
before effectiveness of the Form S-3 or Form F-3?

A.

As a general matter, no. However, the company and the investor may enter
into the equity line agreement before effectiveness of the registration
statement if the investor is a registered broker-dealer acting as an
underwriter.

Q.

Rule 415(a)(4)(iv) states "[t]he underwriter or underwriters must be named
in the prospectus which is part of the registration statement." This leads to
two questions:
•

Is it appropriate to name the underwriter or underwriters in a
prospectus supplement?
No. The registration statement must identify a registered brokerdealer as an underwriter, either in the base prospectus or a post-
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effective amendment - it is not appropriate to rely on Rule 424 and
use a prospectus supplement for this purpose.
•

Who must be named as an underwriter?
The prospectus which is part of the registration statement must
identify the investor, in addition to the registered broker dealer, as
an underwriter.

Q.

How do you calculate the 10% test in Rule 415(a)(4)(ii)?

A.

The entire amount of securities available under the equity line may not
exceed 10% of the aggregate market value of the company's outstanding
voting stock held by non-affiliates.

Q.

When do you calculate the 10% test in Rule 415(a)(4)(ii)?

A.

This calculation is made at the later of the time the issuer enters into the
equity line agreement or files the registration statement for the "at the
market" offering.

Q.

May the company and the investors amend the equity line financing
arrangement later to permit the entire number of securities available under
the equity line to exceed the 10% test?

A.

No. The parties may not amend the agreement in order to exceed the 10%
test; the company may not exceed the 10% test unless it enters into an
entirely new agreement relating to a separate financing arrangement. In
this regard, the company and the investors cannot have agreements to enter
into new agreements - we believe that all currently anticipated agreements
should be combined in determining the 10% threshold.

d.

Division ofMarket Regulation Issues

There may be other issues relating to the underlying or "resale" transaction, including
broker dealer registration, compliance with Regulation M or compliance with pre-filing
requirements of the National Association of Securities Dealers. We encourage companies
and investors to contact the Division of Market Regulation or the NASDR, as
appropriate, regarding these issues.
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B.

Confidential Treatment of Supplemental Materials, Including Responses to Staff
Comments
Issuers requesting confidential treatment of information submitted to the staff in other
than a filing must rely on the procedural provisions of Rule 83 and Regulation S-T.
Rules 406 and 24b-2 relate only to filed materials, not to materials submitted to the staff
supplementally.
While Item 101 (a) of Regulation S-T requires that all correspondence, including
responses to staff comment letters, be filed in electronic format on EDGAR, confidential
treatment cannot be granted for materials filed in electronic format. Confidential
treatment can only be granted for information filed in paper.
If you wish to request confidential treatment for any portion of a supplemental
submission, you must submit the supplemental submission on EDGAR with the
information subject to the confidential treatment request omitted from the electronic
submission. You must also submit the entire supplemental document to the staff in
paper. You must mark the information for which you are requesting confidential
treatment as sensitive or confidential in the paper copy and include the legend required by
Rule 83.

1.

Confidential Treatment Requests in Connection with Transactional Filings

We must complete the processing of all of an· issuer's pending applications for
confidential treatment prior to taking action on a transactional filing. To avoid delays in
the processing of transactional filings, it is helpful when an issuer notifies the
examination staff of pending confidential treatment applications when a transactional
filing is made. The notification can be part of the cover letter to the filing or can be made
to the Office of the Assistant Director responsible for processing the issuer's filings.

c.

Industry-Specific Issues
1.

Clarification of Oil and Gas Reserve Definitions and Requirements

The following are additions to the Division's discussion regarding this matter in the
November 14,2000 Current Issues and Rulemaking Projects outline at Section Vill.A.16.
a.

Determination ofReserves Under Production Sharing Agreements

Under Production Sharing Agreements, a host government typically retains the title to the
hydrocarbons in place, although the contracting company usually assumes all the costs for
exploration and carries all risks. When a discovery is made, the contract provides for the
contracting company to recover all of its exploration and development expenditures and
receive a share of profits, subject to certain limits. The amounts due to the contracting
company are typically taken in kind.

K-20

In general, two methods of determining oil and gas reserves under production sharing
arrangements have been proposed by registrants: (a) the working interest method and (b)
the economic interest method. Under the working interest method, the estimate for total
proved reserves is multiplied by the respective working interest held by the contracting
company, net of any royalty. Under the economic interest method, the company's share of
the cost recovery oil revenue and the profit oil revenue is divided by the year-end oil
price, which represents the volume entitlement. The lower the oil price, the higher the
barrel entitlement, and vice versa.

Reserve volumes determined by various owners should add up to 100% of the total field
reserves, but that is not always the case using the working interest method. If the working
interest is different from the profit entitlement, the economic interest method is the
method acceptable to the staff because it is a closer representation of the actual reserve
volume entitlement that can be monetized by a company. Also, use of the economic
interest method avoids violating the prohibition in paragraph 10 of SFAS 69 against
reporting reserves owned by others.
2.

Sample Letter Sent to Coal Mine Operators Regarding Compliance with Industry
Guide 7

(This letter is available at (<<http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/
coalmineletter.htm» )
3:

Accounting and Disclosure by Companies Engaged in Research and Development
Activities

Biotechnology companies and others engaged in research and development activities
often provide services and transfer rights under complex arrangements that present many
accounting and disclosure issues. The arrangements may include payment terms that
include receipt of up-front fees and milestone payments. These arrangements may include
multiple elements such as product licensing agreements, manufacturing/supply
agreements, royalty agreements, research and development agreements, and equity
issuances, among others. Different methods of accounting for revenue and expense
recognition may be appropriate under each of these arrangements. If these arrangements
comprise a significant portion of revenues, clear and balanced disclosure should be
provided about the terms of the arrangements, the methods of accounting for them, the
specific risks and uncertainties associated with them, and their historical and expected
effects on operations and financial position.
a.

Revenue Recognition

Question 5 to SAB 101 advises that up-front fees, such as technology license fees, should
be deferred and recorded over the term of the agreement unless it is clear that the earnings
process is completed. In evaluating whether the earnings process is complete, the
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perspective of the licensee must be considered. If the licensee requires from the registrant
future products or services to exploit the license, the license fee ordinarily should be
deferred because the earnings process is not complete.
Many arrangements provide for milestone payments to be received either based on the
passage of time or the occurrence of specific events. The timing of milestone payments
may be reflective simply of project financing terms, rather than representative of the
culmination of any particular earnings process. Diversity in accounting for milestone
payments exists. In some cases, registrants defer milestone payments and recognize
contract revenue on a systematic basis corresponding with services, costs, or time. In
other· cases, registrants recognize milestone payments as earned upon the occurrence of
contract-specified events, if those events coincide with the achievement of a substantive
element in a multi-element arrangement or measure substantive stages of progress toward
completion under a long-term contract.
To make the arrangements transparent to investors, the following disclosures are
encouraged:

•

Business Discussion - Describe each type of arrangement entered into by the
company, explaining its business purposes and the underlying activities. Examples
of agreement types are product/technology licenses, research and development
agreements, production/supply agreements, royalty agreements, equity sales
agreements, etc. Disclose the significant terms and characteristics of material
agreements, including the various elements of products and services to be
delivered by each party, the contract period, payment terms and amounts,
obligations of the parties, events and circumstances that trigger milestone
payments, and termination provisions. If the company has more than one
arrangement with the same party, or that party has other types of relationships
with the company, such as vendor, customer, or stockholder, discussion of the
multiple relationships and arrangements together may be necessary for investor
understanding.

•

Management's Discussion and Analysis - Discuss the historical and expected
effects of material new contracts and the achievement of revenue recognition
milestones on operations and financial position. Disclose the amounts of material
up-front and milestone fees scheduled to be received and to be recognized as
revenue over each of the next five years. Material uncertainties affecting
realization of fees should be highlighted.

•

Financial Statements - Disclose your revenue recognition policies. Describe
specifically how you apply your policies for each major revenue stream (i.e.,
research and development services, license agreements, product sales, consulting)
and payment form (i.e., up-front fees, milestone fees, royalty payments). If
different revenue recognition policies are followed for a particular major revenue
stream or payment form due to varying facts, circumstances or contractual terms,
each policy should be separately described. In many cases, especially for
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recognition of milestone payments, it will be necessary to discuss the facts and
circumstances resulting in the culmination of the earnings process. Disclose your
accounting policies for multi-element arrangements. Disclose the major terms of
material arrangements/agreements.
b. Research and Development Expenses

Many biotechnology registrants incur significant research and development expenses.
Although these expenditures may represent the majority of the expenses for many of these
registrants, the discussion of R&D expense in Commission filings is generally
uninformative. As indicated in FRC 501.01, MD&A is intended to give an investor an
opportunity to view a registrant through the eyes of its management. The following
disclosures are encouraged to enhance an investor's understanding of the company's use
and expected use of resources in R&D activities:

•

Business Discussion - Disclose the nature and status of each major R&D project
or group of related projects currently in process.

•

Management's Discussion and Analysis - Disclose for major R&D projects or
groups of related projects the costs incurred to date, the current status, and the
estimated completion dates, completion costs and capital requirements. If
estimated completion dates and costs are not reasonably certain, discuss those
uncertainties. Disclose the risks and uncertainties associated with completing
development projects on schedule and the consequences if they are not completed
timely.

•

Financial Statements - Disclose your accounting policies for internal research
and development expenditures, research and development conducted for others,
and research and development services for which you have contracted. Disclose
the types of costs included in R&D costs, including salaries, contractor fees,
building costs, utilities, administrative expenses and allocations of corporate
costs. Disclose the amount of research and development expenses incurred in each
year.

IX.

ACCOUNTING ISSUES 2

A.

Auditor Association with Interim Financial Statements
Rule 10-01(d) of Regulation S-X and Rule 310(b) of Regulation S-B require the review
of interim financial statements by an independent public accountant prior to their filing in
Form 10-Q or 10-QSB. The registrant is not required to state in the filing that the interim

2 Please also see "Current Accounting and Disclosure Issues in the Division of Corporation Finance," available on
our web site at <<http://www.sec.gov.divisions/corpfin.shtml>>.
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financial statements have been reviewed. A report of the independent public accountant is
required to be included in the filing only if the registrant states that the financial
statements have been reviewed. The interim review should be conducted in accordance
with SAS 71. The AICPA's Professional Issues Task Force issued Practice Alert No.
2000-4, which provides auditors with important information they will need to consider
for quarterly reviews of financial statements of public companies.
If the registrant fails to obtain a review of the interim financial statements prior to their

filing in Form 10-Q or 10-QSB, the filing is deficient and the registrant is deemed not to
be current or timely in its Exchange Act filings. If a review was not obtained, the staff
believes the registrant should disclose in a headnote, under Item 1 of Part I and preceding
the quarterly financial statements, that it did not obtain a review of the interim financial
statements by an independent accountant using professional review standards and
procedures, although such a review is required by the form. Completion of a review after
the interim financial statements have been filed with the Commission will make the filing
current, although it will not be deemed timely.
Auditors have professional responsibilities to consider when the registrant files interim
financial statements in a Form 10-Q or 10-QSB that have not been reviewed. Unless
otherwise disclosed in the filing, investors are likely to presume that the review required
by the form has been performed by the auditor of record. If financial statements with
which the independent accountant would be associated are included in a Form 10-Q or
IO-QSB without the accountant's timely review, the auditor should consider Practice
Alert 2000-4, AU§504 and Exchange Act Section lOA. Practice Alert 2000-4 advises that
the auditor should consider discussing that failure with the company's audit committee
and the company's legal counsel. If the deficiency is not immediately addressed through
the accountant's completion of a review, the accountant should request that the client
promptly amend the filing to disclose that the financial statements nave not been
reviewed by an independent accountant as required by the form. In addition, the auditor
has a responsibility to follow the guidance in Section lOA. Under that section, if the
company and its board fail to take appropriate remedial action with respect to an illegal
act that is material to the financial statements, and the auditor reasonably expects to
modify its report or resign due to the illegal act, then the auditor should report the
violation of the law to the SEC.

B.

Pooling-or-Interests Accounting
Following the tragic events of September 11, 200 I, the Commission took temporary
action in a series of emergency orders and interpretive releases to respond to market
developments.
On September 14, 2001, the Commission issued an emergency order pursuant to Section
12(k)(2) of the Exchange Act with respect to several different matters, including a
registrant's repurchase of its own securities under Exchange Act Rule IOb-18 (see
Section XI below). One aspect of the order affects the Commission's accounting rules.
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In connection with registrant repurchases, the Commission ordered that, notwithstanding
the current accounting literature, acquisitions by registrants of their own equity securities
during the period from September 17, 2001 until September 21, 2001 will not affect the
availability of pooling-of-interest accounting. (See Release No. 34-44791.)
On September 21, 2001, the emergency order was extended until September 28, 2001. (See
Release No. 34-44827.) On September 28,2001, similar relief was granted from October 1,
2001 until Octoberl2, 2001 under Section 36(a)(I) of the Exchange Act. (See Release No.
34-44874.)

C.

Auditor Independence
On September 14, 2001, the Commission also issued Release No. 33-8004. This
interpretive release expresses the Commission's view that, for purposes of Rule 2-01 of
Regulation S-X (which addresses auditors' independence from their audit clients), an
accounting firm with audit clients that had offices in and around the World Trade Center
may assist these clients in recovering their records and systems destroyed in the events of
September 11, 2001, without impairing the firm's independence from these clients. (See
Release No. 33-8004.) For further information, see Commission Press Releases Nos.
2001-91, 2001-97 and 2001-106.

X.

SIGNIFICANT NO-ACTION AND INTERPRETIVE LETTERS - NOVEMBER
15, 2000 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2001

A.

Sections 2(a)(3) and 5 of the Securities Act
1.

Liberty Media Corporation - February 7,2001

The Division was unable to advise that it would not recommend enforcement action if the
registrant redeemed its outstanding shares of tracking stock in exchange for shares of a
subsidiary corporation holding the assets and liabilities the tracking stock was designed to
track without registering the exchange under the Securities Act of 1933. The letter noted
that this will be the Division's position going forward in similar situations involving the
redemption of tracking stock of a parent company in exchange for sh~es of a subsidiary.

XI.

SPECIAL RELIEF ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE WAKE OF THE SEPTEMBER 11,
2001 TERRORIST ATTACKS

A.

Emergency Order
Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Commission issued an emergency
order pursuant to Section 12(k)(2) of the Exchange Act on September 14, 2001, taking
temporary action to respond to market developments. Section 12(k)(2) grants the
Commission the authority, in the event of certain major market disturbances, to issue
summarily orders to alter, supplement, suspend or impose requirements or restrictions
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with respect to matters or actions subject to the regulation of the Commission. The
Commission relied on Section 12(k)(2) to take temporary action with respect to several
different matters, including registrant repurchases of securities under Exchange Act Rule
10b-18 and the profit recovery provisions of Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act and the
rules adopted under it. (See Release No. 34-44791.)

1.

Registrant Repurchases Relief

The Commission ordered that an issuer, or an affiliated purchaser of an issuer, would not
be deemed to have violated Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act or Exchange Act Rule
10b-5 in connection with an Exchange Act Rule 10b-18 purchase of or bid for its own
securities made during the period from September 17, 2001 until September 21, 2001 that
did not strictly comply with the time or volume restrictions of Exchange Act Rule 10b-18.

2.

Exchange Act Section 16 Relief

The Commission ordered that, notwithstanding the profit recovery provisions of Section
16(b) and the rules adopted under it, any purchase during the period from September 17,
2001 until September 21, 2001 by a person subject to Section 16 shall be exempt from the
operation of Section 16(b) with respect to any sale by that person during the preceding six
months, and accordingly shall not be matched with such sale. The purchase continues to
be reportable on Form 4 under Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act. The Form 4 should
use· transaction code "J" and describe the transaction in a footnote, making specific
reference to the emergency order.
On September 21, 2001, the
(See Release No. 34-44827.)

em~rgency

order was extended until September 28, 2001.

On September 28, 2001, the Commission issued an exemptive order pursuant to Section
36(a)(I) of the Exchange Act temporarily easing some of the conditions of Exchange Act
Rule 10b-18 for issuers repurchasing their own securities during the period from October
1, 2001 through October 12, 2001. First, ·issuers whose equity securities trade at
sufficiently high volumes (meeting an average daily trading volume and public float test)
may effect purchases up to 10 minutes before the scheduled close of trading on the
primary market for such security. An issuer's purchase may not constitute the opening
transaction. Second, the volume condition for issuer repurchasers has been eased to
allow purchases of 100% of trading volume. (See Release No. 34-44874.) For further
information, see Commission Press Releases Nos. 2001-91,2001-97 and 2001-106.

B.

Calculation of Average Weekly Trading Volume under Securities Act Rule 144 and
Termination of an Exchange Act Rule IObS-1 Trading Plan
On September 21, 2001, the Commission issued Release No. 33-8005A. This
interpretive release expresses the Commission's view on how to calculate the average
weekly reported volume of trading in securities under Securities Act Rule 144(e), and

K-26

also expresses the Commission's view regarding termination of an Exchange Act Rule
10b5-1 trading plan during the period between September 11, 2001 and September 28,
2001.
Because the markets were open for only one day during the week beginning on September
10, 2001, law firms and registrants asked how to calculate the average weekly reported
volume of trading in an issuer's securities for purposes of Rule 144 under the Securities
Act. Rule 144(e) prescribes that the average weekly trading volume for a class of
securities will be calculated using the average weekly reported volume of trading in such
securities on all national securities exchanges and/or reported through the automated
quotation system of a registered securities association during the four calendar weeks
preceding the dates outlined in Rule 144(e). The Commission determined that the week of
September 10, 2001 does not provide a representative trading volume, and so should be
excluded from the calculation of the average weekly reported volume of trading in an
issuer's securities under Rule 144(e) during a four calendar week period. Instead, an
additional prior week should be included, for a total of four calendar weeks.
The release also addresses Rule 10b5-1 under the Exchange Act. Rule 10b5-1 generally
defines when a purchase or sale constitutes trading on the basis of material nonpublic
information. The release expresses the Commission's view that termination of a Rule
lOb5-1 trading plan during the period between September 11, 2001 and September 28,
2001, inclusive, does not, by itself, suggest that the plan was not "entered into in good
faith and not as part of a plan or scheme to evade" the insider trading rules within the
meaning of Rule 10b5-1(c). Accordingly, the availability of the Rule 10b5-I(c) defense
for transactions under the written plan would not be affected solely by termination of that
plan between September 11, 2001 and September 28, 2001. (See Release No. 33-8005A
and Press Release No. 2001-91.)

c.

Assistance to the Airline and Insurance Industries in Accessing the U.S. Capital
Markets
On September 28, 2001, the Commission issued a Press Release stating that, in support of
the desire of President Bush and Congress to foster the continued vitality of the nation's
airline and insurance industries, and to help companies in these industries reach u.S.
capital markets expeditiously, it has taken the following administrative steps for airline
and insurance companies covered by Congressional legislation in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks.
The Commission established separate telephone «202) 942-2816) and e-mail
(cthotline@sec.goc) hotlines for the airline and insurance industries, their underwriters
and other advisors. These hotlines will allow companies in these industries to obtain
immediate responses to financing and disclosure questions.
The Commission also stated that it wished to help companies in these industries use our
short-form registration on Form S-3 to raise capital quickly. It directed the Division of
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Corporation Finance to take the following short-term actions to enhance the usefulness of
short-form registration on Form S-3 for companies in these industries:
•

For companies with existing shelf registrations pursuant to Rule 415(a)(I)(x), the
staff will permit the extended use of our brief "notice" registration of additional
securities under Rule 462(b). Under this extension, the staff will permit use of
those procedures - including notice by fax and immediate effectiveness- to
register additional securities in an amount up to 20% of the dollar amount of
securities originally registered on that shelf registration'statement' (rather than the
amount remaining on that registration statement).

•

The Commission directed the Division to permit use of Form S-3 for primary
offerings by companies even if they have been late with a required Exchange Act
report during the last year, as long as the companies meet all other reporting
requirements for Form S-3 registration of primary offerings.

•

A requirement to use Form S-3 is that the company's public float be at least $75
million. A number of companies that met this test on September 10, 2001 may no
longer. The Commission believes that issuers in the airline and insurance
industries that were eligible to use Form S-3 on September 10 should be eligible
to use it for the remainder of the year. Accordingly, those issuers may calculate
their public float for purposes of Form S-3 on any date between July 1, 2001 and
December 31, 2001.

The Commission has directed the Division of Corporation Finance to process Securities
Act filings by reporting companies in the airline and insurance industries within not more
than five business days of their receipt.
The Commission has instructed the Division of Corporation Finance to continue these
administrative steps through the end of 2001.
Any company in these industries or shareholder that was or will be unable to meet a
deadline (including those applicable to shareholder proposals) as a result of the events of
September 11, 2001 should contact the Division of Corporation Finance at the hotline
phone number or e-mail address. If the deadline was or will be met within ten business
days of the original due date, the Division will consider the deadline to have been met, in
assessing the "timeliness" of the required action.
An internal task force will monitor federal programs regarding airline and insurance
companies and will prepare appropriate disclosure guidance for companies affected by
these federal programs, after discussion with outside professionals and experts.
The Commission solicits public views on any other relief it can give, consistent with
investor interests, and asks that comments be received on the hotline e-mail or telephone
address or through the u.S. mail at Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation
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Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, NW, Washington,
DC 20549.

D.

Administrative Relief Regarding Price Ranges in Initial Public Offerings
Historically, the staff has not processed amendments to Securities Act registration
statements relating to initial public offerings that did not include the bona fide price range
required under the Securities Act. Because of the current unusual situation, the staff will
process amendments even" if they do' not include a price range. This' temporaiy' relief
applies only to firm commitment underwritten initial public offerings. Once a range is
included in a filing, the staff may need additional time to review the revised disclosure, and
there may be additional comments issued. Of course, a preliminary prospectus that is
circulated must include an estimated range. Refer to Instruction 1 to Item 501(b)(3) of
Regulation S-K.
In addition, the staff has also agreed that under current market conditions, estimated price
ranges of up to 20%, based on the high end of the range, may be deemed "bona fide" for
purposes of requirements under the Securities Act.

addition to this outline, several other sources of information relating to the
ivision of Corporation Finance are available on the Division's homepage located
n the Securities and Exchange Commission's web site, http://~vl1Jw.sec.gov:
•

Manual of Publicly Available Telephone
Interpretations & Supplements

•

Current Accounting and Disclosure Issues

•

Other Accounting & Disclosure Guidance

•

International Financial Reporting & Disclosure Issues

•

Staff Legal Bulletins

•

Plain English Initiative

•

Information for EDGAR filers

•

Information for Small Businesses

ommission releases and Staff Accounting Bulletins also are available on the
ommission's website under the caption "Commission Business."
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